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THE   MODERN   ARMY 
IN  ACTION 


THE  MODERN  ARMY 
IN  ACTION 

AN  EXPOSITION  OF  THE  CONDUCT 
OF  WAR 


BY 

MAJOR  GENERAL  JOHN  F.  O'RYAN 

Commanding  N.  Y.  Division 
AND 

CAPTAIN  W.  D.  A.  ANDERSON 

Corps  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A. 


NEW  YORK 

McBRIDE,  NAST  &  COMPANY 

1914 


Copyright,    1914,    by 
McBride,    Nast  &   Co. 


Published  November,  1914 


*,        *■    .  L  c 


on 


y^ 


FOREWORD 

I  tave  read  **Tlie  Modern  Army  in  Action'* 
with  very  great  interest,  and  consider  the  subject 
treated  by  Major-General  O'Ryan  and  Captain 
Anderson,  especially  at  this  time,  as  being  of 
prime  importance  from  every  point  of  view.  It 
should,  and  I  have  no  doubt  will,  cause  the  people 
of  our  country  to  devote  serious  attention  to  the 
general  technique  of  war,  and  direct  their 
thoughts  toward  the  necessity  for  placing  our 
country  in  a  condition  of  preparedness  which  can 
be  secured  only  through  the  establishment  of  ade- 
quate reserves  for  the  regular  Army  and  Militia, 
and  ample  supplies  to  equip  them  in  case  we  have 
the  misfortune  to  become  engaged  in  war  with  a 
iirst-class  power,  prepared  as  these  powers  are 
immediately  to  make  their  maximum  military  ef- 
fort. No  matter  how  righteous  our  cause  may  be, 
or  how  considerate  we  may  be  of  the  rights  of 
others,  we  must  be  prepared  to  defend  our  rights 
and  to  secure  for  ourselves  just  treatment.  This 
cannot   be    secured    by   treaties    alone.    It    can 


'Mmi'rV 


vi  Foreword 

be  secured  only  when  our  people  are  prepared 
promptly  to  meet  force  with  force.  Undeveloped 
military  resources  are  of  no  more  value  in  the  on- 
set of  a  modem  war  than  would  be  an  undeveloped 
gold  mine  in  Alaska  during  a  panic  on  Wall 
Street. 


Major-General,  U.  S.  A., 
Commanding  Eastern  Division. 


November  4, 1914. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

CHAPTEB  PAGE 

I    Genesis  of  Strategy 1 

Influence  of  politics. —  Definitions  of  strategy. — 
Logistics. —  Tactics. —  Historical  development  of  strat- 
egy.—  Ancient  strategy. —  The  great  captains. —  In- 
ternational arbitration. —  The  peace  propaganda. — 
Causes  of  war. —  The  national  struggle  for  existence. 

—  Future  wars. —  The  influence  of  strategy. 

II    On  Wak 19 

What  it  is. —  Violence. —  Objects. —  Influence  of  civ- 
ilization.—  An  art,  not  a  science. —  Fortunes  of  war. — 
The  nation  in  arms. —  Leadership. —  Racial  influences. 

—  Moral  influences. —  The  psychology  of  war. —  Phys- 
ical fear. —  Drill. 

Ill    Peepaeations   foe  Wae 32 

Historical. —  Tribal  methods. —  Oriental  nations. — 
Greece. —  Methods  of  Alexander. —  Importance  of  phys- 
ical training. —  Military  information. —  Storing  of  war 
supplies. — ■  Numbers. — •  Armament. —  Technical  train- 
ing.—  Development  of  morale. —  The  manly  virtues. 
IV    Gekman  System.    Univebsal  Service 42 

Enrollment. —  Classes  of  service. —  Company  train- 
ing.—  Maneuvers. —  Other  nations. 

V    British  System.    Volunteer  Armies  .....     60 
Recruitment.  —  Classes     of     forces.  —  Training.  — 
American  system. 

VI    Mobilization  and  Concentration 70 

Mobilization.  Rapidity  essential. —  Preparedness. — 
Order  and  duties  of  various  classes. —  Supply. 

Concentration.  Strategic. —  Rail  service. —  Other 
transport. —  Supply. 

Examples.  Prussians  against  Austria,  186G. —  Ger- 
mans against  France,  1870. —  British  against  Boers, 
1900. 


Table  of  Contents 

CHAPTEB  PAGE 

VII    Tbanspoetation  and  Supply 90 

Railroad  service. —  Water  routes. —  Wagon  trains. — 
Automobiles. —  Depots. —  Issues. 

VIII    Pbinciples  of  Stbateqy 110 

Offensive  and  defensive  warfare. —  Examples. — 
Initial  success. —  Influence  of  maneuvering. —  Jomini. 
—  Van  Clausewitz. —  Von  der  Goltz. —  Von  Camer- 
rer. —  Influence  of  roads  and  railroads. —  Boldness. — 
British  comment  on  German  strategical  ideals. 

IX    The  Strategic  Offensive 124 

Advantages. —  Disadvantages. —  Lines  of  communi- 
cation.—  Historical  examples. —  Influence  of  topo- 
graphical features. —  Necessity  for  continuous  stream 
of  reserves. —  Concentration  and  dispersion. —  Rail- 
roads.—  Military  policy. 

X    The  Steategio  Defensive     ..,.,...   137 
Advantages. —  Disadvantages. —  Supply. —  Tactical 
considerations. —  Historical  examples. —  Topographical 
features. —  Maneuvering. —  Diversion. —  Historical. — 
Retreat. —  Counter-stroke. 

XI    Infantry 149 

*  Historical. —  Development  of  firearms. —  Tactics  un- 
der Frederick  the  Great. —  Under  Napoleon. —  The 
Civil  War. —  Historical  references. —  In  attack. —  In 
defense. —  Flank  attack.—  The  rifle. —  Fire  superior- 
ity. —  Casualties.  —  Morale.  —  Examples,  -r—  Value  of 
marksmanship. —  Fire  rapidity. —  Fire  distribution. — 
Peace  time  training. —  Physical  and  nervous  strain  of 
battle. 

XII    Cavalry 181 

Knights  in  armor. — Effect  of  introduction  of  gun- 
powder.—  Cuirassiers. —  Cavalry  luider  Frederick  the 
Great. —  Under  Napoleon. —  Civil  War  period. —  War 
of  1866. —  Franco-Prussian  War. —  Manchurian  Cam- 
paign.—  Boer  War. —  Ratio  to  other  arms. —  Prelim- 
inary training. —  Mounts. —  Modern  role. —  Eyes  of 
the  army. —  Dismounted  action. —  Absence  of  bayonet. 


Table  of  Contents 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

—  American  characteristics. —  Historical  examples. — 
In  the  pursuit. —  Wastage  of  horses  in  war. 

XIII  Ahtiixeby 201 

Various  types  of. —  Fortress  artillery. —  Light  ar- 
tillery.—  Organization. —  Motive     power. —  Historical. 

—  Of  the  ancients.— Of  the  Middle  Ages.— Of  Na- 
poleon.—  In  the  present  European  war. —  Horse  artil- 
lery.—  Howitzers. —  Siege  artillery. —  Mountain  artil- 
lery.—  The  modern  gun. —  Its  construction. —  The  sys- 
tem of  indirect  fire  explained. —  Shrapnel. —  Shell. — 
Tactical  use  of.  , 

XIV  Auxiliary  Services 226 

Aviation. —  Balloons. —  Dirigibles. —  Aeroplanes. — 
Historical  references. —  Functions  of  aircraft. —  Their 
limitations. —  Moral  effect  of. —  Signal  Corps. —  The 
telegraph. —  The  telephone. —  Radio  communication. — 
Engineer  troops.  —  Pontoons.  —  Bridges.  —  Reconnais- 
sance.—  Field  fortification. —  Railroad  operation. — 
Demolition. —  Supply  Corps. —  Purchase  of  supplies. 
— Transportation. — Subsistence. — Medical  Department. 

—  Effects  of  disease. —  Prevention  of. —  Evacuation  of 
wounded. 

XV    Security  and  Information 243 

Information  obtainable  in  time  of  peace. —  Military 
attaches. —  Spies. —  Special  agents. —  Classes  of  in- 
formation.—  General  Staff. —  Security  in  time  of  War. 

—  Historical  newspapers. —  War  correspondents. — 
Friendly  and  unfriendly  inhabitants. —  Reconnaissance 
in  force. —  Patrols. —  Sights  and  sounds. —  Advance 
guards. —  Rear  guards. —  Flank  guards. —  Cavalry 
screen. —  Outposts. 

XVI    Combined  Arms  in  Action 265 

Estimate  of  the  situation. —  The  mission. —  The  con- 
siderations affecting  the  enemy. —  Considerations  af- 
fecting our  own  forces. —  The  decision. —  The  orders. 

—  Communication  of  orders. —  The  march  of  the  di- 
vision.—  March  discipline. —  Tlie  independent  cavalry. 


Table  of  Contents 

CHAPTKB  PAGE 

—  The  advance  and  flank  guards. —  The  halt  for 
mess. —  The  selection  of  a  camp  site. —  The  halt  or- 
dered.—  The  establishment  of  outposts. —  The  outpost 
commander  and  his  duties. —  The  functions  of  the  out- 
post.—  The  functions  of  the  division  staff. —  The 
bivouac. —  The  resumption  of  the  march. —  The  cav- 
alry action. —  The  action  of  the  advance  guard. —  The 
development  of  the  action. —  Tlie  responsibilities  of 
the  commanding  general. —  The  duties  of  his  sub- 
ordinates.—  The  preparation  for  the  infantry  attack. 

—  The  functions  of  the  supporting  artillery. —  Of  the 
signal  corps. —  Of  the  engineers. —  Of  the  sanitary 
troops. 

XVII    Combined  Arms  in  Action  —  Continued    ....  309 
The  attack  and   the  assault. —  The   pursuit. —  The 
care  of  the  wounded  and  the  burial  of  the  dead. — 
The  functions  of  the  chaplain  and  of  the  bandsmen. 

—  The  resumption  of  the  march. —  The  renewal  of  con- 
tact.—  Aeroplane  reconnaissance. —  The  artillery  at- 
tack.—  The  infantry  assault. —  Comments  and  con- 
clusions. 


THE  ILLUSTRATIONS 

A  United  States  mountain  battery Frontispiece 

JACINO 
PAGE 

Infantry  deploj-ed  in   skirmishing  line 2 

Strongly  entrenched  and  screened  infantry 20 

Firing  line  showing  density  to  obtain  fire   superiority    .      .  34 

Infantry  supports  waiting  under  cover 52 

Type  of  heavy  German  siege  gun 86 

High-angle  gun  on  motor  truck  for  attacking  air  craft  .      .  104 

Armored  motor-car  equipped  with  rapid-fire  gun   ....  130 

A  portable  observation  tower  as  used  in  the  German  Army  .  152 

Keconnaissance  by  a  dirigible  airship 176 

Engineers   constructing   a   pontoon   bridge 194 

Armored  and  armed  aeroplane  used  for  reconnaissance   .      .  212 

An  advance  guard  hastily  deployed 244 

A  motor-bus  supply  train 272 

Infantry  firing  from  behind  wire  entanglements    ....  300 

Entrenched  infantry  commanding  a  valley 324 


INTRODUCTION 

Since  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war  in  Europe 
the  interest  of  the  general  public  in  matters  mili- 
tary has  become  keen.  Many  dissertations  on  the 
strategy  of  the  campaigns  now  in  course  of  con- 
duct have  appeared  in  the  daily  press.  Some  of 
these  have  obviously  been  illy  considered  and 
hastily  prepared,  while  others  were  evidently 
written  by  men  of  no  military  training. 

The  authors  have  undertaken  the  preparation 
of  this  elementary  treatise  on  the  conduct  of  war 
at  the  request  of  the  publishers,  and  upon  their 
assurance  that  there  is  an  intelligent  and  wide- 
spread public  demand  for  a  work  of  this  char- 
acter. 

It  is  believed  that  this  timely  book  will  prove 
understandable  and  instructive  to  the  intelligent 
public,  who  cannot  but  realize  that  much  of  what 
is  now  appearing  in  the  daily  press  on  the  con- 
duct of  war,  ranges  from  the  improbable  to  the 
grotesque.  The  strategy  of  the  present  war  can- 
not be  written  until  the  facts  are  authentically 


Introduction 

known,  and  for  obvious  military  reasons  these  are 
withheld  or  distorted  by  the  combatant  powers. 
It  is  believed,  however,  that  the  reader  after 
perusal  of  this  treatise  will  be  enabled  more  in- 
telligently and  with  greater  interest  to  follow  the 
reports  of  the  campaigns,  to  discard  theories  ob- 
viously unreal,  and  to  confine  his  speculations  to 
what  is  reasonable  and  probable  under  the  prin- 
ciples herein  laid  down.  And  it  should  be  remem- 
bered that  many  of  the  principles  of  strategy  are 
eternal,  and  even  now  are  the  subject  of  careful 
consideration  by  those  charged  with  the  conduct 
of  military  activities  abroad. 

The  work  should  prove  of  interest  and  value  to 
the  large  number  of  officers  and  men  of  the  Na- 
tional Guard,  whose  intelligent  interest  in  the 
profession  of  arms  is  so  well  known,  but  who  have 
not  the  time  to  digest,  in  addition  to  their  pre- 
scribed studies,  a  detailed  and  advanced  work  cov- 
ering a  field  so  broad  as  that  of  strategy. 

If  the  work  serves  no  other  purpose  than  to 
bring  to  the  minds  of  some  of  our  influential  fel- 
low citizens  a  realization  of  the  helplessness  of 
a  nation  forced  into  war  without  military  pre- 
paredness, and  the  need  in  this  country  for  an 
intelligent  and  provident  military  policy  as  a  na- 


Introduction 

tional  insurance,  it  will  have  accomplished  its 
mission. 

Chapters  I,  II,  HI,  VIH,  IX,  X,  XI,  XH,  XIH, 
XIV,  XV,  and  XVI  were  written  by  Major  Gen- 
eral O'Ryan,  and  Chapters  IV,  V,  VI  and  VII  by 
Captain  Anderson. 


THE   MODERN   ARMY 
IN  ACTION 


THE  MODERN  ARMY  IN 

ACTION 

CHAPTER  I 

THE  GENESIS  OF  STRATEGY 

As  accounts  are  read  of  the  stupendous  opera- 
tions of  the  armies  engaged  in  the  war  on  the 
continent  of  Europe,  the  thought  naturally  occurs 
to  the  reader  how  such  immense  numbers  of  men 
are  moved,  how  they  are  fed,  whence  they  are 
brought.  There  is  perhaps  no  field  of  human  ac- 
tivity which  has  so  attracted  the  attention  of  men 
throughout  the  ages  as  that  of  war.  In  war  are 
seen  human  emotions  at  their  best  and  at  their 
worst.  The  game  of  war  is  a  magnet  which  has 
attracted  to  destruction  more  human  beings  than 
any  agency  that  has  ever  existed,  and  yet  out  of 
the  fire  and  bloodshed  of  war  has  arisen  much 
that  is  best  in  the  world  to-day.  Political  free- 
dom, the  liberation  of  slaves,  the  expansion  of 


2  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

governments,  and  the  development  of  savage  peo- 
ples, all  these  are  the  products  of  war. 

It  is  said  that  the  human  mind  is  incapable  of 
appreciating  numbers  which  reach  millions.  The 
average  reader  of  war  news  accepts  with  incred- 
ulity accounts  which  describe  millions  of  men 
maneuvering  and  fighting  in  a  common  war.  But 
it  must  be  remembered  that  from  the  beginning  of 
time,  more  minds  have  been  concerned  in  the  de- 
velopment of  the  art  of  war  than  of  any  other  art 
or  science,  and  it  is  therefore  but  reasonable  that 
its  development  should  have  reached  standards 
of  accomplishment  not  to  be  expected  of  younger 
and  more  limited  fields  of  endeavor. 

The  domain  of  war  is  so  extensive  that  its  ac- 
tivities are  grouped  into  many  fields.  In  any  ex- 
position of  the  work  of  armies  in  action  and  of 
the  conduct  of  war,  the  subject  should  be  simi- 
larly subdivided. 

As  war  is  conducted  pursuant  to  principles 
based  largely  on  historical  precedents,  these  prin- 
ciples will  first  be  considered.  They  constitute 
what  is  commonly  called  Strategy.  First,  then, 
as  to  the  genesis  of  Strategy. 

The  government  of  every  nation  reflects  in  its 
policy  to  a  greater  or  less  extent  the  ideals,  com- 


The  Genesis  of  Strategy  3 

mercial  ambitions,  economic  needs  and  national 
fears  of  its  people.  If  the  government  be  an  au- 
tocratic power,  its  policies  may  not  reflect  the  sen- 
timents of  the  people  to  the  extent  that  a  repre- 
sentative form  of  government  would  reflect  them, 
but  certain  it  is  that  public  sentiment  in  all  ages 
and  in  all  forms  of  government  has  been  an  im- 
portant factor  in  the  determination  of  the  policies 
of  government.  Largely  through  the  agency  of 
politics,  the  national  or  governmental  policy  is 
determined,  and  when  a  national  policy  brings  its 
parent  government  into  collision  with  a  conflicting 
policy  of  another  government  and  a  readjustment 
of  these  conflicting  policies  cannot  through  the 
agency  of  politics  and  diplomacy  be  mutually  ar- 
ranged, recourse  is  necessarily  had  to  might  for 
the  enforcement  of  the  national  will.  This  con- 
flict between  national  mights,  is  called  war.  In 
war,  politics  and  diplomacy  are  succeeded  by 
strategy.  Strategy  is  therefore  merely  an  exten- 
sion of  national  politics. 

On  this  point,  Clausewitz,^  a  leading  authority 
on  war,  says:  "War  should  not  be  included  in 
the  domain  of  the  arts  and  sciences,  but  rather  in 
the  sphere  of  social  life.    It  is  a  conflict  of  vast 

1  Clausewitz  on  War. 


4  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

interests,  which  is  solved  in  blood,  and  only  in 
this  respect  does  it  differ  from  other  contests.  A 
better  comparison  could  be  made  with  commerce 
than  with  any  art  whatever,  for  trade  is  also  a 
conflict  of  human  interests  and  activities;  and 
much  nearer  to  it  still  is  politics,  which,  for  its 
part,  can  be  regarded  as  a  species  of  trade  on  a 
large  scale.  Besides,  it  is  the  lap  in  which  war 
is  developed ;  in  it  the  features  of  war  are  already 
obscurely  outlined,  like  the  attributes  of  living 
creatures  in  their  germs." 

Strategy  is  the  art  of  directing  armies  so  as 
best  to  attain  the  ends  for  which  the  war  is  fought. 
Strategy  deals  with  questions  involving  the  move- 
ments of  military  forces,  the  decision  to  give  bat- 
tle, and  the  time,  place  and  manner  of  offering  it. 
Tactics  relate  to  the  control  on  the  field  of  combat, 
of  the  organizations  which  compose  the  army.  A 
strategic  study  may  indicate  for  example  the  de- 
sirability of  promptly  moving  forces  for  the  sei- 
zure of  an  important  railroad  center.  The  order, 
however,  in  which  the  troops  are  placed  in  the 
column  of  march,  and  the  manner  in  which  they 
are  deployed  for  the  attack  for  the  accomplish- 
ment of  that  object,  are  tactical  considerations. 

Clausewitz  said  of  strategy,  that  it  **  Fixes  the 


The  Genesis  of  Strategy  5 

point  where,  the  time  when,  and  the  numerical 
forces  with  which  the  battle  is  fought." 

Jomini  ^  defines  strategy  to  be  "  The  art  of  plan- 
ning military  operations  upon  the  map." 

Wagner^  defines  strategy  as  "The  art  of  mov- 
ing an  army  in  the  theater  of  operations,  with  a 
view  to  placing  it  in  such  a  position,  relative  to 
the  enemy,  as  to  increase  the  probability  of  vic- 
tory, increase  the  consequences  of  victory,  or 
lessen  the  consequences  of  defeat." 

The  conduct  of  war  includes  another  field  of 
thought  and  of  activity  equal  in  importance  to 
that  of  strategy.  That  field  relates  to  the  prob- 
lems involved  in  the  movement  and  supply  of 
armies.  This  subject  is  called  logistics.  There- 
fore, we  have  politics  determining  the  national 
policy,  which  makes  war  and  fixes  its  objects, 
strategy  providing  the  plan  of  operations  by  which 
the  armies  are  to  forcibly  gain  these  objects, 
logistics  solving  problems  of  the  movement  of  the 
armies  to  the  theater  of  operations  and  their 
maintenance  and  supply  during  the  period  of  war, 
and  tactics  governing  the  detailed  movement  and 
fighting  methods  of  the  organizations  composing 

2  "The  Art  of  War"— Jomini. 

« Wagner'a  Organization  and  Tactics. 


6  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

the  army  in  order  to  make  more  effective  their 
offensive  or  defensive  power,  under  the  particu- 
lar conditions  affecting  them  at  the  time. 

The  earliest  warlike  contests  of  mankind  were 
doubtless  fought  out  for  the  possession  of  par- 
ticular hunting  grounds,  or  of  natural  features  of 
the  terrain,  such  as  caves,  lakes,  woods  or  streams. 
There  is  early  historical  record  of  raids  and  wars 
conducted  for  punitive  purposes,  and  for  the  cap- 
ture of  women  and  slaves.  From  the  earliest 
times  when  man's  weapons  were  but  stone  hatch- 
ets, his  cunning  prompted  him  to  cooperate  his 
efforts  in  the  fight  with  those  of  his  fellow  war- 
riors. Experience  and  observation  showed  him 
the  most  effective  ways  of  using  his  crude  weap- 
ons, and  example  and  emulation  produced  stand- 
ards and  methods  among  clans  which  might, 
broadly  considered,  be  termed  tactics.  Strategy, 
however,  was  not  developed  until  man's  mind  had 
developed  its  reasoning  powers,  its  analytical 
sense.  As  the  man  born  without  speech  or  sight 
is  apt  to  develop  the  remaining  senses  more  fully 
and  acutely,  so  it  is  probable  that  clans  or  tribes 
physically  weaker  than  their  neighbors,  were  here 
and  there  enabled  to  survive  by  resorting  to 
strategic  movements  more  effective  in  their  re- 


The  Genesis  of  Strategy  7 

suits  than  would  have  been  mere  physical  resist- 
ance. This  was  strategy  in  its  infancy.  Surprise 
was  probably  one  of  the  earliest  manifestations  of 
a  knowledge  and  appreciation  of  strategy.  To 
accomplish  surprise  requires  a  maneuvering  of 
forces,  and  surprise  was  probably  the  first  prin- 
ciple of  strategy  practically  applied  by  ancient 
man. 

The  earliest  record  of  warfare  comes  to  us  from 
the  Jews.  The  Bible  contains  many  accounts 
which  give  us  a  general  idea  of  the  conduct  of  war 
in  the  earliest  times.  The  records  of  early  wars 
are  also  preserved  on  Egyptian  monuments  and 
from  these  we  know  something  of  the  armament 
and  organization  of  the  ancients.  In  Homer's 
Hiad  we  see  a  picture  of  war  as  it  was  conducted 
more  than  a  thousand  years  before  the  birth  of 
Christ.  We  glean  a  knowledge  of  Persian  wars 
and  of  the  strategy  in  the  era  before  Christianity 
from  the  accounts  of  Herodotus,  and  from  other 
ancient  writers  we  are  able  to  follow  the  gradual 
development  of  the  earlier  methods  of  warfare. 

Warfare  is  generally  grouped  into  four  stages 
of  development.  First,  from  the  earliest  times 
to  the  fall  of  the  Roman  Empire  in  the  west,  a.  d. 
476.    This  period  includes  three  of  the  great  cap- 


8  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

tains  of  history :  Alexander,  Hannibal,  and  Caesar. 
The  second  stage  covers  the  wars  of  the  Middle 
Ages  from  the  fall  of  the  Roman  Empire  to  the 
Thirty  Years'  Wars,  a.  d.  1618.  The  third  stage 
covers  the  modern  wars,  from  1618  to  the  begin- 
ning of  the  French  Revolution.  This  period  in- 
cludes the  wars  of  the  great  captains  Gustavus 
Adolphus  and  Frederick  the  Great.  The  fourth 
stage  covers  the  period  of  recent  wars,  from  the 
French  Revolution  to  the  Great  European  War 
of  1914.  This  period  includes  the  great  captain, 
Napoleon.  These  great  captains,  as  they  are 
called,  were  the  exponents  of  the  strategy  of  their 
time. 

The  subject  of  international  arbitration  is  not 

here  discussed  at  length,  for  the  reason  that  it  is 

.not  strictly  germane  to  strategy,  and  also  because 

of  its  evident  futility  as  a  dependable  agency  for 

the  adjustment  of  conflicting  international  policies. 

In  view,  however,  of  the  large  number  of  per- 
sons in  our  country  who  as  advocates  of  perpetual 
peace  believe  in  the  efficacy  of  disarmament  and 
of  the  neglect  of  military  preparedness  as  means 
to  that  most  desirable  end,  passing  reference  is 
made  to  the  subject  of  international  arbitration. 
It  is  believed  that  a  study  of  the  history  of  man- 


The  Genesis  of  Strategy  9 

kind  and  of  the  world's  nations  shows  little  upon 
which  to  base  a  belief  that  in  the  matter  of  self- 
interest  peoples  and  governments  of  this  age  differ 
greatly  from  those  of  the  past,  and  that  they  will 
no  longer  resort  to  force  for  the  accomplishment 
of  their  ends  when  other  means  fail. 

To  the  military  student,  history  teaches  the  les- 
son that  nations  will  abrogate  or  disregard  the 
most  solemn  treaty  obligations  when  the  national 
conscience  will  justify  such  act  on  the  ground  of 
necessity.    The  fact  that  the  national  conscience 
of  other  nations  not  confronted  with  the  momen- 
tous consequence  involved  will  not  justify  the  act, 
is  immaterial  in  the  determination  of  the  question 
of  war  or  peace  by  the  nation  concerned.    This 
truth  is  frequently  lost  sight  of.    Necessity  knows 
no  law,  and  when  a  nation  on  the  verge  of  war, 
sees  its  power  handicapped  and  its  estate  jeopar- 
dized by  treaty  obligations,  those  obligations  are 
frequently  disregarded  on  the  ground  of  national 
necessity.    As  a  self-confessed  murderer,  under 
our  system  of  jurisprudence,  cannot  by  pleading 
guilty  stipulate  away  his  life,  but  is  required  to 
stand  trial,  so  it  might  also  be  said  that  by  the 
common  consent  of  mankind,  a  government  cannot 
stipulate  away  the  sovereign  life  of  the  State. 


10         The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

Treaties,  therefore,  entered  into  in  good  faith  and 
with  every  intention  of  the  fulfilment  of  mutual 
obligations  by  the  high  contracting  parties,  are 
often  disregarded  when  one  of  the  parties  is  con- 
fronted with  uncontemplated  results  of  such  char- 
acter that  their  happening  would  seriously  affect 
the  stability  or  the  vital  interests  of  the  nation. 
We  have  only  to  recall  that  under  the  terms  of  the 
treaty  to  which  Germany  was  a  party,  the  neutral- 
ity of  Belgium  in  the  event  of  war  was  guaranteed. 
Nevertheless  at  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war 
in  Europe,  Germany  moved  her  forces  through 
Belgium  in  her  invasion  of  France  and  justified 
the  act  mainly  on  the  ground  of  military  necessity. 
An  international  court  of  arbitration  is  not  a 
dependable  agency  for  the  adjustment  of  interna- 
tional differences,  because  it  has  no  power  for  the 
enforcement  of  its  decrees.  The  moral  obligation 
to  abide  by  the  decision  of  a  court  of  arbitration 
cannot  be  said  to  be  greater  than  the  moral  obliga- 
tion to  abide  by  the  terms  of  a  treaty  solemnly 
and  voluntarily  entered  into.  As  the  judgment 
of  a  civil  court  would  become  worthless  without 
due  process  to  execute  it,  and  the  findings  of  a 
criminal  court  an  empty  form  without  a  sheriff 
to  enforce  them,  so  the  mandate  of  an  interna- 


The  Genesis  of  Strategy  11 

tional  court  without  an  international  sheriff  to  en- 
force its  decrees,  becomes  a  futile  agency  for  the 
correction  of  wrongs  and  the  establishment  of 
rights  when  the  judgment-debtor  will  not  volun- 
tarily assume  the  role  of  sheriff  and  self-execute 
the  mandate  of  the  court.  When,  recognizing  this 
organic  defect  of  arbitration  as  a  system  for  the 
adjustment  of  all  international  differences,  we  ad- 
vocate the  maintenance  of  an  international  force 
to  execute  the  mandates  of  the  court,  we  find  our- 
selves seeking  to  reestablish  the  very  principle  of 
the  necessity  for  armed  force,  to  abolish  which 
was  largely  the  raison  d'etre  of  arbitration.  It 
must  be  obvious  that  the  existence  of  an  interna- 
tional force  for  the  execution  of  international  de- 
crees would  place  a  premium  on  the  machinations 
of  governments  for  the  secret  control  of  such  force, 
and  with  our  knowledge  of  human  ambitions  and 
of  the  influence  of  self-interest,  it  must  be  apparent 
that  the  same  motives  and  assumed  justification 
which  have  in  the  past  caused  the  commission  of 
national  acts  of  perfidy,  will  operate  to  seek  perfid- 
ious control  of  a  dominant  police  force  maintained 
at  the  expense  of  contributing  nations.  Thus  we 
might  find  the  innocent  and  credulous  people  of 
a  righteous  nation  which  had  been  lulled  into  dis- 


12  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

armament  and  military  unpreparedness  through, 
reliance  upon  the  integrity  of  an  international 
court  and  the  neutrality  of  the  international 
sheriff,  unable  to  obtain  practical  justice,  their 
rights  flouted  in  a  maze  of  international  legal 
technicalities  and  yet  helpless  through  lack  of 
power  to  protect  and  enforce  their  rights.  Where 
international  wrongs  exist  and  have  existed,  they 
are  and  always  were  the  wrongs  instigated  and 
perpetrated  by  some  one  or  a  number  of  individ- 
ual human  beings.  In  the  earliest  ages  they  were 
committed  ruthlessly  and  without  a  cloak  of 
formal  plausibility;  in  later  times,  mankind  pos- 
sessing the  veneer  of  civilization,  in  turn  veneered 
the  same  ruthless  acts  with  a  cloak  of  sophistry 
and  blessed  them  with  a  text.  But  always  there 
have  been  ruthless  acts,  and  always  there  will  be, 
while  man  continues  to  be  a  self-perpetuating  and 
prolific  animal.  While  the  color  and  extent  of 
the  veneer  may  change  with  the  times,  future 
histories  will  record  the  continuation  of  the  life- 
long struggle  for  existence  and  the  immutability 
of  the  law  of  force  in  its  broadest  sense — of  the 
principle  of  the  survival  of  the  fittest  among  na- 
tions. As  that  which  is  called  civilization  ad- 
vances, man's  relations  with  man  become  more 


The  Genesis  of  Strategy  13 

complicated  and  the  subjects  of  greater  refine- 
ment. This  apphes  to  the  enginery  of  war  as 
well  as  to  the  machinery  of  peace,  but  underneath 
all  the  refinements  of  business,  social  and  govern- 
mental customs,  below  the  idealistic  atmosphere 
of  literature,  art  and  music,  we  find  plain  man, 
and  we  see  him  as  he  has  been  throughout  the  ages 
so  far  as  self-interest  is  concerned.  That  is  to 
say  a  very  small  percentage  of  him  will  be  chiv- 
alrous and  self-sacrificing  in  all  things  and  with- 
out limitation,  but  the  rest  of  him  is  governed  by 
self-interest  in  the  really  important  affairs  of  life 
— in  the  struggle  for  existence.  When  his  real 
interests  are  assailed  he  will  fight,  and  frequently 
he  will  be  the  assailant  in  encroaching  upon  the 
rights  of  others.  Mankind  of  to-day  is  more  pro- 
lific with  excuses  for  his  acts,  more  cunning  in  his 
sophistry  in  extenuation  of  them,  and  more  prone 
to  buttress  them  with  lofty  platitudes  and  solemn 
declarations,  but  stripped  of  these  diplomatic  ha- 
biliments, the  acts  themselves  are  recognized  as 
the  old  friends  of  history.  Therefore  it  is  that 
the  government  which  is  to  develop  its  national 
resources,  aggressively  to  extend  the  activities  of 
its  people — which,  in  other  words  is  to  survive 
among  the  fittest — that  government  must  be  and 


14  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

usually  is  prepared  with  the  possession  of  force 
to  accomplish  its  policies.  This  throws  a  similar 
burden  on  those  nations  that  fear  the  aggressions 
of  powerful  neighbors  and  hence  the  contest  for 
military  superiority.  Ethically,  wrong ;  but  prac- 
tically in  the  end  suicidal  for  the  nations  which 
cannot  keep  the  pace. 

The  desire  for  peace  and  the  avoidance  of  war 
so  strong  in  the  breast  of  every  right-thinking 
man,  has  obscured  in  many  cases,  their  ability  to 
discern  the  truth  of  the  foregoing.  Throughout 
the  years  preceding  the  present  war  in  Europe 
military  writers  and  students  of  military  history 
and  of  psychology,  have  again  and  again  pointed 
out  the  coming  of  the  inevitable  conflict  and  the 
desirability  of  governments  preparing  in  time  of 
peace  to  protect  their  interests  and  integrity  when 
the  conflict  should  come.  But  in  some  countries 
such  admonitions  are  not  heeded,  and  up  to  the 
very  day  of  the  commencement  of  the  present  war 
a  vast  number  of  people  otherwise  intelligent  be- 
lieved that  the  sentiment  for  peace  would  make 
war  impossible.  An  example  of  this  timely  warn- 
ing is  furnished  in  the  writings  of  Colonel  F.  N. 
Maude  of  the  British  Army,  who  wrote  the  intro- 
duction to  the  English  translation  of  Clausewitz 


The  Genesis  of  Strategy  15 

on  *'War."    In  that  introduction,  referring  to  the 
military  spirit  on  the  continent  of  Europe,  he  said : 

"I  do  not  wish  for  one  moment  to  be  understood  as  asserting 
that  Clausewitz  has  been  conscientiously  studied  and  under- 
stood in  any  Army,  not  even  in  the  Prussian,  but  his  work  has 
been  the  ultimate  fomidation  on  which  every  drill  regulation  in 
Europe,  except  our  own,  has  been  reared.  It  is  this  ceaseless 
repetition  of  his  fundamental  ideas  to  which  one-half  of  the 
male  population  of  every  Continental  Nation  has  been  sub- 
jected for  two  to  three  years  of  their  lives,  which  has  tuned 
their  minds  to  vibrate  in  harmony  with  his  precepts,  and  those 
who  know  and  appreciate  this  fact  at  its  true  value  have  only 
to  strike  the  uecessaiy  chords  in  order  to  evoke  a  response  suf- 
ficient to  overpower  any  other  ethical  conception  which  those 
who  have  not  organized  their  forces  beforehand  can  appeal  to." 

How   truly   prophetic   is    the    following   from 
Colonel  Maude's  introduction  referred  to: 

"In  1887  Germany  was  on  the  very  verge  of  War  with 
France  and  Russia.  At  that  moment  her  superior  efficiency, 
the  consequence  of  this  inborn  sense  of  duty — surely  one  of 
the  highest  qualities  of  humanity — was  so  great  that  it  is  more 
than  probable  that  less  than  six  weeks  would  have  sufficed  to 
bring  the  French  to  their  knees.  Indeed,  after  the  first  fort- 
night it  would  have  been  possible  to  begin  transferring  troops 
from  the  Rhine  to  the  Niemen;  and  the  same  ease  may  arise 
again.  But  if  France  and  Russia  had  been  allowed  even  ten 
days'  warning  the  German  plan  would  have  been  completely 
defeated.  France  alone  might  then  have  claimed  all  the  efforts 
that  Germany  could  have  put  forth  to  defeat  hei'. 


16  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

"Yet  there  are  politicians  in  England  so  grossly  ignorant  of 
the  German  reading  of  the  Napoleonic  lessons  that  they  ex- 
pect that  Nation  to  sacrifice  the  enormous  advantage  they  have 
prepared  by  a  whole  century  of  self-sacrifice  and  practical 
patriotism,  by  an  appeal  to  a  Court  of  Arbitration  and  the 
further  delays  which  must  arise  by  going  through  the  medi- 
eval formalities  of  recalling  Ambassadors  and  exchanging  ulti- 
matums." 

The  foregoing  positively  expressed  view  of 
Colonel  Maude  was  home  out  when  the  present 
European  conflict  began.  And  no  matter  who 
may  be  the  victor  in  that  conflict,  and  no  matter 
what  the  results  to  other  nations  may  be,  it  can 
safely  be  predicted  that  the  struggle  among  na- 
tions for  existence  will  continue,  and  that  period- 
ically the  struggle  will  find  expression  in  war. 
There  are  numerous  actors  now  rehearsing  to 
perform  their  parts  in  the  coming  dramas  of  the 
world's  future  development.  They  will  enter  the 
stage  perhaps  thoroughly  schooled  for  the  per- 
formance of  their  parts,  and  where  these  conflict 
with  the  lines  of  other  and  perhaps  wearied  actors, 
the  dropping  of  the  curtain  will  have  seen  the 
elimination  of  the  latter  from  the  dramatis  per- 
sonse  of  the  world's  nations. 

Strategy  therefore  is  not  a  waning  art.    Just 


The  Genesis  of  Strategy  17 

as  to-day  its  sway  is  dominating  the  destinies  of 
Europe  while  at  the  same  time  its  details  embrace 
all  the  complicated  activities  of  man  and  its  ap- 
plication transcends  in  scope  and  difficulty  any- 
thing in  previous  history,  so  to-morrow  with 
the  further  advance  of  civilization,  strategy  will 
be  confronted  with  a  wider  scope,  presented  with 
greater  and  more  numerous  difficulties  and 
harassed  with  more  momentous  consequences. 
The  military  student  does  not  justify  human  weak- 
ness nor  the  evils  which  flow  from  them.  He  does 
not  justify  the  use  of  military  power  for  the  ac- 
complishment of  improper  and  selfish  national 
ends.  He  does  not  glorify  the  accomplishments 
of  strategy  when  its  light  is  shed  in  the  support 
of  an  unrighteous  cause.  But  he  appreciates  the 
influence  of  strategy  on  the  conduct  of  war 
whether  the  same  be  conducted  for  the  perpetra- 
tion of  wrongs  or  for  the  defense  of  the  right.  He 
knows  that  the  era  of  warfare  has  not  passed,  and 
that  it  behooves  the  government  charged  with 
the  destinies  of  a  people  to  be  prepared  in  time  of 
peace  for  the  test  of  war  which  may  be  forced 
upon  them.  **The  Gods  of  War  are  on  the  side 
with  the  heaviest  battalions."    And  it  should  be 


18  The  Modem  Army  in  Action 

remembered  that  this  means  the  heaviest  battal- 
ions at  the  crucial  point  of  contact.  The  art  of 
having  the  heaviest  battalions  at  the  right  place 
at  the  right  time — that  is  Strategy. 


CHAPTER  II 
ON  WAR 

War  is  a  contest  between  nations  in  which  each 
seeks  to  impose  its  will  on  the  other  through  the 
agency  of  physical  force  and  violence.  In  the 
utilization  of  physical  force,  each  side  avails  itself 
of  the  inventions  of  science  and  of  art  in  order 
to  make  its  violence  more  effective.  There  are 
no  restrictions,  except  those  customs  and  usages 
which  have  come  to  be  recognized  with  the  advance 
of  civilization  and  which  find  their  expression  in 
the  rules  of  warfare  laid  down  and  agreed  upon 
in  international  conventions. 

As  war  involves  the  utilization  of  violence  to 
its  limit,  it  follows  that  war  necessitates  the  de- 
struction of  lives  and  of  property  on  a  large  scale. 
This  loss  is  inseparable  from  the  conduct  of  war. 
Clausewitz  ^  says : 

"Now,  philanthropists  may  easily  imagine  there  is  a  skilful 
method  of  disarming  and  overcoming  an  enemy  without  caus- 
ing great  bloodshed,  and  that  this  is  the  proper  tendency  of 

1  Clauaewitz  "On  War." 

19 


20  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

the  art  of  war.  However  plausible  this  may  appear,  still  it  is 
an  error  which  must  be  extirpated;  for  in  such  dangerous 
things  as  war,  the  errors  which  proceed  from  a  spirit  of 
benevolence  are  the  worst.  As  the  use  of  physical  force  to  the 
utmost  extent  by  no  means  excludes  the  cooperation  of  intelli- 
gence, it  follows  that  he  who  uses  force  unsparingly,  without 
reference  to  the  bloodshed  involved,  must  obtain  a  superiority 
if  his  adversary  uses  less  vigor  in  its  application.  The  former 
then  dictates  the  law  to  the  latter,  and  both  proceed  to  ex- 
tremities to  which  the  only  limitations  are  those  imposed  by 
the  amount  of  counteracting  forces  on  each  side.  This  is  the 
way  in  which  the  matter  must  be  viewed;  and  it  is  to  no  pur- 
pose, it  is  even  against  one's  own  interest,  to  turn  away  from 
the  consideration  of  the  real  nature  of  the  affair,  because  the 
horror  of  its  elements  excites  repugnance." 

Civilization  nevertheless  has  succeeded  by  the 
introduction  of  rules  of  warfare  in  ameliorating 
many  of  the  cruelties  of  war  which  existed  in  the 
past.  Particularly  does  this  apply  to  the  protec- 
tion now  afforded  noncombatants  and  prisoners 
of  war  and  the  care  given  to  the  wounded,  not  only 
of  one  side  but  to  those  of  the  enemy  falling  into 
the  hands  of  the  opponent. 

War  results  from  many  causes.  When  these, 
however,  are  classified,  it  will  be  found  that  they 
closely  resemble  the  causes  which  actuate  indi- 
vidual men  to  deal  violently  with  each  other.  The 
causes  of  war  may  be  grouped  generally  into  two 


^ 
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bi 


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ID 


On  War  21 

classes ;  those  based  on  hatred  and  those  based  on 
assumed  necessity.  The  former  group  includes 
racial  and  religious  animosities  and  the  latter 
colonial  expansion  and  trade  supremacy. 

All  the  activities  of  war  are  based  on  the  neces- 
sity of  disarming  the  enemy,  or  rendering  him  un- 
able to  offer  further  resistance,  in  order  to  make 
him  incapable  of  opposing  the  will  of  the  victor. 
This  means  that  the  defeated  nation  must  be 
placed  in  a  position,  the  continuance  of  which  is 
more  disadvantageous  to  him  than  would  be  the 
acceptance  of  the  terms  demanded  as  a  condition 
of  peace.  The  more  forcibly  the  enemy  is  pushed 
into  such  a  situation  and  the  more  disadvan- 
tageous that  situation  is  made  for  him,  the 
quicker  will  he  yield — the  sooner  will  there  be 
peace.  In  a  fight  between  individuals  both  of 
whom  are  armed,  that  one  who  is  first  dis- 
armed will  be  the  first  forced  to  yield.  It  is  the 
same  with  nations.  The  object  of  military  opera- 
tions viewed  broadly,  is  therefore,  to  disarm  the 
enemy,  either  actually,  or  by  placing  him  in  a  posi- 
tion where  disarmament  appears  inevitable.  In 
this  connection  it  should  be  remembered  that  a 
defeated  army  unless  thoroughly  crushed  or  dis- 
armed may,  even  if  seriously  defeated,  be  resup- 


22  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

plied  and  reequipped  and  return  to  fight  again. 
The  object  of  war  therefore  is  to  completely  dis- 
arm and  crush  the  opponent's  forces,  or  to  place 
him  in  such  position  and  condition  that  the  prob- 
ability of  such  result  will  force  terms  of  peace 
satisfactory  to  the  victor. 

History  shows  that  nations  defeated  in  war 
have  sometimes  regarded  the  defeat  merely  as  a 
temporary  embarrassment,  although  acceding  to 
all  the  demands  of  the  victor.  In  such  cases,  the 
theory  of  acceptance  and  of  submission  was  to 
live  for  a  day  of  reckoning. 

The  conduct  of  war  is  an  art  and  not  an  exact 
science  and  among  the  factors  which  enter  into 
the  problem  of  success  there  will  be  found  that 
one  which  has  been  designated  "the  fortune  of 
war."  For  it  is  true  that  success  is  frequently 
lost  or  gained  as  the  case  may  be,  by  the  interven- 
tion of  unforeseen  circumstances.  On  this  point 
Clausewitz  says  that  from  the  outset  of  war 
''There  is  a  play  of  possibilities,  probabilities, 
good  and  bad  luck,  which  spreads  about  with  all 
the  coarse  and  fine  threads  of  its  web,  and  makes 
war,  of  all  branches  of  human  activity,  the  most 
like  a  gambling  game." 

In  war  the  might  and  power  of  the  nation  is 


On  War  23 

represented  by  its  military  and  naval  forces  and 
so  essential  is  it  for  the  success  of  the  war  that 
these  agencies  attain  the  highest  efficiency  that  the 
activities  of  the  people  are  subordinated  to  that 
end.  The  soldier  is  conscripted,  clothed,  armed, 
fed,  supplied  and  transported  at  the  expense  of 
all,  in  order  that  he  may  fight  with  the  greatest 
efficiency  and  with  the  greatest  numbers  at  the 
right  time  and  place. 

Until  the  present  century  wars  were  frequently 
of  long  duration  and  included  long  periods  of  mil- 
itary inactivity.  Warfare  of  the  present  genera- 
tion, however,  is  conducted  on  so  gigantic  a  scale 
that  the  expense  involved  demands  a  continuous 
performance  looking  for  the  early  attainment  of 
the  objective.  This  policy  reaches  its  highest  ful- 
filment on  the  continent  of  Europe  where  the  na- 
tional armies  are  constituted  of  the  nation  in  arms 
and  where  every  preparation  is  made  in  time  of 
peace  for  making  of  the  nation  in  arms  an  efficient 
army  in  time  of  war.  The  exception  to  the 
present-day  policy  is  found  in  countries  like  the 
United  States  which  relies  not  on  preparedness 
for  war  but  on  its  vast  population  and  its  mighty 
resources.  A  long  period  of  time  would  be  neces- 
sary for  the  United  States,  out  of  these  resources, 


24  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

vast  as  they  are,  to  manufacture  a  modem  army 
commensurate  with  its  needs  in  any  great  war. 

We  cannot  refer  to  the  conduct  of  war  without 
reference  to  the  subject  of  leadership.  An  army 
requires  a  general.  While  it  is  true  that  the  more 
martial  nations  are  those  whose  territory  is  moun- 
tainous and  whose  people  live  simply,  these  con- 
ditions do  not  necessarily  increase  the  genius  of 
the  people  for  the  development  of  high  command. 
The  conditions  referred  to  make  for  prevalence 
among  the  people,  of  courage,  initiative  and  phys- 
ical fitness,  but  not  necessarily  the  development 
of  a  high  character  of  generalship.  That  depends 
in  a  great  measure  upon  the  standard  of  intellec- 
tual development  in  the  country.  Among  uncivi- 
lized tribes  will  frequently  be  found  a  warlike 
spirit,  higher  than  that  possessed  by  the  people 
of  civilized  nations.  But  a  high  order  of  leader- 
ship is  seldom  found  among  uncivilized  tribes, 
certainly  not  of  a  standard  which  could  be  called 
generalship.  Generalship  requires  a  high  de- 
velopment of  the  reasoning  powers  as  well  as 
natural  aptitude,  physical  fitness  and  courage, 
and  it  will  be  found  that  the  greatest  generals 
have  been  produced  by  the  nations  whose  people 
combine   these  qualities  in  the  highest  degree. 


On  War  25 

This  is  exemplified  by  the  military  records  of 
Eome,  France,  Gennany,  Great  Britain,  and  the 
United  States.  A  military  leader  requires  not 
only  intellectual  development  of  a  high  order  but 
great  physical  and  moral  courage.  By  physical 
courage  is  not  necessarily  meant  contempt  for 
danger  or  the  physical  inability  to  experience 
fear,  but  more  the  power  to  dominate  the  weak- 
nesses of  the  body.  It  is  told  of  one  of  Napoleon's 
marshals  that  during  a  battle,  while  giving  in- 
structions to  a  young  officer,  he  was  chagrined  to 
observe  that  his  own  hands  and  knees  were  trem- 
bling and  that  the  young  officer  observed  it.  He 
relieved  the  situation  by  turning  from  the  young 
man  and  addressing  his  body  as  follows:  *'Yes, 
you're  trembling  now,  but  how  you  would  shake 
if  you  but  knew  where  I  intend  to  take  you  in  a 
few  moments."  This  was  surely  the  supremacy 
of  the  will  over  the  frailties  of  the  body. 

In  any  consideration  of  war,  the  moral  forces 
which  enter  into  its  conduct  should  be  recognized. 
Traced  to  its  source,  a  battle  is  in  a  way  merely 
an  expression  of  hostility,  and  hostility  is  a  feel- 
ing. The  individual  feelings  of  hostility  pos- 
sessed by  the  men  constituting  an  army  form  the 
national    hatred    so    often    manifested    in    war. 


26  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

These  feehngs  of  the  individual  men  are  merged 
with  other  feelings  such  as  courage,  fear,  ambi- 
tion, love  of  power,  and  lust  of  battle.  These 
feelings,  their  causes  and  effects,  and  the  methods 
for  stimulating  those  that  are  valuable  in  war  and 
suppressing  those  that  are  detrimental,  consti- 
tute the  psychology  of  warfare.  One  of  the  most 
important  departments  of  the  psychology  of  war 
is  the  psychology  of  discipline,  for  discipline  is 
that  indefinable  psychic  something  which,  when 
present  in  the  individual  or  in  an  organization  of 
individuals,  makes  possible  control  and  concerted 
action  and  a  degree  of  accomplishment  not  other- 
wise attainable. 

One  of  the  most  serious  obstacles  to  be  over- 
come by  armies  in  action  is  the  instinct  of  self- 
preservation.  Any  conditions  which  jeopardize 
the  life  of  the  normal  man  produces  among  other 
emotions  the  emotion  of  fear;  and  of  all  human 
emotions  the  most  potent  is  ordinarily,  fear.  But 
fear  is  incompatible  with  the  duties  to  be  per- 
formed by  the  soldier,  because  fear  is  an  active 
and  demoralizing  emotion.  It  is  communicable 
and  contagious.  It  may  produce  panic  and 
stampede  other  forces  who  know  not  the  cause  for 
the  fear  of  those  first  stricken.    Great  fear  might 


On  War  27 

be  termed  a  psychological  cholera,  for  its  effects 
are  deadly  and  it  thrives  among  the  ignorant. 

In  the  preparation  for  war  every  psychological 
artifice  is  availed  of  in  the  effort  to  suppress  the 
inborn  instinct  of  fear,  and  generally  to  control 
and  discipline  the  human  emotions.  Largely  this 
is  done  through  the  agency  of  drill  for  the  pur- 
pose of  establishing  habit.  The  aim  of  constant 
drill  is  not  to  produce  perfection,  but  to  create 
habit ;  to  bring  about  in  other  words,  by  constant 
repetition,  a  physical  response  to  the  stimulus  of 
command  that  is  so  automatic  as  not  to  involve  a 
conscious  mental  operation. 

"When  the  instinct  of  fear  seizes  possession  of 
the  human  heart,  the  man's  reasoning  powers 
largely  vanish.  Fear  is  in  possession  of  the  mus- 
cles and  of  the  nerves,  and  the  man  acts  sub-con- 
sciously—with animal  instinct.  To  attempt  the 
control  of  such  a  man  or  a  combination  of  such 
men  by  an  appeal  to  reason  would  be  futile.  To 
combat  fear  under  such  circumstances,  fire  must 
be  fought  with  fire.  Resort  is  therefore  had  to 
the  use  of  stimuli  that  will  act  as  fear  acts,  viz., 
automatically.  These  stimuli  are  the  military 
commands  which  through  reiteration  and  long  es- 
tablished habit  are  responded  to.     An  interesting 


28  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

incident  illustrating  this  occurred  in  the  Santiago 
campaign  in  the  Spanish-American  war.  The 
American  forces  were  forming  for  the  attack  when 
one  of  the  companies  sustained  a  number  of  casu- 
alties. It  was  the  first  engagement  for  most  of 
the  men  of  the  company.  Some  confusion  in  the 
ranks  was  shortly  followed  by  evidence  of  panic, 
when  the  company  commander  had  the  company 
arise,  and  gave  in  succession  the  commands, 
** Present  arms,"  *' right  shoulder  arms,"  "order 
arms,"  "lie  down."  The  automatic  responses, 
the  result  of  long  training  and  drill  followed,  and 
something  else  also  followed.  The  machine  like 
precision  of  all  the  men  gave  to  each  man  an 
optical  demonstration,  automatically  recorded, 
that  discipline  and  organization  still  prevailed. 
Panic  was  averted ;  confidence  was  restored.  Yet 
how  difficult  for  the  man  having  no  knowledge  of 
the  psychology  of  war  to  conceive  an  officer  con- 
ducting a  drill  of  precision  at  such  a  time  and 
under  such  circumstances  even  for  a  few  moments. 
The  more  the  details  of  military  action  in  bat- 
tle are  handed  over  to  the  effortless  custody  of 
automatism,  the  more  are  the  higher  powers  of 
mind  set  free  for  their  own  proper  work. 
Habit  enters  largely  into  the  daily  life  of  every 


On  War  29 

man.  It  is  common  knowledge  that  after  wearing 
a  soft  hat  for  a  considerable  period  of  time,  the 
wearer  who  substitutes  a  derby  will  find  himself 
in  his  first  attempt  to  raise  the  hat  from  his  head, 
bringing  his  hand  to  the  crown  rather  than  to  the 
brim  for  that  purpose.  This  is  the  result  of  habit. 
Who  can  say  that  he  never  unconsciously  wound 
his  watch  as  a  result  of  removing  his  waistcoat 
in  the  day  time?  From  force  of  habit  the  re- 
moval of  the  garment  was  the  automatic  signal 
for  the  winding  of  the  watch,  and  the  necessary 
movements  followed.  Who  can  say  what  shoe  he 
first  puts  on  in  the  morning,  or  which  arm  he 
first  inserts  in  the  coat  sleeve?  These  questions 
cannot  ordinarily  be  answered  because  this  work 
is  done  for  us  automatically  by  our  brain  nerve 
servants,  and  these  nerve  servants  always  per- 
form this  work  in  the  same  manner.  For  some  of 
us  to  answer  these  questions,  it  would  be  neces- 
sary to  actually  put  on  the  shoes  and  coat  and 
observe  the  order  in  which  these  servants  per- 
formed their  work.  What  a  commentary  on  the 
force  of  habit  in  human  existence ! 

The  Duke  of  Wellington  once  exclaimed, 
''Habit  a  second  nature! — habit  is  ten  times  na- 
ture."   And  so  we  find  that  riderless   cavalry 


30  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

horses  on  many  battlefields  have  joined  in  column 
of  fours  and  have  been  controlled  by  trumpet  calls 
— habit.  Convicts  grown  old  in  prison  after  a 
short  period  of  freedom  have  asked  to  be  returned 
to  prison  in  order  to  regain  the  environment  and 
customs  which  through  habit  had  entered  into  and 
dominated  their  existence.  Habit,  therefore, 
psychologically  understood,  is  regarded  as  a  most 
valuable  ally  in  the  control  of  men,  particularly 
when  they  are  experiencing  the  emotion  of  fear. 
And  it  is  the  establishment  of  habit  which  is 
largely  the  object  of  constant  drill. 

The  stimulating  effect  of  martial  music  on  sol- 
diers has  been  recognized  for  ages.  Frequently 
the  Colonel  of  a  regiment  whose  men  are  jaded  on 
the  march  will  direct  the  bandmaster  to  *'play 
up"  the  pluck  of  the  men.  The  effect  is  instan- 
taneous, and  yet  it  is  evident  that  the  sound  waves 
of  the  music  produce  no  change  in  the  muscular 
state.  It  is  entirely  psychological.  The  muscles 
of  the  men  are  as  fatigued,  but  the  men  no  longer 
believe  they  are  fatigued  and  in  consequence  the 
burdens  of  the  march  are  lightened. 

The  influence  of  psychology  on  armies  in  action 
has  been  recognized  for  many  years.    Little,  how- 


On  War  31 

ever,  has  been  written  on  the  subject  until  re- 
cently. 

In  the  conduct  of  war  there  are  four  factors  to 
be  considered;  numbers,  armament,  technical 
training  and  morale.  Napoleon  is  authority  for 
the  statement  that  three-fourths  of  the  credit  for 
victory  belong  to  the  last  factor — to  morale.  It 
was  one  of  Napoleon's  marshals,  Marmont,  who 
in  an  essay  on  the  spirit  of  military  institutions, 
remarked : 

"100,000  men  far  away  from  families,  property,  interests; 
the  exhibition  of  their  docility,  obedience,  mobility  and  state 
of  presentation;  finally  the  existence  of  a  spirit  which  ani- 
mates them  in  such  manner  as  to  lead  them  to  throw  themselves 
with  pleasure  into  the  most  imminent  dangers  in  which  many 
of  them  will  find  death  itself,  at  the  mere  signal  of  a  single 
man — this  assuredly  is  one  of  the  most  extraordinary  spec- 
tacles which  can  be  presented  in  the  society  of  mankind;  it  is 
a  phenomenon  the  cause  and  principle  of  which  are  only  to  be 
found  among  the  mysteries  of  the  human  heart." 

We  might  sum  this  up  and  say  that  morale  is  the 
soul — the  military  spirit  of  an  army.  In  the  con- 
duct of  war  much  depends  on  the  morale  of  the 
army. 


CHAPTER  III 
PREPARATIONS  FOR  WAR 

In  the  earliest  times  every  male  from  the  age 
when  he  could  use  a  weapon  until  his  age  rendered 
him  helpless,  was  a  warrior.    As  his  intelligence 
increased  and  he  developed  arts  and  sciences  their 
products  were  applied  for  warlike  use  as  well  as 
for  peace  time  demands.    Gradually  the  warriors 
accustomed  to  fight  in  masses  without  particular 
order,  were  exercised  and  trained  in  preparation 
for  war.    This  was  done  under  the  leadership  of 
the  more  expert  and  intelligent.    Tribes  learned 
to  build  their  huts  and  villages  in  places  difficult 
of  access  and  learned  to  protect  them  with  walls 
and  stockades.    From  these  rude  beginnings  de- 
veloped the  fortified  towns  of  later  days.    As 
tribes   expanded  into   nations,   warfare   became 
more   complicated   and   a   greater   undertaking. 
There  were  two  factors  which  gradually  resulted 
in  the  development  of  standing  armies  among  the 
ancients.    These  were  the  existence  of  caste  and 
the  necessity  for  a  part  of  the  people  to  devote 

32 


Preparations  for  War  33 

their  energies  to  productive  fields  in  order  to  pro- 
vide means  and  subsistence  for  tlie  conduct  of 
war.  The  Phoenicians  were  the  first  to  employ  a 
standing  army.  They  maintained  a  paid  force 
and  this  system  enabled  the  states  to  carry  on  the 
commerce,  upon  which  their  resources  and  power 
largely  depended.  Standing  or  mercenary  armies 
were  also  employed  by  Egypt  and  Persia,  and  in 
time  of  need  they  were  augmented  by  drafting 
warriors  from  entire  sections  of  the  countries. 
Generally  it  may  be  said,  however,  that  warfare 
was  not  conducted  on  an  efficient  scale  among  the 
Oriental  nations.  What  their  armies  lacked  in 
efficiency  and  preparedness  the  Orientals  sought 
to  make  up  by  the  magnitude  of  their  forces,  and 
history  tells  us  of  the  vast  territories  overrun  by 
them.  The  flower  of  the  Oriental  army  was  the 
cavalry.  This  was  due  to  the  excellent  mounts 
then  available  among  the  Eastern  peoples.  Their 
superiority  in  cavalry  endured  long  after  Greece 
had  demonstrated  the  superiority  of  the  Grecian 
infantry. 

In  Greece  every  citizen  was  a  soldier  and  he  was 
trained  as  such.  Religion,  education,  and  public 
athletic  contests  contributed  to  the  preparation 
of  the  Greek  citizen  for  war.    He  was  a  soldier 


34  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

between  the  ages  of  eighteen  and  sixty  and  polit- 
ical preferment  was  based  upon  military  distinc- 
tion. The  Greek  armies  were  mobile,  although 
they  lacked  cavalry.  After  the  Trojan  War 
chariots  disappeared.  The  men  were  not  paid 
but  were  allowed  to  loot.  The  discipline  of  the 
Spartan  soldier  is  proverbial.  The  habits  of  the 
Spartan  people  were  simple  and  they  developed, 
what  for  that  time,  was  perfect  infantry.  In  the 
periods  of  peace,  the  training  of  the  soldier  for 
war  was  incessant.  This  training,  however,  was 
largely  a  training  of  the  body  and  the  Spartans 
knew  little  of  strategy.  The  Athenian  citizen  was 
equally  amenable  for  the  military  service,  but  his 
military  life  was  divided  into  two  periods.  From 
eighteen  to  forty  he  was  available  for  any  service, 
while  from  forty  to  sixty  his  service  was  limited 
to  resisting  invasion. 

After  the  development  of  the  Persian  Empire 
under  the  great  Cyrus  many  of  the  Persian  sa- 
traps, acquiring  power  and  ease,  lost  interest  in 
the  rigorous  requirements  of  war  preparation  and 
lived  in  their  harems.  Mercenary  troops  were 
largely  employed.  Tactics  and  war  preparation 
lapsed.  In  Greece  also,  mercenary  troops  began 
to  be  employed  and  although  citizens  were  still 


©  Underwood  &   Underwood 

A    German    firing-line    illustrating    density    of 
obtain  fire  superiority 


position    to 


Preparations  for  War  35 

held  to  serve  tlie  State  as  soldiers,  substitutes 
were  allowed,  and  troops  were  paid. 

Under  Philip  of  Macedon  and  his  son  Alexander 
the  Great,  the  Macedonian  Phalanx  obtained  its 
wonderful  reputation  for  shock  and  action. 
Under  these  men  the  army  was  thoroughly  pre- 
pared in  time  of  peace,  discipline  was  rigid,  and 
the  cavalry  was  trained  to  a  high  degree  of  disci- 
pline and  drill.  The  army  was  trained  to  endure 
long  marches  and  severe  hardships.  The  Field 
Artillery  of  that  day,  consisting  of  ballistas  and 
catapults,  were  developed  to  a  high  degree  of 
efficiency.  Alexander  organized  a  corps  of  young 
men  of  the  best  families  who  lived  near  the  king's 
person  and  learned  the  profession  of  arms  in  the 
field.  Generally  it  may  be  said  that  in  his  prep- 
aration for  his  historic  invasion  of  Persia,  Alex- 
ander developed  every  department  of  military  ac- 
tivity. 

In  like  manner  it  will  be  found  throughout  the 
history  of  the  world  that  where  success  has  come 
to  armies  and  their  leaders,  it  can  be  attributed 
in  large  measure  not  only  to  the  genius  possessed 
by  the  leader,  but  to  thorough  and  detailed  prepa- 
ration in  time  of  peace  for  the  trials  and  exactions 
of  a  state  of  war.    Hannibal,  Caesar,  Gustavus 


36  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

Adolphus,  Napoleon,  Von  Moltke,  and  tlie  forces 
successfully  handled  by  them,  all  illustrate  the 
correctness  of  this  principle. 

Preparation  for  war  includes  not  only  the  phys- 
ical training  of  the  combatant  forces,  but  the  ob- 
taining in  time  of  peace  of  military  information 
concerning  the  enemy.  This  information  covers 
the  geography,  resources  and  military  strength 
of  the  opponent,  the  character  and  composition  of 
his  forces,  their  clothing,  arms  and  equipment.  It 
also  includes  the  preparation  of  military  maps  of 
possible  theaters  of  operations,  and  in  recent 
years  the  playing  of  war  games  on  such  maps 
under  assumed  conditions  approximating  as 
closely  as  possible  the  conditions  that  would  ob- 
tain in  war.  Information  of  the  enemy's  coun- 
try is  obtained  in  time  of  peace  not  only  from 
available  books  and  commercial  sources  of  infor- 
mation, but  through  local  representatives  of  the 
government,  such  as  consuls  and  military  attaches. 
In  addition  to  these,  most  governments  possess 
an  ejB&cient  secret  service  to  obtain  special  infor- 
mation. The  chapter  on  Mobility  and  Concentra- 
tion illustrates  the  vast  field  of  preparation  neces- 
sarily   covered    in    time    of    peace    to    produce 


Preparations  for  War  37 

promptly  at  the  outbreak  of  war,  the  forces  de- 
scribed therein. 

War  is  a  greedy  destroyer,  and  in  active  opera- 
tions the  expenditure  of  ammunition  and  the  de- 
struction of  military  property  and  equipment  are 
so  great  that  almost  from  the  declaration  of  war, 
a  steady  stream  to  cover  this  expenditure  and 
waste  should  commence  to  flow  from  the  home  de- 
pots to  the  armies  at  the  front.  To  insure  this, 
the  nation  conducting  war  should  possess  not  only 
the  resources  in  raw  material  necessary  for  the 
manufacture  of  such  articles,  but,  in  addition, 
the  manufacturing  plants  capable  of  producing 
promptly  in  an  amount  sufficient  to  meet  the  de- 
mands, the  supplies  required.  The  greatest  dif- 
ficulty in  the  manufacture  of  such  supplies  relates 
to  ammunition,  for  the  use  of  ammunition  in  time 
of  war  so  far  exceeds  its  use  in  time  of  peace,  that 
it  is  not  profitable  for  a  commercial  plant  to  main- 
tain in  time  of  peace  a  plant  equal  to  the  demands 
of  war.  Hence,  in  most  countries  the  commercial 
plants  are  supplemented  by  government-owned 
factories  so  constructed  and  equipped  that  they 
are  capable  of  almost  immediate  expansion  on  a 
big  scale. 


;S4G(>5  J 


38  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

Most  governments  maintain  in  time  of  peace 
large  supply  depots  where  are  stored  the  arms, 
clothing  and  equipment  for  such  number  of  men 
as  the  country  under  its  system  of  raising  armies 
can  make  available  promptly  at  the  outbreak  of 
hostilities.  In  the  great  military  nations  on  the 
continent  of  Europe  this  armament  and  equip- 
ment are  not  stored  in  centralized  supply  depots, 
but  are  decentralized  to  such  an  extent  that  every 
member  of  the  first  line  of  reserves  at  least  has 
practically  in  his  possession  the  arms  and  clothing 
necessary  for  him  to  possess  at  the  call  to  the 
colors.  This  property  is  stored  in  local  barracks 
or  depots  in  every  town,  and  each  individual  re- 
servist knows  where  and  how  to  draw  this  prop- 
erty when  the  demand  for  his  services  is  made. 

In  the  preparation  of  the  forces  of  a  nation 
for  war,  numbers  and  armament  are  not  the  only 
essentials.  The  result  of  the  battle  of  Bull  Eun 
in  1861  forcibly  illustrates  this.  Technical  train- 
ing is  also  a  part,  and  an  important  part,  of  the 
preparation  for  war.  The  various  systems  in  use 
for  providing  this  training  are  explained  in  some 
of  the  succeeding  chapters,  but  here  it  may  be  said 
in  general  that  clothing  a  citizen  in  a  soldier's 
uniform  and  providing  him  with  arms,  does  not 


Preparations  for  War  39 

necessarily  make  of  him  a  soldier.  Yet  there  ex- 
ists in  this  country  among  some  of  our  people,  a 
belief  that  national  policies  may  be  forcibly  sus- 
tained when  necessary,  by  the  action  of  a  million 
men  springing  to  arms  at  their  country's  call. 
With  a  little  reflection,  however,  it  must  be  ap- 
parent, even  assuming  the  ability  of  the  govern- 
ment to  promptly  clothe  and  equip,  supply  and 
maintain  such  a  force,  that  they  would  not  consti- 
tute an  army  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  term.  No 
one  has  been  able  to  suggest  from  what  source 
the  officers  for  such  a  force  or  even  for  fifty  per 
cent,  of  that  force,  could  be  obtained.  The  effort 
to  obtain  the  necessary  non-commissioned  officers 
for  their  elementary  training  would  seem  to  be 
equally  hopeless.  In  truth  they  would  have  to  be 
created,  and  the  creation  of  an  efficient  military 
officer  is  a  slow  process.  There  is  almost  a  fixed 
ratio  of  efficiency  between  the  soldiers  of  an  or- 
ganization and  the  officers  who  command  them. 
If  the  officers  are  inefficient,  the  men  reflect  their 
inefficiency. 

Is  it  to  be  believed  that  an  aggregation  of  in- 
dividuals hastily  organized  into  military  units 
and  later  grouped  into  large  commands  can  se- 
riously be  regarded  as  an  army?    Such  a  force 


40         The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

would  lack  confidence  in  its  own  ability,  and  we 
have  seen  that  this  confidence  is  in  itself  an  essen- 
tial in  the  make-up  of  an  army.  By  confidence  is 
not  meant  ignorant  enthusiasm,  but  military 
morale,  the  importance  of  which  has  already  been 
referred  to. 

Therefore  it  is  that  in  the  preparation  for  war, 
not  only  do  governments  accumulate  material 
things  necessary  for  the  conduct  of  the  war,  but 
they  provide  in  some  manner  for  the  technical 
training  and  the  development  of  the  military  mor- 
ale of  those  who  are  to  do  the  fighting. 

Success  in  war  depends,  however,  not  only  on 
what  may  properly  be  included  in  the  prepara- 
tion for  its  advent,  but  fundamentally  it  depends 
on  the  extent  to  which  the  people  possess  those 
manly  qualities  which  enable  men  to  suffer  and 
endure  without  loss  of  courage  and  the  determina- 
tion to  conquer.  History  shows  that  nations  that 
have  possessed  these  qualities  have  subsequently 
parted  with  them  through  generations  of  easy 
living  and  sensual  ease.  The  development  of 
morale  requires  the  presence  of  a  spirit  of  indi- 
vidual self-sacrifice.  An  old  saying  has  it, 
"Common  suffering  unites  more  than  common 
joys."    We  have  only  to  remember  the  fall  of 


Preparations  for  War  41 

the  Roman  Empire  to  realize  that  in  the  conduct 
of  war  and  in  the  preparation  for  war,  something 
more  is  necessary  than  a  high  standard  of  edu- 
cation and  the  possession  of  a  civilization  which 
provides  the  material  things  for  war  and  the  good 
things  for  life.  ''He  that  has  a  crust  has  a 
creed. ' '  And  it  will  be  found  that  the  people  who 
combine  with  education,  the  simple  and  correct 
life,  are  more  apt  to  possess  the  spirit  of  self- 
sacrifice  and  the  ability  to  suffer  and  endure  than 
a  people  who  give  themselves  up  to  the  comforts 
and  enjoyments  provided  by  civilization. 


CHAPTER  IV 
GERMAN  SYSTEM  OF  TRAINING 

The  strength  of  the  German  government  rests 
on  its  military  system  which  is  based  on  a  full 
realization  of  the  principle  of  national  service. 
History  shows  that  while  progress  in  civilization 
develops  in  peace,  progress  in  human  rights  comes 
only  through  war.  To  maintain  its  culture  and 
the  individual  liberty  of  its  citizens  a  nation  must 
be  prepared  to  fight  for  them.  When  the  military 
ideals  are  lost,  civic  virtues  soon  follow,  and  the 
nation,  like  Rome  and  Carthage,  falls  into  decay. 
"While  other  nations  were  more  or  less  diverted 
from  this  primal  social  principle,  the  Teutonic 
races  maintained  it,  even  through  the  vicissitudes 
of  subjection  to  alien  conquerors.  It  is  seen  in 
the  underlying  raison  d'etre  of  the  British  Mil- 
itia and  the  Colonial  Militia,  the  precursor  of  the 
National  Guard  and  Militia  System  of  the  United 
States.  In  Switzerland  this  military  inheritance 
of  tribal  days  is  seen  in  much  of  its  original 
purity.    Every  man  is  a  soldier  and  though  not 

42 


German  System  of  Training  43 

disturbed  in  his  domicile  and  occupation  he  has  to 
complete  sufficient  military  training  to  enable  him 
to  discharge  his  patriotic  duties  in  defense  of  his 
country  in  case  of  war. 

The  innate  devotion  of  the  Geraianic  peoples 
to  full  personal  liberty  prevented  for  many  cen- 
turies their  amalgamation  into  a  great  nation. 
The  subordinate  divisions  of  the  race  were  even 
frequently  pitted  against  each  other  and  the  ab- 
sence of  a  united  front  subjected  them  to  the 
devastations  of  their  enemies.  In  the  "War  of 
Austrian  Succession  1741-1748  and  the  Silesian 
War  of  Frederick  the  Great  1756-1763  Germany 
was  overrun  from  end  to  end  by  the  contending 
armies  of  France,  Eussia,  Austria,  and  the  Ger- 
man States.  The  climax  was  reached  in  the  cam- 
paigns of  Napoleon  in  which  from  1796  to  1814 
the  French  armies  were  a  scourge  to  the  western 
German  states. 

The  present  national  system  is  the  development 
of  Prussia.  Spurred  on  by  the  disastrous  war 
^^ith  France  in  1806-1807  and  by  the  terms  of  the 
treaty  of  Tilsit,  the  Prussians  realized  that  their 
national  life  rested  on  a  development  of  their  mil- 
itary strength.  They  were  limited  by  the  above 
treaty  to  a  standing  army  of  42,000  men.    In 


44  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

order  to  have  available  trained  men  in  the  num- 
bers needed  for  the  large  armies  to  defend  her 
home  territory  in  case  of  war,  Prussia  adopted 
the  system  of  short  service  of  successive  annual 
contingents,  thus  multiplying  the  available  num- 
ber of  trained  men  far  beyond  the  42,000  of  the 
standing  army. 

Under  the  plans  and  leadership  of  Scharnhorst, 
the  Prussian  Minister  of  War,  the  nation  adopted 
in  1813  the  system  that  for  the  first  century  in 
history  maintained  the  Prussian  territory  free 
from  invading  armies  in  spite  of  the  wars  against 
Denmark  in  1864,  Austria  in  1866  and  France  in 
1870. 

This  system  of  military  service  was  further  de- 
veloped under  Germany's  great  organizer,  Field 
Marshal  von  Moltke,  who  was  Minister  of  War 
under  William  I,  King  of  Prussia  and  first  Em- 
peror of  Germany.  To  national  training  was 
added  the  quick  striking  power  of  the  Prussian 
army  which  was  responsible  for  the  overthrow  of 
Austria  in  1866,  and  for  the  victory  over  the 
powerful  regular  army  of  the  French  in  1870. 

This  is  the  system  that  to-day  enables  Germany 
with  a  population  of  65,000,000  to  put  in  the  field 
such  enormous  armies.    As  the  sincerest  flattery 


German  System  of  Training  45 

is  imitation,  so  is  the  value  of  the  German  system 
attested  by  its  adoption  by  all  of  the  leading  gov- 
ernments of  the  world  except  the  British  Empire 
and  the  United  States. 

In  Gennany  every  man  is  born  a  soldier;  from 
his  earliest  years  a  boy  is  regaled  with  stories 
of  the  deeds  of  his  father  and  his  relatives  in 
service  and  in  war.  Even  the  home  training  is 
almost  military  in  its  discipline.  The  relaxing 
of  parental  restraint  comes  only  with  the  entry 
into  military  service  in  the  twentieth  year.  This 
date  then  marks  for  the  boy  the  turning  point  of 
recognized  manhood,  and  means  for  him  far  more 
than  the  ''free  white  and  twenty-one"  for  which 
the  American  boy  longs. 

Throughout  life  the  military  service  is  a  bond 
of  interest  and  a  voucher  of  character.  The  man 
who  has  failed  to  perform  his  service  in  the  army 
is  looked  on  with  suspicion  as  one  who  must  have 
some  physical  or  moral  defect.  He  must  be  for- 
ever excusing  and  explaining  his  position  to  em- 
ployers and  new  acquaintances.  The  military  life 
pervades  the  nation ;  it  is,  in  truth,  in  the  words  of 
the  first  emperor,  ''A  Nation  in  Arms." 

National  military  service  is  the  cornerstone  of 
the  political  structure  of  the  Empire.    One  of  the 


46  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

first  provisions  of  the  national  code  reads,  ''Every 
German  is  in  duty  bound  to  defend  his  country, 
and  he  cannot  discharge  this  duty  through  a  sub- 
stitute. ' ' 

When  a  boy  is  born  his  name  is  entered  on  the 
military  lists.  When  he  reaches  twenty  years 
he  may  live  far  from  his  birthplace,  but  the  call 
follows  him  and  the  fact  of  service  is  credited  on 
the  birth  register.  Defaulters  are  followed  up 
through  the  various  domiciles  of  their  families 
and  are  severely  punished  if  they  ever  enter  Ger- 
man territory.  So  strong  is  the  social  obloquy 
that  attaches  to  the  quitter  that  there  are  prac- 
tically no  cases  among  the  resident  Germans. 

The  number  of  young  men  newly  available  for 
military  service  was  556,000  in  1907  and  is  now 
over  600,000.  Economic  reasons  limit  the  stand- 
ing army  to  about  one  per  cent,  of  the  population 
of  the  empire,  which  calls  for  an  annual  contin- 
gent averaging  260,000.  About  10,000  are  also 
taken  annually  for  naval  service.  The  remainder 
are  not  reUeved  from  liability  for  service  in  case 
of  war,  but  are  assigned  to  the  various  classes  of 
reserves  that  are  described  later. 

The  entire  number  of  men  who  become  due  for 
military  service  in  a  given  year  are  thereafter 


German  System  of  Training  47 

listed  as  the  class  of  that  year.  Thus  the  recent 
calling  to  the  colors  of  the  Classes  of  1915,  1916 
and  1917  means  that  the  men  who  will  reach  their 
twentieth  birthday  in  those  years  are  being  taken 
into  the  army  ahead  of  time  at  ages  of  19,  18  and 
17  years,  respectively.  That  is,  all  of  the  young 
men  down  to  seventeen  years  of  age  are  now  in 
the  German  army. 

The  accepted  recruits  are  assigned  to  the  com- 
panies nearest  to  their  homes  and  report  for  duty 
on  October  1  of  their  year  of  service.  All  their 
ordinary  clothes  are  left  at  home;  they  are  fur- 
nished neat-fitting  uniforms,  and  for  the  two  or 
three  years  of  their  active  service  every  thought 
is  guided  toward  their  duty  as  soldiers. 

The  course  of  training  is  a  stiff  one.  It  not 
only  makes  soldiers  of  the  raw  recruits,  but  it 
also  makes  men  well  developed  both  in  physique 
and  in  appreciation  of  their  responsibility  to 
carry  out  well  whatever  duties  may  be  assigned 
them  either  in  the  army  or  in  their  civil  occupa- 
tions. The  ex-soldier  is  accordingly  valued  as 
an  industrial  employee. 

On  reporting  for  duty  with  their  companies  the 
recruits  are  divided  into  squads  of  four  and  are 
placed    under    a    non-commissioned    officer    who 


48  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

teaches  them  to  march,  face  about,  and  to  control 
their  muscles  readily  for  any  movement.  These 
squads  are  practically  teams ;  the  recruits  are  ex- 
erting every  effort  to  qualify  as  soldiers  and  the 
corporal  is  rated  on  the  results  of  his  squad.  All 
are  enthused  by  the  effort  to  win  out  in  the  com- 
petitive drill  that  is  held  at  the  end  of  the  prelim- 
inary training  period. 

Next  they  receive  rifles  and  are  trained  in  the 
manual  of  arms  and  in  close  order  drill.  An 
under-officer  (sergeant)  is  given  a  section  of  sev- 
eral squads  and  the  competitive  drills  are  repeated 
for  another  period.  Progressively  the  platoon 
training  and  the  company  training  are  taken  up  on 
the  same  basis.  The  four  platoons  of  the  com- 
pany are  pitted  against  each  other  and  later  the 
four  companies  of  the  battalion.  The  winners  are 
announced  and  for  a  time  *'crow  over"  the  others. 

From  October  to  May  this  training  is  carried 
on  with  the  aim  of  having  the  company  in  shape 
to  take  up  regimental  field  training  in  the  spring 
maneuvers.  The  summer  training  is  especially 
directed  to  training  and  hardening  the  men  in 
preparation  for  the  great  maneuvers  in  August 
and  September  when  battle  movements  are  car- 


German  System  of  Training  49 

ried  out  under  conditions  as  near  those  of  war  as 
possible. 

For  two  years  this  thorough  training  proceeds. 
Not  only  does  it  cover  marching,  rifle  firing  and 
battle  tactics,  but  it  also  furthers  the  education  of 
the  man.  Classes  are  conducted  in  the  various 
trades;  in  the  winters,  high  school  subjects  are 
taught.  Great  importance  is  laid  on  physical  de- 
velopment and  every  day  the  companies  are  put 
through  drills  in  running,  leaping  and  suppling 
exercises.  Long  marches  are  taken  with  every 
man  loaded  with  the  full  war  pack  of  rifle,  car- 
tridges, knapsack  and  blankets,  in  order  to  con- 
tinually have  every  man  in  the  ''pink  of  condi- 
tion" and  hardened  for  the  arduous  service  of 
war. 

At  the  end  of  two  years  of  this  service  the  men 
in  dismounted  service — infantry,  foot-artUlery, 
and  train — are  furloughed  and  transferred  to  the 
active  reserves.  The  men  in  the  mounted  services 
— cavalry,  horse-artillery,  and  engineers — are  held 
for  a  third  year.  Thereafter  until  their  twenty- 
seventh  year  these  ex-soldiers  are  classed  as  the 
active  reserve  and  are  at  once  called  into  service 
in  case  of  war. 


50  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

For  peace  training  the  units  are  kept  at  a 
smaller  strength  in  war.  The  deficiency  is  made 
up  on  order  for  mobilization  by  calling  in  enough 
of  the  most  recently  furloughed  men  to  fill  up  the 
vacancies.  The  exact  peace  strength  differs  from 
year  to  year,  but  the  war  strength  of  the  units  is 
fixed.  The  organization  of  the  various  arms  is 
shown  in  the  table  below. 

Infantry  Abtilleby      Cavalby 


fl       .2 


fl 

o 

a 

^ 

a 

<u 

>> 

Ol 

dj 

a 

lr> 

ci 

a 

Ti 

a 

■4^' 

•+-> 

a 

bU 

43 

-fJ 

6C 

p 

bn 

O) 

d 

eS 

Ol 

a^ 

a> 

M 

pq 

pq 

K 

m 

« 

f  Officers    

Peace -^ 

L Enlisted    men.. 

4 
142 

18 
571 

56 
1,768 

4 
128 

14 
386 

30 

774 

5 
135 

27 
695 

f  Officers    

War  A 

I  Enlisted    men.. 

5 

250 

22 
1,002 

68 
3,017 

5 

162 

17 

488 

36 

578 

6 

150 

26 

602 

The  remaining  men,  forming  the  majority  of 
the  active  reserves,  are  definitely  assigned  to  com- 
panies of  reserve  regiments  that  form  reserve  di- 
visions to  strengthen  the  armies  at  the  front.  The 
assignment  lists  are  revised  annually  so  that  every 
man  knows  exactly  his  assignment.  On  furlough 
from  active  service  every  man's  uniforms  and 
(equipment  are  bundled  and  tagged  with  his  name, 


German  System  of  Training  51 

and  stored  at  the  mobilization  center  nearest  to 
his  home.  On  receiving  the  call  for  active  service 
he  reports,  draws  his  equipment,  and  is  ready  to 
move  to  the  front.  In  order  to  keep  every  reserv- 
ist up  to  date  in  his  military  training,  he  is  called 
out  twice  during  his  active  reserve  period  for 
maneuver  service  lasting  from  six  to  eight  weeks. 

The  able-bodied  young  men  not  accepted  from 
the  annual  contingents  for  service  in  the  active 
army  are  not  entirely  excused  from  military  serv- 
ice. About  two-thirds  are  enrolled  in  the  ersatz 
reserve,  whose  special  function  is  to  supply  men 
to  replace  war  losses  so  as  to  maintain  the  com- 
panies in  the  field  at  full  strength.  For  twelve 
years  they  are  carried  in  this  reserve  and  during 
this  time  they  are  called  out  for  a  total  of  three 
periods  of  training,  lasting  ten,  six  and  four  weeks 
respectively.  As  they  have  grown  up  and  lived 
in  a  military  environment  they  are  fairly  well  in- 
formed as  to  the  elementary  duties.  On  comple- 
tion of  the  ersatz  reserve  period  they  pass  into 
the  landwehr  and  then  into  the  landsturm,  de- 
scribed below. 

On  the  order  for  mobilization  all  of  the  ersatz 
reserves  are  mustered  at  the  various  training  de- 
pots.   Their  training  is  rushed  as  fast  as  possible, 


52  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

so  that  in  a  few  weeks  they  are  fit  for  service  at 
the  front.  There  they  are  mixed  in  with  the  bat- 
tle-tried soldiers  and  quickly  become  dependable 
men.  In  this  way  the  Germans  get  the  full  value 
of  their  fighting  force  in  spite  of  a  large  percent- 
age of  recruits. 

This  contrasts  markedly  with  the  system  fol- 
lowed by  the  United  States  in  her  wars.  After 
armies  at  the  front  have  been  augmented  by  send- 
ing up  newly  recruited  complete  regiments.  The 
trained  regiments  became  ineifective  through  lack 
of  numbers,  while  the  regiments  of  recruits  were 
almost  useless  until  months  of  service  had  given 
them  the  experience  that  could  have  been  picked 
the  regiments  first  sent  forward  were  depleted  the 
up  in  a  few  days  from  the  older  soldiers  if  the 
recruits  had  been  assigned  to  the  older  organiza- 
tions. 

The  first  German  armies  for  war  are  made  up 
of  the  standing  army,  the  active  reserve  and  the 
ersatz  reserve.  However,  this  is  not  the  limit  of 
Germany's  available  military  strength.  After 
completing  his  period  of  assignment  to  the  active 
reserve,  the  ex-soldier  is  transferred  to  the  second 
reserve,  or  landwehr,  in  which  he  is  liable  for  serv- 
ice in  the  field  armies  until  his  39th  year.    This 


German  System  of  Training  53 

is  divided  into  two  bans,  or  levies :  the  first  cover- 
ing five  years,  27  to  32,  and  the  second  covering 
seven  years,  32  to  39.  During  the  first  ban  the 
landwehr  reserve  is  called  out  for  two  training 
periods  of  two  weeks  each,  after  which  the  reserv- 
ist is  subject  to  call  only  in  case  of  war.  For  the 
mounted  troops  the  landwehr  service  is  divided 
into  two  bans  of  three  years  and  nine  years  re- 
spectively. 

Like  the  active  reserve  every  landwehr  reservist 
is  definitely  assigned  to  a  company  and  regiment 
and  his  equipment  is  stored  ready  for  issue  on 
mobilization.  When  the  active  armies  take  the 
field  in  war  the  landwehr  form  the  garrisons  of 
the  home  fortresses  and  the  coast  defenses.  They 
also  furnish  the  armies  to  occupy  conquered  terri- 
tory, to  guard  prisoners,  and  to  assume  every 
duty  that  will  prevent  the  diversion  of  troops  from 
the  battle  lines  at  the  front. 

The  last  line  of  the  military  system  is  the 
landsturm,  the  third  reserve  or  ''home  guards." 
This  force  is  also  divided  into  two  levies  or  bans. 
The  first  includes  all  men  from  17  to  39  years  of 
age  who  are  not  enrolled  in  any  of  the  above 
classes.  Finally,  all  men,  both  trained  soldiers 
and  untrained  landsturm,  are  enrolled  from  their 


54         The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

39tli  to  45tli  year  in  the  second  ban  of  the  land- 
sturm.  No  special  training  is  required  of  this 
reserve.  When  the  landsturm  is  called  out  it  re- 
lieves the  landwehr,  making  the  latter  available 
for  service  at  the  front. 

Besides  the  above,  Germany  provides  a  special 
class  of  one  year  volunteers  from  which  officers 
and  noncommissioned  officers  of  the  reserves  are 
obtained.  When  a  young  man  can  pass  an  ex- 
amination, about  equal  to  that  for  our  high  school 
graduates,  he  is  allowed  to  complete  his  active 
service  in  one  year,  provided  his  family  bears 
all  expense,  not  only  of  his  support,  but  also  of 
his  military  equipment.  In  this  way  the  govern- 
ment reduces  its  expenditure  and  at  the  same  time 
secures  intelligent  educated  men  for  the  subordi- 
nate officering  of  its  reserves.  It  is  noteworthy 
that  nearly  one-fifth  of  the  men  annually  taken  into 
the  active  army  are  ** one-year  volunteers." 

The  officers  are  recruited  from  two  classes; 
first,  the  graduates  of  the  military  academies  and, 
second,  the  high  school  graduates  who  have  served 
in  the  ranks  and  have  passed  an  examination 
equivalent  to  graduation  from  a  military  academy. 
Both  classes   then  receive  provisional  appoint- 


German  System  of  Training  55 

ment  as  ensigns,  and  are  assigned  to  the  war 
school  for  a  further  course  of  study  and  training. 
Upon  graduation  each  ensign  is  assigned  to  a  regi- 
ment for  six  months'  service,  after  previous  con- 
sent of  its  officers.  After  six  months'  service  in 
the  regiment  its  officers  vote  as  to  whether  to 
accept  him  as  an  officer.  If  he  passes  this  test 
he  is  commissioned  a  second  lieutenant. 

From  second  lieutenant  up  to  general  the  pro- 
motion is  regular,  except  that  the  Kaiser  can 
award  special  promotion  in  exceptional  cases. 
After  reaching  the  grade  of  major  a  rigid  elimi- 
nation is  enforced,  large  numbers  of  officers  being 
transferred  to  reserve  duties. 

The  officers  of  the  various  reserves  are  fur- 
nished from  two  sources.  The  senior  officers  and 
some  of  the  juniors  are  transferred  from  the  reg- 
ular army  by  elimination  as  above  or  still  more 
largely  upon  request  due  to  business  reasons. 
The  company  officers  are  appointed  from  one-year 
volunteers  and  exceptionally  efficient  regular  serv- 
ice men  who  have  followed  a  special  course  of 
study  and  training  and  have  established  their  pro- 
ficiency by  passing  prescribed  tests. 


56  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

ORGANIZATION 

The  typical  infantry  organization  is  four  com- 
panies to  the  battalion,  three  battalions  to  the 
regiment,  two  regiments  to  the  brigade,  and  two 
brigades  to  the  division.  The  division  is  prac- 
tically a  small  army  ready  for  complete  service. 
In  addition  to  the  two  infantry  brigades,  it  has  a 
brigade  of  field  artillery,  a  regiment  of  cavalry, 
an  engineer  battalion  and  sanitary  and  train 
troops.  Its  strength  on  a  war  footing  is  about 
15,500  men. 

Two  infantry  divisions  form  an  army  corps ;  to 
which  is  attached  a  battalion  of  siege  artillery,  a 
bridge  train,  and  sometimes  a  cavalry  division. 
The  corps  is  a  complete  administrative  unit  both 
in  peace  and  in  war.  The  commanding  general 
has  final  say  in  every  question  that  arises,  except 
dismissal  of  officers.  Through  his  staff  he  pro- 
vides for  the  supply  of  food,  clothing,  equipment 
and  pay  of  the  troops ;  his  inspectors  keep  track 
of  the  efficiency  with  which  training  is  carried 
out. 

The  German  Empire  is  divided  into  twenty- 
four  corps  districts,  each  of  which  furnishes  the 
troops  for  one  corps  of  the  active  army.     The 


German  System  of  Training  57 

corps  commander  also  has  charge  of  the  reserve 
service  of  his  district.  The  twenty-fifth  corps  is 
the  Guards  Corps,  stationed  at  Berlin,  and  is 
made  up  of  specially  selected  men  from  all  parts 
of  the  empire. 

The  detailed  composition  of  an  army  corps  is: 

24  battalions  of  infantry  25,626  men 

1  battalion  of  riflemen   1,035  men 

4  regiments  of  field  artillery,  144  guns  4,258  men 

1  battalion  of  heavy  artillery 675  men 

1  regiment  of  cavalry    683  men 

1  battalion  of  pioneers 600  men 

1  telegraph  section 

1  bridge  trEiin 

12  ammunition  columns 

6  supply  columns 
12  transport  columns 

2  field  bakeries 

3  ambulance  companies 
12  field  hospitals. 

Its  total  strength  is  in  round  numbers  41,000 
men  and  13,000  horses.  However,  this  must  be 
distinguished  from  its  fighting  strength,  which  is 
approximately  32,000  men.  This  difference  is  due 
to  the  enormous  number  of  men  required  for  the 
auxiliary  services  listed  above.  To  keep  the  men 
at  the  front  in  condition  to  fight,  they  must  be  fed, 
furnished  ammunition,   and  kept  physically  fit. 


58  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

The  2200  vehicles,  alone,  take  up  a  goodly  part 
of  these  9000  non-combatants. 

The  efficiency  of  the  German  army  rests  ulti- 
mately upon  the  great  General  Staff,  composed 
of  the  best  men  in  the  army,  obtained  through  a 
gradual  selective  system.  This  is  divided  into 
sections,  each  of  which  is  charged  with  the  over- 
sight and  improvement  of  a  part  of  the  military 
administration.  They  seek  for  improvements  in 
arms  and  equipment,  keep  track  of  progress  in 
other  countries,  obtain  maps  of  all  districts  of 
probable  campaigns,  and  plan  maneuvers  for  the 
field  training  of  the  army.  Especially  important 
is  their  work  in  planning  in  the  greatest  detail 
the  use  of  Germany's  forces  in  case  of  war  with 
her  neighbors.  This  is  studied  out  for  every  com- 
bination of  opponents  and  allies  and  complete 
train  service  schedules  are  prepared  for  the  move- 
ments of  the  regiments  from  their  home  stations 
to  the  assigned  places  for  war.  These  are  revised 
yearly.  There  is  little  question  but  that  on  July 
30  last,  the  General  Staff  when  notified  of  war,  had 
only  to  direct  the  sending  of  the  telegrams  already 
written,  addressed  and  filed,  waiting  for  the  call. 

This  system,  combined  with  the  efficient  concen- 
tration system  described  later,  enables  Germany 


German  System  of  Training  59 

to  make  the  prompt  delivery  on  her  borders  of 
armies  superior  in  strength  to  her  neighbors  as 
shown  by  the  operations  at  the  beginning  of  the 
Campaign  of  1914. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  BRITISH  SYSTEM 

In  the  social  struggles  of  the  Middle  Ages  between 
the  kings  and  the  nobles  of  each  country  as  to 
which  should  be  supreme  in  the  direction  of  the 
affairs  of  state,  the  levies  of  the  nobles  repre- 
sented the  militia  of  the  country,  while  the  de- 
pendence of  the  kings  was  placed  on  standing 
armies,  largely  mercenary.  The  supremacy  of  the 
kings  led  to  the  development  during  the  Seven- 
teenth and  Eighteenth  Centuries  of  the  large 
armies  of  professional  soldiers  to  which  fighting 
was  largely  delegated. 

In  Great  Britain  both  systems  survived  on 
somewhat  divergent  lines.  The  regular  army  rep- 
resented the  power  of  the  king,  the  militia  was  the 
bulwark  of  the  people.  With  the  removal  of  fear 
of  royal  usurpation  and  with  the  increase  in  mili- 
tary demands  due  to  the  growth  of  the  empire, 
the  two  military  services  have  been  drawn  to- 
gether to  fill  the  need  for  a  strong  defense  force 
and  have  almost  coalesced. 

60 


The  British  System  61 

Both  regular  army  and  mihtia  are  maintained 
by  voluntary  enlistment  alone.  In  the  regulars 
this  enlistment  is  for  a  long  period,  the  service 
being  practically  professional ;  in  the  Territorials 
it  is  for  a  shorter  period.  In  both  services  en- 
listments may  be  renewed  until  the  soldier  is  39 
or  40  years  old,  with  the  result  that  every  com- 
pany is  made  up  of  men  of  unequal  ages  and  to 
some  extent  of  unequal  physique. 

By  the  '^ Reserve  Act"  of  1907,  Great  Britain's 
military  forces  consist  of  the  Regular  Army,  the 
Army  Reserves,  the  Special  Reserves,  and  the 
Territorials.  The  first  two  form  the  active  fight- 
ing force.  The  special  reserves  have  as  their 
function  the  training  of  recruits  to  be  sent  to  the 
front  to  keep  the  field  army  up  to  full  strength. 
The  territorials  are  the  home  defense  force. 

The  regular  army  enlistment  is  for  twelve  years, 
but  the  soldier  is  not  required  to  stay  with  the  col- 
ors this  full  time.  After  three,  seven  or  eight 
years,  according  to  the  branch  of  the  service,  he 
can  apply  for  transfer  to  the  army  reserves  for 
the  remainder  of  his  enlistment.  This  is  encour- 
aged by  the  government  for  in  this  way  a  reserve 
of  trained  men  available  for  war  is  obtained  with- 
out the  expense  of  maintaining  full  strength. 


62  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

On  enlistment  tlie  new  recruit  is  put  in  the 
''rookie  squad"  to  learn  how  to  carry  himself, 
handle  his  rifle,  and  march.  Then  he  joins  the 
ranks  of  his  company  and  goes  through  two  years' 
training  in  field  and  garrison  duties.  Especial 
emphasis  is  laid  on  the  summer  training  which  is 
devoted  to  extended  order  drill,  battle  tactics, 
patrolling,  outpost  duty,  and  maneuvers  under 
field  conditions. 

When  the  soldier  enlists  he  has  to  go  wherever 
the  needs  of  the  War  Office  may  dictate.  The  ma- 
jority of  the  regular  army  is  held  at  home,  but  a 
large  part  is  required  to  protect  and  maintain  or- 
der in  the  colonies.  The  distribution  of  the  peace 
strength  in  1912  was : 

British  Isles   134,339 

India    75,884 

Other  colonies    45,215 

Total    481,365 

This  long  service  makes  the  British  Army  one 
of  seasoned  veterans  that  is  probably  superior  to 
any  other,  man  for  man.  Its  great  defect  is  its 
relative  paucity  in  numbers  as  compared  with  the 
vast  armies  now  used  in  war.  While  Great 
Britain  is  putting  260,000  men  in  the  field  in  Eu- 


The  British  System  63 

rope,  France  from  a  smaller  population  can  send 
to  the  front  700,000.  In  active  reserves  Great 
Britain  falls  still  further  behind,  while  of  second 
line  reserves  she  has  none  at  all. 

The  soldiers  transferred  to  the  active  reserve 
receive  a  small  stipend  and  have  to  keep  the  near- 
est county  office  informed  of  their  address.  In 
case  of  war  they  report  to  the  nearest  recruiting 
office  and  are  then  assigned  wherever  men  are 
needed.  From  this  source  Great  Britain  counts 
on  augmenting  her  fighting  force  with  138,000 
trained  men. 

The  Boer  War  developed  the  need  of  having  a 
home  battalion  to  provide  a  steady  supply  of  men 
to  replace  the  losses  due  to  battle  and  sickness. 
Indeed  this  was  one  of  the  principal  objects  of 
the  Reserve  Act  of  1907.  By  it  a  special  reserve 
is  organized  which  provides  a  third  battalion  for 
every  regiment  of  infantry.  The  members  are  re- 
quired to  have  six  months'  preliminary  training 
and  to  attend  a  two  weeks'  camp  every  year. 
They  continue  their  civilian  vocations,  but  are 
called  into  service  on  mobilization  for  war.  This 
third  battalion  does  not  go  to  the  front,  but  forms 
a  depot  for  maintaining  the  fighting  strength  of 
the  two  battalions  in  active  service. 


64  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

This  "special  reserve"  furnishes  also  the  depot 
units  for  cavalry,  field  artillery  and  the  other 
arms,  performing  like  functions  in  maintaining 
the  fighting  strength  of  the  active  unit.  The  spe- 
cial reserve  has  been  still  further  developed  for 
the  infantry  branch,  and  provides  enough  addi- 
tional battalions  to  furnish  a  fourth  one  to  some 
of  the  regiments.  This  battalion  does  not  take 
the  field  at  once,  but  can  do  so  after  a  short  train- 
ing period  on  account  of  drawing  on  the  depot 
battalion  for  its  best  material. 

The  special  reserve  furnishes  an  immediate 
strengthening  of  the  field  army  by  providing,  in 
addition  to  the  above,  a  large  part  of  the  men  to 
man  the  supply  service  of  the  army.  This  serv- 
ice requires  a  large  percentage  of  the  enrolled 
strength,  about  one  man  in  five.  Men  direct  from 
civil  pursuits  can  take  hold  readily  of  these  duties 
and  thus  release  the  trained  soldiers  for  the  serv- 
ice on  the  firing  line.  These  auxiliary  services  in- 
clude not  only  the  forwarding  of  the  immense 
quantities  of  food  required  for  armies,  but  also 
cover  the  furnishing  of  ammunition,  clothing, 
medicines,  tentage,  horses,  and  the  performance 
of  the  clerical  duties  at  the  various  headquarters. 

The  Territorial  Force  corresponds  to  the  Na- 


The  British  System  65 

tional  Guard  in  the  United  States.  The  men  drill 
on  special  dates  throughout  the  year  and  every 
summer  have  a  week  or  two  in  camp.  They  may 
be  sent  anywhere  in  the  Empire  for  service,  but 
may  not  be  sent  beyond  its  limits  except  with  their 
consent.  They  are  primarily  a  "home  guard'* 
force. 

The  territorials  are  administered  and  are 
largely  maintained  by  the  County  Associations 
under  the  supervision  of  the  War  Office.  For 
their  summer  camps  they  receive  the  same  pay 
as  the  regular  army.  Enlistment  is  for  four  years 
and  may  be  repeated  until  the  man  is  forty  years 
old.  They  are  organized,  on  the  same  system  as 
the  regular  forces,  into  fourteen  divisions  and 
fourteen  cavalry  brigades.  The  officers  hold  per- 
manent commissions  and  are  tested  and  trained 
by  field  service  in  summer,  and  by  examinations 
for  promotion.  The  total  strength  of  this  force 
in  1912  was  315,408  men. 

On  mobilization  for  war  the  fourteen  divisions 
of  territorials  are  called  out  for  active  service  and 
are  gathered  in  division  camps  near  their  home 
districts.  A  strenuous  course  of  training  is  fol- 
lowed in  marching,  shooting  and  maneuvering  un- 
der campaign  conditions.     The  British  plan  pro- 


66  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

vides  six  months  of  this  training  as  a  prerequisite 
for  the  arduous  demands  of  field  service. 

The  territorials,  however,  augment  the  military 
strength  of  the  nation  from  the  day  of  the  first 
call.  Members  who  have  had  experience  in  active 
service  are  allowed  to  transfer  to  the  regulars  and 
volunteers  for  immediate  service  at  the  front. 
Others  transfer  to  the  supply  services.  The  home 
garrisons  of  regulars,  replaced  by  territorials,  can 
be  sent  with  little  delay  to  join  the  fighting  force. 
And  the  territorials  can  also  be  sent  to  garrison 
oversea  stations,  such  as  Bermuda,  Gibraltar,  etc., 
releasing  their  garrisons  of  regulars  for  further 
reenforcement  of  the  armies  at  the  front. 

It  is  of  especial  interest  to  Americans  to  follow 
the  use  made  by  Great  Britain  of  her  military 
forces.  Our  system  is  founded  on  the  same  lines, 
and  will,  in  following  the  innate  principles  of  our 
social  system,  develop  on  similar  lines  to  those 
of  the  British.  When  we  see  how  small  the  army 
of  Great  Britain  is  in  comparison  with  the  hosts 
of  France,  Germany,  Austria,  Eussia  and  Japan, 
it  makes  us  realize  the  great  weakness  of  the 
United  States  in  case  any  nation  should  consider 
that  our  policy  conflicts  with  its  interests. 

For    the    further    development    of    military 


The  British  System  67 

strength  Great  Britain  has  to  depend  on  volunteer 
regiments  raised  for  the  war.  By  assigning  to 
some  of  these,  only  men  who  have  had  experience 
in  service,  she  can  get  a  few  regiments  available 
for  early  service,  but  the  bulk  of  the  volunteers 
will  be  entirely  raw  troops.  Without  the  element- 
ary training  necessary  to  fit  them  to  take  care  of 
themselves  in  the  field,  they  would  merely  clog  up 
the  hospitals  and  die  in  droves  without  adding 
proportionately  to  the  strength  at  the  front. 

The  British  have  profited  by  the  ill-success  of 
the  American  policy  with  its  enormous  waste  of 
lives  due  to  the  system  of  allowing  untrained 
troops  to  ** spring  to  arms"  and  to  rush  to  the 
front  without  knowledge  of  either  tactics  or  sani- 
tation. It  is  far  within  the  limits  of  actual  possi- 
bilities to  state  that  one-half  of  the  sick  and  dead 
could  have  been  saved  in  the  Mexican  War,  the 
Civil  War,  and  the  Spanish  War  if  our  people  had 
realized  the  seriousness  of  war.  The  urgent  pop- 
ular cry  of  ''on  to  the  front"  has  caused  more 
suffering  and  deaths  than  have  all  the  bullets  of 
our  wars. 

Great  Britain  avoids  this  by  requiring  a  rigid 
course  of  training.  The  men  are  allowed  to 
''spring  to  arms,"  but  they  are  held  in  training 


68  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

camp  for  six  months.  Without  training  in  shoot- 
ing and  marching  a  soldier  is  of  little  value  on  the 
firing  line.  But  without  training  in  cooking,  care 
of  food,  feet  and  body,  care  of  his  own  health  and 
that  of  all  around  him,  the  soldier  will  have  little 
chance  to  get  as  far  as  the  firing  line.  It  takes 
time  to  impress  all  of  this  on  the  recruit.  He  has 
to  learn  an  entirely  new  system  of  living  in  addi- 
tion to  learning  a  new  trade.  The  greater  the 
civilization  of  the  nation,  the  greater  will  be  the 
time  required  for  adaptation  to  the  rough  and  al- 
most savage  conditions  of  life  in  campaign. 

Out  of  the  call  for  300,000  volunteers  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  European  War,  the  British  have 
probably  obtained  over  100,000  veterans  of  serv- 
ice, ready  to  go  to  the  front  after  a  few  weeks  to 
get  back  into  training.  The  remainder  of  the  first 
call,  and  practically  all  of  the  second  call  of  500,- 
000  volunteers  must  be  trained  in  first  principles 
before  they  can  augment  the  British  military 
strength. 

In  military  resources  Great  Britain  has  well 
over  5,000,000  men.  In  military  strength,  in  men 
ready  for  service  in  her  armies  at  home,  she  has 
less  than  700,000.  Either  Italy  or  Japan  could 
overwhelm  her  in  two  months  if  they  could  reach 


The  British  System  69 

her.    Her  military  strength  Has  not  in  her  5,000,- 
000  young  men,  but  in  her  navj^  that  gives  time  for 
her  military  resources  to  be  converted  into  mili- 
tary strength. 
The  British  military  forces  consisted  in  1912  of: 

Home  Regular  Army,  peace  strength 134,339 

Araiy  Reserves  138,000 

Special  Reserves 87,927 

Home  Regular  Forces 360,266 

Regular  Army  in  India  75,884 

Regular  Army  in  other  Colonies 45,214 

Total  Regular  Forces  481,364 

Territorials,  British  Isles   .•.315,408 

Canad^ :     Permanent  Force    . . .     5,000 

Active  Militia   62,037 

Reserve  Militia  39,346  106,383 

Indian   Army    162,000 

Australian  Militia  and  Regulars 46,400 

Total  1,111,555 

The  militia  of  South  Africa,  New  Zealand,  and 
the  smaller  British  Colonies  will  add  at  least 
100,000  more  men  of  various  degrees  of  military 
training. 


CHAPTER  VI 

MOBILIZATION  AND  CONCENTRATION 

The  wars  of  the  last  half  century  have  shown 
that  a  nation  cannot  depend  upon  her  standing 
army  alone  for  defense.  It  can  serve  only  as  a 
first  line  to  delay  operations  until  the  manhood  of 
the  nation  can  be  organized  into  armies  and  moved 
to  the  threatened  points.  This  involves  two 
operations;  first  the  companies  must  be  enlisted 
to  full  strength  and  assembled  into  regiments,  and, 
second,  the  regiments  must  be  transported  to  the 
place  assigned  them  at  the  front.  This  places 
them  as  part  of  a  definite  division,  corps,  and 
army. 

The  mobilization  is  greatly  facilitated  if  skele- 
ton organizations  have  been  provided  in  time  of 
peace  and  if  trained  men  are  available  to  fill  up 
the  companies.  All  that  they  then  need  to  fit  them 
for  war  is  a  short  period  of  training  to  enable 
them  to  gain  team  work.  This  is  the  object  of  the 
great  reserve  systems  of  all  the  leading  countries 
of  the  world  except  the  United  States. 

70 


Mobilization  and  Concentration        71 

When  war  is  imminent  an  order  is  issued  for 
mobilization  on  a  war  footing.  The  first  efforts 
are  directed  to  raising  the  active  army  to  full 
strength  and  dispatching  it  to  the  front,  and  only 
when  its  mobilization  is  well  started,  is  that  of  the 
first  line  or  reserves  commenced.  The  successive 
lines  of  reserves  are  in  turn  taken  up ;  as  one  per- 
fect unit  is  worth  much  more  than  two  unformed 
ones,  each  line  is  fully  provided  for  before  the 
next  is  called. 

The  protection  afforded  Great  Britain  by  her 
navy  has  relieved  her  of  the  necessity  of  such  vast 
development  of  reserve  military  strength  as  is 
found  on  the  continent.  Her  regular  army  and 
reserves  include  only  a  small  percentage  of  her 
young  men  of  fighting  age.  Her  territorials 
might  be  considered  as  corresponding  to  the  land- 
wehr,  or  second  reserve,  of  the  continental  sys- 
tems. For  the  bulk  of  her  fighters  in  a  great  war 
she  has  to  depend  upon  newly  organized  volun- 
teers. As  these  would  be  worse  than  useless  un- 
less trained  in  the  elementary  principles  of  field 
service,  her  war  policy  must  provide  for  a  delay 
of  six  months  or  more  before  her  full  military 
strength  can  be  brought  to  bear. 


72         The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

THE   BRITISH   SYSTEM 

On  the  proclamation  of  the  king  commanding 
the  mobilization  of  the  British  army,  all  of  the  re- 
serves are  at  once  summoned  to  the  colors  to  fill 
up  the  fighting  arms  to  war  strength.  The  supply 
service  is  manned  by  the  special  reserves.  The 
reserve  (third)  battalion  of  each  regiment  takes 
the  stations  from  which  the  two  active  battalions 
are  moved  and  forms  the  depot  battalion.  They 
make  good  the  losses  of  the  two  battalions  at  the 
front  and  train  the  newly  enlisted  recruits. 

The  extra  reserve  battalions  form  fourth  bat- 
talions for  the  regiments  and  are  at  once  avail- 
able for  field  service. 

The  mobilization  proclamation  calls  the  Terri- 
torials into  active  service,  and  provides  a  force 
315,000.  These  men  have  learned  the  rudiments 
of  military  training  in  their  armory  drills  and  in 
the  two  weeks  of  annual  camp,  but  time  and  train- 
ing are  needed  to  fit  them  for  the  arduous  duties 
of  campaign.  The  British  system  provides  for  a 
siK  months  training  period  for  this  purpose. 

This  system  makes  about  four  fifths  of  the  regu- 
lar army  at  home  stations  available  for  early  serv- 
ice at  the  front.    As  the  home  army  totals  180,000 


Mobilization  and  Concentration        73 

and  the  army  reserve  150,000,  Great  Britain's 
*' quick  striking"  force  is  about  260,000  men. 

The  value  of  the  Territorials  is  also  realized  in 
advance  of  the  six  months'  training  period  in  two 
ways.  Members  of  the  Territorials  who  have  had 
experience  in  the  regular  army  or  in  campaign 
are  permitted  to  transfer  to  the  regulars  or  volun- 
teers. Still  more  important,  the  Territorials  may 
be  sent  to  garrison  outlying  stations  of  the  Em- 
pire, releasing  the  garrisons  of  regulars  for  serv- 
ice at  the  front. 

Since  all  of  the  above  sources  provide  only  about 
800,000  men,  Great  Britain  is  forced  to  have  re- 
course to  newly  recruited  volunteer  organizations 
in  order  to  form  the  armies  needed  for  a  great 
war.  These  are  entirely  recruits,  except  for  a 
sprinkling  of  officers  of  some  experience.  A  long 
training  period  is  needed  to  work  them  into  shape. 

The  Territorials,  special  reserves,  and  volun- 
teers are  assembled  in  great  camps,  as  at  Alder- 
shot,  where  every  effort  is  made  to  hasten  their 
training.  At  the  same  time  the  administrative 
and  supply  reserves  are  organized  and  gradually 
gotten  into  smooth  running  order  for  discharging 
the  immense  task  of  controlling  and  supplying 
such  numbers  of  men. 


74  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

The  essential  feature  in  which  the  British  or 
the  American  mobilization  differs  from  that  of  a 
continental  nation  is  that  the  greater  part  of  the 
organization  has  to  be  carried  out  after  the  war 
has  already  started.  Time  is  necessary  to  prop- 
erly coordinate  the  many  departments  of  work  and 
excessive  haste  means  only  waste  and  weakness. 
The  full  development  of  military  strength  by  this 
system  demands  as  a  prerequisite  the  delay  by 
some  means  of  the  enemy's  invasion  for  a  six 
months'  period. 

CONTINENTAI.  SYSTEM 

For  the  nations  on  the  continent  of  Europe  the 
onset  of  an  enemy's  army  must  be  met  with  little 
delay;  indeed  quick  striking  power  is  more  im- 
portant than  military  resources  in  gaining  vic- 
tories. This  is  well  shown  in  the  Seven  Weeks' 
War  of  Prussia  and  Mecklenburg  against  Austria, 
Bavaria,  Hanover,  and  Saxony  in  1866.  The  un- 
derlying cause  was  the  desire  of  Prussia  to  oust 
Austria  from  the  German  Confederation  and  to 
inherit  her  hegemony.  Prussia's  population  was 
in  round  numbers  19,000,000  while  that  of  Austria 
was  35,000,000;  including  the  allies  on  both  sides 
the  populations  were  23,000,000  against  49,000,000. 


MobiKzation  and  Concentration        75 

But  against  the  superior  resources  of  the  Allies, 
Prussia  had  her  wonderful  rapidity  of  mobiliza- 
tion and  concentration  due  to  the  careful  planning 
of  her  Minister  of  War,  von  Moltke. 

War  was  declared  by  Austria  on  June  17  and 
her  armies  moved  north  in  the  effort  to  take  ad- 
vantage of  the  salient  of  Bohemia  and  Moravia 
for  an  advance  on  Berlin.  The  Prussians  con- 
centrated in  three  armies  near  Gorlitz  and  Glatz 
in  Silesia  and  Torgan  just  north  of  the  Saxon 
border.  So  carefully  had  von  Moltke  followed  the 
Austrian  movements  that  he  was  able  to  hasten 
the  final  Prussian  concentration  by  keeping  the 
armies  separated  until  the  very  day  of  the  great 
battle.  On  July  3  the  three  Prussian  armies, 
united  on  the  battlefield  of  Koniggratz,  and  so 
decisively  defeated  the  Austrian  regular  army 
that  the  defense  of  Vienna  against  the  Prussian 
advance  was  hopeless.  On  July  26  hostilities 
were  suspended  and  the  preliminaries  of  peace 
were  signed.  In  less  than  seven  weeks  Prussia 
by  the  ''quick  striking  power"  of  her  military 
system  had  overthrown  Austria  and  her  allies  in 
spite  of  their  apparent  superiority  in  military 
strength  and  resources. 

The  Prussian  system  has  since  been  copied  by 


76         The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

all  of  the  Continental  Powers,  and  may  be  taken 
as  a  sample  of  all.  The  basic  principle  is  that 
every  man  must  have  a  definite  assignment  for 
war,  that  his  equipment  must  be  stored  waiting 
for  him,  that  he  must  report  at  a  definite  place  to 
join  his  company  and  to  be  outfitted,  and  above  all 
that  every  plan  be  checked  up  every  year  and  re- 
vised so  as  to  be  always  up-to-date. 

The  present  German  system  may  be  taken  as 
typical.  The  twenty-four  corps  districts  are  each 
divided  into  four  brigade  districts,  which  are  in 
turn  divided  into  four  to  six  landwehr  districts, 
immediately  charged  with  the  records  and  duties 
of  maintaining  the  preparedness  of  the  reserves 
for  prompt  mobilization.  The  landwehr  district 
is  under  a  field  officer  of  the  retired  list  of  the 
army  who  has  a  sufficient  staff  to  carry  on  the 
many  duties  of  the  office.  This  district  headquar- 
ters does  not  take  the  field  in  case  of  war,  but 
remains  to  provide  for  calling  out  the  successive 
lines  of  reserves  and  for  training  and  forwarding 
the  recruits  for  the  armies  at  the  front. 

At  the  district  headquarters  are  kept  complete 
lists  of  every  man  in  the  district  of  military  age 
17  to  45,  including  his  age,  reserve  assignment, 
occupation,  residence,  and  every  item  of  military 


Mobilization  and  Concentration        77 

value.  The  men  who  are  to  be  called  to  fill  up  the 
active  army  to  war  strength  are  on  one  roll,  those 
for  each  reserve  company  on  another,  those  for 
each  landwehr  company  on  yet  another,  and  sim- 
ilarly for  the  ersatz  reserves  and  the  landsturm. 
Notices  are  made  out  for  every  man;  the  method 
of  notification  whether  by  wire  or  messenger  is 
selected;  even  the  route  by  which  the  man  is  to 
proceed  to  the  designated  assembly  point  is  ex- 
actly laid  down.  Nothing  is  left  to  chance. 
Every  detail  is  covered.  To  provide  for  natural 
changes  the  whole  system  is  revised  annually. 

The  district  headquarters  is  largely  a  record 
and  administrative  bureau  that  starts  the  mobili- 
zation going.  The  work  is  then  taken  up  and  car- 
ried on  by  the  reserve  officers  called  into  service. 
These  men  are  obtained  by  transfer  from  the  reg- 
ular army  or  by  promotion  from  the  ranks  as  de- 
scribed in  Chapter  IV.  Each  officer  has  his  as- 
signment, has  to  learn  by  heart  his  duties  for  each 
of  the  eight  days  assigned  to  mobilization,  and  is 
tested  at  definite  intervals  on  his  ability  to  do  his 
part. 

The  reservists  are  collected  in  groups  near  their 
homes  and  under  a  sergeant  proceed  to  their  com- 
pany station.    Here  they  are  issued  the  equip- 


78  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

ments  held  in  store  for  them  and  are  put  through 
drills  to  get  them  back  into  training.  Wagons 
and  company  equipage  are  drawn  from  the  store- 
rooms, draft  animals  are  commandeered,  and  the 
organization  stands  ready  to  move  to  the  front; 
that  is,  has  completed  its  mobilization. 

In  order  to  obtain  the  enormous  amount  of  trans- 
portation required  for  an  army  in  the  field  the 
landwehr  district  officer  keeps  a  record  of  every 
animal,  and  vehicle  in  his  district.  A  special 
bounty  is  given  to  owners  of  horses  and  automo- 
biles that  answer  military  requirements.  A 
yearly  assessment  of  value  is  made  and  part  of 
the  mobilization  includes  summoning  the  owners  to 
deliver  their  animals  and  vehicles  at  designated 
points. 

It  is  readily  seen  that  the  resources  of  the  dis- 
trict are  strained  to  the  limit  to  secure  the  rapid 
despatch  of  the  active  army  to  the  front.  The 
reserve  divisions  follow  close  behind.  At  the 
same  time  the  youths  and  the  ersatz  reserves  are 
called  into  the  depots  to  be  ready  to  maintain  the 
fighting  strength  of  the  fighting  armies.  The  suc- 
cessive classes  of  reserves  are  notified  to  be  ready 
and  are  called  out,  each  as  the  mobilization  of  the 
preceding  class  is  effected.    The  reason  for  the 


Mobilization  and  Concentration        79 

successive  calls  spread  over  many  days,  is  ap- 
parent. 

The  stages  of  mobilization  are  well  illustrated 
by  that  of  the  German  army  for  the  war  against 
France  in  1870.  **At  the  opening  of  the  Franco- 
German  war,  the  army  of  the  North  German  Con- 
federation numbered  about  304,000  men.  The 
plan  of  mobilization  called  for  a  field  army  of 
578,000  men,  159,000  horses,  and  1284  guns;  a 
depot  force  of  194,000  men,  23,000  horses,  and  246 
guns ;  a  reserve  and  garrison  force  of  209,000  men, 
17,000  horses,  and  162  field  guns. 

^'The  order  for  mobilization  was  telegraphed 
from  Berlin  on  the  night  of  July  15,  and  the  fol- 
lowing day,  three  days  before  the  declaration  of 
war,  was  appointed  for  the  first  day  of  mobiliza- 
tion. On  the  first  and  second  days  the  calls  were 
issued  for  the  reserves,  men  on  furlough,  and  the 
owners  of  horses,  and  the  regiments  began  sending 
details  to  bring  back  their  quotas.  In  the  infan- 
try, on  the  third  day  arms  and  ammunition  were 
drawn  from  the  artillery  depots,  and  carriages  and 
harness  were  made  ready  for  the  horses.  On  the 
fourth  day  the  horses  arrived,  and  the  infantry 
field  trains  were  organized.  On  the  fifth  day  the 
men  on  furlough  returned  and  were  equipped.     On 


80  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

the  sixth  and  seventh  days  the  reserves  appeared 
and  were  armed,  clothed  and  equipped ;  each  man 
had  been  allowed  twenty-four  hours'  delay  to  ar- 
range his  affairs.  On  the  eighth  day  the  regiment 
was  reported  ready  for  field  service. 

''Cavalry  and  field  artillery  required  a  day  or 
two  longer  than  infantry,  and  the  organization  of 
the  siege,  engineer  and  general  supply  trains,  a 
few  days  more  than  the  mounted  services.  How- 
ever by  the  evening  of  the  eighth  day,  the  mobili- 
zation of  the  field  army  was  so  nearly  complete 
that  its  transportation  to  the  front  was  begun  the 
next  day,  July  24. 

* '  While  the  field  army  was  being  mobilized,  the 
depot  troops  were  being  formed.  Each  infantry 
regiment  formed  a  depot  battalion,  each  cavalry 
regiment  a  depot  squadron,  and  each  regiment  of 
artillery  a  depot  battalion ;  the  other  services  also 
organized  their  depot  units.  The  depot  troops 
were,  as  a  rule,  composed  of  partially  instructed 
recruits  and  ersatz  reserve  men.  The  reserve  and 
garrison  troops  were  formed  of  the  extra  reserve 
and  landwehr  men;  the  youngest  classes  were  as- 
signed to  reserve  battalions,  and  the  oldest  to  the 
garrison  troops.  The  number  of  extra  men  of  the 
reserve  and  first  contingent  of  the  landwehr  fur- 


Mobilization  and  Concentration        81 

nished  about  two  battalions  of  reserve  troops  for 
every  regiment  of  tbe  field  army. "  ^ 

When  the  troops  are  trained  and  fully  equipped 
with  arms,  ammunition  and  a  smooth  w^orking 
supply  service,  they  are  ready  to  take  care  of 
themselves  in  the  field.  They  can  be  moved  about 
as  needed ;  that  is,  they  are  mobilized. 

The  next  step  is  to  bring  together  the  scattered 
regiments  into  divisions  and  corps,  and  the  con- 
centration of  these  in  armies  at  the  front.  Where 
the  troops  are  trained  and  the  working  of  the 
division  organization  has  been  tested  in  frequent 
maneuvers,  the  two  steps  above  outlined  can  be 
combined  and  the  regiments  can  be  moved  direct 
to  their  places  at  the  front,  the  divisions,  corps 
and  armies  being  assembled  all  at  the  same  time. 
The  concentration  is  necessarily  a  period  of  vul- 
nerability. To  protect  their  armies  while  the  com- 
manding general  is  making  sure  of  having  them 
well  in  hand,  the  leading  continental  powers  have 
constructed  extensive  border  fortifications. 

Where  the  corps  are  not  sufiiciently  organized 
and  trained  for  field  service  the  concentration  is 
carried  only  as  far  as  division  or  corps  camps 
where  the  newly  organized  regiments  are  broken 

1  From  "Strategy,"  by  Col.  G.  J.  Fiebeger. 


82  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

in  and  the  men  are  taught  to  shoot,  march  and 
take  care  of  themselves  in  campaign.  Such  were 
the  great  camps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  or- 
ganized under  McClellan  in  the  winter  of  1861- 
1862  and  the  camps  of  the  various  corps  in  1898 
at  Mt.  Gretna,  Falls  Church,  Augusta,  Mobile,  St. 
Augustine  and  Tampa.  Great  Britain  now  has 
the  great  majority  of  her  military  forces  in  such 
camps,  where  they  are  getting  the  training  and 
outfitting  necessary  for  service  at  the  front. 

The  concentration  of  the  armies  on  the  border  is 
planned  by  the  General  Staff  of  the  country.  The 
problem  is  so  enormous  that  it  cannot  be  realized 
until  one  begins  to  take  count  of  the  details.  The 
first  need  is  rail  or  water  transportation.  One 
hundred  and  fifty  separate  trains  are  required  to 
transport  the  men,  animals,  guns,  wagons  and 
necessary  baggage  of  an  army  corps.  A  single 
track  railroad  can  handle  only  about  fifty  trains  a 
day  in  one  direction,  so  more  than  three  days 
single  track  service  is  required  for  every  corps 
transported.  And  after  arrival,  a  steady  supply 
of  food,  ammunition  and  recruits  must  be  for- 
warded to  maintain  the  fighting  strength  of  the 
army.  This  great  rail  problem  is  the  simplest 
part  of  the  transportation  and  supply,  for  it  is 


Mobilization  and  Concentration        83 

definite  and  can  be  planned  ahead  of  time.  The 
difficult  part  comes  after  leaving  boat  or  train, 
when  the  armies  have  to  spread  out  over  broken 
country  and  the  enormous  supplies  have  to  be  for- 
warded by  w^agons  and  automobiles. 

So  much  is  the  strategic  planning  of  concentra- 
tion dependent  upon  rail  lines  that  both  France 
and  Germany  have  in  the  last  generation  spent 
large  sums  in  building  connecting  links  so  that  the 
commercial  rail  lines  would  service  the  military 
demands.  Since  1909  Germany's  special  efforts 
have  been  the  construction  of  a  number  of  freight 
yards  and  long  sidings,  to  facilitate  the  detraining 
of  troops  in  Lorraine  between  Metz  and  the  Saar 
Eiver  and  in  Rhenish  Prussia  between  Dusseldorf 
on  the  Rhine  and  the  Belgian  frontier.  One  of  the 
conditions  of  the  French  loans  to  Russia  in  recent 
years  has  been  that  a  portion  should  be  spent  to 
improve  the  rail  facilities  for  moving  troops  into 
Poland. 

The  units  must  be  kept  together  in  the  concen- 
tration; the  ten  trains  required  for  an  in- 
fantry regiment  must  follow  closely  behind  each 
other.  Time  schedules  are  made  out  for  every 
move:  from  barracks  to  the  station;  entraining; 
start  of  train ;  meal  stops ;  arrival  at  destination ; 


84  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

detraining ;  march  to  camp  or  cantonment.  Train 
schedules  are  prearranged,  providing  for  rapid 
forwarding  of  trains  in  the  ruling  direction,  and 
for  the  prompt  return  of  empties.  An  enormous 
amount  of  detailed  work  is  necessary  in  order  to 
provide  for  the  maximum  use  of  all  rolling  stock 
and  the  minimum  delay  in  movement  of  troops. 

On  the  outbreak  of  war  all  the  railroads  of  the 
continental  nations  are  put  under  military  control. 
[Until  the  active  armies  have  been  moved  to  the 
front,  the  entire  service  is  devoted  to  this  end. 
Thereafter  the  supply  trains  have  right  of 
way,  but  it  is  possible  also  to  carry  some  com- 
mercial traffic.  When  the  reserve  armies  have 
completed  this  mobilization,  the  railroads  are 
again,  during  this  movement  to  the  front,  monop- 
olized by  the  military  service.  There  are  then 
successive  periods  of  entire  stoppage  of  ordinary 
traffic  followed  by  periods  of  limited  commercial 
service. 

In  the  concentration  of  corps  to  form  armies 
there  is  a  limit  to  the  number  of  men  that  can  be 
controlled  by  one  commanding  general.  He  must 
carry  in  his  head  the  location  and  duties  of  each 
superior  unit  of  his  command,  through  the  con- 
stantly  changing   conditions    of   the    campaign. 


Mobilization  and  Concentration        85 

The  Second  German  Army  in  1870  had  at  first 
seven  infantry  corps  and  one  cavalry  corps,  but 
it  was  broken  up  into  two  armies  after  Metz  was 
reached.  Six  army  corps,  or  250,000  men,  seems 
to  be  of  numbers  for  effective  control. 

One  of  the  most  effective  concentrations  of  re- 
cent wars  was  that  of  the  Germans  in  1870.  Their 
reserves  were  called  out  July  16.  Each  corps  was 
mobilized  in  the  district  from  which  it  was  re- 
cruited, and  the  troops  were  moved  according  to 
prearranged  detailed  plans  from  their  districts  to 
the  points  of  concentration,  in  the  Bavarian 
Palatinate,  protected  by  the  fortresses  at  Coblentz, 
Mayence,  and  Germersheim  in  their  rear.  Their 
first  attitude  was  defensive,  but  as  concentration 
was  completed,  and  the  expected  offensive  move- 
ment of  the  French  failed  to  materialize,  the  Ger- 
mans secured  all  the  advantages  of  the  initiative. 

Their  armies  were  organized  as  follows : 

The  First  Army,  on  the  right,  consisted  of  the 
ArCI  and  VIII  Corps,  and  one  cavalry  division,  and 
was  later  reenforced  by  the  I  Corps  and  another 
cavalry  division,  bringing  its  strength  to  about 
85,000  men  and  270  guns. 

The  Second  Army,  in  the  center,  consisted  of 
the  III,  IV,  X  and  the  Guard  Corps  with  two  cav- 


86  The  Modern  Amiy  in  Action 

airy  divisions,  and  the  cavalry  of  the  Guard  Corps. 
It  was  later  reenforced  by  the  II,  IX,  and  XII 
Corps,  bringing  its  strength  to  about  200,000  men 
and  630  guns. 

The  Third  Army,  on  the  left,  was  composed  of 
the  V  and  XI  Prussian  Corps,  the  I  and  II  Bava- 
rian Corps,  the  Baden  and  Wurtemburg  divisions, 
and  one  cavalry  division.  It  was  later  reenforced 
by  the  VI  Corps  and  one  cavalry  division,  bringing 
its  strength  to  about  175,000  men  and  576  guns. 

The  concentration  was  ordered  as  follows: 
First  Army  at  Wittlich  in  front  of  Coblentz ;  Sec- 
ond Army  at  Homburg  in  front  of  Mayence,  and 
the  Third  Army  at  Landau  in  front  of  Mannheim. 
This  was  practically  completed  on  the  Rhine  from 
Coblentz  to  Mannheim  by  July  31,  and  on  August 
3,  the  line  Carlsruhe-Landau-Kaiserlautern-Neun- 
kirchen  was  occupied  by  the  Second  and  Third 
Armies,  with  the  First  Army  threatening  Sarre- 
louis. 

This  concentration  of  320,000  men  and  1000 
guns  in  eighteen  days,  reenforced  to  460,000  men 
and  1476  guns  four  days  later,  armed  and  fully 
supplied  for  a  successful  offensive  campaign,  sur- 
prised the  world.  With  the  improvements  in 
transportation  the  concentrations  of  the  present 


>i  bfi 


Mobilization  and  Concentration        87 

war  brought  together  still  greater  armies  in  equal 
time. 

The  problems  of  the  countries  engaged  in  the 
European  War  of  1914,  in  the  concentration  of 
their  armies  on  their  borders  may  be  well  under- 
stood by  marking  on  a  map  the  peace  locations  of 
their  corps.     The  administrative  centers  are: 

France  :  I  Corps,  Lille ;  11  Crops,  Amiens ;  III 
Corps,  Eouen ;  IV  Corps,  Le  Mans ;  V  Corps,  Or- 
leans; VI  Corps,  Chalons-sur-Marne;  VII  Corps, 
Besangon;  VIII  Corps,  Bourges;  IX  Corps, 
Tours ;  X  Corps,  Rennes ;  XI  Corps,  Nantes ;  XII 
Corps,  Limoges;  XIII  Corps,  Clermont-Ferrand; 
XIV  Corps,  Lyons;  XV  Corps,  Marseilles;  XVI 
Corps,  Montpellier;  XVII  Corps,  Toulouse; 
XVIII  Corps,  Bordeau;  XIX  Corps,  Algiers;  XX 
Corps,  Nancy. 

Germany:  Imperial  Guards,  Berlin;  I  Corps, 
Koenigsberg;  II  Corps,  Stettin;  III  Corps,  Ber- 
lin; IV  Corps,  Magdeburg;  V  Corps,  Posen;  VI 
Corps,  Breslau ;  VII  Corps,  Miinster ;  VIII  Corps, 
Coblentz;  IX  Corps,  Altona;  X  Corps,  Hanover; 
XI  Corps,  Cassel;  XII  Corps,  Dresden;  XIII 
Corps,  Stuttgart;  XIV  Corps,  Carlsnihe;  XV 
Corps,  Strassburg;  XVI  Corps,  Metz;  XVII 
Corps,    Dantzic;    XVIII    Corps,    Frankfort-on- 


88  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

Main;  XIX  Corps,  Leipsic;  XX  Corps,  Allenstein; 
XXI  Corps,  Saarbrucken;  I  Bavarian  Corps, 
Munich;  II  Bavarian  Corps,  Wurzburg;  and  III 
Bavarian  Corps,  Nuremburg. 

Austria:  I  Corps,  Cracow;  II  Corps,  Vienna; 
III  Corps,  Graz;  IV  Corps,  Budapest;  V  Corps, 
Poszony;  VI  Corps,  Kascliau;  VII  Corps,  Temes- 
var;  VIII  Corps,  Prague;  IX  Corps,  Leitmeritz; 
X  Corps,  Przemysl;  XI  Corps,  Lemberg;  XII 
Corps,  Hermannstadt ;  XIII  Corps,  Agram;  XIV 
Corps,  Innsbruck;  XV  Corps,  Sarajevo;  XVI 
Corps,  Ragusa. 

Russia  draws  recruits  for  each  corps  from  terri- 
torial districts  but  stations  them  near  the  western 
border.  Before  the  outbreak  of  the  war  the  dis- 
tribution was  reported  as:  First  Army,  St. 
Petersburg,  6  Corps;  Second  Army,  Vilna,  4 
Corps;  Third  Army,  Warsaw,  4  Corps;  Fourth 
Army,  Kiev,  5  Corps;  Fifth  Army,  Odessa,  2 
Corps;  Sixth  Army,  Moscow,  5  Corps;  Seventh 
Army,  Kazan,  2  Corps,  and  Ninth,  Caucasia,  3 
Corps.  There  were  also  5  Corps  in  Eastern 
Siberia,  and  24  cavalry  divisions  distributed 
among  the  above  stations  and  the  district  of  the 
Don. 

Great  Britain  is  divided  into  seven  commands 


Mobilization  and  Concentration        89 

with  headquarters  at  Aldershot,  Tidworth,  Lon- 
don, Dublin,  Chester,  York  and  Edinburgh.  The 
Aldershot  command  includes  an  army  corps  main- 
tained in  readiness  for  prompt  despatch  to  any 
seat  of  war. 

The  publicly  announced  dates  for  the  mobiliza- 
tion of  the  active  armies  and  reserves  in  the  great 
European  War  were:  Austria  on  July  25;  Rus- 
sia on  July  29;  Germany  on  July  31;  France  on 
August  1 ;  and  Great  Britain  on  August  4. 


CHAPTER  VII 

TRANSPORTATION  AND  SUPPLY 

So  enormous  are  the  supplies  tliat  must  be  fur- 
nished to  armies  of  the  size  with  which  modern 
wars  are  fought,  that  their  campaigns  are  largely 
governed  by  this  consideration.  In  the  days  of 
Napoleon  great  wagon  trains  were  formed  with 
convoys  of  troops  to  protect  them  during  their 
march  to  the  front.  The  break  down  of  this  serv- 
ice due  to  the  failure  to  make  proper  allowance 
for  the  difficulties  of  traversing  the  dirt  roads  of 
Russia  was  principally  responsible  for  the  col- 
lapse of  the  campaign  to  Moscow  in  1812.  Prior 
to  the  last  decade  campaigns  of  large  forces  were 
entirely  limited  to  theaters  that  could  be  readily 
supplied  by  rail  and  water  routes.  The  develop- 
ment of  automobile  transport  extends  this  sphere 
to  include  regions  of  paved  roads.  But  not  even 
this  improved  transportation  can  overcome  the 
obstacles  of  mud  or  mountains. 

In  the  American  Civil  War  President  Lincoln 
was  particularly  interested  in  the  advance  of  the 

90 


I 


Transportation  and  Supply  91 

Northern  armies  from  Cincinnati  to  Knoxville, 
in  the  valley  of  the  Tennessee,  in  order  to  support 
the  local  population  that  was  largely  Unionist  in 
sjTupathies.  Every  commanding  general  was 
urged  by  the  President  to  prosecute  this  cam- 
paign. In  spite  of  every  support  of  numbers, 
equipment,  supplies,  and  administrative  backing, 
every  general  reported  this  move  as  an  unwise 
waste  of  forces  due  to  the  impossibility  of  main- 
taining supplies  when  dependent  solely  upon 
wagon  transport  along  the  long  line  of  communi- 
cations over  the  dirt  roads  of  the  low  country 
and  over  the  rocky  roads  of  the  mountains.  Due 
to  a  rail  route  for  supplying  the  army  it  was  a  less 
difficult  military  problem  to  conduct  a  campaign 
of  600  miles  through  Louisville,  Nashville,  and 
Chattanooga  to  Knoxville  than  it  was  to  advance 
250  miles  on  the  direct  line  over  the  mountains. 

So  dependent  are  military  operations  upon  lines 
of  railroad  that  the  major  portion  of  the  rail  de- 
velopment of  central  Europe  during  the  last  sixty 
years  has  been  determined  in  route  and  location 
by  military  requirements  rather  than  by  commer- 
cial needs.  A  glance  at  a  map  of  Germany  will 
show  a  network  of  railways  in  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine, although  the  commercial  demand  is  very 


92  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

small.  Between  Cologne  and  the  Belgian  border 
is  another  similar  network,  but  one  more  war- 
ranted by  the  amoimt  of  local  traffic.  One  of  the 
French  conditions  for  the  large  loans  to  Russia 
in  recent  years  was  reported  to  be  the  construc- 
tion of  strategic  railways  to  the  Polish  border. 

Not  only  are  railroads  necessary  for  the  supply 
service,  but  also  for  the  rapid  transportation  to 
the  front  of  the  corps  that  form  the  army.  So 
absorbing  is  interest  in  the  activities  of  the  troops 
after  their  arrival  at  the  front  that  we  overlook 
the  problem  of  transporting  them.  To  move  one 
single  army  corps  with  its  supplies  and  field 
transport  requires  160  railroad  trains.  These 
cannot  be  moved  forward  one  behind  the  other; 
they  would  congest  the  track  for  twelve  miles. 
An  experience  like  this  occurred  at  Tampa  in  1898 
during  the  despatch  of  the  first  expedition  to 
Cuba.  This  small  movement  of  17,000  men 
swamped  the  rail  facilities  of  the  Florida  seaport. 
Every  switch  was  filled,  yet  cars  were  stacked  up 
along  the  track  for  miles. 

The  main  line  of  the  railroad  is  not  the  only 
need ;  there  must  also  be  an  ample  supply  of  side 
tracks  long  enough  to  hold  a  complete  train  so 
that  all  cars  may  be  unloaded  at  once.    For  the 


Transportation  and  Supply  93 

prompt  and  convenient  concentration  of  a  corps 
one  hundred  and  sixty  of  these  side  tracks  would 
be  required.  But  each  separate  command  of  the 
armies  of  a  large  nation  contains  four  to  six  corps. 
A  careful  time  chart  must,  then,  be  worked  out  for 
routing  trains  in  both  directions  so  as  to  get  the 
empty  cars  out  of  the  way  of  the  loaded  trains. 
And  this  reduces  the  capacity  of  the  railroads  so 
that  the  rate  of  concentration  at  the  frontier  be- 
comes approximately  an  army  corps  every  three 
days  for  every  single  line  of  track. 

In  this  preparation  for  concentration  Germany 
leads  the  world.  Since  1909  her  principal  rail 
development  has  been  the  construction  of  great 
concentration  yards  at  the  rail  centers  in  Lor- 
raine and  in  Rhenish  Prussia.  France  followed 
suit  in  the  district  south  and  east  of  Nancy,  but 
had  not  provided  facilities  equal  to  those  of  the 
Germans  when  the  "War  of  1914  broke  out.  It 
was  this  provision  for  the  rapid  delivering  of 
armies  on  the  border  that  aided  Germany  in  con- 
centrating such  enormous  armies  on  her  frontier 
within  a  few  days  of  the  outbreak  of  war. 

In  the  transportation  of  such  immense  armies 
as  are  involved  in  this  war  every  detail  must  fit 
in  like  clockwork.    If  any  clog  slips  it  may  stop  the 


94  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

whole  works.  Plans  are  made  up  far  in  advance 
and  are  kept  up  to  date  by  yearly  revisions.  A 
schedule  is  made  out  for  days  counting  from  the 
date  of  the  mobilization  order.  Every  day  has  its 
assigned  duties  for  every  organization  in  prepara- 
tion for  mobilization  and  for  entraining.  The 
complete  time  schedule  for  the  train  is  prepared 
ready  for  use  when  the  state  takes  over  the  rail- 
ways for  the  war  service.  The  destination  of 
every  regiment  is  planned,  as  is  the  assignment 
of  its  units  to  the  twelve  trains  required  for  its 
transportation.  The  exact  hour  of  departure  is 
scheduled,  and  so  are  the  times  and  places  for  tak- 
ing on  water  and  coal,  for  passing  other  trains 
and  for  stopping  for  meals  for  the  troops.  Even 
the  stations  at  these  meal  stops  are  prepared  to 
furnish  definite  amounts  of  water,  coffee,  and  hot 
soup  at  definite  times  to  the  troops  as  they  come 
through.  The  stop  is  only  for  time  sufiicient  for 
each  man  to  fill  his  canteen,  cup,  and  pan;  bread 
is  served  and  the  meal  is  eaten  while  under  way. 

All  of  these  plans  are  completely  prepared  to 
the  last  detail  by  the  branches  of  the  General 
Staff  and  the  Supply  Corps  during  times  of  peace. 
Every  regimental  commander  has  his  complete 
orders   filed  at  his   headquarters.    Just  as  the 


Transportation  and  Supply  95 

British  fleet  was  started  against  Germany  by  a 
brief  wireless,  reported  as  being  **Go  ahead,"  so 
at  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  the  War  Office  of 
each  nation  needs  only  to  send  a  short  message 
directing  the  execution  of  the  orders  already  filed. 

The  influence  of  rail  routes  on  campaigns  is 
most  notably  shown  in  the  Manchurian  campaign 
of  the  Eusso-Japanese  War  of  1904-1905.  The 
whole  fighting  was  limited  to  the  one  single  track 
railroad  from  Dalny  north  to  Mukden.  The  bat- 
tles consisted  of  contending  lines  squarely  across 
the  railroad,  while  the  few  detached  moves  were 
based  on  the  railroad  and  were  sent  out  only  far 
enough  to  maneuver  against  the  enemy's  flank. 

Next  to  railways,  water  routes  are  most  neces- 
sary for  military  campaigns.  The  importance  of 
navigable  rivers  in  facilitating  the  advance  of 
armies  is  shown  in  the  two-year  campaign  against 
Vicksburg,  where  the  advances  by  land  were 
checked  at  Shiloh,  luka,  Corinth,  and  Holly 
Springs.  It  was  only  after  control  of  the  Missis- 
sippi was  gained  that  the  advance  down  the  river 
enabled  the  Union  Army  to  successfully  carry  out 
the  campaign  that  had  seemed  well  nigh  hopeless 
by  land. 

In  Grant's  campaign  against  Richmond  in  1864 


96  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

his  plan  of  campaign  was  based  on  keeping  in 
touch  with  water  transportation.  At  Spottsyl- 
vania  Courthouse  his  army  was  based  on  Acquia 
Creek  and  the  Potomac  Eiver;  for  the  next  ad- 
vance the  base  was  moved  to  Port  Royal  on  the 
Rappahannock.  Later  it  was  moved  to  West 
Point  on  the  York  River,  and  finally  to  the  James, 
as  the  successful  advance  reached  the  vicinity  of 
Petersburg. 

Command  of  the  sea  is  of  immense  strategic 
value  in  enabling  the  dominant  nation  to  strike 
where  it  will.  Such  was  the  condition  that  enabled 
Great  Britain,  during  the  Seven  Years'  War  of 
Prussia  and  Great  Britain  against  the  rest  of 
Europe  to  capture  and  hold  her  present  great  de- 
pendencies, Canada  and  India.  It  was  British 
naval  predominance  again  during  the  Napoleonic 
era  that  protected  the  nation  from  the  fate  that 
overtook  the  continental  countries. 

In  the  campaign  under  General  Kitchener  in 
1898  for  the  reconquest  of  Khartoum  and  the 
Soudan  the  essential  factor  of  the  British  success 
was  the  use  of  the  Nile  for  transportation,  supple- 
mented by  the  special  military  railroad  built  dur- 
ing the  campaign  to  parallel  its  banks  and  to  carry 
supplies  around  its  rapids. 


Transportation  and  Supply  97 

Whether  the  supplies  be  forwarded  to  the  ad- 
vanced base  by  rail  or  water  the  final  distribution 
must  be  made  to  the  companies  by  wagon  or  auto- 
truck. The  wagon  has  the  advantage  that  it  can 
get  through  almost  any  difficulties  of  road  or 
ground,  where  the  auto  would  be  hopelessly  stuck. 
The  autotruck,  though,  can  carry  as  much  as  five 
wagons  and  can  go  ten  times  as  far.  When  the 
mules  or  horses  are  tired  at  the  end  of  their  four- 
teen mile  haul  the  wagon  must  stop.  The  automo- 
bile, however,  needs  only  a  change  of  chauffeur  to 
keep  going,  as  long  as  gasoline  and  a  relief  of 
chauffeurs  can  be  provided.  For  a  country  of 
well  developed  highways  like  France  or  Germany 
the  auto  facilitates  greatly  the  supply  and  also 
the  transportation  of  troops.  It  supplements  and 
augments  the  rail  service  and  increases  enor- 
mously the  mobility  of  armies. 

For  the  maintenance  of  the  fighting  strength  of 
the  army  at  the  front  it  must  be  furnished  a  steady 
supply  of  food  and  a  sufficient  store  of  ammuni- 
tion to  keep  it  always  ready  for  vigorous  physical 
efforts  and  for  the  fullest  possible  development  of 
rifle  and  artillery  fire.  A  man  can  easily  fire  300 
rounds  of  rifle  ammunition  during  a  battle,  while 
a  field  gun  is  limited  only  by  the  number  of  shells 


98  The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

that  can  he  supplied  during  the  course  of  the  en^ 
gagement. 

No  country  can  hope  to  manufacture  during 
wartime  the  large  amount  of  ammunition  used  up 
in  the  first  battles.  It  would  cripple  her  armies 
from  the  start  and  would  expose  them  to  defeat  by 
equal  forces  aided  by  better  equipment.  After  a 
couple  of  months  of  war  the  factories  can  expand 
their  facilities  sufficiently  to  supply  the  steady 
demand,  but  the  munitions  for  the  first  few  weeks 
must  be  provided  in  times  of  peace  and  stored 
ready  for  war. 

Complete  stocks  of  rifles,  field  guns,  and  their 
accessories  are  manufactured  or  purchased  in  suf- 
ficient numbers  to  equip  the  largest  armies  that 
the  nation  will  have  call  to  put  in  the  field.  They 
are  then  labeled  for  assignment  to  special  organi- 
zations on  mobilization  and  are  stored  in  separate 
groups,  ready  for  prompt  issue  when  the  emer- 
gency arises. 

Food  supplies  are  more  difficult  to  store,  but 
are  more  easy  to  obtain  in  case  of  need.  Conse- 
quently no  large  stocks  are  maintained  in  times 
of  peace  except  at  the  fortresses  along  the  fron- 
tiers. Since  the  headquarters  will  be  strained  to 
the  limit  by  the  ordinary  demands  of  mobilization 


Transportation  and  Supply  99 

and  concentration,  it  can  ill  afford  at  this  urgent 
time  to  be  burdened  with  the  provisioning  of  these 
strongholds.  Consequently  each  fortress  main- 
tains even  in  peace  times  a  store  of  hard  bread, 
salt  meat,  flour  and  dried  vegetables,  sufficient  to 
subsist  its  garrison  for  several  months  in  the 
event  of  a  siege.  In  this  way  the  forts  form  sup- 
porting points  along  the  frontier,  ready  to  check 
and  delay  any  sudden  invasion  of  the  enemy,  thus 
gaining  time  for  the  concentration  of  their  own 
armies  in  rear. 

Such  a  function  was  perfoi*med  by  the  fortress 
of  Metz  in  1870,  which  by  its  control  of  the  direct 
railroute,  delayed  the  German  advance  on  Paris 
until  their  military  engineers  could  construct  a 
by-pass  from  Remilly  to  Pont-a-Mousson  to  carry 
their  trains  past  Metz  without  coming  under  the 
fire  of  its  forts.  Such  also  was  the  part  played 
by  Liege  and  Namur  at  the  outbreak  of  the  pres- 
ent war. 

In  order  to  be  ready  for  war  the  supply  depart- 
ment must  keep  track  of  all  available  food  sup- 
plies and  must  be  prepared  to  obtain  prompt 
possession,  of  such  as  would  be  needed  on  the  call 
for  mobilization.  In  order  to  provide  for  the 
large  and  continuous  demands  when  the  armies 


100        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

take  tlie  field,  great  depots  are  formed  at  the  rail 
centers,  where  provisions  of  all  sorts  are  col- 
lected. These  are  then  forwarded  as  needed  to 
advanced  bases  close  to  the  battle  line. 

When  large  armies  are  in  the  field  they  will 
quickly  eat  up  all  stocks  of  provisions  if  the  com- 
munication with  the  home  depot  is  broken.  At 
the  same  time  they  cannot  be  burdened  with  the 
immediate  care  of  large  stocks  of  stores  that 
would  not  be  needed  for  a  number  of  days.  Such 
excessive  trains  appreciably  limit  the  mobility  of 
the  command  and  detract  from  its  fighting  value. 

It  was  this  factor  that  helped  to  delay  the  suc- 
cess of  the  British  campaign  against  the  Boers  in 
1900.  The  Boers  lived  on  a  simple  ration,  largely 
collected  in  the  theater  of  operations,  while  the 
major  part  of  the  British  columns  were  incom- 
moded by  long  trains  carrying  the  supplies  which 
their  troops  were  accustomed  to  demand.  The 
lighter  equipment  enabled  the  Boer  commandos  to 
attack  in  one  place,  and  then  move  rapidly  to  de- 
liver another  attack  in  another  district.  This 
activity  made  it  necessary  for  Great  Britain  to 
send  to  South  Africa  a  force  several  times  the 
strength  of  the  Boer  armies  before  she  could  over- 
come them. 


Transportation  and  Supply  101 

"While  the  army  must  reduce  its  baggage  trains 
to  the  minimum,  it  must  also  take  precautions 
against  a  failure  of  the  supply  of  food.  This  is 
done  by  the  maintenance  of  the  advanced  bases  at 
the  railheads  or  at  the  nearest  boat  landings. 
From  this  point  the  supplies  are  sent  forward  in 
trains  of  wagons  or  automobiles,  which  are  organ- 
ized so  that  each  train  carries  enough  rations  for 
one  division  for  one  day.  A  constant  stream  of 
trains  between  the  advanced  base  and  the  front  is 
thus  kept  up,  the  aim  being  to  keep  always  within 
reach  of  the  troops  enough  rations  for  three  days. 
The  schedule  of  service  is  laid  out  so  that  a  loaded 
train  will  arrive  at  the  front  just  as  the  one  al- 
ready there  is  emptied  of  its  stores.  This  latter 
then  returns  to  the  base  to  replenish  and  to  con- 
tinue the  service. 

So  important  is  the  safeguarding  of  an  army's 
supplies  that  it  demands  a  care  and  attention  only 
exceeded  by  the  strategic  planning  of  maneuvers 
to  defeat  the  enemy.  The  feeding  of  an  army  is 
necessary  to  its  fighting;  the  best  of  troops  cannot 
survive  the  physical  weakening  and  moral  strain 
consequent  upon  deprivation  of  proper  nourish- 
ment. The  general  in  command,  while  watching 
the  enemy  in  front,  must  also  keep  an  eye  on  his 


102        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

line  of  communications,  for  any  move  against  tMs 
line  threatens  him  in  a  vital  point.  The  line  of 
communications  is  like  an  artery  nourishing  the 
arm ;  if  the  artery  be  cut,  the  arm  loses  its  strik- 
ing power.  Only  if  the  flow  of  blood  be  quickly 
restored,  can  the  limb  be  saved  from  destruction 
and  its  fighting  power  be  restored. 

At  all  times  the  supply  trains  en  route  to  the 
front  require  a  guard  to  prevent  thefts,  and  when 
in  a  hostile  territory  this  protection  requires  a 
large  armed  force.  The  trains  stretch  over  a 
great  deal  of  road,  about  one  mile  to  every  100 
vehicles.  When  in  an  invasion  the  trains  are  ex- 
posed to  raids  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  their  de- 
fense may  require  a  small  army.  Their  capture 
may  seriously  influence  the  whole  campaign. 

In  the  invasion  of  Austria  by  Frederick  the 
Great  in  1758  his  campaign  was  defeated  and  he 
was  forced  to  abandon  the  siege  of  Olmutz  on  ac- 
count of  the  capture  of  a  great  train  of  3000  wag- 
ons. In  the  consequent  retreat  to  Prussia  he  had 
to  detach  one  half  of  his  army  to  protect  the 
4000  wagons  that  carried  his  war  materials  and 
supplies. 

In  1846  at  the  beginning  of  the  Mexican  War, 


Transportation  and  Supply         103 

General  Taylor  found  the  supply  of  his  army  on 
the  Eio  Grande  opposite  Matamoros  so  threatened 
by  the  Mexican  detachments  in  his  rear  that  he 
had  to  take  his  entire  army,  except  one  regiment, 
to  march  back  25  miles  to  the  base  at  Point  Isabel 
in  order  to  bring  forward  in  safety  the  supplies 
needed  for  the  maintenance  of  his  troops. 

In  December,  1862,  Grant's  campaign  against 
Vicksburg  had  advanced  to  Oxford,  200  miles 
south  of  his  base  at  Columbus,  Kentucky,  and  30 
miles  south  of  his  advanced  base  at  Holly  Springs, 
Mississippi.  In  the  last  two  weeks  of  the  year 
the  Confederate  cavalry  leader  Forrest  cut  his 
communications  by  destroying  60  miles  of  rail- 
road near  Jackson,  Tennessee,  while  Van  Dorn 
captured  the  base  at  Holly  Springs.  By  hard 
marching  on  half  rations  Grant's  army  escaped 
to  Memphis,  but  the  campaign  by  this  route  was 
defeated. 

Kail  communication  must  likewise  be  thor- 
oughly protected  from  interruption  in  order  to 
permit  a  vigorous  prosecution  of  the  campaign  at 
the  front.  In  the  campaign  of  Sherman  from 
Chattanooga  to  Atlanta  in  1864,  he  reached  the 
latter  city  with  82,000  men.    The  guarding  of  the 


104        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

long  line  of  rail  back  through  Chattanooga  to 
Nashville  had  caused  the  detachment  of  115,000 
men. 

All  of  this  preparation  and  organization  is  to 
the  end  of  supplying  daily  bread  and  meat  to  the 
soldier  at  the  front,  the  man  who  does  the  fight- 
ing. He  is  already  loaded  with  a  nine  pound  rifle, 
150  rounds  of  ammunition,  with  blanket,  rain  cape, 
haversack,  mess  kit,  and  an  extra  pair  of  shoes. 
His  total  pack  runs  from  fifty  to  sixty  pounds  in 
the  various  countries.  Hence  by  furnishing  ra- 
tions daily  this  addition  to  his  load  is  kept  small. 

However,  prudence  dictates  that  he  shall  have  a 
certain  provision  in  case  of  a  failure  to  receive 
rations  when  due,  and  this  is  provided  by  requir- 
ing every  man  to  carry,  in  addition  to  the  day's 
subsistence,  a  second  full  ration,  and  one  or  more 
emergency  rations.  These  last  are  compressed 
cakes  of  chocolate,  biscuit,  and  dried  meat.  A 
cake  the  size  of  a  man's  hand  furnishes  nourish- 
ment for  a  day  if  divided  into  three  morsels,  but 
it  is  far  from  satisfying. 

The  staple  items  of  the  ration  must  necessarily 
be  such  that  they  will  stand  heat  and  storage  with- 
out serious  loss  in  nutriment  or  flavor.  In  all 
nations  these  consist  of  about  13  oz.  salt  meat,  26 


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Transportation  and  Supply  105 

oz.  of  hard  bread  and  7  oz.  of  rice  or  peas,  with 
small  portions  of  sugar,  salt,  and  coffee.  Every 
effort  is  made  to  supplement  the  diet  by  fresh 
meat  and  vegetables,  levied  or  purchased  in  the 
immediate  vicinity  of  the  troops.  This  living  off 
the  country  is  carried  much  further  in  Europe 
than  it  is  in  the  British  or  American  practise. 
The  collection  of  all  available  supplies  in  the  dis- 
trict occupied  is  especially  the  duty  of  the  supply 
officer  of  every  division.  The  forwarding  of  the 
necessary  additional  items  from  the  depots  is  a 
routine  matter  in  which  he  is  only  an  agent.  He 
is  immediately  responsible  for  the  full  utilization 
of  the  resources  of  his  district. 

The  importance  of  this  method  of  subsistence  is 
twofold.  It  varies  and  improves  the  diet  of  the 
men,  and  still  more  important,  it  relieves  the  line 
of  communications  of  the  transportation  of  sup- 
plies to  a  large  extent.  It  is  rare  that  complete 
subsistence  can  be  obtained  by  this  means  and 
then  only  for  a  limited  time.  The  deficiencies 
must  in  every  case  be  made  up  by  supplies  for- 
warded from  the  depots. 

Two  methods  of  utilization  of  local  resources 
are  used.  One  is  to  estimate  the  stock  of  food 
in  the  district  and  then  to  levy  all  that  can  be 


106        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

taken  without  immediate  privation  for  the  resi- 
dents. Since  the  cities  will  have  a  smaller  pro- 
portion of  food  than  country  districts,  their  defi- 
ciency is  made  up  by  cash  levies.  In  home  terri- 
tory or  a  friendly  country  the  supplies  are  paid 
for  at  once ;  in  a  hostile  district  they  may  be  taken 
without  payment. 

The  other  method,  always  used  in  Europe  as 
far  as  possible,  is  to  billet  the  troops  upon  the 
householders.  Every  householder  is  assumed  to 
be  able  to  feed  and  shelter  a  number  of  soldiers 
equal  to  that  of  his  family  for  a  five  day  period. 
Thereafter  the  billeting  is  continued  for  shelter, 
but  rations  are  furnished  by  the  military  supply 
service.  This  system  also  saves  the  supply  serv- 
ice the  burden  of  providing  and  carrying  large 
stores  of  tentage.  In  the  home  country  the  pay- 
ment for  billeting  is  so  liberal  that  it  is  sought  for 
during  maneuvers  by  the  housewives  as  a  money- 
making  proposition. 

When  billeting  cannot  be  carried  out  the  com- 
panies mess  as  units  whenever  possible.  The 
meat  and  vegetable  components  are  put  in  to- 
gether and  are  made  into  a  stew  in  the  big  boilers 
and  fireless  cookers  with  which  each  company  is 
provided.    The  fireless  cookers,  built  into  carts, 


Transportation  and  Supply  107 

are  loaded  up  in  the  morning,  and  at  the  noon  halt 
have  a  supply  of  hot  coffee  and  soup  ready  to  sup- 
plement the  bread  that  the  men  have  carried  in 
their  haversacks.  It  is  even  attempted  to  provide 
fresh  bread  at  intervals  as  a  relief  to  the  monot- 
onous diet  of  hardtack.  Field  bakeries  are  pro- 
vided, one  for  each  division,  which  catch  up  with 
the  armies  for  every  prolonged  halt,  and  start  a 
regular  bread  service. 

So  enormous  is  this  task  of  supplying  armies  in 
the  field  that  unless  every  detail  is  carefully  pro- 
vided for,  the  operations  of  the  armies  may  be 
seriously  embarrassed.  It  can  be  handled  only 
by  spreading  out  the  responsibility,  by  decentrali- 
zation. This  is  accomplished  by  making  each 
army  corps  independent  in  its  service. 

The  chief  supply  officer,  on  the  staff  of  the  corps 
commander,  has  entire  charge  of  the  advanced 
base  for  his  corps  and  of  the  automobile  and 
wagon  transport  for  forwarding  supplies  from  the 
advanced  base  to  the  front.  He  sends  into  the 
nearest  general  depot  'timely  requisitions  in  order 
to  maintain  in  the  advanced  base  a  ten-day  supply 
of  all  classes  of  supplies.  The  railroad  service 
or  communication  service  is  then  responsible  for 
delivering  the  stores  in  bulk,  by  the  train  load,  to 


108        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

the  commander  of  the  advanced  hase.  The  or- 
ganization there  divides  np  the  items  and  makes 
np  the  shipments  to  the  divisions  and  regiments. 

While  the  ration  service  is  more  emphasized 
above  as  being  the  largest  problem,  the  supply  of 
ammunition,  clothing  and  forage  is  carried  out  in 
a  similar  way  and  by  the  same  organization. 

Ammunition  is  forwarded  from  the  advanced 
base  only  when  combat  has  made  necessary  the 
replenishing  of  the  stock  at  the  front.  The  col- 
umns for  the  service  are  made  up  of  the  caissons 
used  with  the  field  artillery  so  that  the  individual 
caissons  can  take  their  places  in  batteries  to  re- 
place those  whose  supply  has  been  used  up.  Sim- 
ilar caissons  are  provided  to  haul  the  rifle  cart- 
ridges to  the  infantry,  but  ordinary  vehicles  can 
be  used  if  necessary. 

Hay  is  enormously  bulky ;  consequently  the  con- 
tinental armies  attempt  to  furnish  only  grain  for 
the  animals.  These  are  expected  to  pick  up 
enough  "roughness"  to  balance  their  feed.  On 
rapid  raids  or  forced  marches  the  conditions  are 
especially  hard  on  the  horses.  To  exhaustion  is 
added  insufficient  feeding ;  the  consequent  wastage 
of  animals  amounts  to  large  figures. 

The  issues  of  clothing  form  an  item  whose  im- 


Transportation  and  Supply  109 

portance  is  easily  overlooked.  Conditions  of 
campaign  use  up  clothes  fast ;  every  three  months 
the  soldier  will  need  a  complete  new  outfit.  Shoes 
seem  almost  to  melt  away  in  the  marching  in  dew 
and  mud.  Any  Civil  War  veteran  can  tell  tales 
of  the  *' fadeaways"  of  the  issues  of  that  period. 
The  life  of  the  best  shoes  is  about  thirty  days. 

To  these  difficulties  further  complications  are 
added  by  winter.  Modern  wars  require  that  fight- 
ing shall  go  on  irrespective  of  the  weather,  so 
extra  precautions  must  be  taken  to  mitigate  the 
hardships  of  the  season.  Heavy  overcoats,  mits, 
hoods,  and  foot  wrappings  must  be  furnished  in 
abundance.  The  service  is  enough  to  sorely  tax 
the  resources  of  the  state. 

Since  every  wagon,  truck,  and  gun  carriage 
must  have  a  driver,  since  the  railroads  and  mili- 
tary arsenals  must  be  manned,  working  force  must 
be  provided,  and  guards  everywhere,  it  is  readily 
seen  that  the  supply  service  uses  up  a  large  part 
of  the  enrolled  military  strength  of  the  state. 
This  total  service,  called  the  service  of  the  rear, 
easily  uses  up  twenty  per  cent,  of  the  men  called 
into  service.  However,  the  older  men  are  used 
for  these  duties,  so  that  the  pick  of  the  fighting 
strength  of  the  state  stays  with  the  fighting  line. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
PRINCIPLES  OF  STRATEGY 

War  may  generally  be  classified  as  offensive  or 
defensive.  Defensive  warfare  frequently  changes 
to  offensive  operations  when  opportunity  offers, 
for  nothing  but  negative  results  may  be  expected 
from  strictly  defensive  action.  A  nation  may  not 
wish  war,  but  having  war  forced  upon  it,  may,  as 
the  best  method  of  defending  its  integrity,  assume 
the  offensive,  carry  the  war  into  the  enemy's  coun- 
try, and  compel  a  peace  upon  its  own  terms.  The 
terms  offensive  warfare  and  defensive  warfare 
are  used  for  convenience,  and  are  generally  de- 
scriptive of  the  character  of  the  causes  of  the  war. 
It  must  not  be  assumed,  however,  that  in  an  offen- 
sive war  the  government  which  provoked  the  war 
is  continually  the  attacker  and  that  the  opponent 
is  continually  on  the  defensive. 

The  causes  and  nature  of  the  war  determine 
necessarily  which  party  in  the  first  instance  at 
least  must  seek  the  offensive.  In  the  Spanish- 
American  War,  for  example,  the  United  States 

110 


Principles  of  Strategy  111 

demanded  of  Spain  the  removal  of  its  military 
forces  from  the  Island  of  Cuba.    When  Spain  re- 
fused this  demand  and  the  United  States  declared 
war,  the  mission  which  our  government  imposed 
upon  itself  determined  the  nature  of  the  military 
operations  to  be  undertaken  by  it.    To  forcibly 
oust  the  Spanish  army  from  Cuba,  required  of- 
fensive warfare.     There  are  occasions,  however, 
where  both  governments  assume  the  offensive  at 
the  outbreak  of  war,  both  strategically  and  tacti- 
cally.    This  is  usually  the  case  where  the  contend- 
ing governments  have  both  prepared  for  a  war 
believed  to  be  inevitable,  where  they  are  contigu- 
ous states,  and  where  the  war  is  the  result  of  racial 
or  commercial  differences  or  strivings.     At  the 
outbreak  of  the  present  war  in  Europe  both  Ger- 
many and  France  assumed  the  strategical  and 
tactical    offensive,    Germany    attacking    through 
Belgium,  and  France  through  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine.    This  might  be  termed  the  double  offensive, 
and  is  based  on  the  knowledge  that  affirmative  re- 
sults can  only  be  looked  for  by  offensive  action 
and  by  the  ability  to  contain  the  theater  of  active 
military  operations  within  the  enemy's  territory. 
The  main  opposing  armies  may  meet  in  the  same 
theater  head  on,  or  they  may  as  in  the  instance 


112        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

cited,  strike  in  separate  theaters.  Where  the  op- 
posing armies  meet  head  on,  the  result  of  the 
earlier  battles  will  determine  which  is  compelled 
to  resort  to  the  defensive.  When  they  are  operat- 
ing in  different  theaters  it  is  obvious  that  the  re- 
sults in  one  theater  will  quickly  and  vitally  affect 
the  operations  in  the  other.  Much  depends  upon 
celerity  and  early  results.  The  aggressor  who  in 
his  own  theater  first  wins  success,  and  follows  it 
up  with  all  the  means  at  hand,  will  usually  find 
that  the  enemy's  offensive  campaign  in  the  other 
theater  is  stopped  in  order  to  move  troops  there- 
from to  stay  the  retreat  in  the  other  theater.  To 
prevent  this,  the  successful  party  usually  causes 
the  troops  acting  on  the  defensive  in  the  theater 
where  the  enemy  attacked,  to  in  turn  attack  the 
enemy  and  make  every  effort  to  assume  the  offen- 
sive. This  action  while  frequently  causing  infe- 
rior forces  to  attempt  the  offensive  against  greatly 
superior  forces,  is  often  justified  when  the  result 
prevents  the  enemy  from  moving  large  forces  to 
the  rescue  of  their  army  being  driven  back  in  the 
other  theater. 

All  the  general  officers  of  experience  in  war,  and 
all  the  writers  on  the  subject  of  war,  make  men- 
tion of  the  great  value  to  an  army  of  early  success 


Principles  of  Strategy  113 

in  war.  Initial  success  raises  the  morale  of  the 
army,  increases  the  fighting  spirit  of  the  men  and 
stimulates  the  organizations  which  did  not  partici- 
pate to  seek  opportunity  to  share  in  the  glory  of 
victory.  Initial  defeat  on  the  other  hand  usually 
lowers  the  morale  of  the  army,  lessens  the  keen- 
ness for  combat  and  tends  psychologically  to  in- 
vite organizations  to  assume  the  tactical  defensive. 
As  we  have  the  strategic  offensive  and  the 
strategic  defensive,  and  the  tactical  offensive  and 
the  tactical  defensive,  so  we  may  have  combina- 
tions of  these  wherein  an  army  operating  on  the 
strategic  defensive  may  adopt  temporarily  the 
tactical  defensive  and  conversely  an  army  on  the 
strategic  defensive  may  adopt  the  tactical  offen- 
sive. An  example  of  the  strategic  and  tactical  de- 
fensive is  presented  by  Lee 's  defense  of  Eichmond 
in  the  Wilderness  campaign.  Grant's  role  in  that 
campaign  illustrates  the  strategic  and  tactical  of- 
fensive. He  was  the  invader  and  the  attacker. 
When  in  1863  Lee  began  the  campaign  which  car- 
ried the  war  into  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania  and 
terminated  in  the  Battle  of  Gettysburg,  he 
dropped  the  strategic  defensive  and  adopted  the 
strategic  offensive.  At  Gettysburg  by  attacking 
the  Union  Army  he  assumed  the  tactical  offensive. 


114        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

If,  however,  he  had  awaited  an  attack  by  Meade, 
as  some  military  writers  claim  he  should  have 
done,  his  action  would  have  illustrated  the  stra- 
tegic offensive  and  the  tactical  defensive.  An 
example  of  the  strategic  defensive  and  the  tactical 
offensive  is  seen  in  Early's  defense  of  the  Shen- 
andoah Valley  in  1864.  Charged  with  the  defense 
of  the  Valley  he  saw  an  opportunity  to  attack 
Sheridan's  army  and  at  Cedar  Creek  in  October, 
1864,  assumed  the  tactical  offensive. 

The  combination  of  strategic  and  tactical  de- 
fensive offers  no  practical  and  enduring  results  in 
war  and  non-success  means  the  destruction  of  the 
army  and  loss  of  territory.  The  combination  of 
the  strategic  and  tactical  offensive  offers  the  de- 
struction of  the  enemy  and  the  occupation  of  his 
territory,  while  defeat  means  only  the  temporary 
abandonment  of  the  campaign.  The  other  com- 
binations are  frequently  desirable  by  reason  of 
special  circumstances  and  as  temporary  expedi- 
ents before  reassuming  the  strategic  and  tactical 
offensive.  The  determination  of  the  strategic 
role  to  be  assumed  is  largely  dependent  upon  poli- 
tics and  but  little  upon  the  will  of  the  commander, 
for  as  has  been  pointed  out,  strategy  is  but  a  con- 
tinuation of  politics.    Where  the  war  is  a  result 


Principles  of  Strategy  115 

of  the  political  offensive,  the  strategic  offensive 
follows  to  carry  out  the  national  policy.  Where 
the  political  policy  is  defensive,  the  strategic  role 
is  usually  though  not  necessarily  defensive. 

Strategy  prior  to  the  Napoleonic  era  was  largely 
concerned  with  maneuvering,  not  always  for  the 
purpose  of  forcing  the  issue  by  battle,  but  to  oc- 
cupy ground  and  to  assume  positions  believed  to 
have  important  bearing  on  the  objects  of  the  war. 
The  campaigns  of  Bonaparte,  however,  from  his 
activities  in  Northern  Italy  as  a  young  general 
of  twenty-eight,  exemplify  a  strategy  which  sought 
results  by  battle.  Bonaparte  maneuvered  for  the 
purpose  of  deceiving  the  enemy  and  to  lead  him 
to  dispose  his  forces  so  that  he  might  crusb  them 
in  detail.  But  always  the  maneuver  led  to  the 
crushing  issue  of  battle.  This  has  been  the  guid- 
ing principle  of  strategy  since  the  time  of  Napo- 
leon. His  rapid  marches,  powerful  strokes,  and 
daring  maneuvers,  have  been  subjects  of  admira- 
tion for  a  hundred  years,  but  in  the  early  days  of 
the  Napoleonic  era,  military  sentiment  was  not  by 
any  means  unanimous  in  approving  the  efficacy  of 
Napoleon's  methods.  One  German  writer  of  that 
time  advocated  that  one  ought  to  avoid  battles  and 
should  have  recourse  to  maneuvering;  that  to  be 


116        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

obliged  to  fight  a  battle  indicates  that  a  mistake 
must  have  been  committed  previously;  and  that 
every  victory  can  be  neutralized  by  operating 
strategically  against  the  flanks  and  rear  of  the 
enemy. 

No  consideration  of  the  subject  of  Strategy 
would  be  complete  without  reference  to  Jomini.^ 
This  French  officer,  at  twenty-six  years  of  age,  a 
major  on  the  staff  of  Marshal  Ney,  published  in 
Paris  in  1805  his  treatise  on  military  operations. 
This  work  made  a  great  impression  on  Napoleon 
who  is  reported  to  have  said  after  the  battle  of 
Austerlitz,  *' People  say  that  times  are  not  pro- 
gressing; here  is  a  young  battalion  commander, 
and  of  all  men  a  Swiss,  who  tells  us  things  which 
my  professors  never  told  me  and  which  few  gen- 
erals understand.  This  is  giving  away  to  the 
enemy  my  whole  system  of  war."  Jomini  dis- 
carded the  system  of  conducting  war  by  maneuver- 
ing for  position  and  advocated  what  Napoleon 
practised,  viz.,  the  use  of  force  with  the  utmost 
determination.  He  advocated  the  offensive  when- 
ever practicable,  pointing  out  that  the  offensive, 
if  successful,  permitted  the  victor  permanently  to 
retain  the  initiative,  thereby  compelling  the  enemy 

1  "Traite  des  grandes  operations  militaires,"  Jomini. 


Principles  of  Strategy  117 

to  conform  his  movements  to  those  of  the  victor. 
The  object  of  the  offensive  was  the  annihilation  in 
battle  of  the  opposing  army  and  the  relentless 
pursuit  of  escaping  columns. 

In  the  domain  of  strategy  the  Prussian  General 
von  Clausewitz  is  usually  regarded  as  Germany's 
greatest  military  theorist  and  philosopher.  He 
was  present  as  a  young  Prussian  officer  at  the 
battle  of  Jena,  and  later  he  was  for  a  time  in  the 
Russian  army  and  served  on  the  Russian  General 
Staff.  While  a  Russian  officer  he  had  consider- 
able experience  in  campaigns.  He  combined  with 
his  experience  in  war  a  thorough  grasp  of  mili- 
tary history.  His  work  on  war  was  not  published 
until  after  his  death.  Clausewitz  has  been  called 
the  real  schoolmaster  of  the  Prussian  army.  He 
advocated  aggressiveness  in  battle  as  the  means 
to  attain  the  object  of  war.  He  said,  ''Let  us  not 
hear  of  generals  who  conquer  without  bloodshed 
If  a  bloody  slaughter  is  a  horrible  sight,  then  that 
is  ground  for  paying  more  respect  to  war,  but  not 
for  making  the  swords  we  wear  blunter  and 
blunter  by  degrees,  from  feelings  of  humanity, 
until  some  one  steps  in  with  one  that  is  sharp  and 
lops  off  the  arm  from  our  body."  ^ 

2  "On  War,"  Book  IV,  chapter  11. 


118        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

In  connection  with  the  present  war  in  Europe, 
it  is  interesting  to  note  that  this  Prussian  author 
Clausewitz  stated,  *'The  defensive  is  the  stronger 
form  with  a  negative  object;  the  attack  is  the 
weaker  form  with  the  positive  object."  This 
doctrine  has,  since  the  time  it  was  written,  been 
continually  criticized  by  many  German  writers. 
One  German  authority  says,  "The  resolution  to 
act  on  the  defensive  is  the  first  step  to  irresolu- 
tion. ' '  ^  General  von  der  Goltz  who  at  the  pres- 
ent writing,  October,  1914,  is  German  Military 
Governor  of  Belgium,  in  his  work,  ''The  Nation 
in  Arms,"  says,  "The  idea  of  the  greater 
strength  of  the  defensive  is,  in  spite  of  all,  only  a 
delusion."  And  he  later  adds,  "And  to  make 
war,  means  attacking. ' '  ^  Even  more  interesting 
in  its  connection  with  the  present  war  in  Europe 
is  the  contrary  view  expressed  by  the  German 
General  von  Camerrer  in  his  work  on  the  ' '  Devel- 
opment of  Strategical  Science"  which  in  a  way 
seems  to  have  been  prophetic.  It  appeared  in 
1904.  He  says,  "If  at  some  future  occasion  our 
German  Empire  may  have  to  fight  for  life  in  sev- 
eral directions,  like  Prussia  in  the  Seven  Years' 

3  "Chief  System  of  Leading  Troops,"  Merkel,  page  35. 

4  "The  Nation  in  Arms"— Von  der  Goltz. 


Principles  of  Strategy  119 

"War,  we  can  surely  not  do  without  confidence  in 
the  power  of  defense;  and  it  would  be  very  re- 
grettable if  in  large  circles  the  feeling  prevailed 
that  irresolution  was  now  beginning  and  that  our 
cause  was  already  half  lost."  In  the  present  con- 
flict in  Europe  the  position  of  Germany  resembles 
very  much  the  situation  here  outlined  as  justifica- 
tion for  the  adoption,  temporarily  at  least,  of  the 
strategic  defensive;  but  the  adoption  of  the  de- 
fensive may  be  likened  to  the  parrying  movements 
of  the  pugilist — they  are  sometimes  necessary  as 
a  preparation  for  the  counter-stroke.  The  coun- 
ter-stroke might  rightfully  be  considered  as  an  in- 
tegral part  of  defensive  operations,  and  all  the 
accepted  authorities  on  strategy  advocate  the 
swift  and  vigorous  assumption  of  the  offensive  at 
the  right  moment. 

The  Nineteenth  Century  saw  material  changes  in 
the  conduct  of  war.  These  resulted  from  the  ex- 
tended use  of  railways  in  civilized  countries,  the 
improvement  of  public  highways,  the  introduction 
of  telegraphy  and  of  the  telephone,  and  the  in- 
creased range  and  power  of  fire  arms,  particu- 
larly of  field  artillery  cannon.  Roads  and  rail- 
roads not  only  directly  affect  the  rapidity  with 
which  troops  may  be  concentrated,  but  indirectly 


120        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

they  make  possible  the  utilization  of  vast  num- 
bers by  providing  means  for  their  supply.  With 
the  increase  in  the  number  and  capacity  of  loco- 
motives and  cars,  the  ability  to  transport  in  a 
given  time  a  stated  number  of  tons  of  supplies  has 
been  greatly  increased,  and  so  to-day  we  find  ac- 
tively engaged  on  the  continent  of  Europe  almost 
with  uninterrupted  fighting,  vast  numbers  of  men, 
which  prior  to  the  advent  of  the  modem  railway 
systems,  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  main- 
tain. 

Military  history  furnishes  examples  of  a  reali- 
zation on  the  part  of  those  charged  with  the  con- 
duct of  a  war,  of  correct  principles  to  be  applied 
in  the  solution  of  a  given  problem,  but  a  failure 
to  adopt  and  apply  such  principles  because  of 
irresolution  on  the  part  of  the  leader,  or  his  un- 
willingness to  shoulder  the  responsibility  of  the 
sacrijfices  to  be  incurred  in  carrying  out  the  opera- 
tions dictated  by  such  principles. 

Boldness  of  leadership  and  perseverance  of 
officers  and  men  are  as  much  a  part  of  applied 
strategy  as  are  the  abstract  principles  of  strategy. 
Every  great  general  has  been  the  possessor  of 
this  quality  of  boldness.  Not  always  is  this  qual- 
ity dressed  in  dramatic  habiliments.    Sometimes 


Principles  of  Strategy  121 

it  is  cloaked  by  an  exterior  of  quietness  and  taci- 
turnity.   But   nevertheless   among  the   qualities 
possessed  by  the  great  military  leader  will  always 
be  found  the  essential  one  of  boldness.    In  our 
own  history  we  have  only  to  reflect  on  the  cross- 
ing of  the  Delaware  by  Washington  in  the  dead  of 
winter,  and  his  bold  and  successful  attack  upon 
the  Hessians  at  Trenton.    The  great  Confederate 
General,  Lee,  well  exemplifies  the  quiet  and  ap- 
parently conservative  type  of  leader  whose  opera- 
tions were  nevertheless  characterized  at  times  by 
boldness  to  the  extreme.    Under  given  conditions 
he  did  not  hesitate  to  violate  accepted  principles 
of  strategy  to  accomplish  an  end  which  his  bold- 
ness led  him  to  believe  could  be  attained  with 
reasonable  safety  under  the  particular  circum- 
stances affecting  the  situation  at  the  time.    At 
Chancellorsville  in  the  face  of  the  enemy,  he  de- 
tached a  large  part  of  his  army  under  Jackson. 
Jackson's  Corps  made  a  long  flank  march  and 
falling  unexpectedly  on  the  right  wing  of  the 
Union  Army,  crumbled  it  up  and  threw  it  back  in 
such  disorder  that  the  Union  General  Hooker  felt 
his  offensive  powers  paralyzed,  and  the  battle  of 
Chancellorsville  was  lost  to  him. 
If  the  people  of  a  nation,  through  the  means 


122        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

obtained  from  successful  commerce,  indulge  them- 
selves in  the  enjoyments  of  comforts  to  such  an 
extent  that  what  might  be  termed  effeminacy  of 
feeling  results,  there  will  follow  a  degeneracy  of 
those  qualities  of  boldness  and  perseverance 
under  stress  so  essential  in  war.  These  qualities 
are  in  a  manner  the  tools  with  which  strategy 
must  work,  and  might  even  be  considered  parts  of 
the  machine  itself. 

The  great  military  teachers  have  recognized 
these  qualities  in  the  application  of  strategy,  and 
as  a  part  of  their  strategy  have  sought  to  develop 
them  among  their  people.  In  no  country  has  this 
effort  been  so  consistently  made  as  in  Germany, 
and  in  that  country,  as  exemplified  by  the  present 
war,  there  exists  among  the  people  an  intense 
willingness  to  accept  any  burdens  and  to  make  any 
sacrifices  for  the  furtherance  of  their  cause.  The 
German  people  interpret  the  black,  red  and  white 
of  their  national  colors  by  the  saying — ^'Durch 
Nacht  und  Blut  zur  Licht" — (Through  night  and 
blood,  to  light).  This  maxim  is  largely  the  actu- 
ating principle  of  German  military  teachings 
since  the  Napoleonic  era.  All  the  writings  of  the 
German  military  authors  breathe  this  spirit. 

The  English  writer  Colonel  F.  N.  Maude,  as  far 


Principles  of  Strategy  123 

back  as  1911,  referring  to  tlie  German  view  of 
strategy  and  of  war,  stated:  "It  reveals  'War' 
stripped  of  all  its  accessories,  as  the  exercise  of 
force  for  the  attainment  of  a  political  object  un- 
restrained by  any  law,  save  that  of  expediency, 
and  this  gives  the  key  to  the  interpretation  of 
German  political  aims,  past,  present  and  future, 
which  is  unconditionally  necessary  for  every 
student  of  the  modern  conditions  of  Europe." 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE  STRATEGIC  OFFENSIVE 

As  the  strategic  offensive  necessarily  carries  tlie 
armies  of  tlie  aggressor  into  the  territory  of  the 
enemy,  it  relieves  the  government  and  territory 
of  the  aggressor  of  the  embarrassments  and  dis- 
tress which  accompany  the  active  operations  of  an 
army,  and  visits  these  hardships  upon  the  enemy. 
This  leaves  not  only  the  resources  of  the  home 
country  free  to  be  drawn  upon  for  the  prosecu- 
tion of  the  war,  but  makes  available  for  the  same 
purpose  the  territory  of  the  enemy  as  fast  as  it 
comes  into  possession  of  the  invader.  The  stra- 
tegic offensive  enables  the  aggressor  to  make  and 
follow  his  own  plan,  so  long  as  he  is  successful. 
The  defender  must  shape  his  plan  to  meet  that  of 
the  aggressor,  and  he  must  therefore  be  prepared 
in  every  theater  of  possible  operations,  and  can- 
not commit  himself  until  he  knows  or  believes  he 
knows  the  invader's  plan.  This  tends  to  inde- 
cision and  vacillation  on  the  part  of  the  defender, 
while  the  preparations  and  operations  of  the  ag- 

124 


The  Strategic  Offensive  125 

gressor  are  characterized  by  eagerness,  activity 
and  certainty. 

When  the  strategic  offensive  is  the  best  means 
of  national  defense,  it  should  be  adopted  without 
hesitation.  There  is  no  better  method  of  defend- 
ing one's  person  from  the  threatened  assault  of  a 
highwayman,  than  a  sudden  blow  which  antici- 
pates his.  This  measure,  often  successful,  illus- 
trates what  is  sometimes  termed  the  offensive-de- 
fensive. 

When  the  Boer  War  became  inevitable,  the  late 
President  Kruger  did  not  await  the  coercive  meas- 
ures of  Great  Britain.  He  immediately  assumed 
the  offensive  as  the  best  method  strategically,  of 
preserving  the  integrity  of  his  own  country. 
Commenting  on  this  action  the  German  General 
von  der  Goltz  said:  ''The  statesman  who,  know- 
ing his  instrument  to  be  ready  and  seeing  war 
inevitable,  hesitates  to  strike  first,  is  guilty  of  a 
crime  against  his  country." 

The  strategic  offensive  enables  the  assailant  to 
select  the  point  of  attack  and  by  massing  his 
troops  and  striking  at  the  point  selected,  he  is 
enabled  not  only  to  effect  possible  surprise,  but 
to  have  greatly  superior  numbers  at  the  point  of 
contact. 


126        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

There  are  certain  disadvantages,  however,  in- 
herent to   the   strategic  offensive.    In  the   first 
place  the  more  successful  are  the  offensive  opera- 
tions, the  further  is  the  army  ordinarily  carried 
from  its  hase  of  operations.    The  large  forces 
which  make  up  the  modern  army  cannot  find  suf- 
ficient supplies  and  forage  in  captured  territory 
to  make  the  army  self-supporting.    In  any  event 
the  retiring  enemy  would  remove  or  destroy  any- 
thing which  might  be  of  aid  and  benefit  to  the 
enemy.    It  is  therefore  essential  for  an  army, 
particularly  one  operating  on  the  offensive,  to 
have  a  continuous  stream  of  supplies,  ammuni- 
tion, and  subsistence  and  forage  flowing  from 
some  source  in  the  home  country  to  the  organiza- 
tions in  the  field.     The  line  over  which  these  sup- 
plies are  forwarded  is  called  the  ' '  Line  of  Commu- 
nications."   The  line  of  communications  is  there- 
fore an  artery  extending  from  the  base  out  to  the 
army  in  the  field.    Under  modern  conditions  a 
railroad  line  is  almost  an  essential  part  of  a  line 
of  communications.    The  cutting  or  interruption 
by  the  enemy  of  the  line  of  communications,  might 
result  in  a  suspension  of  offensive  operations  at 
the  front.    The  destruction  of  the  line  of  commu- 
nications might  result  in  the  capture  or  destruc- 


The  Strategic  Offensive  127 

tion  of  the  forces  at  the  front.  The  line  of  com- 
munications must  therefore  be  protected  by 
troops  assigned  for  that  purpose.  These  troops 
include  all  arms.  They  must  be  available  in  suf- 
ficient numbers,  not  only  to  resist  strong  raids, 
but  to  guard  every  trestle,  bridge,  tunnel,  yard, 
switch  and  mile  of  track  against  depredation  by 
individuals.  With  a  short  line  of  communications 
within  the  army's  home  territory,  this  problem  is 
not  a  serious  one  and  does  not  involve  the  assign- 
ment of  many  troops  for  the  protection  of  the 
line.  But  as  the  army  advances  into  the  enemy's 
territory,  in  furtherance  of  the  strategic  offen- 
sive, the  line  of  communications  necessarily 
lengthens  and  its  protection  requires  additional 
troops.  As  it  enters  hostile  territory,  the  dan- 
gers become  greater  and  more  numerous  and  a 
greater  percentage  of  troops  per  mile  of  line  are 
necessarily  employed. 

The  employment  of  troops  for  the  protection  of 
the  line  of  communications  is  as  important  and 
necessary  as  the  work  performed  by  the  troops  at 
the  front.  Yet  the  effective  fighting  force  at  the 
front  are  the  troops  with  which  the  battles  are 
fought.  In  the  conduct  of  the  strategic  offensive, 
the  numerical  ratio  which  the  line  of  communica- 


128        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

tions  troops  bears  to  the  total  numbers  constitut- 
ing the  army,  increases  steadily  as  the  offensive 
operations  carry  the  army  into  the  enemy's  terri- 
tory, until  finally  the  troops  in  rear  may  exceed 
in  numbers,  the  troops  at  the  front.  An  example 
of  this  is  furnished  by  Napoleon's  Russian  Cam- 
paign. In  1812  he  crossed  the  Niemen  River  with 
440,000  men.  In  his  advance  to  Moscow  it  was 
necessary  for  him,  operating  as  he  was  in  a  hos- 
tile country,  to  fully  protect  his  line  of  communi- 
cations, and  intermediate  supply  depots.  When 
he  arrived  as  Moscow  he  therefore  had  actually 
with  him  but  95,000  of  the  440,000  with  which  he 
started.  Another  example  of  the  disadvantages 
of  the  strategic  offensive  when  the  operations 
carry  the  army  far  from  the  home  base,  is  fur- 
nished by  Massena's  Campaign  in  Spain  in  1810. 
Marshal  Massena  crossed  the  Pyrenees  Mountains 
with  400,000  men.  His  advance  towards  Lisbon 
was  marked  by  continued  successes,  but  owing  to 
the  length  of  his  line  of  communications  he  ar- 
rived there  with  less  than  50,000  men,  a  force  which 
he  found  insufficient  to  deliver  a  crushing  blow  to 
the  enemy.  He  could  not  well  remain  after  the 
battle  of  Torres  Vedras  and  so  he  was  forced  to 
retreat  without  attaining  the  object  of  the  cam- 


The  Strategic  Offensive  129 

paign.  General  Sherman  at  Atlanta  had  under 
him  nearly  200,000  men  present  for  duty,  and  yet 
the  total  number  available  for  the  actual  march  to 
the  sea  approximated  but  80,000  men.  He  con- 
sidered this  force  insufficient  to  make  the  ad- 
vance, and  at  the  same  time  to  maintain  a  line  of 
communications.  He  therefore  abandoned  his 
communications,  and  succeeded  in  living  on  the 
country  in  his  march  from  Atlanta  to  Savannah. 
At  the  latter  place  he  established  a  new  base. 

Another  disadvantage  of  the  strategic  offensive 
usually  mentioned  by  the  authorities  is  the  fact 
that  knowledge  of  the  topographical  features  of 
the  enemy's  territoiy  are  not  as  well  known  to 
the  assailants,  as  are  those  of  the  home  country. 
Reliance  is  necessarily  had  on  incorrect  maps,  re- 
ports of  patrols  and  unfriendly  inhabitants. 
This  comment  is  particularly  exemplified  by  the 
experience  of  the  Union  Armies  in  the  Civil  War, 
and  by  the  operations  of  European  armies  in  the 
Far  East  and  in  Africa. 

In  recent  years,  however,  the  importance  of  this 
objection  to  the  strategic  offensive  has  been 
greatly  lessened  because  of  the  full  and  complete 
information  gathered  by  the  military  authorities 
of  the  leading  governments,  of  all  the  facts  af- 


130        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

fecting  possible  theaters  of  operations.  This  in- 
formation includes  the  preparation  of  accurate 
maps. 

Natural  obstacles,  such  as  wide  rivers  or  moun- 
tain ranges  crossing  the  path  of  the  army  are  dis- 
advantages, in  the  pursuit  of  the  strategic 
offensive.  The  crossing  of  a  formidable  stream 
on  improvised  bridges  or  of  a  mountain  range 
through  a  narrow  pass  or  defile  is  not  only  a  dif- 
ficult operation  in  itself,  but  in  the  event  of  the 
defeat  of  the  army  after  a  successful  passage  or 
crossing,  such  obstacle  becomes  a  serious  menace 
to  the  integrity  of  the  forces.  There  are  many 
examples  furnished  by  military  history  of  the  de- 
struction of  an  army  fighting  with  a  river  or 
mountain  range  at  its  back.  These  features  of 
the  terrain  may  be  likened  to  the  exit  of  a  public 
hall,  which,  ample  for  the  egress  of  persons  under 
normal  conditions,  becomes  a  death  trap  under 
abnormal  conditions.  This  was  the  fate  suffered 
by  the  Russian  Army  at  Friedland  in  1807. 

The  power  of  the  strategic  offensive  has  been 
referred  to  as  a  waning  power,  and  unless  the 
nation  assuming  the  strategic  offensive  has  made 
preparation  to  continually  strengthen  the  fight- 
ing front  by  sending  in  a  steady  stream  of  re- 


The  Strategic  Offensive  131 

serves  the  adoption  of  the  strategic  offensive 
though  successful  in  the  first  instance,  may  result 
in  ultimate  disaster.  It  is  essential  that  the  gov- 
ernment conducting  strategic  offensive  operations 
should  recognize  the  culmination  of  their  offensive 
power.  If  the  defeat  of  the  enemy  and  the  object 
of  the  campaign  have  not  been  attained  with  the 
culmination  of  power,  prudence  requires  that 
peace  be  concluded  on  the  most  favorable  terms, 
or  that  the  offensive  be  abandoned  and  the  stra- 
tegic defensive  resorted  to. 

By  the  adoption  of  the  strategic  defensive  is 
not  meant  military  passivity.  This  has  been 
pointed  out  in  Chapter  VIII.  The  adoption  of 
the  strategic  defensive  does  not  therefore  pre- 
clude offensive  tactics.  And  it  may  develop  as 
a  result  of  offensive  tactics  that  the  strategic  de- 
fensive is  so  well  maintained  and  the  power  of  the 
enemy  so  adversely  affected  that  the  role  of  the 
strategic  defensive  may  be  dropped  and  that  of 
the  strategic  offensive  employed.  It  is  too  early 
to  attempt  a  study  of  the  military  operations  now 
being  carried  on  in  Europe,  because  our  informa- 
tion is  not  authentic,  but  nevertheless  it  is  ap- 
parent that  in  opposing  the  advance  of  the  Ger- 
man armies  into  France  by  way  of  Belgium,  the 


132        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

allied  forces  wMcli  constituted  tlie  left  wing  of  the 
allied  army  adopted  the  strategic  defensive,  and 
though  constantly  fighting,  continued  to  retire 
before  the  German  advance  until  their  retrograde 
movement  carried  them  to  the  line  of  the  Marne. 
Here  a  defensive  action  of  great  severity  was 
maintained  for  a  period  of  several  days,  at  the 
conclusion  of  which  it  would  appear  that  the  allies 
assumed  the  tactical  offensive.  This  action  on 
their  part  was  followed  by  the  German  right  wing 
opposed  to  them,  dropping  the  strategic  offensive 
and  adopting  the  strategic  and  tactical  defensive. 
Whether  this  change  in  their  strategy  was  the  re- 
sult of  punishment  inflicted  on  them  when  the 
allies  adopted  the  tactical  offensive  on  the  line  of 
the  Marne  or  whether  it  was  made  necessary  by 
the  presence  of  other  allied  forces  in  their  right 
rear,  which  required  a  bending  back  of  their  right 
wing  in  order  to  protect  their  line  of  communica- 
tion and  the  right  flank  of  the  army,  is  not  certain 
at  this  time.  The  operations,  however,  so  fresh 
in  the  minds  of  all,  serve  to  illustrate  the  applica- 
tion of  the  principle  mentioned. 

In  order  to  conduct  the  strategic  offensive,  it  is 
necessary,  when  actual  contact  is  about  to  be 
made,  to  so  maneuver  the  available  forces  as  to 


The  Strategic  Offensive  133 

effect  concentration.  But  concentration  increases 
the  difficulties  of  maintaining  an  army,  and  en- 
dangers health.  Concentration  furthermore  is 
apt  to  notify  the  enemy  of  the  location  of  the 
forces  and  thus  may  furnish  him  the  opportunity 
to  glean  the  plan  of  operations.  All  the  consid- 
erations therefore  which  affect  the  health  and 
comfort  of  the  troops,  the  supply  of  organizations 
and  the  necessity  for  deceiving  the  enemy  dictate 
a  reasonable  dispersion  of  forces,  while  the  neces- 
sities for  the  aggressive  prosecution  of  the  of- 
fensive, require  that  they  shall  be  concentrated. 
The  German  author  von  Scherff  ^  on  this  subject, 
recommends  that  a  commander  should  "keep  all 
the  forces  as  much  as  possible  collected,  and  only 
to  consent  to  a  separation  when  such  is  abso- 
lutely necessitated  by  considerations  of  supply 
and  by  the  requirements  of  detached  duties,  or 
when  there  is  a  guarantee  that  by  this  division  of 
forces  the  enemy  can  readily  be  deceived.  Only 
an  actual  and  considerable  numerical  superiority 
should  allow  us,  without  disadvantage,  the  luxury 
of  separation.'* 

In  the  prosecution  of  the  strategic  offensive, 
surprise  is  one  of  the  most  effective  methods  em- 

1  "About  the  Conduct  of  War,"  von  Scherff,  pages  330  and  632. 


134        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

ployed.  By  surprise  is  not  only  meant  such  ma- 
neuvering of  forces  as  will  enable  the  aggressor  to 
launch  an  attack  in  the  nature  of  a  surprise,  but 
those  measures  generally,  which  because  they  are 
uncontemplated  by  the  enemy,  embarrass  him  and 
force  the  adoption  by  him  of  hastily  considered 
dispositions  to  oppose  their  effectiveness.  Gen- 
erally it  may  be  said  that  the  effectiveness  of  sur- 
prise depends  upon  secrecy  and  rapidity.  The 
older  authorities  on  strategy  discount  to  some  ex- 
tent the  value  of  surprise  as  a  strategic  principle. 
All  agree  on  its  value  tactically.  This  distinction 
is  based  on  the  great  difference  existing  between 
the  magnitude  of  the  movements  and  details  in- 
volved in  strategic  surprise  and  in  tactical  sur- 
prise. In  the  tactical  surprise  the  troops  may 
march  and  actually  deliver  their  attack  within  a 
reasonably  short  period  after  the  adoption  of  the 
plan ;  while  in  the  strategic  surprise,  where  armies 
and  subdivisions  are  to  be  moved,  much  time 
might  necessarily  be  consumed  in  providing  not 
only  for  the  movement  of  large  forces  but  for  the 
extension  of  lines  of  communication  and  the  estab- 
lishment of  new  supply  depots  for  the  mainte- 
nance of  such  forces. 
Modern  conditions,  however,  have  materially 


/ 


V 


The  Strategic  Offensive  135 

changed  the  value  of  this  distinction,  for  the  net- 
work of  railroads  which  now  cover  the  territory 
of  most  civilized  nations  and  the  amount  of  roll- 
ing stock  available,  make  possible  the  rapid  trans- 
portation of  vast  numbers  of  men  and  animals, 
with  all  necessary  supplies,  from  point  to  point 
as  the  necessities  of  the  strategic  plan  for  surprise 
may  dictate. 

While  the  principles  of  offensive  strategy  are 
to  a  certain  extent  fixed,  each  great  war  produces 
a  new  exponent  of  their  practical  application.    It 
will  be  found  that  the  successful  leaders,  while 
they  have  been  students  of  the  past,  have  not  hesi- 
tated in  their  application  of  the  principles   of 
strategy,    to    avail    themselves    of    the    modern 
methods  and  facilities  of  their  time.    In  time  of 
peace  the  military  system  of  a  government  is  apt 
to  suffer  from  what  might  be  termed  military 
arterio-sclerosis  or  hardening  of  the  military  ar- 
teries.   A    military    system,    if    not    carefully 
watched  and  kept  youthful,  strong,  and  up-to-date, 
may  become  actually  fossilized  by  the  refusal  of 
those  in  authority  to  discard  the  methods  sufficient 
and  proper  in  the  time  of  their  youth  for  the  more 
modern  methods  contemporaneous  with  their  ad- 
vanced years,  but  of  which  perhaps  they  have  not 


136        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

intimate  acquaintance.  And  so  we  find  througli- 
out  history  that  venerable  and  respected  military 
structures,  solidly  founded  on  worthy  perform- 
ance in  past  wars,  loyally  supported  by  a  gi*ateful 
people,  and  receiving  the  respect  due  to  age,  have 
sometimes  fallen  with  a  crash  under  the  weight  of 
the  more  modern  conditions  of  a  new  war. 

In  the  United  States  the  advent  of  the  Spanish 
War  in  1898  played  havoc  with  the  military  sys- 
tem of  the  country.  It  is  told  of  one  venerable 
departmental  officer  that  shortly  after  the  out- 
break of  war  he  grieved  considerably  over  the 
condition  of  his  department,  stating  that  for  years 
he  had  gradually  built  up  and  had  finally  per- 
fected a  great  system,  when  along  came  the  war 
to  interfere  with  his  work  and  bring  down  the 
system  like  a  house  of  cards.  If  we  could  all 
profit  by  the  teachings  of  history  and  each  genera- 
tion avoid  the  repetition  of  incorrect  methods 
clearly  established  as  such  by  the  experience  of 
the  past,  the  world  would  to-day  be  much  further 
advanced  in  all  lines  of  activity. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  STRATEGIC  DEFENSIVE 

The  advantages  of  the  strategic  defensive  are 
many,  so  far  as  military  operations  are  concerned, 
but  as  pointed  out,  none  but  negative  results  may 
be  looked  for,  unless  at  an  opportune  moment, 
the  defensive  role  is  dropped  and  the  tactical  of- 
fensive at  least,  assumed.     The  commander  oper- 
ating on  the  strategic  defensive  has  the  advantage 
of  operating  in  his  own  country.    He  has  many 
friendly  sources  open  to  him  for  obtaining  reliable 
information  concerning  movements  of  the  enemy. 
He   frequently  has  heavily  fortified  supporting 
points  to  stiffen  his  defensive  line.    He  has  an 
accurate  and  intimate  knowledge  of  the  ground. 
He  can  select  his  position  where  he  will  resist  fur- 
ther advance  of  the  enemy,  and  in  the  preparation 
of  that  position  he  usually  has  available  second 
line  troops  and  large  numbers  of  civilian  em- 
ployees.   His  task  is  much  less  formidable  than 
is  the  task  of  the  opposing  commander,  for  while 
the  latter  must  seek  out  and  destroy  the  defender, 

137 


138        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

the  defender  has  only  to  successfully  resist  his 
opponent  in  order  to  be  successful.  Where  the 
defender  is  obviously  weaker  than  the  assailant, 
he  may  offer  resistance  up  to  a  point  consistent 
with  safe  retirement  and  make  another  stand. 
This  policy  if  repeated  successfully,  requires  the 
assailant  to  attack  and  suffer  the  high  losses 
which  are  incidental  to  the  strategic  and  the  tacti- 
cal offensive,  while  the  defender  may  retire  from 
each  engagement  with  a  much  lower  percentage  of 
loss.  While  the  defender  is  retiring  he,  unlike 
the  assailant,  is  shortening  his  line  of  communica- 
tions. His  problems  of  maintenance  and  supply, 
unless  the  country  has  been  exhausted  with  con- 
tinuous warfare,  are  simple  problems,  and  his  line 
of  communications  is  generally  readily  protected. 
The  strategic  defensive  is  the  conservative  plan 
of  operations.  In  the  adoption  of  the  strategic 
offensive,  military  commanders  are  sometimes 
forced  to  adopt  a  radical  and  ill-considered  plan, 
based  on  public  demand.  Examples  of  this  are 
furnished  by  the  insistent  demands  of  the  north- 
ern press  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  War  that 
the  Union  Army  move  immediately  on  Eichmond. 
The  adoption  of  the  strategic  offensive  for  the 
purpose  of  complying  with  this  demand,  resulted 


The  Strategic  Defensive  139 

in  the  disaster  of  Bull  Kun.  The  strategic  de- 
fensive avoids  such  pitfalls  and  leaves  the  way- 
open  for  a  prompt  change  to  the  tactical  offensive 
if  the  assailant,  in  his  oifensive  policy,  adopts  a 
radical  and  faulty  plan. 

In  the  present  war  in  Europe,  while  the  stra- 
tegic offensive  was  adopted  by  the  right  wing  of 
the  French  Army,  when  it  invaded  Alsace  and 
Lorraine,  the  strategic  defensive  was  adopted  by 
the  left  wing  which  conducted  a  series  of  defensive 
engagements  while  falling  back  toward  Paris,  be- 
fore the  advance  of  the  German  armies  through 
Belgium  and  Luxemburg.  It  must  be  apparent 
that  due  to  constant  infliction  of  losses  on  the  Ger- 
man forces,  the  intense  and  unrelenting  physical 
and  mental  strain  inseparable  from  their  rapid 
marching  and  continuous  fighting  and  the  elonga- 
tion of  their  line  of  communications,  their  offen- 
sive power  waned  as  they  advanced.  On  the  other 
hand  the  strategic  defensive  policy  adopted  by 
General  Joffre,  while  it  hurt  French  public  pride, 
enabled  the  French  authorities  to  bring  up  their 
reserve  forces  and  make  possible  the  cooperation 
and  actual  participation  in  the  campaign  of  their 
British  Allies.  Therefore  it  transpired  that  as 
the  German  power  waned  with  its  advance,  the 


140        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

power  of  the  AHies  was  increased  as  they  retired. 
The  allied  forces  were  therefore  enabled,  along 
the  line  of  the  Marne,  to  fight  in  a  manner  and 
under  conditions,  which  they  conld  not  have  done, 
and  which  did  not  obtain  along  the  line  of  first 
contact. 

The  strategic  defensive  is  frequently  adopted 
as  a  temporary  policy  until  conditions  favor  the 
adoption  of  the  strategic  or  the  tactical  offensive. 
Under  the  principle  that  positive  results  can  only 
be  obtained  through  the  medium  of  the  strategic 
and  the  tactical  offensive,  the  latter  policy  should 
be  resorted  to  when  the  conditions  justify  that 
course.  This  principle  is  well  illustrated  by  the 
actions  of  the  Allies  in  the  present  war  in  Europe. 
After  the  engagements  along  the  line  of  the 
Marne,  the  conditions  which  affected  the  Allies 
and  the  Germans,  at  the  opening  of  the  campaign 
had  so  changed  that  when  the  German  right  wing 
adopted  the  strategic  defensive,  the  Allies  changed 
from  the  strategic  defensive  and  adopted  the  stra- 
tegic and  the  tactical  offensive,  and  followed  the 
GeiTnans  aggressively. 

Elvers  and  mountain  ranges  play  an  important 
part  in  the  success  of  defensive  operations.  As 
an  enemy's  army  is  normally  and  properly  the 


The  Strategic  Defensive  141 

objective  of  an  invading  force,  it  is  desirable  that 
the  defender  so  maneuver  as  to  place  in  the  Une  of 
the  assailants '  advance,  physical  obstacles  of  that 
character.  General  Lee  constantly  availed  him- 
self of  rivers  in  the  strategic  defense  of  Rich- 
mond. The  seriousness  of  a  river  obstacle  is  in- 
dicated by  the  defeat  of  the  Union  Army  of  over 
100,000  men,  under  Burnside,  at  Fredericksburg. 
Burnside  did  succeed  in  crossing  the  Rappahan- 
nock River,  but  Lee's  Army  fully  intrenched  was 
there  to  oppose  him,  and  although  the  defenders 
numbered  but  60,000  men  they  successfully  re- 
pelled the  Union  assaults.  When  General  BuUer 
of  the  British  Army  undertook  to  relieve  the  Brit- 
ish forces  besieged  in  Ladysmith  his  route  re- 
quired him  to  cross  the  Tugela  River.  The 
attempted  crossing  resulted  in  a  severe  check  to 
the  British  arms.  Mountain  ranges  offer  favor- 
able means  for  defensive  measures,  particularly 
if  they  are  rough  and  can  be  crossed  by  large 
forces  only  through  one  or  two  passes.  Usually, 
the  tactical  defense  of  a  mountain  range  is  made 
on  the  side  away  from  the  enemy.  This  enables 
the  defenders  to  strike  the  attacking  columns 
while  they  are  emerging  from  the  defiles  or  passes 
and  offers  opportunity  to  defeat  them  in  detail. 


142        Tlie  Modern  Army  in  Action 

In  the  last  analysis  the  objection  to  the  stra- 
tegic defensive  is  that  it  can  never  accomplish 
positive  results.    At  best,  it  can  only  avoid  defeat. 

There  are  many  methods  of  maneuvering  troops 
in  large  forces  based  on  the  desire  to  avoid  the 
losses  entailed  by  frontal  attacks.  Some  of  the 
more  common  forms  of  strategic  maneuver,  hav- 
ing this  object  in  view,  will  now  be  considered. 
The  first  of  these  is  diversion. 

In  any  consideration  of  military  operations  in 
war,  it  is  well  to  keep  in  mind  that  the  greatest 
difficulty  experienced  by  the  commander  is  the 
problem  of  discarding  incorrect  information, 
recognizing  authentic  information  and  of  analyz- 
ing and  properly  appraising  the  latter.  An  army 
in  campaign  works  in  an  atmosphere  of  ominous 
rumor,  doubt,  and  alternating  cheerful  optimism 
and  discouraging  pessimism.  It  is  therefore  fre- 
quently difficult  for  a  commander  to  correctly 
sense  the  true  meaning  of  some  operation  of  the 
enemy.  This  makes  what  is  known  as  diversion, 
an  important  feature  of  strategy,  and  one  fre- 
quently employed  in  the  strategic  defensive. 
Diversion  cannot  be  better  illustrated  than  by 
reference  to  Jackson's  campaign  in  the  Shenan- 
doah Valley. 


The  Strategic  Defensive  143 

While  McClellan  was  engaged  in  the  campaign 
against  Eichmond  in  the  Spring  of  1862,  he  was 
promised  the  cooperation  of  General  McDowell's 
corps  which  had  been  detached  from  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  in  order  to  cover  Washington,  and 
which  was  concentrated  in  the  vicinity  of  Manas- 
sas. This  force  numbered  about  30,000  men.  The 
Union  General  Banks  had  a  strong  division  in  the 
vicinity  of  Harrisonburg.  Other  Union  forces 
under  Generals  Fremont  and  Shields  were  also 
operating  in  Northern  Virginia.  Jackson  by 
rapid  marching  successively  defeated  these  forces, 
and  created  such  a  diversion  that  President  Lin- 
coln telegraphed  General  McClellan  on  May  26, 
1862,  "In  consequence  of  General  Banks'  critical 
position,  I  have  been  compelled  to  suspend  Gen- 
eral McDowell's  movements  to  join  you." 

In  1864  when  Grant  was  before  Eichmond  and 
the  Confederate  Army  was  again  hard  pressed, 
Lee  sent  Early's  Corps,  although  they  were 
greatly  needed  in  the  intrenched  lines  at  Cold 
Harbor,  into  the  Shenandoah  Valley  to  make  a 
demonstration  against  Washington.  General 
Early  succeeded  in  marching  down  the  Shenan- 
doah Valley,  crossed  the  Potomac  and  advanced 
on  Washington.     He  was  not  strong  enough  to 


144        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

break  through  the  defenses  of  Washington,  but 
the  diversion  had  the  effect  of  alarming  the  North, 
and  of  causing  two  full  corps  to  be  sent  to  Wash- 
ington as  reenforcements.  Later  to  prevent  sim- 
ilar diversions,  and  to  enable  the  Union  Army  to 
take  the  offensive  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  the 
Army  of  the  Shenandoah  under  General  Sheridan 
was  organized.  One  of  the  corps  sent  to  oppose 
Early  was  from  Grant's  army,  where  its  presence 
was  needed,  and  the  other  was  diverted  while  on 
its  way  from  New  Orleans  to  join  Grant  before 
Richmond. 

Strategic  penetration  is  the  name  given  opera- 
tions which  seek  to  pierce  the  enemy's  line  of  de- 
fense for  the  purpose  of  cutting  it  in  two  and 
defeating  the  parts  in  succession.  When  penetra- 
tion is  successful  the  effect  is  sure  to  drive  apart 
the  wings  of  the  opposing  army  and  force  one  or 
both  of  them  to  retire  in  a  lateral  direction. 
Strategic  penetration  involves  the  tactical  offen- 
sive at  the  point  selected  to  be  penetrated.  It 
means  the  launching  of  overwhelming  forces 
against  that  point,  and  the  determination  and 
ability  to  drive  through  with  large  forces  of  fol- 
lowing troops.  If  the  wedge  is  not  strong  enough 
for  the  work,  it  may  not  penetrate,  but  on  the 


The  Strategic  Defensive  145 

contrary  it  may  be  subjected  to  severe  losses, 
amounting  almost  to  annihilation.  If  successful, 
however,  it  enables  relatively  small  forces  of  the 
attacker  to  hold  or  contain  one  wing  of  the 
enemy's  army,  while  the  attacker  with  all  the  re- 
maining available  forces  envelops  or  rolls  up  the 
remaining  wing. 

An  example  of  what  may  be  accomplished  by 
strategic  penetration  is  furnished  by  Napoleon's 
campaign  of  1796  against  the  Austrians  and  Pied- 
montese.  In  April  of  that  year  Napoleon  was  on 
the  Riviera  at  Savona.  He  had  36,000  men. 
Opposite  his  right  there  were  30,000  Austrians 
between  Sassello  and  Voltri,  based  on  Milan. 
Opposite  his  left  were  22,000  Piedmontese  at 
Ceva,  based  on  Turin  on  the  northwest.  Napo- 
leon determined  to  advance  with  his  united  forces 
against  the  point  where  the  lines  of  the  opposing 
armies  met.  When  he  advanced,  the  Austrian 
right  advanced  to  meet  him,  and  on  the  11th  and 
12th  of  April  he  defeated  them  severely  in  the 
battle  of  Montenotte,  driving  them  back  on  Dego. 
On  the  14th  he  captured  the  latter  place,  the  Aus- 
trians retiring  to  xYcqui  while  the  Piedmontese 
remained  at  Ceva.  Napoleon  therefore  had  suc- 
ceeded in  placing  his  army  between  the  allies  op- 


146        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

posed  to  him.  The  allies  were  not  only  separated 
but  were  on  divergent  lines  of  retreat.  The  dis- 
tance from  Acqui  to  Ceva  by  the  best  available 
roads  then  in  use  was  sixty-seven  miles.  Napo- 
leon having  defeated  the  Austrians,  as  stated,  lost 
no  time,  but  turned  his  victorious  troops  against 
the  Piedmontese  and  then  again  followed  up  his 
advantage  against  the  Austrians. 

Under  a  consideration  of  the  strategic  defensive 
should  be  included  the  subject  of  retreat  after  a 
lost  battle.  It  is  a  military  axiom  that  after  the 
loss  of  a  battle,  a  second  battle  must  be  avoided 
until  there  is  a  change  in  the  circumstances  of  the 
vanquished.  This  change  of  circumstances  may 
be  due  to  reenforcements  received  by  the  van- 
quished or  by  a  diversion  created  by  cooperating 
forces  which  has  been  effective  in  its  influence  on 
the  operations  of  the  enemy.  The  retreat  is  nor- 
mally continued  until  such  change  of  circum- 
stances enables  the  army  to  make  a  stand  with 
some  reasonable  probability  of  success.  Not  al- 
ways, however,  is  the  retreating  army  enabled  to 
conduct  its  retreat  in  such  manner  as  to  occupy 
and  attempt  to  hold  ground  previously  selected 
for  that  purpose.  The  pursuit  of  the  enemy  may 
be  so  swift  and  unrelenting  that  disorganization 


The  Strategic  Defensive  147 

and  panic  enter  the  ranks  of  the  vanquished,  and 
the  retreat  develops  into  a  rout.  History  shows, 
however,  that  a  vanquished  army  is  frequently 
enabled  to  so  delay,  hinder  and  harass  the  pursuit 
of  the  victor  by  the  intervention  of  an  efficient  and 
determined  rear  guard,  that  the  main  body  is 
enabled  to  make  another  stand  on  ground  but  a 
short  distance  from  that  which  saw  their  defeat. 
The  greatest  damage  which  the  vanquished  ordi- 
narily suffers,  is  not  the  loss  of  men,  animals  or 
property  so  much  as  it  is  the  loss  of  morale — 
the  intermixing  of  organizations,  the  straggling, 
skulking,  loss  of  confidence,  and  the  difficulty  of 
communicating  orders  and  controlling  the  various 
activities  essential  in  the  coordination  of  military 
forces.  The  first  part  of  every  retreat  is  there- 
fore devoted  to  correcting  these  shortcomings 
while  the  enemy  is  sought  to  be  held  at  bay  by  the 
rear  guard.  When  order  has  been  reestablished 
and  coordination  effected,  the  counter  stroke  is 
frequently  resorted  to  to  compel  the  pursuer  to 
stay  the  pursuit. 

In  conducting  the  retreat  after  a  lost  battle 
some  authorities  advocate  a  division  of  forces  and 
a  retreat  of  the  subdivisions  eccentrically.  This 
plan  is  justified  by  them  on  the  theory  that  it  will 


148        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

compel  division  of  the  pursuing  forces  if  they  are 
to  follow  both  subdivisions;  while  if  they  do  not 
divide,  opportunity  is  afforded  one  of  the  van- 
quished subdivisions  to  attack  the  pursuer  in 
flank.  After  the  battle  of  Brienne  on  January 
30,  1814,  Napoleon  divided  his  forces,  sending 
Marmont  back  to  the  Aube,  while  he  himself  turned 
toward  Troyes.  The  Allies,  who  were  pursuing, 
missed  their  opportunity  for  they  divided  their 
forces  in  like  manner,  sending  one  detachment 
under  Bliicher  toward  the  Marne.  The  other  de- 
tachment, under  Sehwartzenberg,  did  not  pursue 
vigorously  due  to  a  belief  that  the  column  lacked 
strength.  Napoleon,  therefore,  succeeded  in  with- 
drawing his  forces  in  safety.  Generally,  how- 
ever, the  policy  of  a  division  of  forces  in  retreat 
is  condemned.  A  lost  battle  in  itself  tends  to 
division  and  disorganization,  and  the  first  work 
of  the  defeated  general  should  be  to  regather  his 
forces  and  to  effect  their  concentration  rather 
than  their  dispersion,  in  order  to  regain  order 
and  control  and  to  reestablish  confidence  and 
morale. 


CHAPTER  XI 
INFANTRY 

In  early  times  the  foot  soldiers  of  armies  were 
usually  the  more  inferior  warriors.  The  best 
men  were  mounted.  This  may  be  seen  in  the  cav- 
alry of  the  Middle  Ages,  which  consisted  of 
knights  encased  in  armor.  The  Swiss  mountain- 
eers and  the  archers  of  England,  however,  created 
respect  for  the  infantry  arm.  Infantry  in  the 
modem  acceptance  of  the  term  did  not  exist  until 
after  the  introduction  of  gun  powder  brought  into 
use  the  musket.  Since  that  time  infantry  has 
become  the  most  important  part  of  an  army,  and 
to-day  the  infantry  is  in  fact  the  army.  The 
other  arms  are  now  merely  auxiliary  to  the  infan- 
try. Prior  to  the  introduction  of  gun  powder  the 
infantry  in  battle,  armed  with  the  pike  and  spear 
were  formed  in  solid  squares  in  order  to  offer  the 
necessary  resisting  power  to  the  armored  knights. 
After  the  introduction  of  the  musket,  however,  a 
change  was  made  necessary  in  tactical  formations 
to  allow  room  for  the  loading  and  discharge  of  the 

149 


150        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

muskets.  It  was  also  necessary  to  avoid  present- 
ing too  large  and  deep  a  target  to  the  opposing 
musketry  fire  and  to  the  newly  invented  field  ar- 
tillery. For  a  time,  however,  pikemen  were 
retained  as  a  part  of  the  infantry  tactical  organi- 
zation to  supplement  fire  tactics  with  shock  tactics 
when  necessary.  The  first  muskets  were  so  heavy 
that  they  required  a  rest  in  order  to  be  effectively 
fired,  and  discharge  was  effected  by  means  of  a 
match.  These  muskets  were  known  as  match- 
locks. Later  this  cumbersome  method  was  re- 
placed by  using  flint  to  ignite  the  charge.  These 
muskets  became  known  as  flint-locks. 

The  manual  of  arms  used  in  the  handling  of  the 
earlier  types  of  musket  was  exceedingly  clumsy. 
It  is  said  that  one  of  these  manuals  prescribed 
ninety-four  distinct  motions  to  execute  the  com- 
mand to  load.  During  the  wars  of  Louis  XIV  the 
bayonet  was  introduced.  This  resulted  in  the 
disappearance  of  the  pike  and  a  still  further  re- 
duction in  the  density  of  the  infantry  line.  By 
that  time  the  custom  was  to  have  the  infantry  line 
four  ranks  deep,  the  first  two  ranks  being  com- 
posed of  musketeers  and  the  remaining  two  ranks 
of  men  who  loaded  for  the  first  two. 

Under  Frederick  the   Great  precision   in   the 


Infantry  151 

manual  attained  a  high  standard  and  the  infantry 
in  action  succeeded  in  delivering  volleys  rapidly 
and  with  facility.  Under  Frederick,  the  Prus- 
sians were  also  trained  intensely  in  the  use  of  the 
bayonet.  The  effective  range  of  the  musket  in 
the  time  of  Frederick  the  Great  was  between  100 
and  200  yards,  but  in  wet  weather  the  weapon  was 
of  little  use. 

Under  Napoleon,  infantry  skirmishing  was 
highly  developed.  The  precise  tactics  of  Fred- 
erick the  Great  were  not  followed.  The  French 
infantry  methods  were  more  flexible.  Small  col- 
umns for  maneuver  and  assault  were  adopted,  and 
lines  were  deployed  for  firing.  Time  and  space 
do  not  permit  more  than  passing  reference  to  the 
development  of  the  infantry  in  the  various  stages 
of  its  evolution.  It  may,  however,  be  said  in  pass- 
ing, that  the  American  War  of  the  Rebellion  saw 
a  remarkable  development  in  the  power  of  in- 
fantry due  to  an  increase  in  military  marksman- 
ship. This  war  developed  the  system  of  infantry 
advance  by  rushes  and  by  successive  deployed 
lines  and  the  use  of  hasty  intrenchments. 

The  advance  by  rushes,  however,  used  in  the 
Civil  War  was  not  in  any  sense  the  counterpart  of 
the  present  day  advance.    The  infantry  of  the 


152        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

Civil  War  period  was  armed  for  the  most  part 
with  muzzle  loading  muskets,  and  it  was  almost  a 
requisite  in  the  loading  of  these  weapons  that  the 
soldier  should  stand  erect  in  order  to  use  with 
facility  the  ramrod  and  return  it  to  its  position  in 
the  groove  below  the  barrel  provided  for  that  pur- 
pose. The  time  involved  in  loading  such  muskets, 
and  the  necessity  for  standing  during  the  opera- 
tion of  loading,  created  such  delay  when  advanc- 
ing infantry  was  halted  for  the  purpose  of  firing, 
that  every  effort  was  made  to  push  the  lines  for- 
ward as  far  as  possible  before  halting  to  fire. 
The  infantry  advance  was,  of  course,  covered  by 
the  fire  of  friendly  artillery.  The  artillery  fired 
over  the  heads  of  the  advancing  infantry  against 
the  opposing  batteries  and  the  intrenchments  of 
the  opposing  infantry,  in  order  to  disconcert  and 
minimize  the  effect  of  the  opposing  fire.  In  most 
cases,  therefore,  in  Civil  War  battles,  there  was 
no  attempt  made  during  the  infantry  advance  to 
obtain  what  at  the  present  time  is  known  as  "fire 
superiority"  as  a  part  of  the  infantry  advance. 
The  theory  of  fire  superiority  will  be  shortly  ex- 
plained. 

The  infantry  attack  of  the  Civil  War  period 
cannot  better  be  exemplified  than  by  reference  to 


A   portable    folding   observation    tower   as   used    in    the 

German    Army 


Infantry  153 

the  third  day  of  the  battle  of  Gettysburg.  Before 
conunenting  on  the  Confederate  attack  made 
against  Cemetery  Eidge  on  that  day,  the  character 
of  the  infantry  which  made  that  attack  should  be 
appreciated.  Charles  Francis  Adams  in  an  ad- 
dress delivered  in  1907  at  the  "Washington  and 
Lee  University  in  Virginia,  on  Lee's  Centennial, 
summarized  the  morale  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  when  it  entered  the  Gettysburg  Cam- 
paign, as  follows: 

"In  the  first  place  Lee  had  at  that  time  supreme  confidence 
in  his  command;  and  he  had  grounds  for  it.  As  he  himself 
then  wrote,  'There  never  were  such  men  in  an  army  before. 
They  will  go  anywhere  and  do  anything,  if  properly  led.'  And 
for  myself  I  do  not  think  the  estimate  thus  expressed  was 
exaggerated;  speaking  deliberately,  having  faced  some  por- 
tions of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  at  the  time,  and  hav- 
ing since  reflected  much  on  the  occurrences  of  that  momentous 
period,  I  do  not  believe  that  any  more  formidable  or  better 
organized  and  animated  force  was  ever  set  in  motion  than 
that  which  Lee  led  across  the  Potomac  in  the  early  summer  of 
1863.  It  was  essentially  an  army  of  fighters, — men  who,  in- 
dividually or  in  the  mass,  could  be  depended  on  for  any  feat 
of  arms  in  the  power  of  mere  mortals  to  accomplish.  They 
would  blanch  at  no  danger.  This  Lee  from  experience  knew. 
He  had  tested  them  and  they  had  full  confidence  in  him." 

This  was  the  type  of  soldier  that  constituted 
the  infantry  of  Lee's  army  at  Gettysburg. 


154        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

On  the  third  day  at  Gettysburg,  Pickett's  Divi- 
sion of  Longstreet's  Corps  was  directed  to  attack 
the  center  of  the  Union  position  along  Cemetery 
Kidge.  The  attack  was  prepared  by  the  Con- 
federate artillery  pounding  the  Union  line  with 
all  their  available  guns.  The  Confederate  in- 
fantry was  to  advance  as  soon  as  the  Union  artil- 
lery was  silenced  and  the  Union  infantry  demor- 
alized by  the  Confederate  artillery  fire.  At  3 :00 
p.  M.  the  men  of  Pickett 's  Division  moved  out 
from  behind  their  own  batteries,  and  with  lines 
well  maintained  walked  toward  the  Union  intrench- 
ments  without  stopping  to  reply  to  the  opposing 
fire.  About  half  way  to  the  Union  line  they 
halted  for  a  short  rest  in  a  ravine  somewhat 
sheltered  from  the  Union  artillery  fire,  which  had 
opened  upon  them,  and  then  proceeded  forward. 
When  they  had  advanced  sufficiently  far  to  the 
front,  the  Confederate  artillery  reopened  over 
their  heads  against  the  Union  line.  The  Confeder- 
ate Division  under  Pettigrew  advanced  on  the  left 
of  Pickett's  Division.  Both  divisions  crossed  the 
Emmitsburg  road  together,  and  thereupon  came 
under  enfilade  fire  from  the  two  wings  of  the 
Union  line,  from  Cemetery  Hill  on  the  north  and 
the  Round  Tops  on  the  south.     Livermore  says : 


Infantry  155 

"Their  graceful  lines  underwent  an  instantaneous  trans- 
formation in  a  dense  cloud  of  smoke  and  dust;  arms,  heads, 
blankets,  guns  and  knapsacks  were  tossed  in  the  air,  and  the 
moan  from  the  battlefield  was  heard  amid  the  storm  of  the 
battle.  Both  flanks  of  the  advancing  line  were  shot  to  pieces 
while  in  the  center  the  losses  were  made  up  by  those  who 
were  led  by  their  instinct  and  their  object  to  crowd  toward 
the  clump  of  trees." 

The  clump  of  trees  referred  to,  marked  the  part 
of  the  Union  line  to  be  assaulted. 

Some  of  the  regiments  of  Pickett's  Division 
actually  reached  and  jumped  over  the  stone  wall 
which  marked  the  Union  line,  but  of  14,000  men 
who  commenced  the  attack,  not  more  than  a  few 
hundred  actually  reached  the  wall. 

Under  modern  conditions,  with  the  rapidity  of 
fire  of  both  field  artillery  guns  and  infantry  rifles, 
an  infantry  attack,  conducted  as  was  the  attack 
of  Pickett's  Division,  would  have  resulted  in  the 
annihilation  of  the  attacking  forces  long  before  it 
reached  the  enemy's  position. 

The  tactics  used  by  the  German  infantry  in  the 
Franco-Prussian  War  of  1870,  may  be  illustrated 
by  reference  to  the  interesting  account  of  the  at- 
tack delivered  by  the  Kaiser  Franz  Regiment  at 
LeBourget,  described  by  Hohenlohe  in  his  letters 
on  infantry.    He  says : 


156        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

"At  this  point  there  were  two  battalions  of  the  Franz  Regi- 
ment who  had  to  attack  over  2000  paces  of  open  ground. 
The  officer  commanding  this  regiment  had  already  practised 
it  in  the  attack.  In  accordance  with  his  practise,  he  sent  for- 
ward the  whole  of  the  leading  line,  which  consisted  of  two 
companies,  in  thick  swarms  of  skirmishers,  and  made  them  ad- 
vance over  the  open  ground  in  two  parts  (by  wings)  which 
alternately  ran  in,  300  paces.  After  each  rush  the  whole  of 
the  wing  which  made  it  threw  itself  down,  and  found  some 
cover  among  the  high  potatoes;  there  they  recovered  their 
breath  while  the  other  wing  rushed  in.  As  soon  as  they  ar- 
rived within  the  range  of  the  needle  gun,  the  wing  which  was 
lying  down  opened  a  fire  of  skirmishers  on  that  edge  of  the 
village  which  they  were  attacking.  I  can  still  remember  as  I 
write,  the  delight  which  we  felt  as  from  our  position  we 
watched  this  attack  which  had  been  so  carefully  thought  out 
and  was  so  weU  carried  through.  The  best  of  the  thing  was 
that,  as  the  commander  of  the  regiment  assured  me,  these 
troops  suffered  no  loss  up  to  the  time  when  they  reached  the 
edge  of  the  village.  It  was  not  until  the  street  fighting  began 
that  the  regiment  endured  the  losses  which  it  had  to  deplore  on 
that  day." 

In  the  Franco-Prussian  War  of  1870  the  Ger- 
man infantry  attacks  were  usually  made  by  lines 
of  skirmishers  supported  by  other  lines,  and  some- 
times by  columns  in  close  order.  Here  we  see  the 
beginning  of  the  practise  which  led  up  to  the 
theory  of  superiority  of  fire,  for  the  skirmishers 
engaged  the  enemy  in  a  fire  fight,  disconcerted 
them  in  a  degree  commensurate  with  the  effect- 


Infantry  157 

iveness  of  their  fire,  and  by  successful  advances 
reached  a  position  from  which,  with  the  arrival  of 
the  supports,  the  assault  could  be  made. 

It  is  with  the  infantry,  in  the  last  analysis,  that 
the  enemy  must  be  driven  from  the  position  in 
which  he  seeks  to  maintain  himself.  Owing  to 
the  efficacy  of  field  intrenchments,  it  is  obvious 
that  the  defenders  cannot  be  shot  out  of  such  posi- 
tions, for  during  a  period  of  fire  action  alone  the 
defenders  will  keep  well  down  in  their  intrench- 
ments, many  of  them  provided  with  head  cover, 
and  wait  for  the  storm  to  blow  over.  It  is  there- 
fore necessary,  in  order  to  capture  a  position, 
that  the  infantry  shall  advance  and  physically 
make  contact  with  the  defenders,  drive  them  away 
or  destroy  or  capture  all  who  remain.  There  is  a 
psychology  about  all  this  which  frequently  enables 
the  attacking  forces  when  they  arrive  within  100 
or  200  yards  of  the  intrenched  position,  to  occupy 
it  without  further  resistance  due  to  a  sudden  and 
simultaneous  realization  by  the  mass  of  the  de- 
fenders that  further  defense  is  futile,  and  their 
hasty  withdrawal  in  accordance  with  that  judg- 
ment. Conversely  it  sometimes  happens  that  in- 
fantry who  have  successfully  advanced  to  the 
assaulting  position  after  suffering  great  losses, 


158        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

realize  that  a  successful  assault  would  he  imprac- 
ticable, and  in  consequence  they  either  retire  or 
dig  into  the  ground  and  remain  where  they  are  un- 
til nightfall  or  the  arrival  of  supports  to  give  them 
the  strength  and  impetus  necessary  to  again  carry 
them  forward. 

When  the  infantry  therefore,  in  pursuance  of 
the  necessity  of  physically  making  contact  with 
the  defenders  and  of  driving  them  from  their 
position,  commence  the  necessary  advance  for  that 
purpose,  it  is  evident  that  if  they  are  to  be  stayed 
in  their  advance,  the  defenders  must  inflict  such 
losses  on  them  as  will  paralyze  their  advance  be- 
fore it  reaches  a  position  from  which  a  successful 
assault  may  be  delivered.  This  attempt  to  de- 
stroy the  attacking  forces  during  their  advance 
is  made  by  the  artillery  and  the  infantry  of  the 
defense,  with  their  fire.  If  the  defenders,  occupy- 
ing masked  positions  for  their  field  artillery  and 
intrenched  positions  for  their  infantry,  knowing 
the  ranges  (often  measured  in  advance),  and  sup- 
plied with  ample  ammunition,  were  permitted 
without  hindrance  to  fire  continuously  upon  the 
attacking  infantry  throughout  the  period  of  the 
latter 's  advance,  it  is  evident  that  under  such  con- 


Infantry  159 

ditions  no  infantry  could  hope,  successfully  to 
arrive  at  an  assaulting  position  with  enough  sur- 
vivors to  deliver  anything  but  a  feeble  attempt  at 
an  assault.  Therefore  it  is  that  in  the  infantry 
attack  an  effort  must  be  made  coincident  with  the 
attack  and  as  a  part  of  it,  to  so  embarrass  and 
demoralize  the  defenders  that  they  find  them- 
selves unable  to  deliver  their  fire  with  deliberation 
and  accuracy.  This  is  attempted  to  be  accom- 
plished by  the  fire  of  the  attacking  forces,  so  deliv- 
ered as  to  cover  the  advance  of  their  own  infantry. 
The  artillery  of  the  offensive  endeavors  to  seek 
out  and  silence  the  opposing  batteries  by  covering 
them  with  such  a  deluge  of  field  artillery  projec- 
tiles that  their  materiel  is  destroyed  or  the  can- 
noneers are  unable  to  serve  their  guns.  All  the 
batteries  not  necessary  for  this  purpose,  turn  the 
weight  of  their  power  against  the  intrenchments 
of  the  opposing  infantry.  This  is  not  done  under 
a  belief  that  the  shrapnel  and  shell  so  fired  will 
reach  the  defenders  while  they  remain  deep  down 
in  their  intrenclunents  protected  by  cover,  but 
rather  to  destroy  those  who  attempt  to  fire  from 
the  top  of  the  intrenchment  at  the  advancing  in- 
fantry, and  so  to  demoralize  the  defenders  and 


160        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

compel  them  to  keep  under  cover  or  at  least  to  so 
limit  their  fire  efforts  that  the  damage  inflicted  by 
them  will  be  minimized. 

This  then  is  the  problem  of  the  infantry  in  the 
attack — to  cross  a  fire  swept  zone,  by  any  means 
which  will  enable  them  to  assault  with  enough 
survivors  and  with  sufficient  remaining  morale,  to 
make  the  expectancy  of  success  a  reasonable  one. 
And  with  the  infantry  in  the  defense  the  problem 
is  to  minimize  losses  and  to  prevent  demoraliza- 
tion from  the  enemy's  big  gun  fire,  so  that  when 
the  advance  of  the  attacking  infantry  reaches  an 
acute  stage,  they  may  deliver  a  fire  of  such  ac- 
curacy and  volume,  that  the  attackers  will  be  shat- 
tered with  losses  and  swept  back. 

There  are  many  modifications  of  this  simple 
outline  of  the  infantry  in  attack  and  in  defense. 
Sometimes  for  example  infantry  meets  infantry 
in  head  on  collision,  a  rencontre  as  it  is  called. 
Both  may  attack,  each  commander  believing  that 
his  mission  calls  for  aggressiveness  and  that  he 
has  the  necessary  strength.  Again  the  infantry 
frontal  attack  may  be  what  has  been  called  a  hold- 
ing, or  secondary  attack,  made  for  the  purpose  of 
deceiving  the  enemy  and  holding  his  attention 
while  the  main  forces  of  the  attacker  envelop  a 


Infantry  161 

flank  of  the  defenders  and  deliver  the  main  attack 
against  the  flank.  But  it  will  be  found  that  these 
and  similar  operations  when  the  enemy  is  trained 
and  resourceful,  usually  resolve  themselves  ulti- 
mately into  the  more  or  less  conventional  attack 
and  defense  above  outlined.  For  when  the  in- 
trenched defender  is  notified  by  his  patrols  sent 
out  for  the  security  of  the  flank  that  the  enemy  is 
advancing  against  the  flank,  he  bends  back  the 
threatened  flank  and  mans  the  new  line  with  men 
from  the  front  line,  or  from  supports  and  re- 
serves; so  that  when  the  enemy's  main  attack  is 
made,  he  finds  himself  confronted  with  the  prob- 
lem of  delivering  a  frontal  attack  where  he  hoped 
to  make  a  flank  attack. 

It  is  evident  from  the  foregoing,  that  in  the 
practical  solution  of  the  problem  presented  to  the 
infantry  in  the  attack,  his  weapon  and  its  use  play 
an  all  important  part. 

Much  has  been  said  in  the  public  press  concern- 
ing the  methods  in  use  in  the  existing  war  abroad, 
governing  the  formations  of  the  infantry  in  the 
attack.  Comparative  accounts  have  been  fre- 
quent illustrating  the  great  losses  incurred  by 
one  side  as  a  result  of  what  the  articles  designate 
as  ''massed  formations."    At  the  same  time  the 


162        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

advantages  of  attack  formations  which  provide 
for  wide  intervals  between  the  men  in  the  advanc- 
ing line,  are  favorably  commented  upon.  As  a 
result  of  these  writings  much  misunderstanding 
has  resulted  in  the  minds  of  many  persons  con- 
cerning the  infantry  attack  in  battle,  and  the 
foreign  commanders  and  their  forces  have  in  some 
instances  been  credited  by  public  opinion  with 
methods  and  theories  which  have  no  foundation 
in  fact. 

In  all  the  great  armies  of  the  world,  it  is  recog- 
nized that  the  infantry  is  the  army — the  rest  be- 
ing auxiliary  thereto.  In  every  army,  the  problem 
of  the  infantry  attack  is  recognized  as  one  of 
crossing  a  fire  swept  zone  with  enough  infantry 
to  deliver  the  assault  successfully.  While  each 
army  has  its  own  detailed  methods  of  executing 
the  advance,  they  do  not  differ  materially  in  prin- 
ciple, and  an  explanation  of  the  use  and  influence 
of  the  rifle  in  relation  to  the  attack,  and  of  the 
theory  of  fire  superiority,  will  serve  to  illustrate 
the  general  practise  in  all  armies. 

It  may  be  said  generally  that  infantry  fire  in 
the  attack  is  delivered  for  the  purpose  of  produc- 
ing results  of  two  classes,  the  first,  actual  casual- 
ties, and  the  second,  by  demoralization.     Infantry 


Infantry  163 

fire  produces  these  results  in  two  ways.  First,  by 
the  continuous  and  successful  delivery  of  a  well 
aimed  fire  which  has  the  effect  of  gradually  les- 
sening the  morale  of  the  defenders  by  the  inflic- 
tion of  losses,  and  by  compelling  a  realization  of 
the  futility  of  attempting  to  reply  to  the  fire  at- 
tack with  a  well  aimed  and  effective  fire ;  secondly 
by  paralyzing  the  enemy  with  such  a  sudden  and 
unexpected  volume  of  fire  that  he  is  momentarily 
incapable  of  effective  reply.  This  latter  result  is 
an  exceptional  one  and  usually  follows  a  battle 
opportunity  suddenly  presented  to  the  attacker 
when  he  finds  the  opponent  open  to  such  fire  as- 
sault. "When  such  opportunity  is  offered  and 
taken  advantage  of  in  the  manner  indicated,  it  is 
often  practicable  to  effect  capture  of  the  forces 
so  stricken.  In  other  words,  good  troops  may 
preserve  their  morale  in  spite  of  a  high  percent- 
age of  casualties  if  the  casualties  are  so  extended 
as  to  cover  a  considerable  number  of  hours, 
whereas  they  might  completely  lose  their  morale  if 
the  same  percentage  of  casualties  were  inflicted 
upon  them  suddenly  and  within  a  short  space  of 
time.  It  has  been  stated  that  to  enable  the  attack- 
ing infantry  to  advance  it  must  first  dominate  the 
fire   of   the   defenders.    One    of   our   American 


164        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

authorities  on  the  subject  of  infantry  fire  in 
battle  *  says  that : 

"Fire  superiority  can  be  attained  only  by  inflicting  upon  the 
enemy  in  a  given  space  of  time  more  losses  than  he  himself 
occasions." 

It  must  be  evident,  however,  that  this  is  not  liter- 
ally true;  but  the  statement  serves  to  crystallize 
the  principle  that  the  advancing  infantry  to 
avoid  losses  which  would  make  its  further  ad- 
vance impossible,  must  shoot  into  ineffectiveness 
the  fire  of  the  defenders.  This  is  accomplished 
not  only  by  the  decrease  in  rifle  bearers  among 
the  defenders,  represented  by  the  casualties  in- 
flicted, but  also  by  the  moral  effect  of  the  attack- 
er's fire. 

Among  the  public,  the  opinion  generally  pre- 
vails that  success  in  attaining  fire  superiority  is 
dependent  upon  individual  marksmanship.  The 
following  interesting  considerations  will  serve  to 
show  that  such  belief  is  not  correct,  although  in- 
dividual marksmanship  is  a  factor  in  fire  efficiency. 

Let  us  assume  a  force  of  one  hundred  men 
charged  with  the  mission  of  attacking  an  in- 
trenched force  of  one  hundred  men,  distant  from 

1  "The  Rifle  in  War,"  Eames. 


Infantry  165 

the  initial  firing  point  1200  yards.  The  attack- 
ing force  does  not  know  the  range  accurately. 
The  range  must  be  estimated.  It  is  obvious  that 
it  would  be  impractical  and  lead  to  confusion  if 
every  man  were  to  make  his  own  estimate  of  the 
range  and  fire  accordingly.  Were  this  done  and 
the  resulting  shots  could  be  observed  by  dust 
kicked  up  here  and  there,  it  would  be  impossible 
to  tell  whose  shots  were  going  over  and  whose 
falling  short.  It  is  therefore  up  to  the  com- 
mander to  announce  the  range  at  which  the  sights 
will  be  set.  He  may  rely  in  making  his  decision 
upon  the  estimates  of  one  or  more  men  known 
by  experience  to  be  best  qualified  for  this,  but  in 
the  last  analysis  he  must  determine  the  range  and 
require  the  men  to  set  their  sights  accordingly. 
We  will  assume  that  his  estimate  of  the  range  is 
1100  yards.  The  men  set  the  sights,  and  at  the 
command  to  commence  firing  they  aim  at  the  in- 
trenchment  and  begin  the  delivery  of  their  fire. 
The  captain  and  his  officers  watch  through  their 
glasses  the  results  of  this  fire.  As  a  matter  of 
fact  at  ranges  above  500  to  600  yards  in  ordinary 
country,  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  pick  up  the  im- 
pact of  rifle  bullets.  If  the  ground  is  moist  and 
there  is  considerable  vegetation  and  few  stones  or 


166        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

rocks,  it  is  almost  impossible  to  tell  where  the 
shots  fall.  If,  however,  there  has  been  a  period 
of  drought,  and  the  ground  is  dusty,  vegetation 
sparse,  and  there  are  numerous  rocks  and  stones 
in  the  vicinity  of  the  target,  the  impact  of  the 
bullets  will  here  and  there  throw  up  little  clouds 
of  dust  or  pulverized  stones  which  serve  to  mark 
the  zone  covered  by  the  bullets.  We  will  assume 
in  this  particular  case  that  the  captain  finds  it 
necessary  to  have  the  firing  continued  for  about 
ten  minutes  before  he  can  locate  enough  shots  to 
determine  the  zone  or  belt  of  their  fall.  He  sees 
some  of  the  bullets  striking  the  top  of  the  intrench- 
ment  and  throwing  up  dust.  He  sees  some  cut  off 
small  branches  and  twigs  from  bushes  beyond  the 
target,  while  at  the  same  time  he  sees  evidence 
that  many  of  the  bullets  are  falling  short. 

Now  let  us  assume  that  of  the  hundred  men 
who  are  firing  twenty  per  cent  are  expert  in  the 
use  of  the  rifle,  sixty  per  cent  are  mediocre  shots 
and  the  remaining  twenty  per  cent  have  had  no  ex- 
perience and  training  with  firearms.  As  the  sights 
of  all  the  hundred  men  are  set  at  1100  yards  when 
in  fact  the  true  range  is  1200  yards,  is  it  not  evi- 
dent that  none  of  the  bullets  fired  by  the  expert 
riflemen  are  producing  any  effect,  either  actual 


Infantry  167 

or  moral,  on  the  enemy?  These  men,  correctly  and 
carefully  aiming  at  the  target,  are  striking  the 
ground  with  their  bullets  one  hundred  yards  in 
front  of  the  target,  the  presence  of  grass  perhaps 
preventing  observation  of  their  fall.  This  is  so 
because  their  sights  are  set  at  1100  yards  when  the 
correct  range  is  1200.  Of  the  sixty  per  cent  of 
mediocre  shots  in  the  company,  many  of  them 
possess  eccentricities  of  firing  which  serve  to  de- 
range the  line  of  fire  when  they  pull  their  triggers. 
All  of  their  shots  do  not  fall  at  1100  yards  owing 
to  these  eccentricities.  Some  of  them  fall  short  of 
that  distance,  while  others  fall  beyond ;  and  of  the 
latter  group  a  percentage  strike  the  intrenchment 
and  may  even  inflict  casualties  on  the  enemy. 
Even  among  the  twenty  per  cent  of  men  of  the 
company  who  have  had  no  experience  and  whose 
fire  is  more  or  less  wild,  it  will  be  found  that  some 
of  their  shots  will  strike  on  or  about  the  enemy's 
line.  So  we  have  the  odd  result  that  the  men  who 
are  contributing  least  toward  the  attainment  of 
fire  superiority  are  the  experts  of  the  company. 

The  subject  of  fire  action  in  combat  is  really 
so  extensive  that  no  more  can  here  be  attempted 
than  to  point  out  that  for  the  attainment  of  fire 
supremacy  in  battle  much  more  is  necessary  than 


168        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

individual  marksmanship.  The  idea  that  a  na- 
tion of  individual  marksmen  would  prove  invinci- 
ble in  war,  has  no  basis.  There  are  many  other 
essentials  which  can  only  be  provided  by  careful 
drill  and  training. 

Let  us  consider  another  factor  of  importance  in 
the  attainment  of  fire  superiority.  We  will  again 
assume  the  conditions  above  mentioned,  except 
that  the  attacking  force  has  now  correctly  esti- 
mated the  range,  and  that  the  sights  are  set  ac- 
cordingly. The  defenders  also  have  the  correct 
range.  It  is  now  a  fight  for  fire  superiority,  each 
side  seeking  to  inflict  the  greater  losses  on  the 
other.  We  will  assume  that  the  efficiency  of  the 
individual  men  of  both  forces  is  the  same,  that 
each  presents  the  same  size  of  target  to  the  other, 
and  that  both  sides  are  inflicting  casualties  at 
the  rate  of  three  per  thousand  shots  fired.  The 
attackers  are  firing  at  the  rate  of  ten  shots  per 
minute  per  man,  while  the  defenders  are  firing 
at  the  rate  of  five  shots  per  minute  per  man.  In 
each  minute  therefore,  the  attackers  fire  one  thou- 
sand shots  and  inflict  three  casualties  on  the  de- 
fenders, while  in  the  same  time  the  defenders  fire 
but  five  hundred  shots  and  inflict  less  than  two 
casualties  per  minute.    Assuming  that  the  fire  is 


Infantry  169 

maintained  on  this  basis  for  a  period  of  ten  min- 
utes, the  attackers  will  have  inflicted  casualties  of 
thirty  per  cent,  on  the  defenders,  while  the  de- 
fenders Avill  have  inflicted  on  the  attacking  force 
casualties  of  but  fifteen  per  cent.     It  therefore  be- 
comes evident  that  there  is  an  additional  factor 
in  the  attainment  of  fire  superiority,  namely — 
fire  rapidity.    Under  actual  conditions,  of  course, 
the  foregoing  assumed  factors  would  not  be  con- 
stants.    They  would  be  variable  factors  for  the 
reason  that  when  the  losses  of  the  defenders  be- 
gin to  climb  upwards,  their  morale  would  begin 
to  be  shaken,  and  this  loss  of  morale  would  lessen 
the   correctness   of  their  aim.    In  consequence, 
they  would  not  in  fact  have  inflicted  on  the  at- 
tackers the  rate  of  loss  above  mentioned  after  the 
first  few  minutes.    AVhen  it  became  apparent  to 
the  attackers  that  their  o^vn  fire,  by  reason  of  its 
accuracy  and  rapidity,  had  disconcerted  the  enemy 
to  the  extent  described,  in  other  words  that  fire 
superiority  had  been  temporarily  attained,  the 
commander  would  endeavor  to  hold  this  fire  supe- 
riority with  part  of  his   line  while  he  pushed 
forward    the    remainder    closer    to    the    enemy. 
When  the  advanced  subdivision  had  again  taken 
up  the  fire  after  readjusting  its  sights  and  were 


170        THe  Modern  Army  in  Action 

able  to  take  over  from  the  other  subdivision  the 
duty  of  holding  the  fire  supremacy,  the  remaining 
subdivision  would  then  be  rushed  forward  to  the 
new  alignment  or  perhaps  even  advanced  beyond 
the  new  alignment. 

To  illustrate  another  factor  that  enters  into  the 
attainment  of  fire  superiority,  let  us  assume  that 
the  attacking  line  is  now  engaged  at  a  range  of 
900  yards,  and  is  firing  at  the  rate  of  ten  shots 
per  minute  per  man  and  skimming  the  top  of  the 
enemy's  intrenchment  at  the  rate  of  three  shots 
out  of  every  one  hundred  shots  fired.  We  will 
assume  that  this  danger  space  above  the  intrench- 
ment extends  from  the  top  of  the  parapet  to  a 
line  ten  inches  above  the  same.  It  is  in  this  zone 
that  the  heads,  arms  and  shoulders  of  the  de- 
fenders appear  when  they  are  using  their  rifles. 
The  attacking  force  in  like  manner,  we  will  as- 
sume, are  within  a  belt  ten  inches  high,  extended 
as  they  are  in  the  prone  position.  The  defenders 
are  firing  at  the  same  rate  and  are  delivering  the 
same  percentage  of  bullets  within  the  belt  con- 
stituting their  target.  We  will  assume  this  dif- 
ference however — that  the  attacking  force  has 
made  no  effort  to  apportion  the  target  and  dis- 
tribute the  fire,  but  that  each  man  of  his  own 


Infantry  171 

initiative  is  selecting  a  particular  point  in  the 
enemy's  line  to  be  fired  at.  The  defenders  on 
the  contrary,  pursuant  to  orders  of  their  com- 
mander, have  apportioned  the  attacking  line  into 
what  are  called  fire  sectors.  The  captain  has 
designated  the  right  half  of  the  attacking  line  as 
the  fire  sector  for  his  own  right  platoon,  and  the 
left  half  of  the  enemy's  line  as  the  fire  sector  of 
his  own  left  platoon.  Each  platoon  is  therefore 
firing  at  that  part  of  the  enemy's  line  which  is  op- 
posed to  its  front  and  it  confines  its  fire  entirely 
to  that  sector  of  the  enemy's  line.  In  like  manner 
the  platoon  commanders  subdivide  the  fire  sectors 
assigned  them,  among  the  squads  composing  their 
platoons.  This  is  what  is  called  fire  distribution 
and  its  importance  will  be  noted  in  a  moment. 

Reference  has  been  made  to  the  influence  played 
by  psychology  in  warfare  generally,  and  in  com- 
bat, particularly.  Nowhere  is  this  better  illus- 
trated than  in  the  fire  fight,  for  it  is  well  kno\^^l 
that  the  soldier  in  action  mechanically  turns  his 
rifle  on  a  target  which  attracts  his  attention  as  be- 
ing particularly  vulnerable  or  which  in  some  other 
manner  exerts  a  psychological  influence  over  him. 
Thus  in  field  firing  problems  where  targets  repre- 
senting soldiers  have  been  placed  in  a  trench  and 


172        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

the  trench  carefully  screened  by  bushes,  except 
in  one  small  sector  where  a  view  may  be  had  of 
the  hats  and  heads  of  the  dummy  defenders,  it 
is  found  that  the  attacking  soldiers  find  themselves 
attracted  to  fire  on  whai  they  can  clearly  see 
rather  than  on  the  vague  and  illy  defined  target 
marked  by  the  intervening  brush.  And  so  it  has 
happened  in  such  fire  problems  that  certain 
dummy  figures  in  the  trench  have  been  shot  to 
pieces  while  many  others  have  remained  unhit. 
In  the  problem  assumed,  although  all  the  other 
factors  have  equal  value,  that  of  fire  distribution 
in  the  case  of  the  defenders,  has  a  high  value  while 
in  the  case  of  the  attackers  it  has  no  value.  It 
will,  therefore,  be  found  in  estimating  actual 
casualties  (as  distinguished  from  bullets  passing 
through  the  belt  mentioned)  that  the  attacker  in 
this  instance  will  fail  to  attain  fire  superiority 
and  that  his  advance  will  be  stayed.  This  illus- 
trates the  importance  of  proper  distribution  of 
fire.  The  foregoing  examples  thus  briefly  out- 
lined will  serve  to  illustrate  that  in  the  organized 
shooting  of  military  combat  there  is  much  more 
in  the  problem  of  success  than  mere  individual 
marksmanship. 

In  a  combat,  what  has  been  described  in  the  case 


Infantry  173 

of  a  single  company,  is  more  or  less  continuous 
along  the  opposing  lines,  and  this  brings  us  to  a 
consideration  of  the  so-called  ''massed  forma- 
tions" in  conducting  an  attack.  It  must  be  evi- 
dent that  the  greatest  security  of  the  attacker 
against  the  infliction  of  casualties  from  the  de- 
fender's infantry  fire  is  the  superiority,  pursuant 
to  the  principles  above  laid  down,  of  his  o\vn  fire. 
In  the  statement  of  facts  above  assumed  for  the 
purpose  of  illustrating  other  factors  besides  in- 
dividual marksmanship  entering  into  success  in 
infantry  combat,  it  was  assumed  that  one  hundred 
men  were  pitted  against  one  hundred  men.  Let 
us  now  assume  that  instead  of  fixed  numbers,  there 
are  designated  positions  on  the  one  side  to  be  held 
and  by  the  other  side  to  be  attacked.  It  must  be 
evident  that  the  greater  number  of  rifles  which 
the  attacker  can  bring  to  bear  on  the  enemy's  posi- 
tion, in  the  conduct  of  his  attack,  the  greater  the 
number  of  bullets  there  will  be  fired  against  the 
position  per  minute,  all  other  factors  being  equal. 
But  additional  rifles  on  the  line  means  additional 
men  on  the  line,  and  since  the  establishment  of  the 
principle  of  the  necessity  for  fire  superiority  as 
a  preliminary  to  successful  advance,  there  has 
been  an  increasing  tendency  to  fatten  the  firing 


174        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

line  with  men,  until  now  in  most  armies  their 
number  is  limited  only  by  the  space  necessary  for 
the  proper  use  of  their  weapons.  Thus  in  the 
United  States  service  the  firing  line  in  action  num- 
bers a  man  per  yard.  This  places  them  in  the 
prone  position  practically  side  by  side,  and  as 
close  together  as  the  use  of  their  weapons  will 
permit. 

There  are  many  views  and  many  devices  held 
and  offered  as  means  for  getting  men  forward  into 
the  firing  line  with  a  minimum  of  loss.  Largely 
the  selection  of  the  particular  method  to  be  em- 
ployed depends  on  the  distance  of  the  enemy, 
whether  or  not  the  opposing  fire  is  field  artillery 
shrapnel,  rifle  fire,  machine  gun  fire  or  a  combina- 
tion of  these,  and  the  character  of  the  terrain  over 
which  the  advance  is  to  be  made.  Generally 
speaking,  however,  infantry  going  into  action, 
keep  in  column  as  long  as  such  formation  is  con- 
sistent with  safety  and  there  is  cover  to  protect 
them  in  such  formation.  This  is  done  because 
the  command  may  thus  be  maneuvered  with 
greater  facility,  and  the  men  kept  under  better 
discipline  and  control.  But  when  the  point  is 
reached,  when  to  continue  in  close  formation 
would  tend  to  endanger  the  safety  of  the  com- 


Infantry  175 

mand,  it  breaks  up  into  subdivisions.  For  ex- 
ample the  regiment  will  break  up  into  battalions. 
Usually  one  battalion  is  designated  as  the  re- 
serve and  is  kept  under  the  immediate  command 
of  the  colonel.  The  remaining  battalions  continue 
the  advance,  but  shortly  break  up  into  compi&nies, 
one  company  usually  being  held  by  the  major  un- 
der his  personal  command  as  a  support  for  the 
three  remaining  companies,  which  usually  consti- 
tute the  firing  line  in  the  fijst  instance.  The  three 
companies  which  are  to  constitute  the  firing  line  in 
each  battalion  may  deploy  as  skirmishers  connect- 
ing with  the  other  battalion  and  move  forward  in 
that  manner  until  the  enemy's  fire  compels  them 
to  halt  and  seek  for  fire  superiority.  On  the  other 
hand  it  may  be  that  owing  to  the  nature  of  the 
ground,  better  cover  may  be  secured  if  the  com- 
panies instead  of  presenting  to  the  enemy's  fire  a 
line  of  skirmishers,  present  themselves  in  columns 
of  twos,  or  in  platoon  columns.  This  forma- 
tion might  be  described  as  sending  the  line 
"end  on"  toward  the  enemy.  No  fixed  rule  can 
be  prescribed  for  all  occasions  of  combat.  In 
general,  however,  it  may  be  said  that  such  method 
will  be  adopted  as  under  the  circumstances  will 
best  enable  the  men  to  ^et  as  close  to  the  enemy 


176        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

as  possible  with  the  least  losses,  before  being  com- 
pelled to  halt  and  commence  the  fire  fight  for 
superiority.  In  like  manner  the  supports  and  re- 
serves are  pushed  forward  so  that  they  may  be 
fed  into  the  line  as  needed  to  replace  losses  and 
maintain  the  firing  power  of  the  line  at  its  limit, 
and  to  advance  readily  at  the  time  of  the  assault 
in  order  to  support  the  line  and  secure  the  victory. 

In  the  entire  field  of  peace-time  fire  training 
there  is  no  more  pernicious  factor  in  the  United 
States  than  the  artificial  one  of  the  known  range. 
The  fact  that  in  combat  the  range  is  unknown  and 
must  be  measured  with  instruments  or  estimated, 
would  naturally  suggest  that  this  factor  be  early 
introduced  into  the  fire  training  of  the  soldier. 
Yet  it  will  be  found  that  in  rifle  practise  generally, 
and  in  practically  all  the  prescribed  military  rifle 
matches  the  contests  are  conducted  at  known 
ranges. 

Brigadier  General  R.  K.  Evans,  of  the  United 
States  Army,  in  a  lecture  on  Infantry  Fire  in 
Battle,  delivered  at  the  Army  War  College,  said : 

"In  all  the  domain  of  human  endeavor  the  actual  practical 
results  of  fire  action  in  battle  present  the  most  pitiful  failure. 
The  fault  does  not  lie  with  the  gun,  but  is  entirely  due  to  lack 
of  proper  training  and  handling  of  the  man  behind  the  gun." 


Infantry  177 

The  physical,  mental  and  nervous  strain  which 
the  infantry  soldier  is  subjected  to  in  the  modem 
battle  is  well  exemplified  by  the  occurrences  of  the 
present  war  in  Europe.  The  limit  of  endurance 
often  appears  to  have  been  reached,  but  further 
events  frequently  indicate  continued  fighting  by 
the  same  organizations.  It  is  largely  a  matter  of 
psychology  and  training.  Eacial  characteristics 
are  of  course  carried  into  battle  by  soldiers,  and 
as  those  characteristics  are  martial  or  not,  the 
fighting  ability  of  the  soldier  is  increased  or  les- 
sened. But,  when  the  opposing  forces  are  both 
possessed  of  the  individual  qualities  valuable  in 
battle — courage,  determination  and  physical  fit- 
ness— the  advantage,  irrespective  of  leadership 
and  numbers,  should  be  with  the  forces  having  the 
better  discipline  and  training. 

By  discipline  and  training  is  not  meant  that 
conventional  expertness  in  performing  set  drill 
movements  or  manipulating  the  weapons  carried, 
so  often  mistaken  by  the  general  public  for  real 
discipline  and  training.  Such  conventional  ex- 
pertness is  merely  one  of  the  aids  to  proper  disci- 
pline and  training.  It  is  relatively  of  no  im- 
portance in  battle  whether  men  have  been  taught 
to  execute  the  manual  of  arms  one  way  or  an- 


178        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

other;  whether  they  form  squads  according  to 
one  method  or  as  prescribed  by  another.  Military 
discipline  and  training  strike  much  deeper.  They 
grasp  at  the  very  spirit  of  the  man.  They  hold 
before  his  mind  the  highest  ideals  of  loyalty  to 
fatherland,  respect  for  the  law,  and  sacrifice  of 
self  for  the  good  of  the  many.  By  a  vigorous 
course  of  physical  exercise,  they  increase  the 
physical  fitness  of  the  soldier  to  a  degree  which 
makes  possible  the  physical  exertions  of  campaign 
and  battle.  With  all  the  devices  that  have  come 
down  through  the  ages  of  military  preparation, 
they  coordinate  the  spirit  and  the  physical  fitness 
so  developed,  in  order  that  the  spirit  may  domi- 
nate the  mere  nerves  and  muscles  that  constitute 
the  physique.  This  ability  of  the  spirit  of  the 
soldier  to  subordinate  his  physical  weaknesses  to 
his  obligations,  has  been  variously  called  pride, 
esprit  de  corps  or  morale.  The  latter  is  the  more 
comprehensive  term.  Discipline  and  training 
therefore  develop  the  moral  character  of  the 
soldier,  and  seek  to  build  up  a  morale  strong 
enough  to  carry  him  through  the  vicissitudes  of 
battle. 

The  subject  of  morale  and  its  development,  is  a 
thought  world  in  itself.    Every  art  and  science 


Infantry  179 

have  been  drawn  upon  where  necessary  for  the 
furtherance  of  its  ends.  Suffice  it  to  say  here  that 
it  is  largely  a  psychological  study,  and  that  of  all 
the  arms  of  the  service  represented  in  an  army, 
nowhere  is  morale  so  important  as  in  its  infantry. 
The  field  artillery-man  in  action  is  psychologic- 
ally chained  to  his  guns.  The  horses  are  away 
under  cover,  while  the  guns  and  shields  afford  him 
some  protection  at  least.  While  he  is  thus  led  to 
remain,  he  is  actuated  to  perform  his  functions 
by  the  instinctive  desire  to  do  something — to  act. 
These  psychological  factors,  all  aid  the  dictates 
of  his  morale  to  perform  his  duty. 

With  the  cavalryman,  the  horse  is  an  influence 
not  to  be  disregarded.  When  subjected  to  fear 
inspiring  conditions,  the  instinct  of  the  cavalry- 
man is  nevertheless  not  to  forsake  his  horse.  The 
animal  is  clung  to  as  a  possible  means  of  safety. 
With  the  sounding  of  "the  charge"  the  horses  are 
away  at  a  gallop,  mechanically  and  together, 
carrying  off  to  duty  and  honor  some  who  were 
perhaps  unwilling  actors.  None  of  this  applies  to 
the  infantryman.  In  the  attack  he  advances  over 
any  terrain.  While  he  seeks  cover  when  halted 
to  fire,  he  must  leave  it  promptly  and  expose  his 
body  when  the  signal  to  advance  is  given.     Some- 


180       The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

times  he  is  advancing  through  woods  or  bushes, 
and  the  temptation  is  great  for  him  to  hug  his 
cover  and  let  the  line  go  on  without  him.  Per- 
haps he  will  not  be  missed,  or  it  will  be  assumed 
he  has  been  wounded.  In  the  attack  he  is  ex- 
pected to  advance,  always  to  advance,  and  always 
getting  closer  to  the  enemy;  and  the  advance  is 
but  preliminary  to  the  assault,  where  he  is  ex- 
pected to  spring  forward  with  the  bayonet  and 
meet  his  enemy  in  personal  physical  encounter. 
To  develop  a  morale  to  meet  these  requirements 
necessitates  a  discipline  and  training  which  are 
something  more  than  mere  precision  in  mechan- 
ical drill. 


CHAPTER  XII 

CAVALRY 

Pkior  to  the  introduction  and  use  of  firearms,  the 
cavalry  was  the  corps  d' elite.  The  mounted  man 
was  of  superior  caste.  He  usually  had  the  means 
to  provide  himself  with  superior  weapons  and 
armor,  but  in  consequence  he  was  frequently  so 
weighted  down  in  combat  that  as  a  cavalryman  he 
lacked  the  mobility  for  true  cavalry  action.  Fre- 
quently both  horse  and  rider  were  so  protected 
with  armor  that  both  were  invulnerable  so  far  as 
the  weapons  of  their  time  were  concerned.  It  is 
said  that  in  some  of  the  combats  of  the  middle 
ages,  the  only  knights  who  were  killed  were  those 
who  through  accident  were  unhorsed.  Owing  to 
the  weight  of  their  armor  they  were  unable  to 
arise,  were  trampled  upon  and  suffocated!  The 
armor  of  a  knight  often  equaled  in  weight  that 
of  the  wearer. 

After  the  introduction  of  the  musket  the  knights 
made  a  vain  attempt  to  maintain  their  importance 
as  warriors  by  increasing  the  resistance  of  their 

181 


182        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

armor  so  as  to  withstand  the  impact  of  the  in- 
fantry projectiles.  The  development,  however,  of 
infantry  firearms  was  too  rapid.  About  1521  the 
pistol  came  into  use  in  the  cavalry.  To-day  the 
pistol  is  used  as  a  weapon  for  individual  self-de- 
fense, and  on  rare  occasions  for  individual  offen- 
sive action ;  but  when  first  introduced,  it  was  used 
as  a  substitute  for  other  weapons.  In  combat, 
the  cavalry  rode  up  several  lines  deep,  and  as 
the  first  line  discharged  their  pistols,  they  moved 
to  the  right  and  left,  leaving  the  way  open  for  the 
next  succeeding  line,  which  thereupon  advanced 
and  fired,  being  succeeded  in  like  manner  by  the 
next  line.  These  cumbersome  tactics  were  not 
effective  when  the  enemy's  cavalry  adopted  shock 
tactics  and  charged  aggressively  into  the  forma- 
tion. As  the  ineffectiveness  of  armor  became  ap- 
parent, it  was  gradually  lightened,  but  the  helmet 
and  cuirass  were  retained  as  a  concession  to  con- 
servatism, and  in  the  France  of  to-day  may  be 
found  the  cuirassier  with  helmet  and  what  rep- 
resents the  cuirass  of  the  sixteenth  century. 

Up  to  the  time  of  Charles  XII,  of  Sweden,  cav- 
alry generally  charged  at  a  trot,  the  practise  hav- 
ing its  origin  in  the  days  of  armor  when  the  horse 
was  so  weighted  down  that  he  could  not  charge  at 


Cavalry  183 

a  faster  gait.  Charles  XII,  however,  abolished 
the  helmet  and  cuirass  in  his  cavalry,  prohibited 
the  use  of  mounted  fire  action  and  inaugurated 
the  charge  at  a  gallop.  His  cavalry  were  armed 
with  the  long,  straight  sword  which  was  used  as 
a  thrusting  weapon.  This  type  of  weapon  has 
lately  replaced  the  saber  in  the  U.  S.  Cavalry. 

Frederick  the  Great  developed  the  efficiency  of 
the  cavalry  to  still  higher  standards.     He  not  only 
prohibited  the  use  of  mounted  fire  action  and  pre- 
scribed the  charge  at  full  speed,  but  he  so  disci- 
plined and  trained  his  cavalry  that  large  bodies 
could  maneuver  with  facility  and  charge  w^ithout 
confusion.     It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  cav- 
alry of  Frederick's  armies  ultimately  numbered 
one-fourth  of  the  strength  of  the  infantry.     This 
is  the  highest  proportion  of  cavalry  to  infantry 
recorded  in  any  of  the  armies  of  history.     Freder- 
ick used  the  cavalry  so  extensively  that  they  de- 
cided most  of  his  battles.     His  cavalry  was  de- 
veloped as  a  battle  field  force,  and  was  not  spe- 
cially efficient  in  reconnaissance  work. 

The  cavalry  of  France  at  the  end  of  the  eight- 
eenth century  consisted  of  heavy  cavalry,  car- 
bineers and  light  cavalry.  The  carbineers  were 
armed  not  only  with  the  pistol  and  straight  sword. 


184        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

but  with  a  carbine  provided  with  a  bayonet.  Na- 
poleon developed  the  French  cavalry  to  the  great- 
est efficiency,  not  only  in  the  work  of  actual  com- 
bat, but  in  reconnaissance  and  screening.  In 
battle  he  frequently  directed  the  cavalry  to  charge 
at  the  crucial  moment,  and  when  this  was  done, 
the  impact  was  delivered  with  large  numbers. 
Napoleon  restored  the  helmet  and  cuirass,  which 
had  shortly  before  been  discarded.  Fire  action 
was  sometimes  resorted  to,  mounted,  but  shock 
action  was  the  main  reliance.  Horse  artillery  was 
provided  to  accompany  the  cavalry  and  developed 
great  facility  of  action  in  cooperating  with  the 
cavalry. 

The  American  Civil  War  saw  a  remarkable 
development  in  the  role  of  the  cavalry.  From  an 
insignificant  force  of  a  few  regiments  of  regular 
cavalry  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  the  Union 
cavalry  finally  numbered  80,000  men.  The  Con- 
federate cavalry  while  not  as  numerous,  was  ex- 
tremely efficient.  The  names  of  Stuart,  Forrest, 
Fitzhugh  Lee,  Wheeler,  and  Morgan,  serve  to  re- 
call the  intrepidity  and  value  of  the  cavalry  arm 
to  the  Southern  cause. 

In  the  War  of  1866  between  Austria  and  Prus- 
sia, little  that  was  new  in  cavalry  action  was  de- 


Cavalry  185 

veloped.  The  use  of  tlie  cavalry  on  both  sides  in- 
dicated a  failure  to  grasp  the  possibilities  of  the 
arm.  Its  reconnaissance  work  was  limited,  no 
raids  were  made  against  opposing  lines  of  com- 
munication, and  in  the  retreat  of  the  Austrian 
forces,  the  pursuit  was  not  pushed  aggressively 
by  the  Prussian  cavalry. 

In  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  Germany  entered 
France  with  about  50,000  cavalry.     The  French 
cavalry  was  about  10,000  less  in  numbers.     The 
Germans  profited  by  their  experience  in  the  War 
of  1866  with  Austria,  and  did  not  repeat  their  tac- 
tics of  that  period.     On  the  contrary,  the  opera- 
tions of  the  cavalry  of  the  German  army  in  the 
War  of  1870,  were  marked  by  aggressive  enter- 
prise.    The  German  cavalry  preceded  and  fully 
screened  the  movements  of  the  infantry  divisions, 
and  fought  a  series  of  independent  combats  which 
mystified  their  opponents.     The  cavalry  tactics  of 
the  Germans  in  that  war,  so  far  as  reconnaissance 
and  screening  work  are  concerned,  are  held  to  be 
models  of  what  cavalry  action  should  be.     This 
serves  to  illustrate  the  importance  to  a  nation  en- 
gaged in  war,  of  recent  experience  in  war.    There 
are  many  such  examples  furnished  by  history.     In 
the  present  war  in  Europe,  favorable  comment  is 


186        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

constantly  heard  of  the  action  of  the  Russian 
troops,  and  the  British  troops.  A  high  efficiency 
was  expected  of  the  great  armies  of  Germany  and 
France,  but  in  the  public  mind,  the  defects  of  the 
Russian  arms  in  Manchuria  and  of  the  British  in 
South  Africa,  were  still  fresh  and  seemed  to 
furnish  ground  for  a  belief  that  as  much  could 
not  be  expected  of  these  forces  as  of  the  troops  of 
Germany  and  France.  But  the  experience  of 
Russia  in  Manchuria  and  of  Great  Britain  in 
South  Africa,  were  most  valuable.  These  con- 
flicts provided  not  only  the  best  of  training,  actual 
experience  in  war  itself,  but  constituted  a  test  of 
the  practical  and  the  impractical.  The  shortcom- 
ings developed  by  war  were  sedulously  sought  to 
be  eradicated  after  the  war,  and  it  is  known  that 
the  Russian  and  British  armies  in  the  present  war 
in  Europe  are  very  different  organizations  from 
those  which  represented  the  Russian  and  British 
governments  in  the  Manchurian  and  South  Afri- 
can campaigns.  And  so  in  the  Franco-Prussian 
War,  Germany  had  the  great  advantage  of  her  ex- 
perience in  the  Austrian  campaign,  and  in  no  way 
did  the  Germans  better  illustrate  the  manner  in 
which  they  profited  by  their  experience  than  in  the 
use  of  the  cavalry.    In  many  respects,  however, 


Cavalry  187 

the  cavalry  of  botli  the  Germans  and  the  French 
failed  to  reached  the  high  standard  of  accomplish- 
ment attained  by  the  American  cavalry  in  the  Civil 
War.  As  a  fighting  force  it  was  not  as  versatile 
or  as  enterprising.  It  did  not  fight  on  foot  as 
readily  nor  maneuver  for  effective  position  as 
persistently  and  successfully. 

The  Boer  War  in  South  Africa  developed  on 
the  British  side  the  use  of  mounted  infantry,  but 
they  were  not  in  any  sense  cavalry.  They  were 
mounted  for  the  purpose  of  providing  a  mobility 
which  infantry  would  not  otherwise  possess.  The 
British  cavalry  after  the  earlier  stage  of  the  war 
did  excellent  work.  Some  of  the  most  brilliant 
work  on  the  Boer  side  was  done  by  their  mounted 
commands,  but  in  their  organization,  discipline 
and  training  they  were  not  cavalry  in  the  sense 
that  the  term  is  used  in  the  great  armies  of  the 
world. 

In  the  Manchurian  Campaign  the  Eussians  were 
opposed  by  an  inferior  cavalry  and  yet  the  Rus- 
sian operations  do  not  indicate  that  advantage  was 
taken  of  this  fact.  The  Russian  operations  do  not 
seem  to  offer  any  important  lessons  in  the  use  of 
cavalry  under  modern  conditions. 

We  know  little  that  is  authentic  of  the  opera- 


188        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

tions  of  tlie  cavalry  of  the  armies  now  engaged  in 
the  great  war  in  Europe. 

It  is  most  important  that  in  time  of  peace  a 
nation  maintain  in  its  regular  forces  a  high  per- 
centage of  cavalry,  for  the  reason  that  the  effi- 
ciency of  cavalry  in  war  depends  not  only  upon  the 
intelligence  and  training  of  the  men,  but  upon  the 
suitability  and  training  of  their  mounts.  The 
training  of  cavalry  horses  takes  much  time  and  in- 
telligent application  of  the  principles  of  horse- 
manship. Under  the  conditions  of  modern  war- 
fare the  infantry  in  a  populous  nation  may  be 
augmented  by  vast  numbers  of  reservists  who  if 
not  trained  soldiers  are  at  least  capable,  with  a 
reasonable  amount  of  training,  of  conducting  de- 
fensive operations.  This  is  not  true  of  the  cav- 
alry arm.  The  efficiency  of  cavalry  depends,  not 
only  upon  the  availability  of  an  intelligent  and 
physically  fit  personnel  who  are  individually  capa- 
ble of  riding  the  animals  furnished  them,  but  upon 
the  degree  of  coordination  which  exists  between 
the  riders  and  their  horses  and  between  various 
groups  or  subdivisions  of  the  cavalry  organiza- 
tion. Particularly  has  this  application  to  that  im- 
portant branch  of  cavalry  activity  known  as 
screening  and  reconnaissance. 


Cavalry  189 

From  the  date  of  the  commencement  of  a  cam- 
paign the  wastage  of  men,  animals  and  military 
property  begins,  and  its  extent  is  dependent  upon 
the  degree  of  hardships  and  non-success  experi- 
enced, and  the  duration  of  the  campaign.  While 
there  are  reservists  available  and  in  process  of 
preliminary  training,  the  wastage  in  men  may  be 
made  up,  but  .the  wastage  of  cavalry  horses  is  not 
so  readily  replaced.  The  cavalry  requires  some- 
thing more  than  a  mere  draft  animal  or  beast  of 
burden,  and  even  eliminating  the  essential  require- 
ment that  cavalry  horses  should  have  training,  the 
number  of  horses  of  a  proper  type  for  cavalry 
service  is  in  most  countries  limited. 

In  the  United  States  a  realization  of  these  facts 
and  a  commendable  prudence,  have  prompted  the 
Government  to  maintain  the  cavalry  of  the  regu- 
lar army  in  numbers  greater  than  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  army  on  a  peace  basis  justifies  under 
established  principles  governing  the  organization 
of  an  army.  In  the  event  of  war,  however,  it  is 
believed  that  the  cost  of  maintaining  whatever 
may  be  considered  as  an  excess  above  the  require- 
ments of  proper  organization,  will  be  found  to 
have  been  money  well  invested,  and  which  will 
make  adequate  return  as  a  result  of  their  availa- 


190        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

bility  in  considerable  numbers  for  immediate  and 
efficient  use. 

The  consensus  of  mihtary  opinion  is  that  under 
modern  conditions  the  cavalry  has  been  driven 
from  its  former  position  of  prominence  on  the 
battle  field.  This  has  been  the  result  of  the  great 
development  in  effectiveness  of  field  artillery, 
small  arms  and  machine  guns.  Cavalry  under 
modern  conditions  will  therefore  as  a  rule,  never 
willingly  engage  in  a  combat  of  the  type  best 
described  as  a  pitched  battle,  except  possibly 
against  hostile  cavalry  in  a  rencontre.  This  com- 
ment, of  course,  refers  to  mounted  action ;  that  is 
to  say,  to  strictly  cavalry  action.  In  such  action 
the  large  target  furnished  by  the  cavalry  and  their 
inability  to  inflict  damage  upon  the  enemy  during 
the  period  of  time  which  must  elapse  from  the  be- 
ginning of  their  advance  to  the  actual  impact  of 
their  charge,  present  conditions  which  spell  anni- 
hilation. While  this  is  true  concerning  combats 
of  the  character  mentioned,  the  importance,  gen- 
erally, of  the  cavalry  arm  in  other  fields  of  activity 
has  increased.  The  cavalry  squadrons  are  the 
eyes  of  the  army. 

These  eyes  are  now  supplemented  by  others  in 
the  form  of  aerial  war  craft,  but  it  should  be  re- 


Cavalry  191 

membered  that  the  mission  of  the  screening  cav- 
alry is  not  only  to  secure  information  concerning 
the  enemy  and  to  report  the  latter 's  movements, 
but  also  by  driving  back  the  enemy's  patrols  and 
detachments,  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  learning 
of  the  movements  of  their  own  forces.  This  latter 
is  a  function  which  aerial  war  craft  have  not  yet 
been  able  to  perform.  A  well-trained  cavalry  will 
not  only  by  reconnaissance  obtain  needed  informa- 
tion for  their  own  forces  and  screen  the  move- 
ments of  the  latter,  but  are  capable  by  their  mobil- 
ity of  making  early  seizures  of  important  points, 
and  by  their  versatility  and  fighting  powers,  to 
hold  them  until  the  arrival  of  supporting  forces. 
Many  officers  of  infantry  profess  to  see  a  great 
difference  between  the  efficiency  of  the  best  cav- 
alry and  good  infantry,  in  the  work  of  combat 
ordinarily  falling  to  the  lot  of  the  infantry,  and 
as  one  of  the  evidences  of  inferiority,  it  is  pointed 
out  that  the  cavalryman  does  not  even  possess  that 
important  weapon  so  characteristic  of  the  infan- 
tryman— the  bayonet.  It  is  contrary  to  the  teach- 
ings of  military  orthodoxy  of  the  present  day  to 
discount  the  value  of  the  bayonet  in  combat.  As 
a  result  of  the  Manchurian  Campaign  interest  in 
bayonet  exercises  was  rejuvenated  in  the  United 


192        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

States,  and  the  advocates  in  the  United  States,  of 
bayonet  training  will  find  much  to  support  their 
views  in  the  daily  accounts  of  bayonet  casualties 
in  the  present  war  in  Europe.  Official  reports 
when  they  become  available  after  the  termination 
of  the  war,  will  undoubtedly  show  that  these  bay- 
onet casualties  were  largely  mythical  or  at  least 
greatly  exaggerated.  It  should  be  remembered 
that  the  relative  efficiency  of  weapons  depends 
greatly  on  the  traditional  characteristics  and 
previous  training  of  the  men  who  are  to  use  them. 
The  Moro  with  the  bolo  is  a  much  more  formidable 
opponent  under  the  conditions  in  which  he  fights 
than  the  Moro  with  a  loaded  magazine  rifle.  It 
is  common  knowledge  that  the  Latin  races  readily 
become  adept  in  the  use  of  cutting  weapons  such 
as  swords,  rapiers,  stilettos,  machetes  and  knives. 
The  British  and  Eussians  pride  themselves  on 
their  skill  with  the  bayonet,  and  constantly  refer 
to  their  reliance  on  ''cold  steel."  The  Germans 
and  the  French  have  impartially  relied  on  both  the 
bayonet  and  fire  action.  But  the  American  is 
essentially  and  traditionally  a  rifleman.  Prac- 
tically every  American  home,  particularly  in  the 
country  and  rural  districts,  has  its  rifle  and  shot- 
gun.   Indeed,  the  average  American  home  fre- 


Cavalry  193 

quently  possesses  a  modest  arsenal.  Deeds  of 
violence  in  the  United  States  are  usually  com- 
mitted not  with  knives  or  cutting  weapons,  but 
with  guns  and  pistols.  The  average  American 
has  more  money  to  spend  than  has  the  European, 
and  is  in  consequence  better  able  to  purchase  am- 
munition. It  will  be  found  on  investigation  that 
in  the  United  States  the  passing  of  the  hunter  and 
the  man  generally  who  uses  firearms  has  not  been 
anything  like  as  marked  as  some  would  have  us 
believe.  In  the  fall  of  the  year  every  patch  of 
woods  from  Maine  to  California  in  the  vicinity  of 
inhabitants  resounds  with  the  crack  of  the  rifle  and 
report  of  the  shotgun  of  the  seekers  after  game. 
The  United  States  Government  liberally  indulges 
the  fire  training  of  its  soldiers,  both  regular  and 
militia,  and  it  is  believed  that  the  mean  standard 
of  American  marksmanship  is  far  above  that  of 
Continental  Europe.  With  the  American  soldier 
there  is  no  inherited  tendency  in  close  combat  to 
discard  the  use  of  his  rifle  as  a  firearm  and  to  use 
it  as  a  lance.  If  he  can  effectively  use  it  against 
the  enemy  when  fifty  yards  or  one  hundred  yards 
from  an  intrenchment  which  he  is  assaulting,  there 
is  no  reason  why  he  should  not  use  it  more  effec- 
tively at  a  range  of  three  yards  or  ten  yards,  and 


194        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

at  sucli  short  distances  its  superiority  over  oppos- 
ing bayonets  which  cannot  reach  him  must  be  ap- 
parent. But  the  advocates  of  the  bayonet  point 
out  that  there  will  be  a  time  when  the  soldier  ar- 
rives at  the  place  of  physical  contact  with  no  am- 
munition and  that  recourse  must  necessarily  be 
had  by  him  to  the  bayonet ;  that  if  he  is  not  adept 
in  its  use  he  will  lack  confidence  and  fail  at  the 
critical  moment.  It  has  been  pointed  out,  how- 
ever, elsewhere  in  this  book  that  physical  contact 
in  most  cases  is  a  fiction,  and  that  the  success  or 
nonsuccess  of  the  assault  is  usually  determined  at 
a  distance  of  fifty  to  one  hundred  yards  from  the 
intrenchment ;  that  the  decision  is  a  psychological 
one.  If  it  is  admitted  that  the  loaded  rifle  at  a  few 
paces  is  a  more  effective  weapon  than  the  bayonet 
and  that  the  only  necessity  for  bayonet  training 
is  the  possibility  of  lack  of  ammunition  at  the 
critical  moment,  this  shortcoming  could  readily  be 
provided  for  by  requiring  the  infantry  soldier  to 
always  reserve  one  clip  of  cartridges  for  a  possi- 
ble assault  as  he  now  reserves,  pursuant  to  the 
strictest  regulations,  the  emergency  ration  for 
possible  famine. 

The  tactics  of  the  Boers  in  South  Africa  illus- 
trate forcibly  the  inherent  differences  in  peoples, 


Cavalry  195 

which  should  influence  the  selection  of  the  weap- 
ons with  which  they  are  to  fight.  The  Boers  were 
ultimately  defeated,  not  only  because  they  were  so 
greatly  outnumbered,  but  because  they  lacked 
discipline  and  subordination  to  military  control. 
They  seldom  used  the  bayonet  and  relatively  but 
few  of  them  were  armed  with  the  bayonet.  They 
were  largely  mounted.  Many  cavalry  writers  deny 
that  they  were  cavalry  in  the  proper  sense  of 
the  term,  and  sometimes  refer  to  them  as  mounted 
infantr}^  However  that  may  be,  they  were  ex- 
cellent horsemen  and  extremely  formidable  with 
their  fire  action.  They  fought  equally  well 
mounted  or  afoot.  There  are  a  number  of  re- 
ported instances  where  they  effectively  charged 
mounted,  using  their  rifles  during  the  charge.  An 
effort  to  have  taught  the  Boer  soldier  the  use  of 
the  saber  would  probably  have  been  futile.  The 
effect  would  doubtless  have  been  to  turn  an  effec- 
tive gun  man  into  a  shiftless  sabreur. 

Warfare  has  been  marked  throughout  its  evolu- 
tion by  radical  departures  from  accepted  prac- 
tise at  various  times,  which  have  often  constituted 
the  real  grounds  for  great  success.  While  the 
bayonet  will  probably  be  retained  in  the  infantry, 
its  comparative  efficiency  as  a  weapon,  so  far  as 


196        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

the  American  soldier  is  concerned,  does  not  rate 
high.  In  the  battle  of  Santiago  in  the  Spanish- 
American  War,  the  United  States  cavalry  fought 
as  infantry.  They  were  armed  with  carbines 
which  were  shorter  and  not  as  effective  as  the  rifle 
with  which  the  infantry  was  armed.  These  car- 
bines were  not  provided  with  bayonets.  The 
cavalry  successfully  assaulted  the  sectors  of  the 
enemy's  intrenched  position  assigned  to  them  to 
attack,  and  it  is  not  recorded  that  they  were  handi- 
capped by  not  possessing  bayonets. 

In  the  development  of  military  preparedness 
among  the  great  nations  of  the  world,  and  their 
consequent  ability  to  place  promptly  in  the  field 
great  masses  of  troops,  the  difficulties  surround- 
ing the  getting  of  information  concerning  the 
enemy's  movements  have  increased.  With  a 
large  and  efficient  cavalry  force  it  seems  clear  that 
great  opportunity  under  these  conditions  will  be 
afforded  the  cavalry  by  reason  of  its  mobility  and 
efficient  fire  action,  to  not  only  obtain  by  independ- 
ent action  valuable  information  concerning  the 
enemy,  but  to  interrupt  his  movements  and  cut  his 
lines  of  communication.  The  larger  and  more  un- 
wieldy the  masses  that  constitute  an  army,  the 
more  dependent  is  the  army  upon  its  line  or  lines 


Cavalry  197 

of  communication,  and  in  consequence  the  greater 
the  injury  will  such  an  army  sustain  when  its  flow 
of  supplies  is  interrupted  or  cut  off. 

The  richest  field  for  the  tactical  activities  of 
cavalry,  is  the  pursuit.  Once  the  enemy  is  severely 
defeated  and  driven  back  in  anything  like  dis- 
order, the  cavalry  should  pursue  aggressively  and 
relentlessly.  Then  it  will  find  that  the  opposing 
infantry,  which  Avhen  unshaken  it  would  be  suicidal 
to  attack,  is,  in  disorganized  column  of  retreat,  a 
vastly  different  foeman.  The  mobility  of  the  cav- 
alry then  enables  it  not  only  to  make  and  hold  close 
contact  with  the  enemy's  rear  guard  in  an  effort 
to  push  through,  but  also  to  parallel  the  retreat, 
perhaps  on  other  roads,  and  to  cut  in  on  the 
disorganized  column.  The  individual  infantry 
soldiers,  when  constituting  an  organization  de- 
ployed for  attack  or  defense  have  little  fear  of  the 
cavalryman  and  his  horse.  When,  however,  they 
are  intermixed  on  the  retreat  on  congested  roads, 
with  men  of  other  organizations  and  other  arms, 
and  with  horses,  wagons,  teamsters  and  other 
fugitives,  they  realize  the  impotence  of  disorgani- 
zation and  dread  the  thunder  and  clatter  which 
announces  the  impending  charge  of  hostile  cav- 
alry.   With  the  remarkable  perfection  of  military 


198        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

methods  of  organization  and  the  abihty  of  a  well- 
trained  force  to  bring  order  out  of  apparent  chaos 
within  a  reasonable  time,  it  is  essential  that  the 
victor,  if  he  is  to  reap  the  full  fruits  of  victory, 
should  follow  his  tactical  victory  by  such  aggres- 
sive operations  as  will  not  permit  the  enemy  the 
time  or  the  opportunity  to  effect  reorganization. 
Any  combat  that  results  in  the  decisive  defeat  of 
a  well-trained  army  will  frequently  have  required 
of  the  victorious  forces  such  sacrifices  and  exer- 
tions, that  they  are  physically  unable  to  imme- 
diately follow  the  victory  with  the  aggressiveness 
of  pursuit  essential  for  the  purpose  mentioned. 
Then  it  is  that  the  cavalry,  which  in  most  cases 
will  not  have  participated  in  the  trying  ordeals 
of  the  main  combat,  should  initiate  and  conduct 
the  operations  demanded  by  the  situation.  The 
ideal  in  cavalry  operations  of  this  character  is 
illustrated  by  the  Union  cavalry  under  Sheridan 
at  Five  Forks,  Virginia,  in  1865,  when  they  suc- 
ceeded in  getting  around  Lee's  army  and  blocking 
its  further  retreat. 

No  reference  to  the  cavalry  arm  would  be  com- 
plete without  some  comment  on  the  losses  in 
horse  flesh  occasioned  by  war.  In  the  war  of  the 
Eebellion  this  wastage  was  influenced  materially 


Cavalry  199 

"by  the  fact  that  the  cavalry  consisted  in  the  be- 
ginning largely  of  untrained  men  who  had  little 
previous  knowledge  of  the  use  and  care  of  riding 
horses,  and  from  the  lack  of  trained  cavalry  offi- 
cers to  instruct  the  men  and  to  minimize  the  ef- 
fect of  their  shortcomings.  It  is  reported  that 
when  the  war  was  at  its  height  during  the  fiscal 
year  ending  June  30,  1864,  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment purchased  188,718  horses  and  captured  from 
the  enemy  more  than  20,000.  During  that  period 
the  army  required  500  horses  a  day  to  replace 
losses.  These  losses  for  the  most  part  were  not 
losses  in  battle,  but  losses  which  resulted  from 
the  breaking  down  of  the  animals  on  account  of 
hard  riding,  improper  care  and  lack  of  forage. 
Emaciation,  sore  backs  and  epidemics  contributed 
their  inroads. 

In  Napoleon's  advance  on  Moscow  in  1812,  he 
took  with  him  about  187,000  horses,  of  which  about 
60,000  were  cavalry  animals.  Due  to  improper 
food  and  wet  weather  there  was  a  great  mortality 
among  these  animals  in  the  early  part  of  the 
campaign.  Few  of  them  lived  to  take  part  in  the 
horrors  of  the  retreat  from  Moscow.  As  a  mat- 
ter of  fact  more  than  90,000  horses  perished  before 
the  first  fall  of  snow,  and  the  remainder  were 


200        Tlie  Modern  Army  in  Action 

decimated  in  foraging  operations  about  Moscow. 
When  tlie  French  army,  at  the  conclusion  of  its 
retreat  recrossed  the  Niemen,  less  than  2,000  cav- 
alry horses  survived. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

ARTILLERY 

The  artillery  used  with  the  mobile  army  is  called 
field  artillery,  as  distinguished  from  fortress  or 
coast  artillery.  The  artillery  used  in  fortresses 
and  for  the  defense  of  harbors  consists  mainly  of 
great  guns  installed  in  permanent  positions,  al- 
though for  local  defense  light  guns  which  may  be 
moved  about  on  wheels,  are  also  provided.  There 
are  various  classes  of  field  artillery. 

These  include  the  type  generally  called  light 
artillery.  The  function  of  the  light  artillery  is  to 
accompany  the  mobile  forces  in  all  their  daily 
work  in  campaign,  to  cover  with  their  fire  the  at- 
tacks made  by  such  forces  or  to  stiffen  in  like 
manner  their  defense  against  attack  of  the  enemy. 
In  other  words  light  artillery  must  have  extreme 
mobility,  as  well  as  power,  range  and  rapidity  of 
fire.  The  desire  for  power  and  range  tend  to  in- 
crease the  weights  of  gun  carriage  and  ammuni- 
tion, while  the  requirements  of  mobility  place 
limits   on  these  factors.     Hence  it  is  that  light 

201 


202        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

artillery  is  in  a  measure  standardized  throngliout 
the  armies  of  the  world.  The  light  artillery  gun 
usually  throws  a  projectile  weighing  approxi- 
mately fifteen  pounds,  while  the  gun  itself  usually 
weighs  800  to  900  pounds,  and  are  grouped  four 
or  six  to  a  battery.  The  battery  is  an  organiza- 
tion composed  of  the  guns,  the  necessary  number 
of  vehicles  for  carrying  ammunition,  usually  called 
caissons,  the  animals  to  transport  the  vehicles  and 
the  personnel  to  serve  the  guns,  drive  and  care  for 
the  animals  and  attend  to  the  auxiliary  functions 
of  reconnaissance,  administration  and  supply. 
The  battery  is  usually  composed  of  from  100  to 
200  men  and  approximately  the  same  number  of 
horses.  As  the  gun  carriage  and  caisson  must  be 
heavy  enough  to  withstand  the  rough  usage  of 
campaign  afud  to  carry  the  heavy  weight  of  the 
gun  and  ammunition,  it  is  usually  pulled  by  six 
animals.  The  carriage  complete  usually  weighs 
about  two  tons,  and  this  weight  distributed  among 
the  six  horses,  places  a  traction  burden  on  each 
animal  of  approximately  but  650  pounds. 

Compared  with  the  weights  pulled  by  draft  ani- 
mals in  civilian  work  this  burden  of  the  artillery 
horse  seems  light,  but  it  is  to  be  remembered  that 
the  field  artillery  horse  must  possess  in  addition 


Artillery  203 

to  endurance  and  pulling  qualities,  speed  and 
agility.  In  campaign,  furthermore,  lie  is  fre- 
quently required  to  make  long,  fatiguing  marches 
with  short  intervals  of  rest  and  with  improper  and 
insufficient  forage.  Much  of  the  field  artillery 
of  the  armies  of  the  world  is  organized  into  light 
artillery  commands  of  the  character  described. 

It  is  said  that  field  artillery  was  first  used  in 
the  battle  of  Crecy  in  the  year  1346.  The  use  of 
Field  Artillery  in  the  modern  sense  resulted  from 
the  invention  of  gun  powder,  but  prior  thereto 
the  ancients  employed  what  corresponded  to  artil- 
lery. Their  weapons  of  this  character  were  the 
ballista,  the  catapult  and  springal.  The  ballista 
threw  projectiles  of  stone  from  a  wooden  bucket, 
the  propelling  power  being  a  spring.  The  cata- 
pult and  springal  were  gigantic  crossbows,  which 
threw  similar  missiles.  It  is  stated  that  the  larg- 
est of  these  devices  could  throw  projectiles  weigh- 
ing over  five  hundred  pounds  a  distance  of  more 
than  a  thousand  yards.  While  this  is  doubtless 
an  exaggeration,  it  is  clear  that  in  the  invest- 
ment of  castles  and  fortresses,  the  ancients  did 
throw  heavy  missiles  considerable  distances  with 
these  appliances. 

The  earliest  Field  Artillery  guns  were  called 


204        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

bombards,  and  resembled  somewhat  the  old  fash- 
ioned mortar,  which  was  a  short  gun  of  large 
caliber  designed  to  throw  projectiles  high  into  the 
air  with  a  view  of  dropping  them  vertically  on 
the  target.  One  of  the  earliest  big  guns  was  that 
of  Mahomet  II.  Its  bore  had  a  diameter  of  '*12 
pahns,"  and  it  propelled  a  stone  ball  weighing 
about  six  hundred  pounds.  It  required  two  hun- 
dred men  and  sixty  oxen  to  transport  this  weapon. 

Field  Artillery  was  used  extensively  in  the  wars 
of  King  Francis  I  of  France,  and  Charles  V  of 
Germany  and  Spain.  In  those  wars  the  guns  were 
of  many  calibers,  but  the  most  effective  was  the 
so-called  culverin  which  threw  a  projectile  weigh- 
ing about  eighteen  pounds.  The  lighter  pieces 
were  known  as  falcons  and  falconets.  Artillery  at 
that  time,  however,  lacked  mobility.  The  guns 
were  moved  about  by  hired  teams  and  teamsters. 
They  lacked  discipline  and  precision.  The  result 
was  that  when  the  army  was  compelled  to  retreat, 
the  guns  usually  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

The  French  officer,  de  Grebeauval,  is  considered 
to  be  the  father  of  modern  field  artillery.  He  was 
charged  with  the  re-organization  of  the  French 
artillery  about  the  year  1762.  He  improved  the 
material  in  many  ways,  looking  to  greater  mobility 


Artillery  205 

and  increased  range  and  power.  The  horses  were 
harnessed  in  pairs,  as  is  the  custom  at  the  pres- 
ent time,  but  the  objectionable  system  which  pro- 
vided for  hired  ci\'ilian  drivers  was  continued. 
It  was  Napoleon,  however,  who  developed  the 
tactical  use  of  field  artillery.  He  said  himself,  * '  It 
is  the  artillery  of  my  Guard  which  decides  most 
of  the  battles ;  because,  having  it  always  in  hand, 
I  am  able  to  use  it  whenever  it  is  necessary." 
Napoleon's  battles  furnish  numerous  examples  of 
the  daring  and  effective  use  of  field  artillery.  The 
importance  of  field  artillery  has  increased  since 
the  Napoleonic  era  with  the  development  of 
science  generally. 

The  ability  of  the  German  Army  in  August  of 
this  year  to  overcome  the  powerful  defenses  of 
Liege  illustrates  forcibly  that  the  modern  army 
cannot  succeed  in  battle  without  an  efficient,  num- 
erous and  powerful  field  artillery,  and  on  the  other 
hand,  that  possessing  such  artillery,  it  can  suffi- 
ciently break  down  any  defenses  to  enable  the  in- 
fantry to  successfully  assault. 

With  the  development  of  the  field  artillery,  it 
became  apparent  that  several  classes  of  guns  were 
necessary.  Where  for  example  a  large  force  of 
cavalry  was  operating  in  front  of  the  advance 


206        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

of  an  army  for  the  purpose  of  screening  its  move- 
ments, it  was  found  that  the  fighting  power  of 
the  cavalry  would  be  greatly  augmented  by  the 
addition  of  field  artillery.  This  resulted  in  pro- 
viding for  the  cavalry  a  special  type  of  field  bat- 
tery. In  order  to  provide  the  mobility  necessary 
for  the  battery  to  accompany  the  cavalry,  the 
cannoneers  who  ordinarily  rode  on  the  chests  of 
the  carriages  were  individually  mounted  on 
horses.  The  guns  and  carriages  were  structurally 
lightened.  This  type  of  field  battery  exists  to-day 
and  is  known  as  ''Horse  Artillery."  Generally 
speaking  its  tactical  use  and  the  technical  control 
of  its  fire  are  similar  to  the  methods  employed  in 
the  light  battery.  In  like  manner  it  was  found 
that  when  an  army  met  the  enemy  entrenched  in  a 
strong  position  behind  earthworks  constructed  at 
leisure,  the  light  artillery  batteries  were  insuffi- 
cient in  power  to  be  effective.  Several  types  of 
larger  and  heavier  guns  were  therefore  developed 
for  the  special  purpose  of  breaching  or  destroying 
such  works.  These  guns  were  known  generally 
as  heavy  field  artillery  or  siege  guns,  and  included 
not  only  heavy  rifled  cannon  but  also  howitzers 
and  mortars.  Howitzers  and  mortars  differ  from 
the  ordinary  type  of  field  artillery  in  that  they 


Artillery  207 

are  specially  designed  for  what  is  called  high- 
angle  fire ;  that  is  to  say,  for  throwing  projectiles  . 
high  into  the  air  with  the  object  of  having  them 
fall  on  the  target  from  above,  rather  than  to  strike 
them  horizontally  from  the  front.  These  heavier 
types  of  field  guns,  owing  to  their  weight  and  to 
the  increased  ^veight  of  the  carriages  which  bear 
them,  lack  mobility.  They  are,  however,  drawn 
in  the  rear  of  the  army  either  with  draft  animals 
or  by  traction  engines,  and  are  not  brought  up 
until  the  occasion  for  their  use  arises  and  the  way 
is  prepared  for  their  movement  to  the  front. 

In  addition  to  the  types  of  guns  already  enumer- 
ated, most  of  the  modern  armies  include  the  type 
known  as  the  mountain  gun.  It  was  found  that 
in  mountainous  districts  where  the  roads  con- 
sisted of  trails,  it  was  frequently  desirable  in  com- 
bat to  have  artillery  accompany  the  infantry 
troops.  Wheel  transportation  being  impractical 
in  such  terrain  the  mountain  battery  was  devel- 
oped to  fulfil  the  requirements  of  mountain  war- 
fare. Mountain  guns  are  so  constructed  that  they 
can  be  dissembled  and  the  parts  carried  on  pack 
mules.  The  gun  is  carried  by  one  mule ;  the  small 
wheels  by  another;  the  cradle  and  trail  by  a 
third,  while  additional  mules  carry  the  necessary 


208        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

supply  of  anununition.  Such  batteries  are  usu- 
ally officially  designated  as  mountain  batter- 
ies, while  the  soldiers  call  them  mule  batteries, 
jack-ass  batteries  or  ''hee-haw"  batteries.  The 
personnel  are  usually  specially  selected  for  height 
and  strength,  in  order  to  raise  with  facility  the 
guns  from  the  ground  and  pack  them  on  the  mules. 
Various  devices  and  types  of  pack  equipment  are 
in  use  in  the  various  armies  for  the  purpose  of 
carrying  the  load  in  such  manner  that  the  mule 
may  travel  with  as  little  inconvenience  as  possi- 
ble. A  good  mule  can  carry  in  campaign  from 
200  to  250  pounds,  although  for  short  distances 
and  short  periods  they  can  carry  much  greater 
weight  without  injury.  Mountain  guns  are  now 
used  in  very  much  the  same  manner  as  are  the 
light  artillery  guns. 

In  the  United  States  service  horse  batteries  are 
identical  with  light  batteries  so  far  as  the  materiel 
is  concerned,  the  only  difference  being  that  the 
cannoneers  .are  individually  mounted  instead  of 
riding  on  the  gun  carriages.  This  lightens  the 
load  behind  the  horses  and  provides  the  additional 
mobility  necessary  for  horse  batteries  to  possess 
in  order  to  accompany  the  cavalry  in  their  opera- 
tions.    The  technical  control  of  their  fire  is  simi- 


Ai'tillery  209 

lar  to  that  prescribed  for  the  light  batteries.  An 
explanation  of  the  system  of  fire  control  now 
used  in  the  light  artillery  service  of  all  the  great 
powers  will,  therefore,  serve  to  illustrate  the  pres- 
ent day  control  of  field  artillery  fire  generally. 

The  development  of  field  artillery  is  marked  by 
stages  based  on  the  introduction  of  new  devices 
or  inventions,  which  made  necessary  radical 
changes  in  the  use  of  field  artillery.  The  inven- 
tion for  example  of  the  rifled  gun,  enabled  field 
artillery  to  discard  spherical  shot  and  use  the 
present  day  cylindrical  projectiles  having  ogival 
heads.  Rifling,  gives  the  projectile,  in  leaving 
the  bore  of  the  gun,  a  rotary  movement  on  its 
long  axis  which  prevents  it  from  tumbling  during 
its  flight.  The  flat  base  of  the  cylindrical  pro- 
jectile offers  a  better  surface  for  the  propelling 
action  of  the  expanding  gases  of  the  gunpowder 
explosion  than  did  the  convex  surface  presented 
by  the  spherical  shot.  This  greatly  increased  the 
range  of  field  artillery  and  marked  a  stage  in  its 
development.  The  invention  of  the  breech-load- 
ing gun  and  of  the  modern  shrapnel  further  in- 
creased the  power  and  effectiveness  of  field  artil- 
lery and  marked  other  stages  in  its  development. 
About  fifteen  years   ago   the   French   developed 


210        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

what  is  known  as  the  long  recoil  type  of  field  gun 
and  at  the  same  time  introduced  a  new  system  of 
indirect  fire  control.  This  type  of  gun  and  sys- 
tem of  fire  control  have  since  been  adopted  in  the 
leading  armies  of  the  world.  They  constitute  a 
remarkable  advance  in  the  development  of  field 
artillery.  It  is  this  present  stage  in  the  evolution 
of  field  artillery  which  will  now  be  explained. 

Prior  to  the  introduction  of  the  present  type  of 
long  recoil  guns,  it  was  necessary  to  relay  the  piece 
after  each  shot.  The  recoil  of  the  gun  was  such 
that  the  gun  carriage  rolled  back  several  yards 
although  appliances  were  provided  for  '' braking" 
the  wheels.  The  manual  labor  of  pushing  the 
gun  forward  to  its  original  position  and  giving  it 
proper  direction  and  elevation,  consumed  time 
and  limited  the  number  of  aimed  shots  which  could 
be  fired  per  minute,  to  about  four.  The  so-called 
long  recoil  type  of  gun  is  so  constructed  that  when 
fired,  the  carriage  remains  rigid  and  the  gun  recoils 
on  a  supporting  frame  or  cradle  through  the  ac- 
tion of  a  recoil  cylinder  about  equal  in  size  and  di- 
ameter to  the  gun  itself.  When  the  gun  recoils,  it 
carries  with  it  a  piston  rod  and  piston  which  com- 
press powerful  steel  springs  within  the  cylinder. 
The  energy  of  recoil  is,  therefore,  neutralized  by 


Artillery  211 

the  power  of  the  springs  and  also  by  the  resistance 
of  oil  or  air  forced  through  the  piston,  from  one 
part  of  the  cylinder  to  the  other.  When  the  gun 
reaches  its  maximum  recoil  which  is  about  four 
feet,  the  springs  in  expanding,  return  the  gun  to 
the  firing  position,  and  the  oil  or  air  forced 
through  the  piston  in  the  movement  of  recoil 
operates  as  a  buffer  or  check  against  the  gun  be- 
ing forced  back  by  the  springs  to  the  original  fir- 
ing position  with  too  much  force.  Thus  it  is  prac- 
ticable for  the  gunner  and  cannoneer  immediately 
concerned  with  manipulating  the  instruments  con- 
trolling the  fire  and  which  are  affixed  to  the  car- 
riage, to  perform  their  functions  while  seated  be- 
hind the  protecting  steel  shield  on  the  carriage 
without  leaving  those  positions  when  the  gun  is 
fired. 

Light  artillery  projectiles  are  now  made  up  as 
fixed  ammunition,  and  resemble  in  appearance 
giant  rifle  cartridges.  They  may  therefore  be 
handled  without  the  danger  incident  to  the  hand- 
Hng  of  the  old  type  of  field  artillery  ammunition, 
where  each  charge  consisted  of  the  projectile 
which  was  first  inserted  in  the  breech  and  forced 
into  place  with  a  short  rammer  staff,  and  of  the 
propelling  charge  of  loose  powder  contained  in 


212        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

a  cylindrical  bag,  placed  behind  the  projectile.  A 
smoldering  fragment  of  the  bag  of  the  previous 
charge  sometimes  caused  the  premature  discharge 
of  the  succeeding  charge.  With  the  fixed  am- 
munition such  accidents  no  longer  occur. 

With  the  old  type  of  gun  it  was  necessary,  on 
account  of  the  recoil,  for  the  gun  detachment  to 
stand  clear  of  the  gun  carriage  when  the  gun  was 
fired,  which  was  done  by  means  of  a  lanyard  fixed 
to  a  friction  primer  inserted  in  the  breech-block. 
When  the  lanyard  was  pulled  by  the  cannoneer, 
it  exploded  the  primer  which  communicated  its 
flame  through  a  vent  in  the  breech-block  to  the 
propelling  charge  in  the  chamber  of  the  gun.  The 
new  type  of  gun  is  fired  as  a  rifle  is  fired,  by  a 
trigger  pulled  by  a  cannoneer  from  his  seat  on 
the  carriage.  With  the  new  type  gun,  a  rapidity 
of  fire  of  from  12  to  20  shots  per  minute  is  prac- 
ticable. 

But  the  most  important  development  in  the  new 
gun  is  the  sight  and  quadrant  whereby  the  gun 
may  be  directed  so  as  to  hit  the  target,  without  the 
gun  being  in  a  position  from  which  the  target  can 
be  seen.  When  the  great  money  value  of  a  bat- 
tery of  field  artillery  is  considered,  and  to  this  is 
added  the  value  of  the  horses,  the  length  of  time 


-■^  ^ 


Artillery  213 

it  takes  to  manufacture  the  materiel  and  to  train 
the  gunners,  drivers  and  cannoneers,  it  becomes 
apparent  that  any  scheme  which  will  tend  to  safe- 
guard the  battery  from  the  enemy's  fire  is  desira- 
ble and  important.  If  the  battery  therefore  in 
delivering  its  fire,  could  occupy  a  position  on  the 
reverse  slope  of  a  ridge  or  in  or  behind  a  corn 
field  or  woods,  it  is  evident  that  the  chance  of  the 
enemy  locating  and  hitting  the  battery  would  be 
greatly  lessened.  Until  the  introduction  of  the 
new  system  of  fire  control  however,  a  battery 
which  occupied  such  position,  while  it  would  be 
more  or  less  safe  from  the  enemy's  fire,  would 
not  be  able  on  its  own  part  to  deliver  effective 
fire  against  the  enemy. 

Perhaps  the  best  way  to  describe  how  this  is 
now  accomplished  is  to  assume  a  battery  so  located 
and  describe  what  is  done  by  those  concerned  in 
directing  the  fire  of  the  battery  from  such  masked 
position.  We  will  assume  that  the  battery  is  be- 
hind a  ridge  and  on  the  edge  of  a  com  field  most 
distant  from  the  enemy.  Standing  behind  the 
four  guns  and  looking  to  the  front  we  can  see 
nothing  but  corn  which  rises  above  the  heads  of 
the  gunners  and  cannoneers.  The  horses  and 
limbers  have  been  driven  off  and  are  under  cover 


214        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

of  a  deep  draw  on  a  flank  of  the  battery.  Stand- 
ing on  one  of  the  guns  and  looking  to  the  front 
over  the  top  of  the  corn  we  can  see  nothing  but 
the  sky  line  of  the  ridge  in  our  front.  Being  thus 
unable  to  see  anything  of  the  enemy  let  us  follow 
the  captain  who  is  to  conduct  the  fire  of  the  bat- 
tery against  the  enemy's  position  four  thousand 
yards  on  the  other  side  of  the  ridge,  and  to  the 
front  of  the  battery.  We  find  him  perhaps  a 
quarter  of  a  mile  off  to  a  flank  of  the  battery.  He 
is  standing  behind  a  clump  of  bushes  on  a  spur  of 
the  same  ridge  behind  which  the  guns  were  placed. 
With  him  is  one  of  the  lieutenants  of  the  battery, 
who  is  known  as  the  reconnaissance  officer,  and 
there  are  also  present  a  sergeant  and  several  pri- 
vates. One  of  the  latter  has  a  telephone  instru- 
ment, the  receiver  of  which  is  attached  to  his 
head.  He  is  sitting  down  under  cover,  and  from 
the  little  portable  battery  box  and  transmitter  in 
his  hands  we  note  a  wire  running  loosely  over  the 
ground  toward  the  battery.  On  inquiry  we  learn 
that  at  the  other  end  of  the  wire  there  is  another 
soldier  provided  with  a  field  artillery  telephone, 
and  that  these  men  and  their  instruments  consti- 
tute the  means  of  communication  between  the  cap- 
tain and  his  firing  battery.    The  captain  tells  us 


Artillery  215 

that  his  station  is  known  as  the  battery  com- 
mander's station;  that  the  instrument  which  he 
is  operating  and  which  resembles  a  transit  is 
known  as  a  battery  commander's  telescope,  and 
is  in  fact  an  instrument  designed  for  the  measure- 
ment of  horizontal  and  vertical  angles.  It  is 
graduated  in  the  same  manner  that  the  panoramic 
sights  on  the  guns  are  graduated,  except  that  one 
is  read  clockwise  and  the  other  counter  clockwise. 
The  captain,  having  determined  the  target  and 
estimated  or  measured  the  range  thereto  from  his 
station,  selects  what  is  called  an  aiming  point. 
This  aiming  point  is  any  well  defined  vertical  ob- 
ject on  the  horizon,  preferably  at  a  distance  of 
more  than  two  thousand  yards,  which  can  be  seen, 
not  only  by  him  but  also  by  the  four  gunners  of 
his  battery  through  their  panoramic  sights  on  the 
guns.  It  is  evident  that  possessing  a  sight  which 
can  be  rotated  through  the  complete  circumference 
of  a  circle,  the  angle  contained  between  two  lines 
having  as  their  vertex  the  sight,  the  one  line  run- 
ning through  the  target  and  the  other  through  the 
aiming  point,  can  be  measured  on  the  scale  pro- 
vided on  the  sight  for  that  purpose.  By  setting 
the  sight  at  that  angle,  and  giving  the  gun  such 
direction  that  the  vertical  cross-wire  of  the  sight 


216        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

is  coincident  with  the  vertical  aiming  point,  the 
gun  will  be  pointed  in  the  direction  of  the  target. 
The  difficulty  in  measuring  the  angle  at  the  gun 
itself  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  intervening  mask, 
in  this  case  the  corn  field  and  ridge,  make  it  im- 
possible to  see  the  target  from  the  position  of  the 
gun.  At  the  battery  commander's  station,  how- 
ever, this  difficulty  does  not  exist.  The  captain 
may  see  the  target,  the  battery  and  the  aiming 
point.  Hence  with  his  instrument  he  quickly  and 
accurately  measures  the  angle  between  lines 
drawn  through  the  aiming  point  to  his  position, 
and  through  the  target  to  his  position.  This 
angle  will  differ  in  its  value  from  the  angle  hav- 
ing the  gun  as  its  vertex,  by  the  equivalent  of  the 
displacement  of  his  position  from  the  gun.  Vari- 
ous formulae  and  short  cut  methods  have  been 
devised  for  the  determination,  at  the  battery  com- 
mander's station,  of  this  angle  at  the  gun.  The 
angle  is  known  as  the  deflection.  The  same  in- 
strument which  measures  the  horizontal  angle, 
also  measures  the  difference  in  elevation  between 
the  plane  of  the  guns  and  the  plane  of  the  target, 
and  this  difference  is  called  the  angle  of  site.  This 
angle  and  the  range  in  the  indirect  system  of  fire, 
are  laid  off  on  the  quadrant  attached  to  the  gun. 


Artillery  217 

When  the  quadrant  is  properly  set  with  the  range 
and    angle    of    site    indicated,    the    cannoneer 
charged  with  the  adjustment  of  that  instrument, 
by  turning  the  elevating  lever  depresses  or  ele- 
vates the  muzzle  of  the  gun  as  the  case  may  re- 
quire, until  a  longitudinal  spirit  level  on  the  quad- 
rant  is  properly  bubbled.    When  this  is   done, 
assuming  that  the  quadrant  has  been  transversely 
leveled,  it  means  that  the  gun  has  the  proper  ele- 
vation to  deliver  the  projectile  to  the  target.    In 
similar  manner  the  deflections  of  the  other  guns 
will  vary  by  the  extent  of  their  displacement  to 
the  right  or  left  of  the  directing  gun,  and  by 
changing  the  value  of  this  deflection  difference, 
the  fire  of  all  four  guns  may  be  controlled  by  the 
battery  commander  from  his  distant  position,  in 
such  manner  that  the  sheaf  of  fire  may  be  con- 
verged on  one  point  of  the  target  or  opened  up  and 
distributed  over  the  full  front  of  the  target.    In 
like  manner  by  telephoning  an  order  to  add  to  or 
subtract  from  the  deflection,  he  may  shift  the  en- 
tire sheaf  of  the  battery's  fire  from  right  to  left  or 
from  left  to  right,  and  by  varjang  the  range  or 
angle  of  site  may  raise  or  lower  the  sheaf  of  fire. 
Thus  the  fire  of  the  modern  battery  may  be  lik- 
ened to  the  stream  from  a  powerful  fire  hose 


218        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

mechanically  controlled  from  a  distance.  By  pull- 
ing one  lever,  the  stream  of  water  may  he  swept 
to  the  right,  and  by  pushing  the  lever  back  the 
stream  may  be  swept  to  the  left.  By  another 
lever,  the  stream  may  be  raised  or  lowered  and 
by  other  levers  the  nozzle  may  be  so  operated  as 
to  change  the  character  of  the  stream  itself,  now 
widening  it  out  into  a  spray  and  now  concentrat- 
ing it  in  full  force  and  volume. 

Attached  to  the  bodies  of  the  caissons  which 
stand  alongside  of  the  guns  are  mechanical  devices 
for  setting  the  fuses  of  the  shrapnel.  The  shrap- 
nel fuse  is  a  clever  mechanical  device  screwed  into 
the  nose  of  the  projectile  and  designed  to  cause  it 
to  explode  at  a  designated  point  in  its  flight,  or 
on  impact.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  shrapnel, 
known  as  the  man  killing  projectile,  is  designed 
primarily  to  be  burst  in  the  air  and  in  front  of  the 
target,  so  that  it  may,  when  exploded,  drive  its 
charge  of  more  than  two  hundred  balls  against 
the  target.  The  best  results  from  the  shrapnel 
are  obtained  when  it  bursts  about  fifty  yards  in 
front  of  the  target  and  at  a  height  above  the  tar- 
get depending  upon  the  range.  This,  roughly,  is 
about  ten  feet  for  every  thousand  yards  of  range. 
The  striking  power  of  the  shrapnel  balls  therefore 


Artillery  219 

consists  of  the  remaining  velocity  of  the  projectile 
at  the  moment  of  burst,  plus  the  additional 
velocity  given  by  the  bursting  charge  within  the 
shrapnel  case.  The  fuse  consists  of  a  time  train 
which  burns  at  a  uniform  rate  of  speed  after  it 
is  ignited.  When  the  range  to  the  target  is  desig- 
nated, that  range  is  set  off  on  the  instrument 
known  as  the  fuse  setter,  and  the  nose  of  the 
projectile  which  consists  of  the  fuse,  is  set  into 
this  instrument  by  one  of  the  cannoneers  and 
turned  in  such  manner  that  a  dial  on  the  fuse  sets 
off  the  number  of  seconds  and  fifths  of  seconds 
which  it  will  take  the  projectile  to  travel  from  the 
muzzle  of  the  gun  to  the  point  where  it  is  desired 
that  the  shrapnel  burst.  The  turning  of  the  dial 
has  the  effect,  mechanically,  of  determining  the 
length  of  the  time  train. 

Now  as  to  the  manner  in  which  the  time  train  is 
ignited.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  many  per- 
sons believe  until  the  device  is  explained,  that  the 
time  train  is  ignited  by  the  flame  from  the  propel- 
ling charge  behind  the  projectile.  The  fuse,  how- 
ever, is  in  the  nose  of  the  projectile,  and  around 
the  base  of  the  projectile  is  a  rotating  band  de- 
signed for  the  purpose  not  only  of  enabling  the 
projectile  to  readily  receive  a  rotary  movement 


220        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

from  the  rifling,  but  also  of  acting  as  a  gas  check 
against  the  escape  of  the  gases  of  the  explosion 
between  the  projectile  and  the  walls  of  the  bore  of 
the  gun.  No  flame  therefore  could  reach  the  fuse. 
The  time  train  is  ignited  by  the  self-contained  ac- 
tion of  the  fuse.  When  the  gun  is  fired  and  the 
projectile  is  suddenly  started  in  its  flight,  the 
shock  dislodges  a  plunger  provided  for  the  pur- 
pose within  the  fuse,  and  this  plunger  immediately 
comes  in  contact  with  fulminate  of  mercury,  caus- 
ing a  flame  which  communicates  with  the  time  train 
at  the  point  indicated.  The  time  train  continues 
to  burn  until  the  termination  of  the  designated 
number  of  seconds  and  fractions  thereof,  at  which 
time  it  reaches  the  bursting  charge  in  the  base  of 
the  projectile.  This  thereupon  explodes  and 
blows  out  of  the  case  the  shrapnel  balls  toward 
the  target.  These  shrapnel  balls  in  most  pro- 
jectiles of  this  character  are  now  welded  into  a 
matrix  of  tallow  and  resin,  which,  consumed  by 
the  great  heat  of  the  explosion,  gives  off  a  white 
smoke.  This  serves  to  aid  the  officer  conducting 
the  fire  in  readily  spotting  the  shots  and  making 
whatever  corrections  are  necessary.  In  addition 
to  the  shrapnel,  the  light  batteries  are  provided 
with   high   explosive   shell.    Shrapnel  are   used 


Artillery  221 

against  men  and  animals  and  shells  against  mate- 
rial things  such  as  villages,  intrenchments,  re- 
doubts, etc. 

It  was  originally  believed  that  the  system  of  in- 
direct fire  was  complicated,  capable  perhaps 
theoretically  of  great  accomplishment,  but  not 
practical  under  the  conditions  of  campaign  where 
everything  to  be  effective  must  be  simple.  It  was 
urged  by  the  opponents  of  the  French  system  that 
it  was  too  mathematical  and  complicated  and  that 
in  combat  it  would  be  necessary  if  effective  assist- 
ance was  to  be  had  from  the  field  artillery,  that 
they  run  their  guns  up  on  the  hill  tops  as  they  did 
in  past  wars  and  while  hammering  the  enemy  take 
such  punishment  as  fell  to  their  lot.  Extensive 
experiments  and  experience  with  this  system, 
however,  have  served  to  convince  most  officers  that 
it  makes  for  greater  certainty  of  fire  than  was 
possible  under  the  old  system,  and  that  this  is 
true  because  of  the  elimination  in  large  measure 
of  the  personal  equation  of  the  enlisted  man.  Un- 
der the  new  system  it  will  be  noted  that  the  firing 
battery  is  more  apt  to  be  removed  from  the  stress 
and  excitement  of  combat  than  was  the  battery 
under  the  old  conditions.  The  gunner  now  is  no 
longer  a  man  upon  whose  expertness,  eyesight, 


222        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

judgment  and  skill  depends  the  efficient  fire  of  the 
gun.  Not  only  the  gunners,  but  the  entire  gun 
crews,  now  resemble  the  engineers,  oilers  and 
stokers  in  the  bowels  of  a  battleship.  They  are 
performing  important  mechanical  work,  but  only 
indirectly  are  they  participants  in  the  fight. 
They  are  not  normally  seen  by  the  enemy,  nor  do 
they  in  turn  see  the  enemy.  Just  as  the  engine 
room  force  aboard  the  battleship  carry  out  the  or- 
ders telephoned  to  them  from  the  conning  tower,  so 
do  the  field  artillerymen,  masked  behind  some  nat- 
ural obstacle,  carry  out  their  mechanical  duties 
pursuant  to  orders  telephoned  to  them  from  the 
battery  commander's  station.  Where  under  the 
old  system  it  was  necessary  to  point  out  the  tar- 
get to  all  four  gunners  and  to  make  sure  that  the 
same  was  identified  by  them  before  the  captain 
could  undertake  to  fire  his  battery,  under  the  new 
system  nothing  is  pointed  out  to  the  gunners  and 
the  captain  shifts  the  fire  of  the  guns  at  will  about 
the  battlefield  within  the  limits  of  the  range,  by 
telephoning  to  the  battery  the  necessary  changes 
in  the  firing  data.  Under  modern  conditions  the 
field  artillery  personnel  with  the  guns  do  not  even 
know  what  they  are  firing  at  or  the  results  of 
their  fire,  unless  the  captain  deems  it  desirable  in 


Artillery  223 

intervals  between  firing  to  give  them  information 
of  results. 

As  explained  in  the  chapter  on  Infantry,  in- 
fantry fire  in  defense  is  ordinarily  so  effective 
that  the  attacking  infantry  cannot  by  its  own  fire 
alone  reasonably  expect  to  sufficiently  demoralize 
that  of  the  defenders  to  make  a  successful  advance 
possible.  Attacking  infantry  must  have  the  sup- 
port of  their  own  field  artillery  fire.  The  mission 
of  the  field  artillery  in  supporting  the  infantry 
attack,  is  to  fire  over  the  heads  of  the  advancing 
infantry  against  the  defenders'  positions,  and  by 
the  accuracy  and  volume  of  the  fire,  to  inflict  such 
casualties  or  to  so  demoralize  the  defenders  that 
their  fire  against  the  advancing  infantry  becomes 
ineffective.  The  function  of  artillery  in  the  de- 
fense is  to  aid  its  own  infantry  in  throwing  back 
the  advance  of  the  enemy's  infantry.  This  it 
does  by  shattering  the  advancing  forces  with 
shrapnel  fire.  From  this  it  becomes  obvious  that 
the  artillery,  in  addition  to  these  functions,  should 
seek  to  silence  the  fire  of  the  artillery  of  the  op- 
ponent, and  under  normal  conditions  of  battle  this 
is  usually  attempted.  The  artillery  of  the  at- 
tacker, when  the  opposing  artillery  opens  on  the 
advancing  infantry,  seeks  to  locate  and  destroy, 


224        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

or  at  least  to  silence,  the  batteries  thus  interfer- 
ing with  the  infantry  advance.  For  the  purpose 
of  distinguishing  batteries  firing  on  opposing  ar- 
tillery from  the  batteries  firing  on  the  enemy's 
infantry,  the  former  are  called  counter  batteries 
and  the  latter  infantry  batteries.  The  same  com- 
ment applies  to  the  functions  of  the  artillery  of 
the  defender.  Part  of  the  defender's  artillery  is 
employed  against  the  advancing  infantry  and  part 
against  the  opposing  artillery.  It  should  not  be 
understood  by  this  that  batteries  of  artillery  are 
permanently  designated  as  counter  batteries  or  as 
infantry  batteries.  They  may  act  now  in  one  ca- 
pacity and  again  in  the  other.  All  the  artillery  on 
one  side  may  concentrate  its  fire  against  the  op- 
posing artillery,  or  when  necessary  its  entire 
power  may  be  delivered  against  the  opposing  in- 
fantry. The  decision  is  based  on  the  tactical 
necessities  of  the  moment. 

Where  the  infantry  attack  is  successful  and  the 
enemy's  position  is  assaulted  and  captured,  some 
of  the  attacking  artillery  is  promptly  advanced 
to  the  new  position  to  aid  in  repulsing  any  counter 
attack  that  may  be  made  by  the  enemy  for  the  pur- 
pose of  regaining  the  position. 

Military  opinion  holds  the  view  that  the  role  of 


Artillery  225 

the  field  artillery  is  of  increasing  importance  on 
the  modern  battle-field.  This  opinion  appears  to 
be  borne  out  by  the  reports  which  come  to  us  of 
the  activities  of  the  field  artillery  of  the  armies 
now  engaged  in  the  war  in  Europe. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

AUXILIARY  SERVICES 

As  civilization  lias  advanced,  the  organization  of 
armies  has  become  more  complicated.  Many  of 
the  activities  necessarily  performed  by  armies  are 
so  technical  in  their  nature,  that  special  bodies 
of  troops  have  been  formed  for  the  purpose  of 
rendering  service  more  or  less  technical  in  its 
character.  Thus  we  find  in  the  organization  of  a 
large  army,  aviation  organizations,  signal  troops, 
engineer  troops,  sanitary  troops  and  supply 
troops. 

Aviation  is  the  newest  field  of  military  activity, 
and  the  present  war  in  Europe  presents  the  first 
real  opportunity  for  determining  the  value  of 
air-craft  as  military  assets  in  war.  These  aerial 
craft  consist  of  free  balloons,  captive  balloons,  di- 
rigibles, aeroplanes  and  kites.  In  the  American 
Civil  War,  in  the  Franco-Prussian  War  and  in 
subsequent  conflicts  the  balloon  was  frequently 
used.  The  free  balloon,  although  subject  to  the 
caprices  of  the  prevailing  wind,  was  used  with 

226 


j 


Auxiliary  Services  227 

success  in  carrying  passengers  and  information 
from  beleaguered  cities  to  friendly  territory. 
The  captive  balloon  was  more  frequently  used  in 
the  militarv  service.  It  consisted  of  a  balloon, 
containing  one  or  more  observers,  attached  to  a 
cable  which  was  played  out  over  a  windlass  until 
the  observers  had  arrived  at  a  height  sufficient  to 
enable  them  to  make  what  observations  were  de- 
sired or  were  possible  under  the  conditions.  Free 
balloons  and  captive  balloons  were  comparatively 
safe  when  struck  by  hostile  rifle  shots,  as  they 
usually  settled  to  the  ground  slowly  and  in  such 
manner  as  to  enable  the  occupants  to  escape 
without  injury.  Owing  to  the  necessity  for  cap- 
tive balloons  to  be  sent  up  at  a  point  far  enough 
distant  from  the  enemy's  lines  to  avoid  destruc- 
tion, it  was  difficult  for  the  observer,  even  with 
powerful  glasses,  to  learn  much  that  was  desired 
concerning  the  movements  or  dispositions  of  the 
enemy. 

In  the  Santiago  campaign  in  the  Spanish- Amer- 
ican war,  the  United  States  forces  sent  up  an  ob- 
server in  a  captive  balloon.  The  appearance  of 
the  balloon  was  the  signal  for  the  enemy  to  turn 
upon  it  a  heavy  fire.  Many  of  these  shots  fell 
among  the  troops  on  the  trail  below  the  balloon 


228        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

and  many  casualties  were  in  consequence  inflicted 
on  them.  It  is  said  that  the  only  information 
furnished  by  the  observer  was  that  the  enemy  was 
in  the  distance  and  was  firing  in  his  direction — 
information  which  the  troops  below  had  already 
received  in  convincing  form. 

With  the  remarkable  development  of  aviation 
during  the  past  few  years,  the  reader  is  doubtless 
familiar.  Of  the  military  value  of  air-craft,  opin- 
ions differ.  The  dirigible  is  self-propelling  and 
capable  of  carrying  a  considerable  number  of  pas- 
sengers. It  is  reported  that  some  of  the  German 
dirigibles  have  carried  more  than  two  score  of 
persons.  These  air-craft,  however,  because  of 
their  immense  size,  present  a  large  target  to 
hostile  fire;  they  are  costly,  and  although  recent 
reports  have  it  that  the  German  Government  has 
developed  a  non-inflammable  gas,  the  reports  have 
not  been  authenticated,  and  its  liability  to  explo- 
sion appears  to  remain  a  serious  defect.  To  avoid 
hostile  fire,  it  must  therefore  seek  a  great  altitude, 
and  this  minimizes  its  value  as  a  scouting  ma- 
chine. The  Germans  have  developed  the  dirigi- 
ble to  a  greater  extent  than  have  any  other  people, 
but  they  have  not  neglected  the  aeroplane  as  a 
military  air-craft. 


Auxiliarj^  Services  /  229 

The  aeroplane  is  believed  to  be  the  best  air- 
craft for  military  reconnaissance.  It  has  been 
developed  for  military  purix)ses  more  particularly 
by  the  French.  Owing  to  the  speed  and  size  of 
such  craft,  they  furnish  extremely  difficult  targets 
for  hostile  fire,  while  their  comparatively  light 
cost  makes  it  practicable  to  sacrifice  a  percentage 
of  them  in  order  to  obtain  important  information 
concerning  movements  of  the  enemy  at  a  critical 
time.  Public  interest  in  the  dirigible  and  aero- 
plane seems  to  be  centered  on  their  bomb  dropping 
qualifications.  The  military  mind  is  more  inter- 
ested in  their  value  as  eyes  of  the  army.  Prior 
to  the  present  war  in  Europe,  military  opinion  dis- 
counted the  popular  belief  concerning  the  amount 
of  damage  which  could  be  done  by  air-craft  in 
time  of  war,  and  the  reports  coming  to  us  from 
Europe  seem  to  support  this  view.  To  illustrate 
the  ground  for  this  military  opinion,  let  the  reader 
compare  the  damage  that  can  be  inflicted  on  a  city 
by  half  a  dozen  aeroplanes,  with  the  damage  possi- 
ble of  infliction  by  the  guns  now  used  in  bombard- 
ing fortified  towns.  Assuming  that  the  aviator 
can  carry,  in  addition  to  his  own  weight,  two 
bombs  weighing  fifty  pounds  each,  it  will  be  neces- 
sary for  him,  in  order  to  drop  them  within  the 


230        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

hostile  city,  to  make  his  ascension  well  without  the 
zone  of  hostile  fire,  to  describe  the  necessary 
number  of  circles  in  order  to  attain  a  height  neces- 
sary to  avoid  destruction  and  then  to  speed  over 
his  target  and  drop  his  missiles.  All  this  involves 
the  great  risk  of  accident  inseparable  from  avia- 
tion, plus  the  increased  risk  imposed  by  the  condi- 
tions of  war.  The  dropping  of  the  bombs  is  in  it- 
self difficult,  and  because  of  the  altitude  there  is 
little  certainty  that  they  will  strike  an  important 
target.  It  is  known  furthermore  that  the  effect  of 
such  explosives  dropped  in  the  manner  indicated 
is  entirely  local.  If  the  aeroplane  is  destroyed 
and  the  aviator  killed,  we  have  the  loss  of  a  costly 
machine  and  a  trained  man  as  a  result  of  an  effort 
to  drop  a  few  shots  in  a  hostile  city.  While  it  is 
true  that  dirigibles  can  transport  a  greater  num- 
ber of  heavier  and  more  powerful  bombs,  its  drop- 
ping accuracy  is  less  than  that  of  the  aeroplane, 
because  of  the  greater  altitude  in  which  it  must 
operate  on  account  of  its  bulk.  Furthermore,  the 
time  of  the  voyage  to  make  delivery  and  of  the 
return  trip  would  be  much  greater  than  that  of 
the  aeroplane,  while  its  destruction  and  the  loss 
of  its  crew  would  far  outweigh  any  success  based 
upon  the  accompUshment  of  its  mission. 


Auxiliary  Services  231 

Compare  these  insignificant  results  with  those 
obtained  by  modern  siege  artillery.  It  is  reliably 
reported  for  example  that  at  Liege  the  Germans 
employed  fifty  howitzers  which  are  said  to  throw 
a  700  pound  projectile.  While  the  rapidity  of  fire 
of  these  guns  is  perhaps  considerably  faster  than 
one  shot  in  five  minutes,  let  us  assume  that  rate 
of  fire  for  a  short  period.  Thus  while  it  would 
take  an  air-craft,  whether  aeroplane  or  dirigible, 
several  hours  to  **tune  up,"  attain  the  necessary 
altitude,  travel  to  a  point  above  the  objective,  drop 
its  projectile,  return,  and  make  its  descent,  the 
fifty  siege  howitzers  in  a  brief  period  of  fifteen 
minutes  would  have  delivered  into  the  hostile  city 
105,000  pounds  or  more  than  fifty-two  tons  of  high 
explosive  projectiles.  As  an  offensive  agency,  the 
existing  air-craft  are  not  to  be  compared  with  mod- 
em heavy  field  artillery.  For  offensive  purposes 
their  only  apparent  superiority  lies  in  their  moral 
effect  and  the  ability  to  exceed  in  their  flight  the 
trajectories  of  artillery  guns.  They  might  deliver 
missiles  into  a  fortress  or  other  defensive  posi- 
tion which  could  not  for  some  reason  be  ap- 
proached by  the  artillery. 

The  human  mind  is  always  more  fearful  of  the 
unusual  and  the  unprecedented  than  it  is  of  any 


232        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

other  form  of  violence,  although  the  former  may 
actually  be  less  harmful.  The  savage  is  more 
afraid  of  the  panting  locomotive  than  he  is  of  a 
really  harmful  wild  beast,  while  with  the  civilized 
man  the  converse  is  true.  So  it  will  probably  be 
found  that  the  damage  done  by  air-craft  in  the 
present  war,  other  than  the  demoralization  spread 
by  their  appearance,  has  been  greatly  exagger- 
ated. 

The  importance,  however,  of  air-craft  as  agen- 
cies for  obtaining  information  concerning  the 
enemy  probably  cannot  be  overestimated,  and 
especially  is  this  true  of  the  aeroplane  on  account 
of  its  speed  and  size.  It  has  been  pointed  out  that 
in  campaign  the  military  commander  has  always 
been  more  or  less  mystified  by  the  great  number 
of  rumors  and  reports  which  reach  him  concern- 
ing the  actual  or  threatened  activities  of  the 
enemy.  The  features  of  the  ground  in  his  front 
and  the  enemy's  out-posts  serve  as  a  curtain  or 
screen  behind  which  it  is  often  impossible  to  pene- 
trate. Much  of  this  difficulty  it  now  appears  is 
obviated  by  the  use  of  aeroplanes,  particularly 
when  the  information  desired  concerns  a  reported 
movement  of  large  bodies  of  the  enemy's  troops. 
The  aeroplanes  seek  from  above  the  same  inform- 


Auxiliaiy  Services  233 

ation  which  the  cavalry  of  the  army  is  seeking  be- 
low. There  is,  however,  another  function  which 
the  cavalry  has  which  the  aeroplanes  cannot  per- 
form. The  function  of  cavalry  is  not  only  to  ag- 
gressively press  forward,  locate  and  report  the 
movements  of  the  enemy,  but  to  prevent  the 
enemy's  cavalry  from  obtaining  like  information 
concerning  their  forces,  by  driving  back  the 
enemy's  patrols  and  detachments  and  keeping 
them  without  the  range  of  observation.  The 
aeroplane  is  incapable  of  performing  this  latter 
duty,  and  hence  its  function  is  in  a  way  merely 
auxiliary  to  that  of  the  cavalry.  It  is  organized 
as  a  separate  corps  only  because  of  its  technical 
and  mechanical  differences. 

The  signal  corps  of  an  army  is  charged  with  the 
maintenance  of  communication  between  the  vari- 
ous units  which  compose  the  army.  It  employs 
all  the  commercial  devices  which  have  application 
to  the  military  service.  The  earliest  messages 
were  conveyed  over  a  distance  either  by  runners 
or  by  signal  fires.  The  invention  of  the  electric 
telegraph  was  the  first  big  step  in  the  develop- 
ment of  military  signal  work.  Prior  to  that  time 
messages  were  largely  conveyed  over  long  dis- 
tances by  flag  signals  during  the  day  and  torch 


234       The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

or  lamp  signals  at  night.  After  the  field  tele- 
graph was  developed  and  had  well  and  faithfully 
served  many  armies  in  campaign,  the  field  tele- 
phone was  developed,  and  to-day  we  have  wireless 
telegraphy  or  as  it  is  called  in  the  military  service, 
radio  communication.  The  practical  use  and  ap- 
plication of  the  various  means  of  military  com- 
munication are  illustrated  in  the  last  two  chap- 
ters under  the  heading  of  ''The  Combined  Arms 
in  Battle. '* 

So  far  as  engineer  troops  are  concerned,  per- 
haps their  most  characteristic  work  with  the 
mobile  army  in  campaign,  is  the  construction  of 
bridges  over  or  across  rivers.  There  are  many 
types  of  bridges  capable  of  hasty  construction  by 
well  trained  engineer  troops.  It  frequently  hap- 
pens, however,  when  the  necessity  arises  to  throw 
a  bridge  across  a  stream  that  there  is  not  imme- 
diately available  sufficient  timber  or  other  ma- 
terial for  the  purpose.  The  engineer  troops 
attached  to  an  army  in  campaign,  therefore, 
usually  include  one  or  more  battalions  of 
pontoniers.  These  troops  are  accompanied  by 
wagons  carrying  heavy  boats,  the  shape  of  scows, 
called  pontons,  together  with  the  necessary  tim- 
bers and  flooring  with  which  to  construct  a  bridge 


Auxiliary  Services  235 

of  reasonable  length.  In  the  United  States  serv- 
ice the  pontonier  battalion  of  engineers  carries 
material  for  186  feet  of  bridge.  In  the  construc- 
tion of  the  ponton  bridge  a  ponton  is  securely 
anchored  in  the  stream  at  such  distance  from  the 
bank  as  will  permit  the  supporting  timbers  of  the 
floor  to  securely  span  the  space  between  the  bank 
and  the  ponton.  As  the  floor  is  laid  on  these 
timbers,  the  next  ponton  is  being  placed  in  posi- 
tion, connected  by  its  floor  timbers  with  the  first 
ponton,  and  properly  anchored.  As  the  flooring 
is  laid  out  to  the  second  ponton,  the  third  is  be- 
ing placed  as  were  the  preceding  pontons.  In  like 
manner  the  construction  of  the  bridge  is  con- 
tinued. The  men  are  so  trained  that  every  man 
knows  his  particular  function,  and  the  bridge  is 
constructed  with  great  rapidity,  and  when  com- 
plete, furnishes  a  substantial  means  for  the  cross-^ 
ing,  not  only  of  infantry  soldiers,  but  of  artillery, 
cavalry  and  loaded  wagons. 

There  are  many  types  of  streams,  however, 
where  the  use  of  the  ponton  bridge  would  not  be 
advisable.  The  ponton  bridge  should  be  reserved 
for  use  over  streams  which  cannot  readily  be 
bridged  with  timber  and  material  available  on  the 
site.     The  capacity  and  strength  of  the  bridges 


236        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

naturally  depend  upon  the  traffic  requirements. 
If  the  bridge  to  be  constructed  is  not  to  be  used  by 
loaded  wagons  or  artillery,  it  may  be  more  lightly 
and  rapidly  constructed  than  if  its  requirements 
included  the  demands  made  by  the  heavier 
weights.  Water  tight  barrels  are  sometimes  used 
as  floats  for  bridges.  Where  the  span  is  short 
the  cantilever  bridge  is  frequently  used,  provided 
the  load  requirements  are  not  too  great.  Another 
form  of  bridge  is  the  truss  type.  The  truss  is  a 
compound  beam  which  supports  the  weight,  and 
the  parts  of  which  are  so  disposed  as  to  form  one 
or  more  triangles  in  the  same  plane.  The  sus- 
pension bridge  is  also  used  under  certain  circum- 
stances. In  this  type  of  bridge  the  roadway  is 
hung  on  two  or  more  cables  stretched  from  bank 
to  bank,  the  ends  of  the  cables  being  attached  to 
fastenings  called  anchorages.  The  cables  are  al- 
lowed to  sag  in  order  to  lessen  the  tension.  On 
the  other  hand  the  greater  the  sag  the  greater  the 
vibration.  For  field  bridges  a  sag  of  one-tenth  the 
span  is  considered  sufficient.  This  type  of  bridge 
is  well  adapted  for  long  spans  and  light  loads. 

Engineer  troops  are  charged  with  the  repair  of 
damaged  roads  where  the  use  of  such  roads  is  re- 
quired for  the  movement  of  troops  or  supplies. 


Auxiliary  Services  237 

They  are  frequently  charged  with  the  construc- 
tion of  new  roads  for  the  same  purposes.  When- 
ever possible  their  forces  are  augmented  by 
civilian  labor.  Their  work  includes  the  repair  of 
railroad  lines  which  may  have  been  damaged  by 
the  enemy  and  which  are  required  for  the  use  of 
the  army.  Conversely  the  engineer  troops  fre- 
quently supervise  the  destruction  of  railroad  lines 
where  such  destruction  is  made  necessary  during 
military  operations. 

When  maps  of  the  theater  of  operations  of  an 
army  are  not  available,  the  engineers  are  charged 
with  the  preparation  of  such  maps.  At  times 
maps  will  be  available,  but  they  will  not  meet  mili- 
tary requirements  and  such  maps  must  be  supple- 
mented in  such  manner  as  to  indicate  the  features 
of  the  terrain  which  concern  the  army  in  cam- 
paign. In  addition  to  this  general  map  work, 
engineer  officers  and  their  troops  are  often  called 
upon  when  a  battle  is  imminent  to  take  part  in 
reconnaissances,  for  the  purpose  of  making  mili- 
tary sketches  and  maps  indicating  the  nature  of 
the  foreground  over  which  the  army  will  have  to 
advance,  the  cover  and  artillery  positions  avail- 
able and  the  location  of  the  enemy's  positions. 

When  an  army  resorts  to  field  fortifications  in 


238        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

the  conduct  of  defensive  operations,  the  construc- 
tion of  intrenchments,  redoubts,  entanglements 
and  block  houses  is  carried  out  under  the  supervi- 
sion and  with  the  assistance  of  the  engineer 
troops.  The  construction  of  land  mines  and  the 
military  demolition  of  objects  in  the  theater  of 
war  which  are  unfavorable  to  the  army  or  favor- 
able to  the  enemy,  are  also  conducted  by  the  en- 
gineer troops.  Combined  with  this  great  diver- 
sity of  engineering  and  mechanical  work  the 
engineer  troops  are  frequently  called  upon  to  fight 
as  infantry. 

The  supplying  of  troops  in  the  field  with  all  the 
material  things  necessary  for  them  to  have  is  so 
technical  that  special  troops  are  organized  for 
the  purpose  of  performing  supply  functions.  In 
the  United  States  service  the  duties  which  per- 
tain to  the  supply  of  troops,  to  their  subsistence 
and  pay,  and  to  the  furnishing  of  forage  for  the 
animals,  are  performed  by  a  corps  known  as  the 
Quartermaster  Corps.  This  corps  is  charged  with 
the  preparation  of  permanent  camp  sites,  with  the 
construction  of  military  buildings,  the  purchase  of 
mules,  horses  and  wagons  and  various  classes  of 
military  equipage  and  equipment,  as  well  as  ra- 
tions and  forage.     Their  duties  include  the  trans- 


Auxiliary  Services  239 

portation  of  supplies  to  the  troops,  as  they  are 
required.  The  corps  is  charged  with  supplying 
transportation,  not  only  animal  and  motor,  but 
rail  transportation  as  well.  In  addition  to  the 
corps  of  officers  and  enlisted  men  whose  duties  are 
general  in  their  application  to  the  mobile  forces, 
there  are  special  officers  and  enlisted  men  in  the 
several  organizations  who  are  charged  with  local 
supply  functions.  When  the  old  maxim  ''that  an 
army  moves  on  its  belly,"  is  remembered,  the  im- 
portance of  the  Quartermaster  Corps  to  the  gen- 
eral efficiency  of  an  army  in  the  field  becomes  ap- 
parent. The  manner  in  which  supplies  are 
forwarded  from  the  base  and  finally  reach  the 
indi\ddual  men  in  the  field,  is  illustrated  in  the 
chapters  on  "The  Combined  Arms  in  Battle." 

The  medical  department  of  most  armies  has 
been  greatly  developed  during  the  present  genera- 
tion. Not  only  are  the  medical  officers  now  con- 
cerned with  the  relief  of  the  wounded  and  of  those 
stricken  by  disease,  but  what  is  even  more  im- 
portant, they  are  largely  engaged  in  the  preven- 
tion of  disease.  It  should  be  remembered  that  in 
war  more  men  have  died  as  a  result  of  disease 
than  were  killed  in  action  or  died  as  a  result  of 
wounds.    In  the  Spanish-American  War  on  the 


240        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

American  side,  243  men  were  killed  in  action  or 
died  of  wounds,  while  2,569  men  died  of  disease. 
In  the  Boer  War,  on  the  British  side,  7,702  men 
were  killed  in  action  or  died  of  wounds,  while 
13,250  men  died  of  disease.    Occasionally  in  war- 
fare the  number  of  killed  and  those  who  die  as  a 
result  of  wounds  exceeds  the  number  of  deaths  by 
disease,  but  in  the  grand  total  of  the  victims  of 
war,  it  will  be  found  that  the  latter  class  exceeds 
the  former.    Much  has  been  accomplished  by  the 
medical  corps  in  lessening  the  number  of  deaths 
from  disease  by  preventive  measures.     Typhoid, 
which  has  always  been  peculiarly  a  military  or 
camp  disease,  has  practically  been  eliminated  as 
a  result  of  the  introduction  and  use  of  Typhoid 
Vaccine. 

Much  progress  has  been  made  in  determining 
the  causes  of  disease  and  identifying  carriers  of 
disease.  The  fly  and  the  mosquito  are  now  recog- 
nized as  agents  for  the  communication  of  disease 
by  infecting  food  and  contaminating  the  blood. 
Means  are  now  accordingly  adopted  to  lessen  the 
activities  of  these  insects  and  to  screen  the 
soldiers  from  them  whenever  possible.  Great  at- 
tention is  now  given  to  the  care  of  the  soldiers' 
feet.    In  the  Franco-Prussian  war  one  of  the  Ger- 


Auxiliary  Services  241 

man  army  corps  suffered  a  loss  of  nearly  ten 
per  cent  of  its  strength  due  to  sore  feet,  and  at  one 
time  the  German  army  had  as  many  as  30,000  men 
disabled  in  this  manner.  In  the  modern  army  the 
selection  of  foot  gear  is  no  longer  left  to  the  whim 
of  the  individual  soldier.  Marching  shoes  have 
been  designed  after  many  experiments  and  trials, 
and  much  care  is  exercised  in  fitting  the  shoes  to 
the  feet  of  the  wearers. 

Every  soldier  going  into  camp  is  now  provided 
with  a  sanitary  compress  and  bandage  contained 
in  a  hermetically  sealed  packet  which  he  carries 
attached  to  his  cartridge  belt.  In  regimental  or- 
ganizations, there  is  a  detachment  of  men  known  as 
the  hospital  corps  detachment,  who  are  specially 
trained  in  rendering  first  aid  to  the  injured.  The 
division  is  supplied  with  four  ambulance  com- 
panies. T!hese  companies,  in  combat,  establish 
dressing  stations  and  send  out  litter  bearers  to 
gather  in  the  wounded  who  are  unable  to  transport 
themselves.  These  receive  such  immediate  at- 
tention as  they  may  require  at  the  dressing  station 
and  are  then  conveyed  in  ambulances  to  the  field 
hospitals  of  which  there  are  three  to  a  division. 
The  field  hospital  is  supplied  with  every  modern 
facility  necessary  for  emergency  operations.    At 


242        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

the  field  hospital,  statistics  are  kept  of  the  men, 
other  than  the  killed,  who  constitute  the  casualties 
of  the  action.  From  the  field  hospital  the  men 
are  transported  at  the  first  opportunity  in  wagons 
or  ambulances  to  another  hospital  further  towards 
the  rear.  From  this  hospital,  known  as  the 
Evacuation  Hospital,  many  of  them  are  shipped 
to  base  hospitals  or  to  convalescent  camps.  The 
functions  of  the  medical  corps  include  the  inspec- 
tion of  camps,  quarters  and  stables  with  a  view  to 
rectifying  every  defect  which  might  be  a  cause  of 
disease. 

The  operations  of  the  sanitary  troops  in  battle 
are  explained  in  the  chapter  covering  **The  Com- 
bined Arms  in  Battle.'* 


CHAPTER  XV 
SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION 

Akmies  do  not  fight  duels  according  to  set  rules 
and  at  a  stipulated  time  and  place.  We  have  seen 
in  the  chapter  on  War  that  there  are  few  limita- 
tions governing  the  conduct  of  armies  in  cam- 
paign. Other  than  these  few  limitations  there 
are  no  restrictions,  and  the  commander  is  ex- 
pected in  the  conduct  of  his  operations,  to  do 
everything  that  will  increase  his  own  chances  for 
success  and  to  leave  nothing  undone  to  place  the 
enemy  at  a  disadvantage.  In  consequence,  armies 
maneuver  so  as  to  place  the  enemy  on  ground  un- 
favorable to  him.  The  military  commander  is 
ever  alert  to  take  his  enemy  at  a  disadvantage; 
for  example,  when  he  is  crossing  a  stream,  with 
part  of  his  forces  on  one  side  and  part  on  the 
other.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  commander  to  em- 
barrass his  enemy  by  cutting  off  his  water  supply 
or  destroying  his  stores,  or  cutting  his  line  of  com- 
munications. He  employs  spies  to  secretly  obtain 
information   of   the   conditions   in   the  enemy's 

243 


244        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

camp,  of  the  enemy's  movements  and  proposed 
operations. 

Success  in  war,  therefore,  depends  not  only 
upon  the  martial  qualities  of  the  opposing 
soldiers,  their  numbers,  morale  and  armament, 
but  upon  the  extent  of  the  information  known  of 
the  enemy.  The  obtaining  of  military  informa- 
tion begins  in  time  of  peace.  The  General  Staff 
of  an  army  in  time  of  peace  makes  every  effort 
to  acquire  all  possible  information  concerning  na- 
tions with  which  its  government  may  engage  in 
war,  and  concerning  the  country  in  which  the  con- 
tending armies  may  operate.  This  information  is 
systematically  obtained,  kept  up  to  date,  and  filed 
away  properly  indexed,  in  the  official  archives. 
Some  of  the  information  is  gathered  by  military 
attaches  on  duty  with  the  governments  of  other 
nations.  Other  sources  of  information  are  books, 
professional  periodicals  and  spies  or  agents 
charged  with  obtaining  special  information.  The 
information  sought  includes  the  geography  of  the 
country,  its  resources,  mineral  and  agricultural 
products,  its  exports  and  imports,  its  railways, 
military  system,  fortifications,  finances  and  every 
other  material  item  of  information  which  would 
be  of  value  in  the  event  of  war. 


English   troops   hastily   deployed   at    a   roadside.      Note    the 
rapid-lire   Kun   in    the   foreground 


Security  and  Infoniiation  245 

It  will  therefore  be  seen  that  information  may 
be  divided  into  two  classes ;  information  obtained 
in  time  of  peace,  and  information  to  be  gained  in 
time  of  war.  The  first  class  comes  under  the  head 
of  preparation  for  war,  and  has  been  discussed  in 
the  chapter  devoted  to  that  subject.  Information 
of  the  second  class  is  sought  mainly  for  the  pur- 
pose of  aiding  active  operations  of  the  forces  in  the 
field.  As  the  obtaining  of  information  concern- 
ing the  enemy  is  necessary  for  the  efficient  action 
of  an  army,  it  is  equally  important  that  the  enemy 
be  denied  similar  information  concerning  the  op- 
posing forces.  To  prevent  the  enemy  obtaining 
such  information  and  to  guard  against  sudden  ac- 
tions of  the  enemy  which  would  place  the  army  at 
a  disadvantage,  many  tactical  devices,  methods, 
and  even  minor  operations,  are  resorted  to.  All 
of  these  come  under  the  head  of  security.  As  the 
duty  of  acquiring  information  concerning  the 
enemy  is  so  closely  related  to  the  obligation  of 
providing  for  the  security  of  the  command  these 
subjects  are  usually  grouped  together  in  any  study 
of  tactical  operations,  under  the  heading  * '  Secur- 
ity and  Information." 

In  active  operations  important  information 
other  than  that  acquired  by  the  troops  is  usually 


246        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

obtained  from  one  of  the  following  sources ;  from 
spies,  friendly  and  unfriendly  inhabitants,  news- 
papers and  captured  mail.  So  far  as  spies  are 
concerned  they  are  usually  civilians  employed  for 
that  purpose,  although  occasionally  officers  have 
acted  in  that  capacity  where  the  information  de- 
sired is  not  only  important  but  of  a  nature  re- 
quiring technical  military  knowledge  to  obtain. 
Shortly  before  General  Nathaniel  Lyon  attacked 
the  Confederate  camp  in  the  vicinity  of  St.  Louis, 
Missouri,  during  the  Civil  War,  he  assumed  a  dis- 
guise and  succeeded  in  visiting  the  camp  and  gain- 
ing much  information  of  value  to  him  in  determin- 
ing his  plan  for  the  attack.  His  attack  resulted  in 
the  capture  of  the  camp.  "Women  have  frequently 
proven  to  be  very  clever  spies.  In  the  Shenan- 
doah Valley  Campaign  General  Sheridan  regularly 
received  much  valuable  information  from  a 
woman  residing  within  the  Confederate  lines. 
Spies  frequently  pose  as  venders,  drivers  and 
traveling  comedians.  Various  ruses  are  on  oc- 
casions resorted  to  to  gain  for  the  spy,  admission 
to  the  inner  circles  of  the  enemy's  army.  At 
times,  in  order  to  accomplish  this,  spies  have  acted 
as  double  spies,  that  is  to  say,  acting  on  behalf  of 
one  government  they  have  succeeded  in  securing 


Security  and  Information  247 

employment  in  a  similar  capacity  from  tlie  oppos- 
ing government.  There  have  been  occasions 
when  double  spies  have  not  played  fairly  with 
either  employer.  On  the  other  hand  some  of  them 
have  rendered  valuable  service  to  one  side  while 
transmitting  to  the  other  only  enough  informa- 
tion to  maintain  the  employment  necessary  for 
the  carrying  out  of  the  real  mission.  Spies  are 
usually  well  compensated  and  on  the  other  hand 
many  are  frequently  influenced  to  become  spies  by 
reason  of  injustice  suffered  by  them  at  the  hands 
of  the  opposing  government.  In  view  of  the  un- 
certainty in  many  cases  of  the  dependence  to  be 
placed  on  the  loyalty  of  a  spy,  it  is  the  practise  of 
those  charged  with  the  conduct  of  their  opera- 
tions, to  keep  them  in  the  dark  concerning  all  mat- 
ters not  essential  for  them  to  know.  The  identity 
of  other  spies  in  the  employ  of  the  commander  is 
not  divulged,  and  the  reports  received  from  other 
spies  are  not  disclosed.  Sometimes  the  reports 
received  from  one  spy  are  checked  against  reports 
on  the  same  subject  received  from  other  spies. 
Where  the  loyalty  of  a  spy  is  not  certain  the  prac- 
tise is  to  transact  business  with  him  in  the  vicin- 
ity of  an  outpost  so  that  he  cannot  by  visiting  and 
moving  about  freely  within  the  camp,  be  in  a  posi- 


248        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

tion  to  take  back  important  information  to  the 
other  side. 

The  newspapers  published  in  time  of  war  have 
in  the  past  furnished  much  valuable  information 
to  the  enemies  of  their  country.  During  the 
Franco-Prussian  War,  when  Marshal  MacMahon 
began  his  march  for  the  relief  of  Marshal  Bazaine, 
the  first  information  received  by  General  von 
Moltke  of  this  movement  came  to  him  from  French 
and  English  newspapers.  It  is  common  knowl- 
edge that  during  the  Boer  War  in  South  Africa 
the  Boers  repeatedly  received  valuable  informa- 
tion which  first  appeared  in  English  newspapers 
and  thereupon  was  telegraphed  to  them.  In  the 
Spanish-American  War,  in  similar  manner,  in- 
formation concerning  the  plans  and  operations  of 
the  American  forces  was  furnished  to  the  enemy 
through  the  agency  of  American  newspapers. 
The  harmful  activities  of  newspaper  representa- 
tives are  not  of  course  intentionally  disloyal  or 
traitorous,  but  result  from  the  effort  to  publish 
the  news  for  the  information  of  their  own  country- 
men, in  part  from  recklessness  and  irresponsibil-^ 
ity  of  reporters,  but  more  frequently  from  igno- 
rance of  the  conduct  of  war  and  of  the  important 
influence  which  the  smallest  piece  of  information 


Security  and  Information  249 

may  sometimes  have  on  the  operations  of  the 
enemy.  General  von  der  Goltz,  who  has  been 
quoted  elsewhere  in  this  book,  on  this  point  said : 

"Even  the  best  informed  paper  will  neither  be  able  nor 
willing  to  make  known  the  position  of  its  party,  in  all  its  en- 
tirety. But,  even  here,  what  is  worth  knowing  is  composed 
of  many  petty  details.  Other  flashes  of  light  have  often  so  far 
lit  up  the  picture  of  the  enemy's  doings,  that  only  a  breath 
of  wind  is  still  wanting  to  rend  asunder  the  thin  enshrouding 
veil  of  mist.  The  presence  of  a  high  commander  is  mentioned, 
a  letter  published,  in  which  the  writer  mentions  a  division  of 
troops  and  its  station,  or  narrates  a  deed  of  anns,  exactly  de- 
scribing all  the  circiunstances,  the  regiments,  and  commanders. 
Each  detail  by  itself  is  perfectly  unprejudicial,  but  may  yet 
serve  as  a  valuable  link  of  a  chain  that  at  last  leads  to  its  aim." 

As  a  result  of  the  activities  of  newspaper  re- 
porters and  war  correspondents,  the  leading  gov- 
ernments within  recent  years  adopted  stringent 
regulations  governing  their  conduct  when  accom- 
panying armies  in  the  field  and  supplemented 
these  with  others  to  limit  military  information  to 
be  published  for  public  consumption.  In  the  pres- 
ent war  in  Europe  we  see  evidence  that  regula- 
tions of  this  character  are  being  enforced  by  the 
combatant  powers.  Newspapers,  however,  are 
sometimes  utilized  for  the  purpose  of  disseminat- 
ing false  and  misleading  news  in  order  to  deceive 


250        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

an  enemy  known  to  possess  the  means  of  ohtain- 
ing  such  newspapers. 

In  operations  which  carry  an  army  into  the 
enemy's  country  it  frequently  happens  that  citi- 
zens of  the  invading  government  or  others 
friendly  to  it,  are  found  within  the  invaded  terri- 
tory, and  valuable  information  concerning  the 
enemy  is  often  obtained  from  such  sources. 
Information  is  sometimes  secured  from  un- 
friendly sources — from  hostile  inhabitants,  who 
do  not  realize  the  value  of  the  information  they 
are  giving.  Uneducated  persons  who  have  no  in- 
tention of  imparting  to  an  enemy  information 
which  they  regard  as  valuable,  will  often,  in  order 
to  cover  their  reticence  with  plausibility,  give  cor- 
rect information  which  they  regard  as  of  no  value, 
but  which,  patched  with  information  received  from 
other  sources,  furnishes  important  clues  concern- 
ing the  intentions  or  operations  of  the  enemy. 

Information  is  obtained  tactically,  by  recon- 
naissance. A  reconnaissance  is  a  troop  move- 
ment for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  information 
against  the  enemy.  These  are  usually  classified 
as  reconnaissances  in  force,  special  reconnais- 
sances and  patrolling  and  scouting.  A  reconnais- 
sance in  force  is  usually  a  military  operation  of 


Security  and  Information  251 

some  magnitude  for  the  forces  employed  usually 
consist  of  all  arms  of  the  service.  The  operations 
are  conducted  as  if  the  detachment  were  an  inde- 
pendent command.  A  reconnaissance  in  force  is 
usually  made  for  the  purpose  of  developing  the 
location  and  strength  of  the  enemy's  forces. 
Frequently  in  war  an  enemy  will  screen  his  loca- 
tion so  successfully  that  patrols  and  scouts  are 
unable  to  penetrate  the  screen  to  determine 
whether  the  enemy  is  really  present  in  force  be- 
hind the  screen  or  whether  he  has  departed,  leaving 
a  holding  force  while  he  operates  in  another  direc- 
tion. The  detachment  of  all  arms  charged  with 
making  the  reconnaissance  in  force  will  usually 
attack  the  enemy  vigorously  and  in  a  manner  to 
lead  him  to  believe  that  the  army  is  attacking. 
In  order  to  repel  such  an  attack  the  enemy,  if  he 
is  really  present  behind  the  screen,  will  have  to 
meet  the  attack.  This  usually  enables  the  devel- 
opment of  his  strength  and  dispositions  or  estab- 
lishes the  fact  that  the  enemy's  main  body  is  not 
present. 

A  reconnaissance  in  force  is  however  a  costly 
method  of  securing  information  for  the  reason 
that  an  attack  involves  losses.  An  operation  of 
this  character  is  an  attack  with  insufficient  force, 


252        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

if  we  assume  that  the  enemy  is  in  fact  present  with 
his  main  body.  Troops  taking  part  in  a  recon- 
naissance in  force  frequently  have  no  information 
of  the  object  of  the  movement  nor  of  the  extent 
of  the  forces  involved,  and  in  consequence  conduct 
themselves  as  they  would  in  an  attack  made  by  the 
entire  army.  This  may  be  illustrated  by  a  recon- 
naissance made  in  June,  1864,  against  forces  un- 
der the  Confederate  General  Johnston  at  the  foot 
of  Kenesaw  Mountain.  An  Ohio  regiment  of  in- 
fantry, one  of  the  regiments  of  the  force  making 
the  reconnaissance,  attacked  so  aggressively 
against  a  strong  position  held  by  part  of  the 
enemy  that  they  suffered  a  loss  of  ninety-eight 
killed  and  wounded,  including  seven  officers,  out 
of  a  total  strength  of  three  hundred  and  sixty- 
nine.  This  loss  was  heavier  than  that  sustained 
by  the  regiment  in  any  of  the  great  battles  in 
which  it  participated  during  the  war. 

A  special  reconnaissance  is  made  for  the  pur- 
pose of  determining  specific  information,  for  ex- 
ample, whether  a  bridge  has  been  destroyed  or  a 
designated  position  fortified. 

Patrols  are  small  detachments  sent  out  for  the 
purpose  of  obtaining  general  or  specific  informa- 
tion, largely  by  observation,  although  a  patrol  at 


Security  and  Information  253 

times  may  be  expected  to  engage  in  combat  with 
opposing  detachments  for  the  sake  of  accomplish- 
ing its  ends.  Patrols  usually  consist  of  cavalry 
or  infantry.  They  seldom  consist  of  less  than 
three  men  or  more  than  a  company.  There  are 
many  other  classes  of  patrols,  the  designations  of 
which  serve  to  illustrate  their  functions.  These 
are  officers  patrols,  reconnoitering  patrols,  visit- 
ing patrols,  flanking  patrols  and  connecting 
patrols.  Officers  patrols  are  perhaps  the  most 
important.  It  frequently  happens  that  on  the 
march  or  in  deployment  for  attack  questions  arise 
concerning  features  of  the  terrain  which  might 
have  influence  on  the  movements  of  the  forces  or 
the  conduct  of  the  operations.  If  they  are  not 
held  by  the  enemy  in  force  and  are  within  a  rea- 
sonable distance,  an  officer,  accompanied  by  a  de- 
tachment of  men,  is  sent  to  the  point  for  the 
purpose  of  obtaining  the  information  desired  in 
making  the  necessary  report.  The  men  accom- 
pany him  for  the  purpose  of  protection  and  in 
order  that  they  may  drive  off  hostile  patrols  and 
enable  the  officer  to  complete  his  mission.  This 
may  involve  the  making  of  a  sketch  or  the  exam- 
ination of  the  ground,  or  observation  of  the  en- 
emy through  his  glasses.    In  similar  manner  an 


254        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

officers  patrol  may  be  sent  to  determine  facts  re- 
lating to  a  river,  its  depth,  width,  swiftness  of 
current,  liability  to  sudden  rises,  etc.  In  like 
manner  reconnoitering  patrols  may  be  sent  out  to 
obtain  information  concerning  the  occupancy  by 
the  enemy  of  particular  points  such  as  woods, 
ravines,  farm  buildings,  fences,  defiles,  etc. 

Visiting  patrols  move  between  the  main  body 
and  a  subdivision  for  the  purpose  of  checking  up 
its  security.  Flanking  patrols,  as  the  name  indi- 
cates, are  detachments  thrown  out  to  protect  the 
flanks  of  a  unit  either  on  the  march  or  when  halted. 

All  patrolling  work  which  involves  considerable 
travel  should  be  made  by  cavalry,  because  of  its 
mobility.  Patrols  sent  out  for  the  purpose  of 
quietly  reconnoitering  the  enemy's  position,  seek 
to  obtain  their  information  by  stealth  and  observa- 
tion rather  than  by  force.  The  better  trained  the 
men  who  constitute  small  patrols,  the  more  valua- 
ble and  greater  in  amount,  will  be  the  information 
they  obtain.  At  night  a  patrol  may  succeed  in 
advancing  one  of  its  number  close  enough  to  the 
enemy's  pickets  to  overhear  conversation.  Again, 
a  patrol  may  advance  one  of  its  number  safely  to 
some  point  from  which  he  can  see  or  hear  sights 
and   sounds  which  indicate  much  to  him  as   a 


Security  and  Information  255 

trained  soldier.  For  example,  if  late  at  night  the 
camp  fires  of  the  enemy  seem  to  appear  and  re- 
appear, it  is  evident  that  the  men  are  up  and  mov- 
ing about.  This  would  indicate  the  enemy's  de- 
parture, either  for  offensive  purposes  or  for  re- 
treat. If  the  fires  are  kept  burning  brightly 
throughout  the  night  and  there  is  little  evidence 
of  movement  about  them,  it  is  probable  that  they 
are  kept  burning  by  a  detachment  for  the  purpose 
of  deceit  and  to  cover  the  retreat  of  their  main 
body.  The  braying  of  mules  is  usually  a  sign  in- 
dicating the  arrival  of  other  animals.  The  rat- 
tling of  wagon  wheels,  cracking  of  whips,  barking 
of  dogs,  announce  the  arrival  or  departure  of  or- 
ganizations. The  whistling  of  locomotives  indi- 
cates train  movements.  There  are  many  clues 
which  determine  whether  troops  are  arriving  or 
departing,  although  frequently  such  clues  are  pur- 
posely manufactured  by  the  enemy  to  deceive  the 
opponent. 

Reconnaissance,  therefore,  is  the  name  given  a 
strictly  military  effort  to  gain  information  con- 
cerning the  enemy;  to  be  acquired  by  stealthy 
observation  if  possible,  but  by  force  when  neces- 
sary. 

So  far  as  security  is  concerned,  it  may  be  said, 


256        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

generally,  that  it  may  be  considered  under  two 
heads;  offensive  security  and  defensive  security. 
The  former  includes  the  advance  guard,  the  flank 
guard  and  the  cavalry  screen,  while  the  latter  in- 
cludes outposts,  rear  guards  and  also  at  times  the 
cavalry  screen  and  flank  guards. 

Every  military  force,  no  matter  what  its  size, 
from  the  squad  to  a  field  army,  protects  its  ad- 
vance in  hostile  country  by  an  advance  guard. 
The  advance  guard  itself,  when  it  is  designated  as 
the  detachment  to  perform  the  security  function 
for  the  main  body,  protects  its  own  local  advance 
by  sending  out  its  own  advance  guard  in  the  form 
of  a  subdivision  detached  for  that  purpose.  In 
like  manner  this  subdivision  throws  out  its  own 
little  advance  guard,  and  this  process  is  continued 
until  ultimately  with  decreasing  distance  between 
subdivisions,  we  reach  what  is  called  the  point. 
This  usually  consists  of  a  noncommissioned  officer 
and  three  men.  There  are  no  set  measurements 
for  the  distances  separating  the  subdivisions  of  an 
advance  guard,  nor  are  there  set  rules  governing 
the  strength  of  the  subdivisions.  These  depend 
upon  the  nature  of  the  country  to  be  traversed  and 
the  proximity  and  strength  of  the  enemy.  It  may 
be  said,  however,  in  a  general  way,  that  the  de- 


Security  and  Information  257 

tacliment  designated  as  the  advance  guard  pre- 
cedes the  main  body  by  such  distance  as  will  keep 
the  latter  out  of  rifle  and  artillery  fire  should  the 
advance  guard  meet  the  enemy.  The  distance 
should  be  great  enough,  if  the  advance  guard  is 
driven  back,  to  allow  time  for  the  main  body  to 
make  substantial  deployment  so  as  to  receive  the 
enemy  under  conditions  favorable  to  the  army. 
The  advance  guard  having  assumed  such  posi- 
tion, which  will  usually  be  from  one-half  mile  to 
a  mile  and  a  half  or  even  two  miles,  detaches  a 
portion  of  its  strength  and  sends  it  on  as  its  own 
advance  guard.  The  main  portion  of  the  force  is 
then  designated  the  reserve  of  the  advance  guard, 
while  the  subdivision  sent  on  in  advance  is  known 
as  the  support  of  the  advance  guard.  The  sup- 
port in  like  manner  throws  out,  a  few  hundred 
yards  in  its  own  front,  a  subdivision  which  is 
known  as  the  advance  party,  and  it  is  this  sub- 
division which  throws  out  in  its  front  the  squad 
known  as  the  point.  The  advance  part  recon- 
noiters  to  the  front  and  flank  to  guard  the  support 
against  surprise  by  sending  patrols  to  particular 
points  to  see  that  the  country  is  free  from  the 
enemy  or  to  observe  the  enemy  if  he  be  present. 
The  duties  of  the  advance  guard  are : 


258        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

(1)  To  guard  against  surprise  and  furnish  in- 
formation by  reconnoitering  to  the  front  and 
flanks ; 

(2)  To  push  back  small  parties  of  the  enemy 
and  prevent  their  observing,  firing  upon  or  delay- 
ing the  main  body ; 

(3)  To  check  the  enemy's  advance  in  force  long 
enough  to  permit  the  main  body  to  prepare  for 
action ; 

(4)  When  the  enemy  is  encountered  on  the  de- 
fensive to  seize  a  good  position  and  locate  his 
lines,  waiting  the  arrival  of  supporting  forces ; 

(5)  To  remove  obstacles,  repair  the  road  and 
favor  in  every  way  the  continuous  march  of  the 
column. 

The  operations  of  the  advance  guard  are  out- 
lined in  the  last  two  chapters  of  the  book. 

Where  the  army  is  making  a  flank  march  near 
the  enemy,  a  flank  guard  becomes  of  great  im- 
portance, owing  to  the  vulnerability  of  an  army 
when  attacked  in  flank  suddenly  and  unexpectedly. 
The  flank  guard  is  therefore  a  force  thrown  out 
toward  the  enemy,  but  whose  march  parallels  that 
of  the  column  it  is  protecting.  It  marches  with 
its  own  advance  guard  and  its  relation  to  the  main 
column  should  be  such  that  if  attacked,  the  latter 


Security  and  Information  259 

can,  if  necessary,  go  to  its  support  promptly  and 
efficiently.  Occasions  may,  liowever,  arise  where 
the  flank  guard  will  be  required  to  fight  a  delay- 
ing action  without  assistance  in  order  to  protect 
the  continued  movement  of  the  main  body. 

The  rear  guard  as  its  name  indicates,  is  a  de- 
tachment thrown  out  to  cover  the  retreat  of  a 
column.  It  is  constituted  very  much  the  same  as 
the  advance  guard,  except  that  instead  of  moving 
toward  the  enemy  with  its  point  in  advance,  it 
moves  from  the  enemy  w^ith  its  point  at  the  rear. 
Like  the  advance  guard  the  strength  of  the  rear 
guard  depends  upon  the  nature  of  the  country  and 
the  strength  and  character  of  the  pursuing  force. 
Unlike  the  advance  guard,  however,  it  cannot  count 
on  the  support  of  the  main  body.  Cavalry  and 
machine  guns  are  especially  effective  with  the  rear 
guard.  The  best  known  example  of  rear  guard 
action  is  that  furnished  by  the  rear  guard  of  the 
French  army  in  the  retreat  from  Moscow.  The 
rear  guard  was  under  command  of  Ney,  and  its 
heroic  conduct  in  protecting  the  retreat  of  the 
French  column,  is  historic. 

The  ability  of  the  cavalry  to  fight  on  foot,  in 
hastily  constructed  intrenchments,  compelling  the 
pursuing  enemy  to  deploy  and  when  the  deploy- 


260        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

ment  is  concluded  to  mount  up  and  move  back  to 
a  new  position,  makes  the  cavalry  particularly 
valuable  in  rear  guard  action.  Advance  guards, 
flank  guards  and  rear  guards  are  in  the  nature, 
more  or  less,  of  local  protection  for  troops  on  the 
march.  Eeconnaissance  as  explained,  frequently 
extends  beyond  the  local  sphere  of  protection. 
But  in  large  movements  where  secrecy  is  desira- 
ble, additional  precautions  are  necessary.  This 
is  provided  for  by  the  cavalry  screen.  The  func- 
tion of  the  cavalry  screen  can  best  be  illustrated 
perhaps  by  the  action  of  the  German  cavalry  in 
the  Franco-Prussian  War  of  1870.  As  Count 
Hohenlohe  puts  it,  the  German  cavalry  in  that 
campaign  ' '  overflowed  the  country  for  miles,  even 
several  marches,  ahead  of  the  main  bodies  of  the 
infantry."  In  that  campaign  the  German  armies 
were  preceded  by  bodies  of  horsemen  who  moved 
fifteen  to  twenty  miles  in  advance,  driving  back 
even  considerable  forces  of  the  enemy  who  sought 
to  oppose  them.  The  same  principles  which  gov- 
ern the  security  of  forces  generally,  apply  to  the 
cavalry  engaged  in  screening  operations.  The 
screen  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  the  cavalry 
is  equally  distributed  in  detachments,  with  equal 
intervals  along  the  entire  front  to  be  screened. 


Security  and  Information  261 

On  the  contrary,  the  cavalry  screen  itself  covers 
its  own  advance  with  patrols  more  or  less  evenly 
distributed,  these  in  turn  supported  by  groups  of 
contact  troops.  These  are  followed  by  larger 
groups  in  support,  and  these  latter  by  still  larger 
detachments  which  constitute  the  cavalry  re- 
serves. This  formation  enables  the  cavalry  com- 
mander when  a  particular  part  of  his  line  has  met 
strong  resistance  to  reenforce  it  without  breaking 
up  other  parts  of  his  line  or  lessening  its  screen- 
ing value.  The  supporting  detachments  are  so 
disposed  as  to  most  readily  be  available  at  the 
point  needed. 

The  foregoing  covers  the  security  of  troops  in 
movement.  When  troops  halt  and  go  into  camp, 
their  security  must  also  be  provided  for.  The 
troops  constituting  the  detachments  charged  with 
the  security  of  camps  and  bivouacs  are  designated, 
the  outposts.  The  size  and  disposition  of  an  out- 
post will  depend  upon  the  size  of  the  command,  the 
proximity  of  the  enemy,  nature  of  the  ground  and 
similar  circumstances.  It  may  vary  from  a  small 
fraction  of  the  command  to  one  third  the  entire 
force,  but  it  should  not  be  stronger  than  is  con- 
sistent with  reasonable  security.  This  is  so  be- 
cause of  the  desirability  of  preserving  the  strength 


262        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

of  the  men  in  campaign  by  giving  them  every  op- 
portunity for  rest.  When  a  command  is  on  the 
march  and  halts  for  the  night,  the  advance  guard 
usually  continues  on  duty  for  the  night  as  out- 
post, being  relieved  the  following  morning  when 
the  new  advance  guard  crosses  the  line  of  the  out- 
post. Troops  on  outpost  duty  keep  concealed  as 
much  as  is  consistent  with  the  performance  of 
their  duties.  Infantry  troops  generally  perform 
outpost  duty,  particularly  at  night.  Artillery  and 
machiue  guns,  however,  are  desirable  for  sweeping 
defiles  and  large  open  spaces. 

An  outpost  is  generally  divided  into  four  parts. 
These,  in  order,  as  one  proceeds  from  the  main 
body  are,  the  reserve,  the  line  of  supports,  the 
line  of  outguards  and  the  advance  cavalry.  There 
can  be  no  uniformity  of  distance  between  these 
lines.  The  distance  will  always  depend  upon  cir- 
cumstances. The  reserve  constitutes  the  main 
body  of  the  outpost  and  is  held  at  some  central 
point  from  which  it  can  readily  support  the  troops 
in  front  or  hold  a  position  on  which  they  may  re- 
tire. The  supports  constitute  a  line  of  supporting 
and  resisting  detachments,  and  furnish  the  line 
of  outguards.     The  supports  are  numbered  con- 


Security  and  Information  263 

secutively  from  right  to  left,  and  are  placed  at  the 
more  important  points  on  the  outpost  line.  Their 
line  is  usually  a  line  of  resistance,  or  the  line  which 
is  to  be  held  in  the  event  of  attack. 

The  outguards  constitute  the  line  of  small  de- 
tachments farthest  to  the  front  and  therefore 
nearest  to  the  enemy.  They  are  classified  as 
pickets,  sentry  squads  and  cossack  posts.  They 
also  are  numbered  consecutively  from  right  to  left 
in  each  support.  A  picket  is  a  group  of  two  or 
more  squads  posted  in  the  line  of  outguards  to 
cover  a  given  sector.  The  picket  furnishes  patrols 
and  sentinels  or  cossack  posts,  for  observation. 
A  cossack  post  consists  of  four  men.  It  is  an  ob- 
servation group,  but  employs  a  single  sentinel. 
"With  eflBcient  cavalry  in  front  to  reconnoiter  in  ad- 
vance of  the  line  of  observation,  the  work  of  the 
infantry  line  of  observation  is  reduced  to  a  mini- 
mum. At  night,  however,  the  cavalry  is  usually 
withdrawn  in  order  that  the  horses  may  have 
needed  rest  and  because  outpost  work  at  night  can 
be  better  done  by  infantry. 

Patrols  and  sentinels  must  be  the  first  troops 
which  the  enemy  meets  and  each  body  in  rear  must 
have  time  to  prepare  for  the  blow.    Each  line  of 


264        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

groups  endeavors  to  cause  as  mucli  delay  as  possi- 
ble in  order  to  afford  more  time  for  the  supporting 
detachments  to  prepare. 

One  of  the  unpardonable  offenses  of  a  military 
force  is  to  be  surprised.  This  illustrates  the  im- 
portance of  the  subject  of  security  and  informa- 
tion. Military  history  is  replete  with  examples  of 
the  most  momentous  consequences  which  have 
flowed  from  the  failure  of  detachments  to  properly 
perform  their  functions  as  advance  guards  and 
flank  guards,  but  more  particularly  as  outposts. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

COMBINED  ARMS  IN  ACTION 

The  use  of  the  combined  arms  in  battle,  the  rela- 
tions which  each  arm  bears  to  the  others,  and  the 
relative  limitations  and  possibilities  of  each  may 
best  be  illustrated  by  following  the  movements  of 
a  division  in  a  hypothetical  action.  The  division 
is  the  unit  in  the  organization  of  an  army,  which 
is  complete  in  itself,  both  for  tactical  and  admin- 
istrative purposes,  and  includes  all  the  auxiliary 
arms  of  the  service.  It  numbers  about  20,000 
men  in  most  armies,  and  these  numbers  are  so 
fixed  because  they  constitute  the  greatest  number 
of  men  who,  marching  on  a  single  road  may  be 
brought  into  action  on  the  same  day,  after  the 
head  of  the  column  becomes  engaged. 

The  American  division  may  be  taken  as  typical 
of  the  organization  of  that  unit  of  an  army.  In 
the  United  States  service,  the  division  consists  of 
three  brigades  of  infantry  of  three  regiments  each, 
each  brigade  commanded  by  a  brigadier  general. 
Each  regiment  is  commanded  by  a  colonel  and 

265 


266        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

consists  of  three  battalions  commanded  by  majors, 
each  battahon  having  four  companies  commanded 
by  captains.  At  war  strength  the  companies  have 
150  men,  and  the  regiment  with  the  machine  gun, 
supply  and  sanitary  detachments  has  approxi- 
mately 1800  men.  The  infantry  of  the  division 
therefore  numbers  about  16,000  men.  Each  regi- 
ment is  provided  with  22  wagons  and  a  total  of 
171  draft  pack  and  saddle  animals.  It  is  appar- 
ent that  when  such  a  force  is  on  the  march  in  col- 
umn of  fours  it  occupies  considerable  road  space. 
Exclusive  of  the  wagon  trains,  this  road  space  for 
the  three  brigades  amounts  to  about  10,000  yards 
or  about  five  miles.  This  includes  allowance  for 
what  is  called  elongation,  which  is  an  extension 
of  the  column  due  to  minor  delays,  differences  of 
gait,  varying  grades  and  conditions  of  the  road. 
To  provide  for  the  security  of  such  a  column  on 
the  march,  part  of  it  is  necessarily  employed  as 
an  advance  guard  or  as  a  flank  or  as  a  rear  guard. 
The  ratio  which  the  force  so  employed  bears  to 
the  entire  force,  depends  upon  the  proximity, 
strength  and  direction  of  the  enemy.  It  is  the 
duty,  for  example,  of  the  troops  employed  as  an 
advance  guard  to  precede  the  main  body  by  at 
least  a  mile,  preserving  contact  and  communica- 


Combined  Arms  in  Action  267 

tion  with  it  by  connecting  files,  and  to  scout  the 
country  across  the  zone  of  the  march  of  the  main 
body.  The  advance  guard  provides  for  its  o^^^l 
protection  against  surprise  by  throwing  out  sub- 
divisions to  precede  it  and  to  guard  its  flanks,  at 
the  same  time  detaching  small  parties,  called  pa- 
trols, to  visit  and  scout  all  woods,  ravines,  villages 
and  other  places  within  the  zone  of  the  march  that 
might  afford  shelter  for  forces  of  the  enemy.  It 
is  the  function  of  the  advance  guard  to  drive  back 
all  parties  of  the  enemy,  and  to  do  this  aggres- 
sively so  that  the  march  of  the  main  body  may  not 
be  delayed  or  interrupted.  If  the  enemy  is  en- 
countered in  force,  the  advance  guard  deploys  and 
fights.  Because  of  its  strength  and  the  distance 
separating  it  from  the  head  of  the  main  body, 
there  is  time  and  ground  sufficient  for  the  main 
body  to  make  substantial  deployment  before  be- 
coming engaged.  This  plan  of  providing  for  the 
security  of  troops  on  the  march  enables  the  major 
portion  of  the  force  to  march  without  the  great 
fatigues  incident  to  scouting  and  the  nervous 
strain  of  unremitting  vigilance.  These  hardships 
are  imposed  on  the  subdivisions  charged  with  the 
security  of  the  entire  command.  Organizations 
take  their  turns  in  performing  this  duty. 


268        Tlie  Modern  Army  in  Action 

Owing  to  the  amount  of  ground  to  be  covered 
in  visiting  and  examining  suspicious  places  within 
the  zone  of  the  march  and  of  the  necessity  to  gain 
high  points  to  view  the  country  in  advance  of  the 
march  of  the  column,  infantry  is  not  as  well 
adapted  for  much  of  this  work  as  are  mounted 
men.  In  order  therefore  to  conserve  the  strength 
of  the  infantry,  the  division  is  provided  with  a 
regiment  of  cavalry  commanded  by  a  colonel,  and 
consisting  of  three  squadrons  of  four  troops  each. 
The  squadrons  are  commanded  by  majors,  the 
troops  by  captains.  The  regiment  consists  of  ap- 
proximately 1200  men  and  1435  draft,  pack  and 
saddle  animals.  It  is  the  function  of  the  divi- 
sional cavalry  regiment  to  guard  the  division  on 
the  march  against  surprise,  by  preceding  it  and 
cleaning  out  all  small  detachments  of  the  enemy 
lurking  in  its  front  or  on  its  flanks,  and,  by  finding 
the  enemy  and  keeping  him  in  observation,  always 
to  keep  the  division  commander  appraised  of  the 
enemy's  movements.  When  the  cavalry  is  as- 
signed to  precede  the  advance  guard,  to  lighten 
its  labors  and  cooperate  with  it,  it  is  acting  as 
advance  cavalry.  When  charged  with  an  inde- 
pendent mission,  it  is  called  for  the  time,  independ- 
ent cavalry.     The  cavalry  of  the  division  performs 


Combined  Arms  in  Action  269 

many  functions  in  addition  to  advance  guard  work. 
It  is  used  to  protect  or  convoy  wagon  trains  on 
the  march,  to  attack  and  seize  the  enemy's  trains 
or  to  locate  and  capture  supplies  and  forage  in 
the  enemy's  country  for  the  use  of  the  division,  to 
advance  rapidly  and  to  seize  and  hold  important 
stream  crossings  until  the  more  deliberate  arrival 
of  the  division.  On  a  retreat,  the  cavalry  by  rea- 
son of  its  mobility  is  used  in  the  fighting  of  delay- 
ing or  rear  guard  actions,  to  cover  the  retirement 
of  the  division.  To  fully  perform  its  functions, 
always  the  commander  should  keep  his  chief  ad- 
vised of  his  movements  and  of  all  information 
gathered  by  him  concerning  the  enemy.  In  the 
excitement  of  combat  and  of  rapidly  transpiring 
events,  this  duty  is  often  neglected,  and  when  this 
happens,  the  division  is  robbed  of  its  sight,  for 
the  cavalry  squadrons  are  the  eyes  of  the  division. 
An  example  of  this  is  indicated  by  the  operations 
of  the  Confederate  cavalry  under  the  great  Stuart 
during  Lee's  invasion  of  Pennsylvania  in  1863. 
The  function  of  the  Confederate  cavalry  was  to 
parallel  the  march  of  the  army  of  invasion,  screen- 
ing its  movements  from  the  enemy. 

Instead  of  keeping  his  forces  between  Lee's 
army  and  the  Union  Army,  Stuart  conducted  a 


270        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

raid  to  the  east  of  the  Union  Army,  and  after  sev- 
eral engagements  with  their  cavalry,  proceeded 
north.  By  that  time  the  Union  Army  was  also 
marching  north,  paralleling  the  route  of  Lee's 
Army.  Thus  the  Union  Army  was  between  Lee 
and  his  cavalry,  and  Lee  was  getting  from  his  cav- 
alry no  information  of  the  enemy.  When  Lee 
reached  Chambersburg,  Pa.,  on  June  28,  he 
learned  for  the  first  time  that  the  Union  Army  had 
crossed  the  Potomac  and  was  marching  north. 
Stuart  did  not  rejoin  the  army  until  the  close  of  the 
first  day  of  the  Battle  of  Gettysburg,  having 
marched  completely  around  the  Union  Army. 

As  the  defensive  power  of  infantry  may  be 
greatly  augmented  by  recourse  to  hastily  con- 
structed entrenchments,  it  is  possible  for  a  rela- 
tively weak  force  of  infantry  to  greatly  delay  the 
march  of  superior  numbers  of  infantry.  It  is  also 
possible  for  forces  of  infantry  untilizing  hastily 
constructed  entrenchments,  to  successfully  stand 
off  the  fire  attacks  of  greatly  superior  numbers. 
For  the  purpose,  therefore,  of  providing  the  in- 
fantry division  with  means  for  overcoming  the  re- 
sistance offered  to  the  march  of  the  division  by 
entrenched  bodies  of  the  enemy's  infantry  and  to 
enable  the  infantry  of  the  division  to  attack  en- 


Combined  Arms  in  Action  271 

trenched  positions,  a  brigade  of  field  artillery  is 
provided  as  a  tactical  part  of  the  division.  The 
field  artillery  is  commanded  by  a  brigadier-gen- 
eral and  is  composed  of  two  regiments  of  light 
artillery,  each  composed  of  two  battalions  of  three 
batteries  each.  Regiments  are  commanded  by 
colonels,  battalions  by  majors  and  batteries  by 
captains.  The  twelve  batteries  aggregate  48  guns 
and  144  caissons.  Each  battery  carries  with  it  in 
its  caissons,  358  rounds  of  ammunition  per  gun  or 
over  17,000  rounds  for  the  brigade.  The  brigade 
has  about  2300  officers  and  men,  and  a  total  of 
about  2300  draft,  pack  and  riding  animals. 

While  the  batteries  are  normally  light  batteries, 
the  composition  of  the  brigade  may  include  a  heavy 
field  artillery  battalion  in  place  of  one  of  the  bat- 
talions of  light  artillery.  In  the  march  of  the 
division,  it  is  usual  to  place  one  battalion  of  the 
field  artillery  as  part  of  the  advance  guard,  to 
enable  the  latter  more  quickly  to  overcome  opposi- 
tion. The  road  space  occupied  by  a  brigade  of 
field  artillery,  exclusive  of  the  field  trains,  is  about 
5000  yards,  or  nearly  three  miles. 

It  frequently  happens  that  the  enemy  in  seeking 
to  oppose  the  march  of  the  division,  will  fell  trees 
and  destroy  culverts  and  bridges  along  the  route. 


272        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

For  the  advance  guard,  without  special  tools  and 
appliances  to  remove  such  obstacles  and  to  con- 
struct temporary  bridges   to   replace   those   de- 
stroyed, would  involve  a  great  expenditure  of  time. 
It  is  apparent  in  any  event,  that  such  work  would 
be  more  expeditiously  and  better  done  by  men  of 
special  training  and  skill.    The  division  is,  there- 
fore, provided  with  a  pioneer  battalion  of  engineer 
troops  commanded  by  a  major.     The  battalion 
consists  of  3  pioneer  companies,  each  commanded 
by  a  captain.     The  battalion  has  approximately 
500  officers  and  men,  and  162  draft,  pack  and  saddle 
animals.    It  is  provided  with  tool  wagons  contain- 
ing the  tools  and  implements  necessary  for  the 
construction  of  improvised  bridges,  the  repair  of 
roads,  demolition  of  obstacles,  and  other  similar 
functions.    A  detachment  of  engineer  troops  usu- 
ally marches  with  the  advance  guard  so  as  to  be 
promptly  available  with  tools  and  men  to  meet 
emergencies.    When  the  division  acts  independ- 
ently an  additional  battalion  of  engineer  troops  is 
usually  attached  to  the  division.     This  battahon  is 
a  ponton  battalion  having  pontons  and  materials 
for  hastily  constructing  bridges  over  rivers. 

The  road  spaces   occupied  by  the  combatant 
troops  of  a  full  division  on  the  march  aggregate  9 


Combined  Arms  In  Action  273 

miles,  and  including  the  field  trains  without  dis- 
tance, this  road  space  amounts  to  15  miles.  It 
will  readily  be  seen  that  communication  from  any 
part  of  this  column  to  the  more  remote  units,  pre- 
sents a  serious  problem.  Assuming  that  a 
mounted  messenger  could  travel  on  the  same  road 
with  the  division  at  the  rate  of  five  miles  per  hour, 
it  would  require  6  hours  for  him  to  take  a  message 
from  the  head  of  the  column  to  the  rear  and  return 
^yith  an  answer,  if  the  division  were  not  in  motion 
during  that  period.  If  the  division  were  moving, 
the  time  consumed  in  going  from  the  head  to  the 
rear  of  the  column  would  be  reduced  by  the  time 
equivalent  of  the  distance  covered  by  the  column 
while  the  messenger  was  proceeding  to  the  rear. 
On  the  other  hand,  throughout  the  return  trip,  the 
time  gained  would  be  neutralized  by  the  fact  that 
{lie  column  would  be  moving  in  the  same  direction 
with  the  messenger.  The  desirability  of  a  more 
rapid  agency  of  communication  becomes  ap- 
parent. The  average  rate  of  march  of  a  body 
of  troops  as  large  as  a  division  is  from  2  to  2l^ 
miles  per  hour.  There  are  many  occasions  in 
campaign  when  regiments  or  other  units  of  the 
division  are  detached  to  fulfil  special  missions  and 
it  is  usually  of  importance  that  communication  be 


274        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

maintained  between  the  division  connnander  and 
the  troops  so  detached.  It  is  equally  desirable 
that  the  cavalry,  operating  perhaps  10  miles  or 
more  in  advance  of  the  division,  should  have  a 
means  of  rapid  conamunication  with  the  division 
commander. 

Military  art  avails  itself  of  all  the  sciences  by 
adapting  their  inventions  and  discoveries  to  the 
needs  of  the  military  service.    And  so  the  divi- 
sion has  at  its  command  for  the  purposes  of  rapid 
communication,  all  the  agencies  used  in  the  com- 
mercial world,  as  well  as  those  peculiarly  the 
product  of  military  necessity.    As  the  use  of  some 
of  these  agencies  requires   technical  knowledge 
and  training,  the  organization  of  the  division  in- 
cludes a  battalion  of  signal  troops.    This  bat- 
talion is  commanded  by  a  major  and  is  made  up 
of  a  wire  company  and  a  radio  company,  each 
commanded  by  a  captain.     The  battalion  aggre- 
gates approximately  170  men,  and  180  draft,  pack 
and  saddle  animals.     The  equipment  of  the  bat- 
talion includes  a  shop  wagon  and  20  miles  of  wire, 
6  wire  carts,  2  instrument  wagons  and  4  radio 
sections.    It  is,  therefore,  possible  for  the  organi- 
zations of  a  division  to  communicate  with  each 
other,  not  only  by  mounted  messenger,  but  by 


Combined  Amis  in  Action  275 

field  telephone,  field  telegraph,  flag  signals,  helio- 
graph, semaphore,  acetylene  gas  lamp  (for  night 
use)  and  wireless.  The  personnel  of  the  signal 
companies  are  so  highly  trained  and  so  many 
clever  devices  have  been  provided  for  expediting 
militar^^  communication,  that  it  is  now  possible 
for  the  division  commander  to  communicate  di- 
rectly by  telephone  with  any  important  sub-divi- 
sion of  his  command  without  interrupting  the 
march. 

The  problem  of  handling  the  wounded  during 
and  after  a  combat,  presents  greater  difficulties 
as  civilization  increases  its  demands  in  respect  to 
the  care  of  the  wounded.  In  the  battles  of  ancient 
times,  the  wounded  were  left  to  shift  for  them- 
selves. If  not  too  seriously  injured,  they  re- 
joined their  commands.  If  too  badly  injured  to 
do  this,  they  were  of  no  further  use  to  the  army 
and  the  army  moved  off  without  them.  In  the  or- 
ganization of  the  modern  army,  provision  is  made 
for  the  humane  care  of  a  reasonable  precentage 
of  wounded,  and  an  extensive  system  has  been  es- 
tablished for  rendering  first  aid  to  the  wounded 
and  for  removing  them  with  diligence  from  the 
field  of  battle. 

The  American  division  is  provided  with  a  sani- 


276        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

tary  train,  composed  of  4  ambulance  companies, 
3  field  hospitals  and  a  medical  reserve.  These 
aggregate  over  500  officers  and  enlisted  men,  and 
approximately  500  draft,  pack  and  saddle  animals, 
and  include  an  equipment  of  48  ambulances  and  42 
wagons.  The  sanitary  train  is  commanded  by  a 
colonel  or  lieutenant-colonel  of  the  medical  corps. 
The  ambulance  companies  are  commanded  by  cap- 
tains and  the  field  hospitals  by  majors,  all  of  the 
medical  corps.  The  field  hospitals  provide  216 
beds  for  the  temporary  care  of  the  wounded.  A 
section  of  one  of  the  ambulance  companies  usually 
accompanies  the  advance  guard  so  as  to  promptly 
provide  transportation  to  the  rear  for  the 
wounded.  In  order  to  understand  the  methods 
employed  by  the  sanitary  troops,  it  is  necessary 
to  appreciate  the  importance  of  promptly  evacu- 
ating the  field  of  wounded  men.  Not  only  is  this 
desirable  from  the  view-point  of  the  wounded,  but 
it  is  necessary  in  order  to  keep  at  the  highest 
standard  the  morale  of  the  survivors  and  to 
enable  them  to  perform  their  fighting  functions 
unencumbered  by  the  depressing  demands  of  their 
less  fortunate  comrades. 

In  addition  to  the  sanitary  train,  each  regiment 
has  its  own  hospital  corps  detachment.     The  rela- 


Combined  Arms  in  Action  277 

tion  which  these  detachments  bear  to  the  sanitary 
organizations  of  the  division  and  the  methods  em- 
ployed by  them  in  handling  the  wounded,  will  be 
explained  in  describing  the  conduct  of  a  division 
in  a  hypothetical  action.  In  addition  to  the  am- 
bulance companies  and  field  hospitals,  there  is 
also  provided  a  medical  reserve  of  one  medical 
officer  and  a  small  detachment  of  enUsted  men, 
with  six  wagons  for  carrying  reserve  medical 
stores. 

As  the  American  infantry  division  complete 
aggregates  more  than  22,000  men,  7600  animals 
and  about  900  vehicles,  including  field  artillery 
carriages,  it  is  apparent  that  the  supply  of  this 
force  with  subsistence,  forage,  ammunition  and 
stores,  is  one  of  some  magnitude.  In  addition  to 
the  wagons  which  accompany  each  regiment  and 
which  are  known  as  the  regimental  field  trains, 
there  is  provided  for  the  division,  an  ammunition 
train,  a  supply  train,  an  engineer  train,  and  a 
pack  train.  The  ammunition  train  consists  of 
162  four-mule  wagons,  over  700  mules  and  horses 
and  a  detachment  of  about  200  men  as  a  necessary 
personnel.  The  supply  train  consists  of  126  four- 
mule  wagons,  over  600  mules  and  horses  and  a 
personnel  of  nearly  200  men.     The  pack  train 


278        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

consists  of  50  pack  mules,  having  a  cargo  capacity 
of  6  tons.  The  engineer  train  consists  of  9  mule- 
drawn  wagons,  the  necessary  number  of  animals, 
and  the  men  to  drive  and  care  for  them. 

For  the  purpose  of  illustrating  how  this  force, 
known  as  the  division,  tactically  operates,  eats, 
sleeps,  marches,  fights,  avoids  surprise,  replen- 
ishes ammunition,  rations  and  forage,  removes 
the  wounded,  buries  the  dead,  replaces  losses, 
maintains  discipline,  rewards  the  worthy,  pun- 
ishes the  delinquent,  and  generally  conducts  its 
daily  affairs  in  campaign,  let  us  now  assume  a 
state  of  facts  and  a  mission  for  a  division  in 
campaign. 

Let  us  assume  that  war  has  been  declared  be- 
tween Red  and  Blue  Governments;  that  the  di- 
vision which  we  are  to  follow  is  the  Eed  division 
encamped  in  and  about  the  town  of  Campville, 
through  which  runs  a  railroad  from  the  important 
town  of  Basic  City  in  Red  territory  through 
Campville  and  across  the  border  north  into  Blue 
territory;  that  Campville  is  within  10  miles  of 
the  Blue  border.  For  strategic  reasons  deemed 
proper  by  the  Red  government,  orders  are  sent 
to  the  Commanding  General  of  the  Red  division 
to  march  with  his  division  on  the  following  day 


Combined  Arms  in  Action  279 

into  Blue  territory  and  to  seize  and  hold  the  im- 
portant railroad  junction  at  Junction  City  in  Blue 
territory,  a  distance  from  Campville  of  30  miles. 
It  is  assumed  that  the  Red  division  is  complete 
in  every  way  and  that  its  officers  and  men  are 
trained  professionally  and  physically  for  the  de- 
mands of  war.  No  information  of  the  enemy 
likely  to  be  encountered  by  the  Red  division  is 
known  except  that  Blue  detachments  of  all  arms 
are  in  the  vicinity  of  Junction  City. 

"When  the  Red  commander  receives  his  orders, 
he  makes  what  is  called  an  estimate  of  the  situa- 
tion. This  estimate  of  the  situation  for  the  pur- 
pose of  convenience  follows  a  set  structural  form. 
According  to  this  form,  he  first  considers  and  de- 
termines his  mission.  This  he  determines  to  be 
the  capture  of  Junction  City  with  its  railroad 
yards,  bridges,  supply  depots,  military  property 
and  approaches.  To  increase  his  chances  for  suc- 
cess, celerity  of  movement  is  desirable,  and  he 
therefore  determines  to  move  promptly  for  the 
seizure  of  that  place. 

His  next  thoughts  turn  to  considerations  af- 
fecting the  enemy.  He  considers  all  information 
concerning  the  strength  of  forces  that  may  oppose 
him;    the    character    and    composition    of    such 


280        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

forces,  and  their  location  and  disposition;  the 
roads  and  railroads  available  to  them  for  their 
concentration  and  movements;  the  terrain  avail- 
able to  the  enemy  for  defensive  purposes 
or  for  offensive  action  against  his  own  forces; 
their  supply  and  communications;  and  finally 
he  considers  the  possible  lines  of  action  open 
to  bis  opponent  and  the  latter 's  most  probable 
line  of  action.  We  will  assume  that  his  study 
of  these  matters,  based  on  all  the  informa- 
tion at  hand,  leads  the  Eed  commander  to  believe 
that  the  enemy  upon  learning  of  his  approach, 
will  entrench  and  hold  a  line  of  hills  which  are 
shown  on  his  map  about  3  miles  from  Junction 
City  towards  the  Red  boundary,  the  position 
being  protected  on  one  flank  by  an  unfordable 
stream  and  on  the  other  by  an  extensive  swamp. 

The  Eed  commander  now  turns  his  thoughts  to 
considerations  affecting  his  own  forces,  and  in 
like  manner  he  considers  his  own  strength,  the 
character  and  composition,  location  and  disposi- 
tion of  his  forces ;  the  terrain  which  he  will  have 
to  traverse,  the  roads  and  railroads  available  for 
the  movement  of  his  troops;  his  supply  and  line 
of  conununications ;  and  finally  he  will  consider 
the  possible  lines  of  action  open  to  him,  and  from 


Combined  Arms  in  Action  281 

among  them  will  adopt  what  he  believes  to  be  the 
best  possible  line  of  action. 

We  will  assume  that  after  considering  these 
factors,  he  believes  that  his  division  can  best 
march  on  two  roads  which  parallel  one  another 
from  the  vicinity  of  Campville  to  and  through 
Junction  City  and  are  separated  one  from  the 
other  by  a  mean  interval  of  one  mile;  that  his 
supplies  which  have  been  coming  to  him  by  rail 
from  Basic  City  will  be  available  at  Campville 
for  refilling  the  wagons  of  his  supply  train  as 
they  require  replenishment,  at  least  until  the  divi- 
sion advances  well  towards  its  objective;  there- 
after, if  the  railroad  is  in  condition,  he  may  ad- 
vance the  refilling  point  to  some  station  on  the 
railroad  closer  to  the  front  and  requiring  less 
travel  for  his  wagons.  He  observes  from  the 
map  that  there  are  no  serious  obstacles  to  his 
march  presented  by  the  terrain,  except  an  un- 
fordable  river  cutting  across  the  line  of  his  ad- 
vance and  distant  from  Campville  18  miles.  The 
river  in  the  vicinity  of  the  line  of  his  march  is 
crossed  by  three  bridges,  one  for  the  railroad 
and  the  others  carrying  the  highways  referred  to. 

Having  determined  his  mission  and  considered 
all  things  affecting  the  enemy  and  his  own  force, 


282        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

the  Eed  commander  now  arrives  at  a  decision. 
His  decision  is  to  march  from  Campville  the  fol- 
lowing morning  at  6  o'clock  towards  Junction 
City.  It  will  be  noted  that  he  does  not  decide 
how  far  he  will  march  and  this  is  in  accordance 
with  a  military  principle,  that  the  commander 
should  not  commit  himself  in  advance  to  future 
lines  of  action  which  by  reason  of  intervening 
circumstances  he  may  not  be  able  to  follow.  The 
length  of  his  march  will  depend  on  the  condition 
of  the  roads,  the  state  of  the  weather,  the  opposi- 
tion or  lack  of  opposition  of  the  enemy,  and  many 
other  factors. 

Having  arrived  at  this  decision,  it  is  now  neces- 
sary for  him  to  issue  an  order  to  make  effective 
that  decision  and  to  prescribe  the  manner  in 
which  it  is  to  be  executed.  This  class  of  order 
is  called  a  field  order,  and  the  particular  order  to 
be  issued  under  these  circumstances  is  known  as  a 
march  order.  A  form  of  field  order  has  been 
adopted  in  most  armies.  It  was  found  that  by 
following  a  common  form  of  field  order,  ground 
for  misunderstanding  was  reduced,  verbosity  was 
decreased,  a  more  general  and  common  under- 
standing of  what  was  desired  was  insured  and 
altogether  better  team  work  made  more  certain. 


Combined  Arms  in  Action  283 

The  prescribed  form  of  order  has  five  para- 
graphs. In  the  first  is  briefly  set  forth  informa- 
tion concerning  the  enemy  and  of  our  own  sup- 
porting forces.  In  the  second  paragraph  is  set 
forth  the  plan  of  the  commander.  In  the  third 
paragraph  is  stated  the  manner  in  which  the  plan 
is  to  be  carried  out.  This  paragraph  includes 
subdivisions  containing  the  instructions  for  inde- 
pendent cavalry — the  place  and  time  of  departure 
and  any  special  mission  imposed  on  the  cavalry; 
in  the  next  subdivision  is  contained  the  instruc- 
tions for  the  advance  guard — the  place  and  time 
of  their  departure,  the  distance  which  it  will  pre- 
cede the  main  body  and  the  route  to  be  followed ; 
in  the  next  subdivision  is  set  forth  the  instruc- 
tions for  the  main  body  including  their  time  of 
departure ;  in  the  next  subdivision  is  set  forth  in- 
structions for  a  flank  guard  (if  any) ;  in  the  next 
subdivision  is  set  forth  instructions  for  the  signal 
troops — communications  to  be  established  by 
them,  etc.,  and  in  the  last  subdivision  is  usually 
set  forth  the  instructions  for  the  outposts — when 
they  will  stand  relieved  and  their  subsequent  du- 
ties. The  fourth  paragraph  of  the  order  governs 
the  movements  of  the  field  trains  and  of  the  sani- 
tary,  ammunition,   supply   and   engineer   trains. 


284        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

As  it  is  also  desirable  for  subordinates  to  know 
where  they  may  expect  to  find  their  command- 
ing general,  the  fifth  and  last  paragraph  of  the 
order  contains  a  statement  where  the  command- 
ing general  may  be  found  or  where  messages  for 
him  may  be  dehvered. 

In  march  orders  it  is  customary  to  write  on  the 
left  hand  margin  of  the  order  under  appropriate 
subheads  the  order  in  which  the  troops  will  march 
in  the  column.  When  complete,  the  order  is  com- 
municated to  the  officers  concerned,  either  by  fur- 
nishing them  with  correct  copies  or  by  communicat- 
ing to  them  by  telephone  or  telegraph  the  contents 
thereof.  The  order  issued  by  the  Red  general  in 
this  case  would  read  as  follows : 

Field  Orders  1st  Division,  Red  Field  Army, 

No.  1  Campville,  Red  Territory, 

Troops  20tli  Jun.  14,  8  p.m. 

(a)  Independent  Cavalry       1.  Detachments    of    the    enemy, 

Colonel    C.  including    cavalry    and    artil- 

1st  Red  Cavalry,  lery  are  reported  to  be  in  the 

Det.  Signal  Bn.  vicinity     of     Junction     City. 

The    remaining    divisions    of 
our  field  army  are  at  Xville. 

(b)  Advance  Guard  2.  This   division  will   march  to- 

Brig.  Gen.  1.  morrow      morning      towards 

1st  Infantry,  Junction  City. 


Combined  Arms  in  Action 


285 


2nd  Infantn', 
2nd  Bn.  1st  Field  Arty. 
Co.  A,  Bn.  Eng. 
Det.  Co.  A,  Sig.  Bn. 
1  Amb.   Co. 


(c)   Main  body. 

in  order  of  march. 
3rd   Infantry, 
2nd  Field  Arty. 
3rd  Brigade. 
Bn.  Eng.  (less  Cos.  A 

&  B) 
Bn.       Signal       Corps 
(less    detachments) 
3rd  and  4th  Amb.  Cos. 


(d)   Right  Flank  Guard. 

Brig.  Gen.  2. 
2nd  Brigade, 
1st  Field  Arty.    (Less 

2nd   Bn.) 
Co.  B,  Bn.  Eng, 
Det.   Signal  Bn. 


3.  (a)  The  Independent  Cav- 
alry will  leave  its  camp  to- 
morrow morning  at  5.30  A.  M., 
scout  the  countiy  between 
Campville  and  the  river  18 
miles  to  the  north  thereof,  se- 
curing the  railroad  and  two 
highway  bridges  over  the 
same. 

(b)  The  advance  gixard  will 
clear  the  north  entrance  to  the 
infantry  camp  at  6  A.  M.  and 
march  on  the  Campville-1-3- 
5-Junction  City  road. 

(c)  The  main  body  will  fol- 
low the  advance  guard  at  one 
mile. 

(d)  The  right  flank  guard 
will  leave  the  easterly  en- 
trance of  the  infantry  camp 
at  6  A.  M.  and  march  on 
Campville-2-4-6-Junction  City 
road. 

(e)  The  signal  battalion  will 
provide  and  maintain  com- 
munication between  the  m- 
dependent  cavalry,  advance 
guard  and  flank  guard  and 
the  main  body. 

(x)  The  outposts  will  stand 
relieved  when  the  advance 
guard  clears  the  line  of  out- 


286        The  Modern  Ai^my  in  Action 

2nd  Amb.  Co.  post  supports,  and  thereupon 

rejoin  their  organizations. 
4.  Field  trains  will  follow  the 
main  body  without  distance. 
The  Field  Hospitals,  am- 
munition, supply  and  en- 
gineer trains  will  follow  the 
field  trains  at  3  miles. 
6.  Messages    to    head    of    main 

body. 
By  command  Major  General,  Red, 
Colonel  XYZ, 

Chief  of  StafE. 

Copies  to  Brigade  Commanders, 
Cavalry  Commander, 

Engineer,  Signal  &  Sanitary  Commanders, 
Commanders  of  Trains, 
Members  of  Division  Staff, 

A  synopsis  in  cypher  by  wire  to  Field  Army  Head- 
quarters. 

When  this  order  is  received  by  the  commanding 
officers  of  the  organizations  concerned,  they  no- 
tify their  subordinates  of  the  hour  of  the  march 
the  following  morning,  and  prescribe  the  details 
as  to  the  hours  of  rising,  messing  and  breaking 
camp  necessary  to  enable  the  command  to  march 
on  time.  From  one  to  one  and  a  half  hours  is 
usually  the  time  allotted.  Six  o'clock  therefore 
on  the  following  morning  will  see  the  heads  of  the 


Combined  Arms  in  Action  287 

two  columns  leaving  camp,  the  left  being  the 
point  of  the  advance  guard  of  the  main  body  and 
the  right  the  point  of  the  advance  guard  of  the 
flank  column.  While  the  right  hand  column  is  a 
right  flank  guard  for  the  main  body  of  the  divi- 
sion, it  must  nevertheless  provide  for  its  own 
security  by  throwing  out  its  own  advance  guard. 
The  details  of  the  order  of  march  and  security  of 
the  right  flank  column  are  left  with  the  command- 
ing officer  of  that  column,  who  is  Brigadier  Gen- 
eral 2.  And  so  Brigadier  General  2  issues  his  own 
order  governing  the  details  of  this  column.  In 
the  same  manner  while  the  above  order  prescribes 
what  forces  will  constitute  the  advance  guard,  the 
details  of  disposing  those  forces  rests  with  the 
advance  guard  commander,  and  he  in  turn  issues 
his  own  order  governing  the  march  of  the  advance 
guard.  It  will  be  found  that  a  fundamental  prin- 
ciple of  military  control  is  that  an  order,  while 
prescribing  the  objective  and  fixing  the  limita- 
tions, should  stimulate  initiative  and  encourage 
resourcefulness  by  leaving  to  the  subordinate  the 
ways  of  attaining  the  objective. 

Half  an  hour  prior  to  the  start  of  the  two  in- 
fantry columns,  the  cavalry  left  its  camp  at  a 
walk,  also  throwing  out  an  advance  guard.    Upon 


288        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

reaching  the  outskirts  of  Campville  the  regimen- 
tal commander  called  the  three  majors  together 
and  pointed  out  to  them  what  he  considered  to  he 
the  zone  of  march  of  the  division.  He  stated 
that  for  purpose  of  security  he  considered  this 
zone  to  be  about  four  to  five  miles  wide.  He 
thereupon  divided  it  approximately  into  two 
parts,  assigning  the  right  half  to  Major  A  and 
the  left  to  Major  B.  He  told  them  to  cover  their 
own  sectors  with  their  scouts  and  patrols,  and  to 
advance  without  delay  toward  the  river,  scouting 
the  intervening  country — that  he  with  the  remain- 
ing squadron  would  follow  as  a  reserve  on  the 
2-4-6  road,  keeping  in  touch  with  Major  A's 
squadron  in  front  of  him.  He  added  that  he  did 
not  believe  they  would  meet  the  enemy  in  any 
force  at  least  for  some  miles,  and  suggested  that 
in  open  stretches  of  country,  the  trot  be  taken  up 
so  as  to  expedite  the  movement.  We  will  now 
leave  the  cavalry  to  carry  out  this  plan  and  re- 
turn to  the  infantry  column. 

Eeference  to  the  order  will  show  that  the  in- 
fantry assigned  to  the  advance  guard  constituted 
two  regiments.  Brig.  Gen.  I,  who  commands 
the  advance  guard,  determined  that  he  would  hold 
one  regiment  as  his  reserve  and  advance  the  other 


Combined  Arms  in  Action  289 

regiment  as  a  vanguard  or  support,  and  he 
directed  tliis  to  be  done.  He  determined  that 
with  his  reserve  regiment,  he  would  place  his  field 
artillery  and  his  sanitary  and  signal  detachments. 
He  sent  the  engineer  company  with  the  advance 
regiment.  The  Colonel  of  the  advance  regiment 
in  turn  divided  his  force  by  holding  two  and  a  half 
battalions  as  a  support  and  sending  two  companies 
in  advance  as  an  advance  party.  The  Major 
commanding  the  advance  party  preceded  the  sup- 
port by  about  500  yards  with  his  two  companies 
and  sent  out  a  point  about  200  yards  in  advance 
of  his  subdivision.  The  advance  gnard  thrown 
out  by  the  right  flank  column  was  disposed  in 
similar  manner.  Thus  we  see  two  columns  paral- 
leling each  other,  each  resembling  a  human  arm 
and  hand,  the  arm  representing  the  main  body 
and  the  hand  the  advance  guard.  The  hand  rep- 
resents the  reserve  of  the  advance  guard,  the  hand 
knuckles  the  supports,  the  finger  knuckles  the  ad- 
vance parties  and  the  finger  tips  the  points,  scouts 
and  patrols.  The  functions  of  these  subdivisions 
resemble  very  much  the  functions  of  the  parts  of 
the  hand  referred  to.  This  may  be  illustrated  by 
conceiving  a  man  advancing  in  the  dark  with  his 
hand  outstretched  before  him  to  provide  for  hia 


290        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

own  protection.  If  lie  meets  an  obstacle  the  first 
information  conveyed  to  his  mind  will  be  flashed 
by  his  finger  tips.  To  investigate  further  he  may 
press  with  his  fingers  or  knock  with  his  knuckles. 
If  he  determines  that  the  obstacle  can  be  thrust 
aside,  he  strikes  with  his  fists  and  if  that  blow  is 
insufficient  he  follows  it  with  the  full  weight  of  his 
arm.  If  the  obstacle  resists  the  efforts  of  his 
arm,  he  may  often  overcome  it  by  kicking  and 
shattering  it.  The  division  operates  in  the  same 
manner.  If  the  advanced  subdivisions  cannot  un- 
aided promptly  overcome  opposition,  they  are  re- 
enforced  by  the  supporting  subdivisions  and  if 
necessary  the  artillery  is  brought  up  to  pound  the 
opposition  to  pieces. 

Over  a  mile  behind  the  advance  guard  we  see 
marching  along  in  column  of  squads,  the  troops 
of  the  main  body.  At  or  near  the  head  of  these 
troops  the  Division  Commander  is  riding.  He  is 
accompanied  by  the  members  of  his  staff  who  are 
not  temporarily  away  in  furtherance  of  their 
duties.  The  most  important  of  these  assistants  is 
the  Chief  of  Staff  who  ranks  as  a  lieutenant- 
colonel  and  who  is  a  specially  trained  officer, 
usually  a  graduate  of  the  War  College  and  a  mem- 
ber of  the  General  Staff.    He  is  a  confidant  of  the 


Combined  Arms  in  Action  291 

Division  Commander  and  knows  the  latter 's  plans. 
He  is  the  General's  executive  officer.  He  is 
assisted  by  two  officers  of  lesser  rank  wbo  are 
kno\^Ti  as  Assistant  Chiefs  of  Staff.  As  the 
division  is  an  administrative  unit,  daily  records 
must  be  kept  of  its  numbers,  supplies,  movements, 
losses  and  activities  generally.  These  records  are 
kept  by  an  officer  on  the  General's  Staff  known  as 
the  Division  Adjutant.  He  usually  ranks  as  a 
major.  The  Chief  Quartermaster  and  Chief  Sur- 
geon are  other  assistants. 

The  troops  are  marching  in  route  order,  which 
means  that  they  may  converse,  and  carry  their 
arms  and  adopt  strides  according  to  individual 
preference.  Coming  to  a  rise  in  the  ground  we 
may  see  by  looking  back,  assuming  that  the  day  is 
clear  and  the  road  dry,  a  long  column  of  thick 
dust  marking  the  route  of  the  march.  As  we  stand 
to  watch  the  men  of  the  column  move  past,  we 
frequently  hear  an  officer  or  non-commissioned 
officer  admonish  those  about  him  ''keep  closed  up 
there,"  ''don't  straggle;  close  up."  These  com- 
mands so  frequently  given,  excite  our  curiosity, 
particularly  when  we  fail  to  observe  any  conduct 
of  the  men  amounting  to  actual  straggling.  These 
commands,  however,  are  but  an  expression  of  the 


292        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

realization  by  the  trained  officers  and  non-com- 
missioned officers,  of  the  importance  of  avoiding 
elongation  of  the  column.  An  increase  of  dis- 
tance between  successive  sets  of  fours,  be  it  ever 
so  small,  becomes  material  when  multiplied  by  the 
number  of  these  subdivisions  in  the  column. 
Elongation  means  delay  in  placing  rifles  on  the 
firing  line  when  contact  with  the  enemy  is  made. 
The  quicker  the  men  are  fed  into  the  firing  line 
the  greater  is  the  opportunity  for  a  preponderance 
of  numbers  and  of  superiority  of  fire,  and  we  have 
seen  in  an  earlier  chapter  that  the  side  which  has 
the  greatest  number  of  men  at  the  proper  time  and 
at  the  proper  place  normally  succeeds.  For  fifty 
minutes  we  watch  the  troops  march  by,  the  men 
carrying  in  addition  to  the  rifle,  a  bayonet  and 
ammunition,  a  pack  containing  a  blanket,  shelter 
half,  haversack  with  rations  and  mess  kit,  en- 
trenching tool  and  a  canteen  of  water. 

At  the  end  of  fifty  minutes,  the  column  halts. 
Let  us  inquire  into  the  reason  for  the  halt.  "We 
learn  that  it  is  customary  on  normal  marches  for 
the  Division  to  march  without  interruption  for 
fifty  minutes  and  to  rest  for  ten  minutes,  and  that 
the  normal  day's  march  of  the  Division  is  eight 
to  twelve  miles.    In  the  fifty  minutes  of  march- 


Combined  Arms  in  Action  293 

ing,  if  tliere  has  been  no  interruption,  the  cohimn 
will  have  advanced  between  two  and  two  and  a  half 
miles.  When  the  troops  halted  it  was  observed 
that  both  the  infantry  and  the  field  artillery  closed 
in  to  the  right  side  of  the  road,  leaving  the  left 
side  unobstructed.  This  was  for  the  purpose  of 
permitting  aides,  orderlies,  messengers,  and  the 
signal  detachments  to  have  an  unobstructed  way 
for  their  movements  up  and  down  the  length  of 
the  column. 

While  waiting  for  the  column  to  resume  the 
march,  let  us  see  how  well  prepared  are  the 
soldiers  for  possible  action.  An  examination  of 
their  pack  and  equipment  will  show  that  each 
soldier  carries  on  his  person  100  rounds  of  am- 
munition, but  that  there  is  available  for  prompt 
distribution  on  going  into  action,  an  additional 
120  rounds  per  man  which  are  carried  in  bando- 
liers, packed  in  boxes  and  transported  in  the 
regimental  combat  wagons.  These  wagons  march 
with  the  troops,  two  to  each  battalion.  We  find 
that  some  of  the  men  are  provided  with  small 
light  shovels  while  others  are  provided  with  light 
mattocks  for  the  purpose  of  hastily  constructing 
entrenchments.  Each  man  carries  affixed  to  his 
belt  a  small  hermetically  sealed  packet  containing 


294        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

first  aid  compress  and  bandage.  In  the  haver- 
sack will  be  found  rations  for  three  days,  two  be- 
ing what  are  known  as  haversack  rations,  and  the 
third  an  emergency  ration  which  is  not  eaten  while 
there  are  available  any  other  rations  and  then 
only  with  the  authority  of  the  commanding  offi- 
cer. 

The  column  now  resumes  its  march  and  we  ob- 
serve the  field  artillery  go  by.  We  note  that  al- 
though the  artillery  horses  are  at  a  walk  in  order 
to  conform  their  gait  to  that  of  the  infantry,  the 
drivers,  riding  the  near  horse  of  each  pair  and 
controlling  the  other  with  a  short  rein,  are  sitting 
erect  and  alert.  We  note  that  the  officers  and 
non-commissioned  officers  constantly  supervise  the 
drivers  and  we  learn  that  the  object  of  this  super- 
vision is  to  insure  that  the  drivers  do  not  slouch  in 
the  saddles  and  that  the  traces  of  all  the  horses 
are  kept  taut,  so  that  an  unequal  share  of  the  draft 
will  not  fall  on  any  one  pair.  We  are  also  in- 
formed that  at  each  ten-minute  halt  the  drivers 
of  the  field  artillery  dismount,  raise  and  examine 
the  feet  of  the  horses  for  loose  shoes  or  wedged 
stones;  that  the  harness  is  looked  over;  that  the 
necks  and  withers  of  the  horses  are  examined,  and 
the  bearing  surface  of  the  collars  washed  free  of 


Combined  Arms  in  Action  295 

sweat  with  a  wet  sponge  provided  for  that  pur- 
pose. Similar  care  is  exercised  to  preserve  the 
efficiency  of  all  the  other  mules  and  horses  in  the 
column. 

Let  us  now  rejoin  the  Commanding  General  and 
his  staff.  We  learn  from  him  that  messages  have 
been  received  from  the  commander  of  the  flank 
guard  and  from  the  commander  of  the  advance 
guard ;  that  they  have  seen  nothing  of  the  enemy 
and  that  no  obstacles  were  encountered  in  the 
road,  except  that  at  9  a.  m.  the  advance  guard  of 
the  flank  column  found  a  bridge  destroyed  where 
the  road  crossed  a  large  brook.  It  was  reported 
that  the  engineer  detachment  with  that  column  was 
engaged  in  rebuilding  the  bridge,  while  the  column 
itself  by  wading  the  brook  above  the  bridge  con- 
tinued its  march  without  delay.  These  messages 
were  delivered  to  the  Chief  of  Staff  by  mounted 
orderlies. 

It  is  now  10 :30  a.  m.  and  the  head  of  the  column 
has  reached  a  point  eleven  miles  from  Campville. 
At  this  moment  the  Chief  of  Staff  ridos  up  and 
informed  the  Division  Commander  that  the  cav- 
alry hold  the  bridges  they  were  directed  to  seize, 
having  met  with  no  opposition.  Our  interest  is 
immediately  aroused.     How  is  it  possible  for  the 


296        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

Chief  of  Staff  seven  miles  from  the  bridges  to 
know  that  they  have  just  been  seized  by  the  cav- 
alry! In  answer  to  our  question,  the  commander 
of  the  signal  battalion  who  is  acting  as  the  Chief 
Signal  Officer  of  the  Division,  tells  us  that  when 
the  cavalry  left  Campville  at  5 :30  in  the  morning 
they  were  accompanied  by  a  radio  detachment  of 
the  signal  troops  carrying  on  pack  mules  a  radio 
equipment.  The  equipment  has  a  radius  of  ac- 
tion of  fifty  miles  and  is  capable  of  being  set  up  in 
a  few  minutes.  The  mules  of  this  detachment 
trotted  along  with  the  cavalry  reserve  under  the 
Colonel  C's  direct  command.  The  signal  officer 
further  informs  us  that  it  was  agreed  before  the 
departure  of  the  cavalry  that  once  an  hour,  on  the 
hour,  the  radio  section  with  the  cavalry  and  one 
of  the  radio  sections  with  the  main  colunm,  would 
halt,  set  us  and  establish  communication  for  the 
purpose  of  transmitting  messages.  In  this  man- 
ner it  was  learned  shortly  after  10  a.  m.  that  the 
cavalry  had  marched  rapidly  to  the  river,  at  the 
same  time  scouting  the  intervening  country,  and 
had  found  the  bridges  unguarded;  that  they  had 
pushed  across  the  river  leaving  strong  detach- 
ments in  possession  of  the  bridges,  and  are  now 
engaged  in  scouting  the  farther  side  of  the  stream. 


Combined  Arms  in  Action  297 

The  Chief  of  Staff  now  asked  the  Division  Com- 
mander if  he  had  decided  how  far  he  would  march. 
The  General  replied  that  the  early  seizure  of 
Junction  City  was  important ;  that  his  troops  had 
been  hardened  by  training,  that  men  and  animals 
were  still  fresh,  and  that  he  would  halt  at  12 
o'clock,  allow  an  hour  for  the  men  to  eat  and  for 
the  animals  to  be  watered,  and  resume  the  march 
at  1  o'clock.  This  decision  a  few  moments  later 
was  communicated  by  orderlies  to  the  command- 
ers within  a  mile,  and  to  those  more  distant  by 
means  of  the  field  telephone.  The  telephone  wire 
of  the  signal  company  had  been  reeled  out  from  a 
reel  cart  at  the  head  of  the  column  as  the  march 
progressed,  and  taken  up  by  another  reel  cart  at 
the  rear  of  the  column.  The  cart  at  the  head  of 
the  column  when  its  load  of  wire  was  paid  out,  and 
the  cart  in  the  rear  when  it  had  reeled  up  its  ca- 
pacity, being  each  replaced  by  a  reserve  reel  cart 
provided  for  that  purpose.  On  each  cart  sat  a 
telephone  operator  with  instruments  attached  to 
his  head  who  transmitted  and  received  messages 
through  the  reel  of  wire  while  it  was  being  reeled 
out  at  one  end  of  the  column  and  taken  up  at  the 
other.  At  stated  distances  along  the  fifteen  miles 
of  this  stretch  of  wire  marched  mounted  linemen 


298        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

of  the  signal  corps  watching  the  line  and  provided 
with  kits  to  make  prompt  repairs  in  case  of  a 
break. 

At  12  o'clock  the  column  halts  and  it  is  found 
that  the  men  in  anticipation  of  the  halt  have  been 
picking  up  sticks  of  wood  with  which  to  make 
small  fires.    They  clear  the  roadway,  stack  arms, 
unsling  their  packs  and  almost  immediately  num- 
berless small  fires  are  started.    One  of  the  two 
haversack  rations  is  opened  by  each  man  and  it  is 
observed  that  it  contains  enough  bacon,  coffee, 
sugar  and  hard  tack  for  three  meals.     The  soldiers 
fill  their  tin  cups  with  water  from  the  canteens 
and  place  them  over  the  fires  to  boil.    Strips  of 
bacon  are  fried  on  the  mess  pans,  and  soon  the  re- 
freshing aroma  of  hot  coffee  and  fried  bacon  tells 
us  that  the  meal  is  ready  to  be  disposed  of.    After 
this  is  done  the  embers  of  the  fires  are  extin- 
guished, mess  kits  are  washed  and  canteens  refilled 
in  those  units  which  find  good  water  available. 
"Where  water  is  not  available  the  mess  kits  are 
cleaned  with  bunches  of  grass  or  clean  sand  and 
replaced  in  the  haversacks.     Military  animals  are 
fed  but  twice  a  day,  but  during  this  halt  they  are 
watered  and  in  the  artillery  the  collars  are  opened 
up  and  the  bearing  surface  washed.    During  the 


Combined  Arms  in  Action  299 

halt  the  advance  guard  provides  for  the  security 
of  the  column. 

At  1  0  'clock  the  officers '  whistles  blow  attention, 
packs  are  re-adjusted  and  the  column  again  moves 
off.  During  the  course  of  the  noon  meal  the  Gen- 
eral and  the  Chief  of  Staff  discussed  a  possible 
camping  place  for  the  Division  that  night,  and  the 
General  determined  to  occupy  a  farm  about  two 
miles  farther  on  and  about  three  miles  from  the 
bridges.  This  would  require  about  one  hour  of 
marching  after  the  noon  meal  for  the  head  of  the 
advance  guard  to  reach  the  site  selected  for  the 
camp.  The  General  therefore  directed  the  Chief 
of  Staff  to  issue  what  is  known  as  a  halt  order  and 
that  the  Division  would  bivouac  for  the  night  at 
BrouTi's  Farm.  Thereupon  the  Chief  of  Staff 
wrote  out  an  order  of  which  the  following  is  a 
synopsis : 

Field  Orders  1st  Division,  Red  Field  Army, 

No.  2.  13  Miles  north  of  Campville,  Blue  Territory, 

20  Jun.  '14,  1 :15  p.  M. 

1.  No  further  information  of  the  enemy  has  been  received. 
Our  cavalry  hold  the  bridges  over  the  river  four  miles  in  our 
front. 

2.  The  Division  will  halt  for  the  night. 

3.  (a)  The  advance  guard  will  halt  and  camp  one  mile  north 
of  Brown's  Farm,  and  provide  for  the  security  of  the  camp. 


300        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

(b)  The  right  flank  guard  will  camp  (here  is  specified  a 
part  of  the  Brown's  Farm  large  enough  for  the  forces  com- 
posing the  right  column. 

(c)  The  main  body  will  camp  as  follows  (here  is  specified 
a  part  of  the  Brown's  Farm  large  enough  for  the  forces  com- 
posing the  main  body). 

4.  Field  trains  will  rejoin  their  organizations.  The  division 
trains  will  camp  at  Wayville. 

5.  Division  Headquarters  will  be  at  Brown's  Farm  house. 

By  command  of  Major  General  Red 
Colonel  XYZ,  Chief  of  Staff. 
Copies  to,  etc. 

The  Chief  of  Staff  also  sent  a  message  by  wire- 
less to  the  Cavalry  Commander,  the  body  of  which 
is  as  follows : 

Division  camps  at  Brown's  Farm  for' the  night;  advance 
guard  will  camp  one  mile  north  thereof  and  forai  outposts. 
Scout  well  to  the  north  of  the  river.  If  attacked,  hold  posi- 
tion on  the  north  side  of  stream.  You  will  be  supported. 
Your  wagons  will  join  you.  Division  Headquarters,  Brown's 
Farm  House. 

X.  Y.  Z.,  Chief  of  Staff. 

It  is  natural  that  we  should  be  interested  in 
knowing  how  the  Chief  of  Staff  determined  that 
Brown's  farm  possessed  facilities  for  the  camp- 
ing of  so  large  a  number  of  men  and  animals.  In- 
quiry develops  that  he  made  the  assignments  of 
space  by  inspection  of  his  map  and  having  in  mind 


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Combined  Arms  in  Action  301 

the  requirements  of  the  several  organizations. 
These  requirements  are  tabulated  in  most  armies 
and  printed  in  the  field  service  regulations.  Offi- 
cers usually  commit  them  to  memory.  The  Chief 
of  Staff  could  tell  from  his  map  what  land  was 
clear  and  what  land  was  wooded  or  swampy.  The 
contour  lines  of  the  map  indicated  what  land  was 
level  and  what  was  not.  The  map  also  indicated 
the  streams  and  their  direction.  He  allotted 
space,  so  as  to  require  of  the  Infantry  as  little 
extra  marching  as  possible,  and  he  sought  to  place 
the  mounted  organizations  down  stream,  so  as  to 
leave  the  up  stream  water  for  the  men,  undefiled 
by  the  animals. 

When  the  head  of  the  main  body  arrived  at 
Brown's  Farm,  the  organizations  moved  to  the 
allotted  camping  spaces,  stacked  arms  and  pitched 
their  shelter  tents.  When  the  head  of  the  column 
began  this  movement,  the  advance  guard  by  that 
time  had  reached  its  assigned  position  and  the 
commander  was  engaged  in  constituting  of  his 
forces  the  outposts  to  provide  for  the  security  of 
the  main  body  of  the  Division  during  the  night. 
The  advance  guard  commander  therefore  became 
the  outpost  commander  upon  receipt  of  the  halt 
order.    He  immediately  consulted  his  map  and 


302        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

selected  tentatively  the  best  line  from  which  to 
resist  any  attack  the  enemy  might  make  on  the 
camp.  He  quickly  wrote  out  an  outpost  order  in 
the  customary  five  paragraphs,  in  which  he  pre- 
scribed the  subdivisions  of  the  outposts  and  their 
duties.  In  this  instance  he  divided  the  sector  to 
be  covered  by  the  outposts  into  four  supports, 
numbering  them  from  right  to  left  and  divided  the 
sector  among  them.  He  indicated  the  line  of  re- 
sistance in  the  event  of  attack,  and  fixed  the  place 
where  the  reserve  would  bivouac.  Each  support 
commander  threw  out  towards  the  enemy  an  out- 
guard  composed  of  detachments  called  pickets, 
each  of  which  in  turn  sent  further  to  the  front  in- 
dividual sentries.  An  approaching  enemy  would 
therefore  first  meet  a  line  of  sentries,  not  the  gar- 
rison type  of  sentry  formally  walking  post,  but 
men  occupying  points  of  vantage,  screened  from 
observation  and  with  intervals  between  them  not 
too  great  to  enable  them  with  reasonable  diligence 
to  cover  the  intervening  ground.  Behind  the  line 
of  sentries  at  a  distance  of  perhaps  400  yards 
would  be  found  the  line  of  pickets,  the  men  resting 
quietly  under  cover  guarded  by  one  or  two  of  their 
number.  These  forces  constitute  in  general  what 
is  known  as  the  line  of  observation.    Behind  the 


Combined  Arms  in  Action  303 

line  of  pickets  and  perhaps  800  yards  to  the  rear, 
will  be  found  the  line  of  supports,  being  the  larger 
groups  from  which  the  pickets  and  sentries  are 
detached  and  advanced  to  the  front.  The  line  of 
supports  usually  occupies  the  line  selected  for  re- 
sistance in  case  of  an  attack.  Perhaps  1,000  yards 
in  the  rear  of  this  line  and  centrally  located  wall  be 
found  the  reserve.  The  men  of  the  outpost  re- 
serve usually  camp,  eat  and  sleep  as  if  they  were 
part  of  the  main  body.  However,  because  of  their 
location  they  are  more  readily  available  to 
strengthen  the  line  of  resistance  in  the  event  of 
attack.  The  men  further  to  the  front  are  required 
to  exercise  greater  vigilance  and  caution  as  their 
location  gets  nearer  to  the  front. 

Eeturning  now  to  the  main  body  w^e  find  that 
they  began  to  make  camp  shortly  after  2  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon,  but  we  soon  observe  as  regiment 
after  regiment  arrives  that  considerable  time  will 
elapse  before  the  last  organization  in  the  column 
reaches  its  place  of  encampment.  It  now  becomes 
clear  why  the  Commanding  General  marched  his 
division  in  two  columns  when  he  found  there  were 
two  roads  available,  for  what  we  see  transpiring 
in  the  main  body  is  being  repeated  simultaneously 
in  the  right  flank  column.     If  the  Commanding 


304        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

General  had  marched  the  Division  on  a  single  road, 
it  would  be  approximately  6  o  'clock  in  the  evening 
before   the   last   organization   of   the   combatant 
troops  reached  its  camp,  and  much  later  before  the 
trains  which  follow,  could  rejoin  their  regiments. 
The  advantages  therefore  of  marching  the  Divi- 
sion on  two  roads  not  only  cover  the  possibility 
of  more  promptly  effecting  deployment  to  attack 
the  enemy,  but  enable  the  Division  to  make  camp 
in  about  half  the  time  it  would  otherwise  have 
taken.    It  is  also  clear  why  the  Commanding  Gen- 
eral halted  for  lunch  between  12  and  1  o  'clock,  al- 
though he  knew  that  the  head  of  the  column  would 
reach  Brown's  Farm  as  early  as  2  o'clock.     He 
was  thinking  not  only  of  the  troops  at  the  head  of 
the  column  but  of  the  troops  at  the  rear  of  both 
columns,  and  these  troops  will  not  reach  their 
places  of  encampment  until  approximately  4  p.  m. 
Immediately  following  them  are  the  wagons  of 
the  regimental  field  trains.     They  will  arrive  in 
time  to  enable  the  company  cooks  to  prepare  the 
evening  meal  with  the  kitchen  utensils  carried  in 
the  wagons,  thus  avoiding  the  necessity  for  in- 
dividual cooking.    The  remainder  of  the  day's  ra- 
tion carried  by  the  men  will  constitute  the  evening 
meal,  and  this  ration  will  be  replaced  from  the 


Combined  Arms  in  Action  305 

supply  sections  of  the  field  trains.  This  mil  en- 
able the  men  to  follow  the  requirement  that  the 
soldier  should  always  have  on  the  person  three 
days  rations  less  the  meal  or  meals  consumed  dur- 
ing the  day. 

As  each  organization  enters  the  field  assigned 
to  it,  we  observed  a  small  detachment  with  shovels 
from  each  company,  digging  a  trench  about  fifty 
yards  in  the  rear  of  its  camp.  This,  it  was  ex- 
plained, is  the  soldiers'  water-closet,  but  as  it  pos- 
sesses no  water  and  no  closet,  it  is  not  knowTi  by 
that  name,  but  by  the  term  sink  or  latrine.  Eigidly 
enforced  rules  govern  the  use  of  these  sinks,  as  a 
sanitary  precaution  against  the  contamination  of 
water  and  the  spread  of  disease  through  the 
medium  of  flies  and  mosquitoes. 

Before  the  camp  settled  down  for  the  night,  wire 
communication  had  been  established  between  the 
out-post  supports  and  the  out-post  commander 
with  the  reserve,  and  from  the  out-post  com- 
mander to  the  Chief  of  Staff  at  Brown's  Farm. 
Eadio  communication  was  established  between  the 
cavalry  across  the  river  and  the  Chief  of  Staff, 
and  similar  communication  between  the  division 
trains  at  Wayville  and  the  Chief  of  Staff. 

But  while  the  soldiers  of  the  division  have  little 


306        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

to  do  after  the  completion  of  the  camp  chores, 
this  is  not  true  of  the  Division  Commander  and 
his  staif.    He  will  be  found  at  Brown's  Farm 
house  studying  his  maps  and  preparing  to  issue 
a  march  order  for  the  following  day.    Eeports 
of  all  kinds  are  being  received  and  acted  upon. 
Let  us  examine  some  of  these  reports  in  order 
to  learn  something  of  the  daily  routine  happen- 
ings in  this  migratory  city  of  over  20,000  men  and 
more  than  7,000  animals.    Here  is  a  report  that 
a  soldier  of  the  cavalry  together  with  his  horse 
fell  from  one  of  the  bridges  held  by  the  cavalry; 
that  both  were  drowned,  but  that  the  soldier's 
body  was  recovered.     The  Colonel  asked  to  be  in- 
formed what  disposition  is  to  be  made   of  the 
body.    Normally  in  time  of  war  such  a  question 
would  not  be  asked,  for  the  body  would  be  interred 
and  the   identification  tag  which   every   soldier 
wears  around  his  neck  would  serve  to  identify  the 
remains  at  some  future  time  if  that  were  desired. 
It  is,  however,  the  beginning  of  a  war ;  there  have 
been  no  large  casualties  and  the  Eed  Government 
may  wish  to  follow  the  generous  practice  of  the 
American  Government  in  returning  promptly  to 
the  home  country  the  remains  of  soldiers  killed 
in  action  in  a  foreign  clime.    Furthermore,  the 


Combined  Arms  in  Action  307 

command  is  but  a  short  distance  from  the  base. 
Motor  trucks  and  motor  ambulances  are  available. 
The  decision  is  therefore  made  to  send  for  the 
body  that  night  and  take  it  back  to  Campvillo.  The 
decision  is  influenced  by  the  fact  that  another  re- 
port shows  a  cavalry  soldier  suffering  from 
appendicitis  and  recommended  for  prompt  opera- 
tion. The  same  ambulance  therefore  which  brings 
in  the  body  of  the  dead  soldier  will  transport  from 
the  cavalry  camp  the  sick  soldier  who  will  be  re- 
moved to  one  of  the  field  hospitals  at  Wayville  for 
operation.  Other  reports  indicate  that  one  horse 
in  one  of  the  field  trains  broke  a  leg  and  had  to  be 
destroyed,  that  two  men  were  overcome  by  the 
heat  and  that  one  man  broke  an  arm.  All  will  be 
removed  to  the  field  hospital,  thence  turned  over 
as  soon  as  practicable  to  the  evacuation  hospital 
at  Campville.  We  now  observe  a  local  peace  offi- 
cer of  the  Blue  territory  who  has  come  to  com- 
plain of  an  assault  committed  by  some  of  the 
cavalry  soldiers  while  passing  through  Waj-ville 
that  morning.  The  matter  was  referred  to  the 
Provost  Marshal  to  investigate.  So  it  will  be 
found  that  all  the  officers  of  the  staff,  each  in  his 
own  department,  are  busy  and  that  their  duties 
will  keep  them  up  until  a  late  hour  of  the  night. 


308        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

The  march  order  for  the  following  day  was  pre- 
pared and  delivered  or  wired  to  the  various  offi- 
cers concerned.  It  provided  for  the  resumption 
of  the  march  at  6  o'clock  the  following  morning 
by  the  same  roads  taken  by  the  division  the  pre- 
ceding day.  The  cavalry  was  directed  to  hold  the 
bridges  with  detachments  until  the  arrival  of  the 
advance  guard  of  the  division  and  to  continue  the 
march  on  Junction  City. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

COMBINED  ARMS  IN  ACTION  (Continued) 

The  following  morning  at  6  o'clock  tlie  Division 
left  its  bivouac  and  resumed  the  march.  In  due 
course  the  two  columns  crossed  the  bridges  held 
by  the  cavalry  detachments  which  thereupon 
trotted  ahead  and  rejoined  the  cavalry  regiment  in 
the  advance.  Shortly  after  crossing  the  bridges 
distant  rifle  firing  was  heard  from  the  front. 
This  grew  louder  as  the  head  of  the  main  body 
continued  its  advance.  This  was  about  9  a.  m.  and 
the  point  of  the  advance  guard  at  that  time  was 
distant  from  Campville  24  miles,  and  from  Basic 
City  but  6  miles.  At  that  moment  an  officer  rode 
back  from  the  advance  guard  with  a  short  mes- 
sage from  the  advance  guard  commander  stating 
that  there  was  continuous  musketry  firing  more 
than  a  mile  ahead  of  the  point,  and  that  the  cav- 
alry was  evidently  engaged  with  the  enemy.  The 
officer  who  brought  the  message  answered  some 
questions  of  the  Commanding  General  about  the 
terrain  ahead,  the  Division  meanwhile  continuing 

309 


310        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

its  march.  At  the  end  of  thirty  minutes  a  cavalry- 
man galloped  up  with  a  message  addressed  to  the 
Chief  of  Staff ;  it  was  from  the  cavalry  commander 
four  and  a  half  miles  south  of  Junction  City  on  the 
2-4-6  road,  15  Jun.  '14,  9:25  a.  m.    It  read; 

*'Our  patrols  this  morning  met  and  drove  back 
small  patrols  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  and  are  now 
engaged  half  a  mile  north  of  here  with  forces  of 
the  enemy  who  appear  to  be  entrenched.  I  will 
attack  at  once  enveloping  their  right  flank." 

After  conferring  with  the  Commanding  Gen- 
eral the  Chief  of  Staff  wheeled  his  horse  to  the 
side  of  the  road,  dismounted  and  wrote  out  the 
following  message: 

1st  Division,  Red  Field  Army, 
2-4-6  Road,  7  miles  south  of  Junction  City, 

15  Jun.  '14,  10  A.  M. 
To  Commanding  Officer,  1st  Cavalry. 
Push  the  attack.    You  will  be  supported. 

XYZ, 
Chief  of  Staff. 

At  the  same  time  a  message  was  despatched  to 
the  advance  guard  commander  to  push  up  in  sup- 
port of  the  cavalry.  These  messages  were  given 
to  the  cavalry  orderly  for  delivery,  and  a  few 
minutes  later  an  aide  was  despatched  to  the  cav- 


Combined  Arms  in  Action  (Continued)    311 

airy  commander  with  oral  instructions  to  the  same 
effect.  This  was  a  precaution  frequently  adopted 
and  based  on  the  possibility  of  the  orderly  being 
unable  to  deliver  the  written  message.  It  would 
also  enable  the  Commanding  General  upon  the 
return  of  his  aide  to  receive  from  him  as  a  trained 
officer  a  more  comprehensive  account  of  what  was 
going  on  in  the  cavalry  action  than  would  be  possi- 
ble through  the  agency  of  hurriedly  written  mes- 
sages. 

By  this  time  artillery  fire  was  heard  in  front, 
and  from  the  concussion  and  sound,  it  was  evi- 
dent that  the  guns  were  those  of  the  enemy.  The 
Chief  of  Staff  now  mounted,  galloped  ahead  and 
rejoined  the  Commanding  General.  They  de- 
termined to  ride  on  and  get  a  better  view  of  the 
situation  in  front.  Followed  by  the  mounted  sec- 
tion of  the  Headquarters  Detachment  they  moved 
forward  at  a  trot,  and  after  riding  about  one  half 
a  mile,  found  the  reserve  of  the  advance  guard 
leaving  the  road  and  moving  into  the  fields  on  the 
right,  where  there  was  considerable  cover  in  the 
form  of  timber.  The  advance  guard  commander 
was  with  this  reserve  and  had  just  sent  patrols 
well  off  to  the  right  and  left  to  provide  for  the 
security  of  the  position.     The  field  artillery  battal- 


312        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

ion  was  off  the  road  and  in  a  field  to  the  left  be- 
hind a  rather  steep  ridge.  The  horses  were 
hitched  to  the  carriages  and  the  batteries  were  in 
double  section  column.  One  of  the  ofiScers  ex- 
plained that  they  were  occupying  what  is  known 
as  a  position  in  readiness  and  that  their  com- 
mander with  some  assistants  was  making  a  recon- 
naissance for  the  purpose  of  determining  the  best 
position  for  placing  the  guns.  The  engineer  de- 
tachment accompanied  the  reserve,  as  did  the  sig- 
nal detachment,  while  the  ambulance  company  was 
for  the  moment  in  column  in  the  road  further  to 
the  rear  and  under  cover  of  the  woods  in  front. 
The  remaining  troops  of  the  advance  guard,  which 
consisted  of  the  support  were  out  of  sight  beyond 
the  woods.  Let  us  accompany  the  advance  guard 
commander  with  the  reserve  which  is  now  enter- 
ing the  woods  in  line  of  companies,  each  com- 
pany being  in  column  of  squads,  or  as  it  was  for- 
merly called,  column  of  fours.  As  we  enter  the 
woods  the  sound  of  the  firing  in  front  grows 
louder  and  we  can  hear  bullets  striking  the  trees 
above  with  loud,  resounding  whacks.  In  advance 
of  the  line  of  companies  are  scouts  or  patrols.  In 
a  few  moments  a  scout  comes  back  and  reports  to 
the   advance   guard   commander  that  his   patrol 


Combined  Arms  in  Action  (Continued)    313 

reached  the  far  edge  of  the  woods  about  200  yards 
further  on,  and  that  from  such  position  he  could 
see  about  500  yards  beyond,  a  skirmish  line  formed 
by  the  support.  He  further  reported  that  the 
skirmish  line  occupied  the  crest  of  a  slight  rise  in 
the  ground,  but  he  could  not  see  anything  of  the 
enemy  owing  to  the  fact  that  the  position  occupied 
by  the  enemy  was  evidently  below  the  level  of  the 
rise.  At  that  moment  two  shrapnel  fired  by  the 
enemy  burst  in  the  woods,  three  of  the  men  in  one 
of  the  companies  being  struck  by  shrapnel  balls. 
They  were  given  first  aid,  one  of  them  remaining 
on  duty  with  his  company,  the  other  two  walking 
back  to  the  dressing  station  established  by  the 
ambulance  company.  At  this  point  the  Command- 
ing General  conferred  with  the  advance  guard 
commander,  and  they  both  went  to  the  edge  of  the 
woods  and  studied  as  well  as  they  could  the  ground 
in  front.  The  result  of  this  brief  consultation  was 
that  the  Division  Commander  directed  the  with- 
drawal of  the  cavalry,  part  of  which  were  then 
fighting  on  foot  with  the  infantry  support,  and 
sent  them  to  operate  against  the  enemy's  right 
and  rear.  He  sent  another  message  to  the  right 
column  to  halt  and  await  orders.  He  did  this  for 
the  purpose  of  withholding  them  from  the  action 


314        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

until  he  could  determine  what  force  was  in  his 
front.  He  directed  the  advance  guard  commander 
to  push  in  his  reserve  on  the  firing  line  and  to 
press  the  attack,  telling  him  that  the  field  artillery 
battalion  was  now  relieved  from  its  advance  guard 
duties  and  would  be  under  the  direction  of  the 
Division  Commander.  He  sent  word  back  to  the 
main  body  to  continue  the  march.  He  informed 
the  artillery  brigade  commander  that  he  proposed 
to  develop  the  enemy's  position  with  the  troops 
that  had  constituted  the  advance  guard,  and 
directed  him  to  support  their  attack.  At  this  mo- 
ment artillery  firing  was  heard  from  the  left  and 
shortly  thereafter  a  field  artillery  officer  reported 
to  the  advance  guard  commander  that  the  field 
artillery  battalion  occupied  a  masked  position 
about  one-quarter  of  a  mile  to  the  left  of  the  road, 
and  that  the  battalion  commander's  station,  from 
which  he  directed  the  fire,  was  between  the  road 
and  the  guns,  and  on  a  high  knoll  which  could  be 
seen  from  the  road.  He  further  stated  that  from 
that  position  the  enemy's  line  could  be  seen  about 
1400  yards  to  the  front,  and  that  it  seemed  to  con- 
sist of  a  line  of  skirmishers  who  were  not  very 
well  intrenched.  This  officer  remained  with  the 
advance  guard  commander  for  the  purpose  of 


Combined  Aims  in  Action  (Continued)    315 

keeping  in  toucli  with  the  development  of  the  at- 
tack, and  communicating  to  the  artillery  com- 
mander, the  requirements  of  the  infantry  in  re- 
spect to  supporting  artillery  fire. 

In  pursuance  of  the  orders  of  the  Division  Com- 
mander the  advance  guard  commander  directed 
one  of  the  battalions  of  the  reserve  to  advance  and 
deploy  on  the  right  of  the  firing  line  in  front.  This 
was  done,  and  apparently  with  no  loss  owing  to  the 
slope  of  the  ground  in  front,  although  occasionally 
shrapnel,  apparently  aimed  at  the  skirmish  line, 
came  over  the  ridge  and  between  the  firing  line 
and  the  edge  of  the  woods  which  sheltered  the  re- 
serves. The  firing  continued  heavily  for  about  fif- 
teen minutes  at  which  time  a  lieutenant  reported 
to  the  advance  guard  commander  that  the  line  in 
front,  while  it  had  sustained  some  losses,  was 
strong  enough  to  push  the  attack,  if  supported, 
and  the  attack  were  covered  by  artillery  fire. 
The  Lieutenant,  who  was  speaking  for  the  support 
commander,  who  commanded  the  firing  line  in 
front,  stated  that  the  enemy^s  line  was  distant 
from  them  about  900  yards ;  that  no  more  than  a 
regiment  apparently  held  the  position,  and  that 
their  intrenchments  seemed  to  be  of  the  hastily 
constructed  type.    The  enemy 's  artillery  appeared 


316        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

to  be  in  their  right  rear  judging  from  the  direction 
of  the  sound  and  the  angle  of  fall  of  the  pro- 
jectiles. 

The  advance  guard  conunander  thereupon 
directed  the  second  battalion  of  the  reserve  to  ad- 
vance to  the  support  of  the  firing  line  and  to  send 
in  the  companies  where  needed.  He  sent  the 
Lieutenant  back  with  direction  to  the  support  com- 
mander to  advance  his  line,  that  he  would  be  sup- 
ported and  that  the  artillery  would  cover  his  at- 
tack. In  the  meanwhile  the  artillery  brigade  com- 
mander had  received  his  orders,  had  visited  the 
position  of  the  field  artillery  battalion  already  in 
action,  and  had  selected  sites  for  the  remaining 
artillery  battalions  when  they  should  arrive.  The 
artillery  battalion  already  in  action  had  obtained 
the  firing  data  necessary  for  directing  their  fire  on 
the  enemy's  line  and  were  effectively  covering  it 
with  fire.  This  fact  was  noted  by  the  support 
commander  whose  men  were  also  firing  effectively 
at  the  same  objective.  Acting  according  to  the 
principles  explained  under  the  chapter  on  infan- 
try, he  advanced  subdivisions  of  the  firing  line  to 
successive  positions  each  closer  to  the  enemy  than 
the  preceding  one.  Such  casualties  as  the  line 
sustained  during  the  advance  were  replaced  by 


Combined  Anns  in  Action  (Continued)    317 

pushing  forward  squads  from  the  reserves.  Of 
the  men  who  had  been  struck,  some  had  apparently 
been  killed  or  were  unconscious  for  they  were  ap- 
parently lifeless.  Some  could  be  seen  running 
back  quite  actively,  while  others  were  making  their 
way  to  the  edge  of  the  woods  with  apparent  diffi- 
culty. Practically  all  of  them,  however,  had  re- 
mained  where  struck  until  they  applied  and  ad- 
justed the  compress  and  first  aid  bandage  carried 
by  them. 

The  Commanding  General  about  this  time  said 
to  the  Chief  of  Staff:  ^'I  don't  believe  from  the 
lay-out  of  the  ground  in  our  front,  as  indicated  by 
the  map,  that  the  enemy  in  our  front  is  anything 
more  than  an  outpost  or  an  advanced  line.  This 
is  confirmed  by  the  reports  of  the  support  com- 
mander from  our  firing  line  which  state  that  the 
enemy's  intrenchments  appear  to  be  hastily  con- 
structed. I  want  the  cavalry  to  withdraw  and 
attack  the  enemy's  right  and  rear.  This  may  com- 
pel their  withdrawal  if  our  belief  is  correct  that 
the  enemy  is  not  present  in  force.  If  on  the  other 
hand  they  hold  the  line  in  our  front  in  force,  I 
may  make  the  main  attack  against  their  left,  with 
our  right  column  which  is  now  halted.  It  is  too 
early  to  determine  this  now.    We  will  go  to  the 


318        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

hill  on  the  left  of  the  road  where  the  artillery  oh- 
serving  station  is.  Notify  all  organizations  that 
messages  for  me  will  he  delivered  there.  Get 
wires  laid  at  once.  I  want  to  see  the  artillery 
brigade  commander  on  the  hill.*' 

They  walked  hack  in  the  woods  to  where  their 
horses  were,  mounted  and  rode  off.  As  they  left 
the  Chief  of  Staff  told  the  advance  guard  com- 
mander where  to  send  messages.  He  instructed 
the  commanding  officer  of  the  signal  battalion  to 
establish  wire  connection  at  once  between  the  hill 
where  headquarters  would  be,  and  the  right 
column;  also  with  the  advance  guard  commander 
in  the  woods.  He  states  that  wire  connection  with 
the  field  artillery  commander  would  be  unneces- 
sary as  he  would  be  with  the  division  commander 
on  the  hill.  The  signal  officer  left  at  a  gallop  to 
execute  this  order.  The  Chief  of  Staff  directed  an 
assistant  to  notify  all  organizations,  where  head- 
quarters had  been  established.  When  they 
reached  the  bottom  of  the  hill,  the  general,  the 
staff  and  the  headquarters  detachment  dis- 
mounted. Near  the  top  of  the  hill  and  under 
cover  of  some  bushes  were  several  field  artillery 
officers  with  instruments  and  field  glasses  direct- 
ing by  telephone,  the  fire  of  the  Red  batteries  fur- 


Combined  Arms  in  Action  (Continued)    319 

ther  to  the  left.  The  general  and  some  of  the  staff 
crept  up  to  their  position  and  examined  the 
ground  in  front  and  the  enemy's  line,  with  their 
glasses.  Some  of  the  headquarters  detachment 
were  detailed  to  hold  horses,  some  were  detailed 
about  four  hundred  yards  to  the  right  and  to  the 
left,  as  observation  patrols,  some  were  standing 
with  their  horses  under  cover  awaiting  calls  as 
messengers,  while  three,  one  carrying  the  Division 
Commander's  flag,  rode  down  to  the  road  entrance, 
and  took  station  so  as  to  display  the  flag  promi- 
nently to  passing  officers  and  messengers.  This 
flag  served  to  indicate  that  the  station  of  the  Com- 
manding General  was  in  the  vicinity.  About  this 
time,  a  reel  cart  was  driven  up,  and  telephone 
communication  was  established  with  the  advance 
guard  reserve.  One  of  the  signal  officers  said  that 
another  reel  cart  was  unreeling  wire  on  its  way  to 
the  right  column,  and  they  were  about  to  connect 
up  with  it.  The  field  artillery  brigade  commander 
reported  to  the  Commanding  General  that  one  of 
his  officers  was  with  the  advance  guard  com- 
mander, and  was  keeping  him  posted  over  the 
wire  as  to  the  requirements  of  the  infantry  con- 
cerning the  field  artillery  fire,  and  that  they  were 
cooperating    successfully.     The    cavalry    on    the 


320        The  Modem  Army  in  Action 

firing  line  had  withdrawn,  retired  to  where  their 
horses  were  held  under  cover,  had  mounted  up, 
and  moved  off  out  of  sight  of  the  enemy,  to  at- 
tack their  right  flank.  The  Commanding  General 
was  about  to  issue  an  order  in  writing  governing 
the  attack  to  be  made,  when  the  Chief  of  Staff  in- 
formed him  that  the  advance  guard  commander 
had  just  'phoned  he  would  assault  the  enemy's 
line  in  his  front  in  a  few  moments.  The  message 
requested  the  artillery  to  speed  up  in  its  fire  for 
a  short  interval  and  to  watch  for  the  appearance 
of  his  assaulting  line,  so  as  to  shift  the  fire  and 
not  hit  his  men  when  they  got  in  close  to  the 
enemy.  Shortly  before  this  the  commanding  offi- 
cer of  the  3rd  brigade  reported  by  an  aide  that 
his  brigade,  pursuant  to  an  order  from  the  Chief 
of  Staff,  was  closing  up  and  already  had  one  regi- 
ment massed  in  rear  of  the  woods  where  the  ad- 
vance guard  reserve  first  deployed.  The  engineer 
battalion  acting  as  infantry,  was  posted  on  the  left 
of  the  field  artillery  as  a  support.  As  the  artil- 
lery increased  the  rate  of  its  fire  at  the  enemy's 
line,  another  battalion  of  the  Eed  artillery  which 
was  to  the  left  of  the  battahon  supporting  the  in- 
fantry attack,  suddenly  opened  fire  with  great 
rapidity  and  intensity.     The  sound  of  the  firing 


Combined  Arms  in  Action  (Continued)    321 

was  now  such  that  even  on  the  hill,  the  atmosphere 
seemed  to  be  shredded,  and  it  was  difficult  to  carry 
on  conversation,  except  by  shouting.  The  Red  in- 
fantry line  had  pressed  forward  to  an  old  stone 
wall  about  three  hundred  j^ards  from  the  enemy's 
line.  There  they  were  lying  down,  firing  with 
great  rapidity.  Bayonets  were  being  fixed  with- 
out any  apparent  diminution  of  the  fire.  Sud- 
denly the  line  rose  and  with  a  cheer  started  for- 
ward on  a  run  toward  the  enemy.  A  few  men 
were  seen  to  stumble  and  fall.  Some  of  them 
arose  and  went  on.  The  shrapnel  which  had  up 
to  that  time  been  bursting  along  the  line  of  the 
enemy 's  intrenchment,  throwing  up  clouds  of  dust 
where  the  shrapnel  balls  spat,  and  thick  clods  of 
earth  where  the  projectiles  burst  on  impact,  now 
went  screaming  over  the  top  of  the  ridge.  The 
enemy  could  not  now  be  seen.  They  had  evidently 
withdrawn  from  their  intrenchments,  about  the 
time  when  the  fire  attack  was  hottest,  just  before 
the  assault  began.  It  was  evident  that  the  Red  in- 
fantry of  the  advance  guard  which  made  the  at- 
tack, although  they  had  not  suffered  a  high  per- 
centage of  casualties,  were  greatly  fatigued. 
They  were  intermixed  somewhat.  Some  of  them 
were  firing  in  the  direction  of  the  enemy,  while 


322        The  Modern  Army  ;n  Action 

others  had  thrown  themselves  flat  on  the  ground, 
apparently  exhausted  from  physical  exertion  and 
nervous  strain. 

The  Commanding  General  and  Chief  of  Staff, 
and  their  assistants,  were  now  busily  engaged  in 
preparing  orders.     These  were  shortly  sent  off. 
They  directed  the  cavalry  to  pursue  the  enemy — 
that  they  would  be  supported.    The  advance  of 
the  division  was  directed  to  be  continued  at  once 
by  the  3rd  brigade  as  the  new  advance  guard,  with 
the  same  auxiliary  troops  as  had  constituted  part 
of  the  advance  guard  that  morning,  except  that  the 
ambulance  company  busily  engaged  in  the  work  of 
evacuating  the  field  of  the  wounded,  was  left  to 
complete  its  labors,  and  was  replaced  by  the  3rd 
Ambulance  Company.     The  infantry  of  the  old  ad- 
vance guard  was  directed  to  aid  in  the  removal  of 
their  wounded,  provide  for  the  burial  of  the  dead, 
reform  their  units  and  march  as  part  of  the  main 
body  at  one  mile  distance.     The  right  column  was 
directed  to  resume  the  march  maintaining  com- 
munication with  the  main  body.     The  auxiliary 
arms  were  assigned  their  appropriate  places  in 
the  column,  and  with  practically  no  delay,  the 
new  advance  was  on. 

The  Commanding  General  and  Chief  of  Staff 


Combined  Arms  in  Action  (Continued)    323 

looked  over  the  position  vrliich  liad  been  held  by 
the  enemy,  and  discussed  the  events  which  had 
transpired.  The  assistants  were  writing  out  in 
formal  orders  the  oral  instructions  already  given 
for  the  carrying  out  of  the  movements  above  in- 
dicated. The  foUo^dng  points  were  made  clear  in 
the  course  of  their  short  conversation.  That  the 
enemy's  intrenchments  had  been  hastily  con- 
structed and  were  of  the  kneeling  type.  The  ab- 
sence of  communicating  trenches  and  of  shelters 
for  supports  in  rear  were  further  indications  of 
haste.  These  facts  and  the  further  fact  that  the 
enemy  left  the  intrenchments  before  there  was  any 
opportunity  for  physical  contact  and  in  time  to 
gain  cover  in  the  rear  before  the  arrival  of  the 
assaulting  line  at  the  intrenchment,  radicated  that 
the  enemy  had  not  intended  to  make  a  determined 
stand  in  that  position  and  had  retired  on  their 
main  defensive  position — probably  the  ridge  three 
miles  south  of  Basic  City,  and  already  referred  to 
in  the  estimate  of  the  situation  made  by  the  Divi- 
sion Cormnander  when  he  first  received  his  orders 
to  advance.  It  further  appeared  from  the  con- 
versation between  the  Division  Commander  and 
his  Chief  of  Staff  that  the  first  battalion  of  the 
Red  artillery  to  get  in  action  concentrated  its  fire 


324        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

on  the  enemy's  intrenchment  with  such  success 
that  the  enemy's  fire  was  relatively  ineffective; 
that  the  second  battalion  to  go  into  action  suc- 
ceeded in  locating  the  masked  position  of  the  en- 
emy 's  field  artillery  and  it  was  their  sudden  ^ '  fire 
squall"  which  at  a  critical  moment  in  the  action 
so  deluged  the  enemy's  batteries  with  fire  as  to  de- 
stroy or  silence  them.     This  resulted  in  the  sus- 
pension of  their  fire  against  the  Bed  infantry 
about  the  time  they  were  preparing  to  deliver  their 
assault.     The  first  battalion  therefore  were  per- 
forming the  functions  of  '  ^  infantry  batteries ' '  and 
the  second  battalion  the  functions  of  ' '  counter  bat- 
teries," as  explained  in  the  chapter  on  Artillery. 
Leaving  these  two  officers  to  continue  their  con- 
versation while  waiting  for  the  advance  guard  to 
gain  its  prescribed  distance  and  for  the  head  of 
the  main  body  to  begin  its  march,  let  us  see  how 
the  intervening  time  is  expended  by  the  regiments 
which  took  part  in  the  attack.     The  companies  are 
being  formed  in  rear  of  the  crest  and  out  of  sight 
of  the  enemy's  position.    Eolls  have  been  called 
and  a  check  made  of  absentees.    Where  the  infor- 
mation was  readily  obtainable  the  first  sergeants 
classed  these  as  killed,  wounded  or  missing.    Men 
who  had  become  intermixed  with  other  compan- 


> 


-5 


■r, 

O 
Q. 

bO 

5 


-3 


Combined  Arms  in  Action  (Continued)    325 

ies  during  the  progress  of  the  attack  were  returned 
to  their  own  commands.  About  3000  men  took 
part  in  the  attack  as  part  of  the  line  or  as  sup- 
ports. The  casualties  numbered,  with  the  figures 
then  obtainable,  approximately  100  men,  slightly 
over  three  per  cent.  Of  these  men  10  were  killed 
or  were  dead  at  the  conclusion  of  the  action;  65 
were  wounded  in  varying  degrees  of  seriousness, 
and  the  balance  were  missing.  Of  the  missing, 
more  than  half  would  shortly  return  to  their  com- 
mands and  account  for  their  temporary  absence. 
First  aid  stations  had  been  established  early  in 
the  action  by  the  regimental  sanitary  units  and  at 
these  stations  some  of  the  wounded  were  still  re- 
ceiving attention  from  the  regimental  surgeons 
and  the  regimental  hospital  corps  soldiers,  but 
most  of  the  wounded  had  found  their  way  back  to 
the  dressing  station  established  by  the  ambulance 
company  at  a  brook  off  the  road  in  rear  of  the 
woods.  The  more  seriously  wounded  had  been 
carried  back  by  litter  bearers  from  the  ambulance 
company  and  by  the  members  of  the  regimental 
bands,  while  others  had  succeeded  in  getting  back 
without  assistance.  As  soon  as  the  injuries  of  the 
wounded  were  properly  dressed,  when  such  action 
was  necessary  at  the  dressing  station,  they  were 


326        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

transported  back  to  the  field  hospital  in  the  ambu- 
lances of  the  ambulance  company.  One  of  the  field 
hospitals  in  the  sanitary  train  three  miles  in  rear 
of  the  division  had  been  set  up  pursuant  to  a  tele- 
phone order  sent  by  the  Chief  of  Staff  at  the  time 
the  action  commenced.  Upon  the  arrival  at  the 
field  hospital  of  the  ambulances  bearing  the 
wounded,  they  were  passed  through  in  turn  and 
carefully  examined  by  the  attending  surgeons. 
Prior  to  such  examination  a  list  was  made  by  a 
noncommissioned  officer,  giving  the  name,  grade, 
organization  and  nature  of  injury  of  each  soldier. 
Other  records  showed  the  treatment  given  and  the 
disposition  made  of  the  patients.  These  records 
later  become  valuable  data  in  connection  with 
possible  pension  claims.  The  field  hospital  en- 
deavors to  preserve  its  mobility  by  evacuating  as 
promptly  as  possible  all  cases  by  sending  them  to 
the  evacuation  or  to  the  base  hospital. 

Eeturning  to  the  field  of  the  action  we  find 
trenches  being  dug  for  the  burial  of  the  dead.  The 
work  for  the  most  part  is  being  performed  by  the 
bandsmen  of  the  two  regiments  engaged.  The 
bodies  of  the  dead  are  carried  over  to  the  trench 
and  carefully  examined  by  regimental  surgeons  to 
insure  that  life  is  extinct.     The  Chaplains  are  oc- 


Combined  Amis  in  Action  (Continued)    327 

cupied  in  taking  from  the  clothing  of  the  dead  all 
personal  articles  and  placing  them  in  sealed  en- 
velopes indorsed  with  the  name,  grade  and  organ- 
ization of  the  deceased  soldier.  The  identification 
tags  worn  around  the  neck  are  left  on  the  bodies 
for  purposes  of  future  identification.  After  this 
is  done  the  remains  are  interred,  and  if  there  is 
time  the  graves  are  marked  with  crosses  or  stones 
and  a  funeral  service  read  by  one  of  the  Chaplains. 
While  this  is  going  on,  details  from  the  regiments 
are  carefully  searching  the  ground  over  which  the 
regiment  advanced  to  insure  that  no  wounded  or 
dead  have  escaped  attention.  The  regimental 
adjutants  are  engaged  in  making  notes  of  the  hour, 
place  and  details  of  the  operations  up  to  that  time 
for  later  entry  into  the  war  diary  which  is  a  record 
kept  by  each  organization  of  the  daily  events  of 
the  campaign.  A  duplicate  of  the  day's  entry  is 
sent  by  each  organization  to  the  next  higher  com- 
mander, and  from  these  the  latter  makes  his  daily 
report.  He  in  turn  forwards  a  copy  of  this  report 
to  the  next  higher  commander  sending  the  original 
at  the  first  opportunity  to  the  home  war  office.  In 
this  manner  a  careful  record  is  made  of  the  opera- 
tions of  armies  in  campaign,  not  only  for  historical 
record,  but  for  future  military  study. 


328        Tlie  Modern  Army  in  Action 

About  tills  time  the  liead  of  the  main  body,  con- 
sisting of  the  1st  Infantry,  began  its  march  and 
shortly  thereafter  more  firing  was  heard  in  the 
front.  The  Commanding  General  and  his  assist- 
ants moved  off  to  the  head  of  the  main  body,  con- 
tinuing to  discuss  the  events  which  had  transpired 
up  to  that  time,  and  their  connection  with  the  fur- 
ther operations  of  the  division  during  the  balance 
of  the  day.  It  was  agreed  by  them  that  the  enemy 
had  shown  poor  judgment  in  making  the  fight 
which  had  just  been  concluded.  It  ayjpeared  that 
the  enemy  suffered  a  loss  of  16  killed,  and  of  their 
wounded  20  had  been  left  by  them  in  the  trenches. 
The  remainder  they  had  succeeded  in  taking  with 
them.  The  cavalry  which  was  directed  to  operate 
against  the  enemy's  right  and  rear  reported  that 
in  their  attempt  to  envelop  the  enemy's  right  flank 
they  had  met  some  infantry  reserves  and  had  not 
been  able  to  make  headway  against  their  rifle  and 
machine  gun  fire.  That  the  terrain  through  which 
the  enemy  retired  was  not  well  adapted  for  cav- 
alry operations,  and  in  consequence  they  found  it 
necessary  to  confine  their  movements  largely  to 
the  roads,  which  facilitate  the  safe  withdrawal  of 
the  enemy.  Cavalry  patrols  had  found  the  posi- 
tion occupied  by  the  enemy's  artillery  and  had 


Combined  Arms  in  Action  (Continued)    329 

counted  27  dead  bodies  of  Blue  artillerymen  and 
the  carcasses  of  more  than  30  dead  horses.  On 
the  ground  where  the  enemy's  batteries  had  stood 
there  were  two  wrecked  guns  and  three  demolished 
caisson  bodies,  while  the  ground  itself  was  con- 
siderably torn  up,  indicating  that  the  fire  of  the 
Red  "counter  batteries"  had  been  extremely  effec- 
tive. The  retiring  Blue  batteries  had,  however, 
carried  oif  their  wounded. 

Shortly  thereafter  a  message  was  received  from 
the  new  advance  guard  commander  stating  that  his 
support  was  driving  in  the  enemy's  patrols,  and 
that  the  enemy  appeared  to  be  strongly  intrenched 
along  the  ridge  referred  to  by  the  Commanding 
General  in  his  estimate  of  the  situation.  The 
enemy 's  right  flank  was  protected  by  an  extensive 
swamp  and  the  left  flank  by  an  unfordable  stream. 
The  Commanding  General  directed  the  advance 
guard  commander  to  continue  his  development  of 
the  enemy's  position.  He  rode  forward  to  join 
the  reserve  of  the  advance  guard. 

The  Commanding  General  knew  that  he  was  face 
to  face  with  a  problem  involving  a  frontal  attack 
against  the  enemy's  position,  if  his  advance  was  to 
be  made  aggressively  and  promptly  as  his  mission 
required.    He  had  no  information  as  to  what  re- 


330        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

serves  and  other  forces  constituted  the  strength 
of  the  enemy  in  his  front.  With  the  Signal  Bat- 
talion there  had  been  attached  two  portable  aero- 
planes, and  these  he  directed  the  Chief  Signal  Offi- 
cer to  have  prepared  for  immediate  reconnaissance 
of  the  enemy 's  position.  The  necessary  order  was 
telephoned  back  to  the  trains  with  which  the  avia- 
tion detachment  with  three  motor  cars,  was  mov- 
ing. This  order  was  formal  in  its  nature  and  pre- 
scribed the  mission  of  the  aviators  and  the  ob- 
servers who  were  to  accompany  them. 

The  action  developed  very  much  the  same  as  the 
preceding  action  had  developed,  except  that  the 
fire  of  the  enemy  was  more  intense  and  accurate, 
his  line  better  screened,  and  altogether  the  posi- 
tion showed  indications  of  careful  selection  and 
strength.  The  Eed  artillery  brigade  commander 
made  a  careful  reconnaissance  for  positions  for  all 
the  artillery  battalions.  One  regiment  was  placed 
in  a  masked  position  to  the  rear  and  toward  the 
left  of  the  Eed  line,  while  the  other  regiment  oc- 
cupied a  similar  position  with  respect  to  the  right 
of  the  Eed  line.  Although  the  artillery  regiments 
were  thus  separated  by  intervening  ground  they 
were  not  in  fact  separated  in  the  tactical  sense,  for 
the  reason  that  both  regiments  were  connected  by 


Combined  Arms  in  Action  (Continued)    331 

wire  with  the  brigade  commander  who  occupied  a 
crow's  nest  hastily  constructed  for  him  and  his 
assistants  near  the  top  of  two  tall  pine  trees  which 
stood  close  together  and  which  were  screened  by- 
other  trees  in  front.  From  this  position  he  had 
an  excellent  view  of  the  enemy's  position  and 
direct  control  of  the  two  regiments  of  field  artil- 
lery. He  could  shift  their  fire,  concentrate  or  dis- 
tribute it  as  he  might  dictate,  and  in  accordance 
with  the  system  explained  in  the  chapter  on  Artil- 
lery. The  cavalry  was  withdrawn,  one  squadron 
acting  as  a  flank  guard  for  the  right  flank  of  the 
line,  a  second  squadron  performing  a  similar  func- 
tion for  the  left  flank,  while  the  remaining  squad- 
ron was  held  with  the  general  reserve.  The  ad- 
vance guard  of  the  right  column  deployed  and  went 
into  action,  but  the  attack  was  not  pushed  for  the 
moment.  By  the  time  these  dispositions  had  been 
concluded,  the  Eed  aeroplanes  had  made  their  as- 
cent, gained  an  altitude  of  about  4000  feet,  about 
three  miles  to  the  left  of  the  Red  line,  and  were 
now  approaching  the  enemy's  position  from  the 
flank.  The  men  had  been  so  actively  engaged  in 
the  performance  of  their  own  duties  that  there  was 
much  doubt  as  to  whether  the  aeroplanes  were 
hostile  or  friendly.    About  the  time  of  their  ap- 


332        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

pearance,  however,  the  commanding  officers  of  or- 
ganizations informed  their  units  that  the  aero- 
planes were  Eed  machines.  It  was  remarked  by 
a  signal  officer  that  similar  doubt  would  arise  in 
the  minds  of  some  at  least  of  the  enemy  and  would 
favor  the  operations  of  the  aviators  and  observers. 
Shortly  thereafter  the  aeroplanes  having  trav- 
ersed the  air  above  Basic  City,  flew  over  the  en- 
emy's position  at  a  lower  altitude  and  then  rising 
higher  passed  off  to  the  right  and  disappeared. 
Ten  minutes  later  their  reports  were  being  re- 
ceived over  the  telephone.  These  reports  were  to 
the  effect  that  there  was  much  activity  in  the  rail- 
road yards  at  Basic  City,  that  long  trains  of  cars 
were  present  on  sidings,  and  that  switch  engines 
were  moving  back  and  forth ;  that  flat  cars  and  box 
cars  were  being  loaded ;  that  several  hundred  men 
were  working  about  the  freight  houses  and  sta- 
tions; that  more  than  one  hundred  wagons  and 
teams  were  gathered  there ;  that  no  troops  in  con- 
siderable bodies  seemed  to  be  on  the  roads;  that 
about  1500  yards  in  rear  of  the  enemy's  position 
and  opposite  its  center  were  two  regiments  of  in- 
fantry apparently  performing  the  functions  of  a 
general  reserve;  that  the  enemy's  field  artillery 
apparently  consisted  of  a  battalion  and  occupied  a 


Combined  Arms  in  Action  (Continued)    333 

position  on  the  extreme  left  of  their  line  and  close 
to  the  front ;  that  from  the  position  of  the  observ- 
ers above  them  the  position  did  not  seem  to  be  a 
masked  one;  that  the  enemy's  line  seemed  to  be 
well  intrenched,  with  communicating  trenches  con- 
necting the  shelters  in  the  rear ;  that  the  number  of 
men  estimated  to  be  on  the  line  and  in  support  in 
the  shelters  was  not  more  than  a  brigade ;  that  no 
cavalry  was  seen  except  small  detachments  which 
together  did  not  exceed  a  squadron.  Upon  re- 
ceiving this  report  the  Division  Commander  de- 
termined to  attack  after  thorough  preparation  by 
artillery  fire.  He  accordingly  issued  an  attack 
order,  in  the  usual  prescribed  form  of  five  para- 
graphs. 

Upon  receipt  of  this  order  the  organizations 
knew  the  nature  of  the  work  cut  out  for  them.  As 
a  matter  of  fact  the  enemy's  artillery  could  not  be 
seen,  either  from  the  ground  or  from  the  position 
of  the  artillery  commander  in  the  tree  tops.  But 
knowing  from  the  report  just  received  the  loca- 
tion of  the  enemy's  artillery  he  was  enabled  by 
careful  observation  through  powerful  glasses  to 
detect  slight  puffs  of  dust  thrown  up  from  in  front 
of  the  enemy's  guns  when  tliey  were  fired.  Pie 
therefore  caused  one  platoon  of  one  of  the  bat- 


334        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

talions  of  artillery  to  adjust  its  fire  on  the  enemy's 
guns  while  the  regiment  on  the  left  fired  at  the 
enemy's  intrenchments.  Having  completed  the 
adjustment  of  fire  and  obtained  his  firing  data  he 
made  the  necessary  calculations  to  furnish  the 
correct  data  for  all  the  guns  to  bring  their  fire  to 
bear  upon  the  Blue  artillery.  He  asked  permis- 
sion of  the  Division  Commander  to  turn  loose  on 
the  Blue  artillery  the  fire  of  every  one  of  the  Red 
batteries  in  order  that  he  might  overwhelm  and 
annihilate  the  same  without  loss  of  time  and  then 
promptly  turn  the  attention  of  practically  all  the 
batteries  to  the  Blue  infantry.  This  consent  was 
given  and  in  a  few  moments,  pursuant  to  the 
necessary  orders,  the  entire  Red  artillery  brigade 
fired  for  effect  against  the  Blue  battalion.  The 
command  was  for  volley  fire,  three  rounds,  which 
means  that  every  gun  in  the  brigade,  48  in  num- 
ber fired  three  shrapnel  against  the  Blue  battalion. 
This  caused  a  total  of  144  projectiles  to  burst  in 
and  about  the  batteries  within  one  minute  after 
the  command  to  fire  was  given.  Some  of  these 
projectiles,  fired  from  the  regiment  on  the  right, 
struck  the  Blue  artillery  from  the  front,  while 
those  from  the  regiment  on  the  left  fell  at 
an   angle   almost   enfilading   the   Blue   artillery. 


Combined  Arms  in  Action  (Continued)    335 

Most  of  the  shrapnel  burst  in  the  air,  spraying  the 
entire  position  with  shrapnel  balls,  while  others 
burst  on  impact,  overturning  and  shattering  some 
of  the  carriages.  Some  of  the  projectiles  went 
to  the  right  and  left  in  front  of  and  behind  the 
line  of  Blue  guns  and  some  of  these  fell  among 
the  drivers  and  horses  of  the  Blue  batteries  which 
were  in  a  slight  draw  to  the  left  and  rear  of  their 
batteries.  The  Blue  artillery  was  so  thoroughly 
cut  up  and  demoralized  that  their  fire  promptly 
ceased.  The  Eed  artillery  brigade  commander 
thereupon  ordered  that  the  battery  on  the  extreme 
left  of  the  Red  line  should  continue  to  fire  against 
the  Blue  artillery  position,  to  further  the  enemy's 
demoralization  and  to  insure  the  continued  cessa- 
tion of  their  fire.  This  permitted  11  batteries 
of  artillery  to  concentrate  their  fire  against  the 
Blue  line.  The  Blue  line  was  divided  into  sectors 
and  each  battery  was  assigned  a  sector.  It  was 
soon  evident  that  the  effect  of  this  fire  was  such 
that  the  enemy's  infantry  were  badly  handicapped 
in  their  efforts  to  stay  by  infantry  fire  alone  the 
advance  of  the  Red  attack.  The  Red  infantry  at- 
tack had  succeeded  in  advancing  to  within  ap- 
proximately 700  yards  of  the  enemy's  position 
and  were  protected  here  and  there  by  boulders, 


336        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

the   hed    of   a    dry    stream    and   by   dumps    of 
trees. 

The  Division  Commander  at  this  time  deter- 
mined that  he  would  make  the  main  attack  against 
the  right  wing  of  the  enemy's  line,  and  the  Eed 
artillery  brigade  commander  was  instructed  to 
prepare  the  attack  accordingly.  If  the  latter  offi- 
cer suspended  fire  against  other  parts  of  the  en- 
emy's line  it  would  be  notice  to  the  enemy  that 
the  attack  would  probably  fall  elsewhere,  and  so 
he  directed  the  left  wing  of  the  Blue  line  to  be 
covered  by  the  fire  of  one  battalion  while  the  re- 
maining battalions  concentrated  their  fire  against 
the  right  wing. 

While  this  was  being  done  the  Division  Com- 
mander who  had  been  connected  by  wire  with  his 
subdivision  commanders  directed  that  the  sup- 
ports and  reserves  be  closed  up  well  within  sup- 
porting distance  of  the  left  half  of  the  attacking 
line,  and  he  also  designated  a  particular  sector 
of  the  enemy's  right  wing  which  was  to  be  as- 
saulted at  the  earliest  moment,  consistent  with 
proper  preparation.  He  asked  for  a  report  from 
the  commander  of  the  firing  line  as  to  when  he 
felt  he  could  attack  with  success.  This  report  was 
shortly  thereafter  received  from  the  brigade  com- 


Combined  Arms  in  Action  (Continued)    337 

mander  in  charge  of  the  line  and  was  to  the  effect 
that  he  would  assault  in  about  ten  minutes. 
Thereupon  the  field  artillery  was  directed  to  in- 
crease its  rate  of  fire,  and  about  the  time  predicted 
the  infantry  line  having  advanced  under  the  pro- 
tection of  that  fire  to  a  line  about  250  yards  from 
the  enemy's  position  suddenly  swept  forward  with 
a  cheer.  Shortly  after  their  charge  began  the 
artillery  fire  was  raised  and  swept  the  ground  in 
rear  of  the  enemy's  position.  The  Eed  infantry 
gained  the  enemy's  position  and  thereupon  began 
firing  rapidly  toward  their  right.  They  were  fir- 
ing into  detachments  of  Blue  troops  who  had  been 
tardy  in  leaving  their  intrenchments  on  the  left 
wing  of  the  enemy's  line.  About  this  time  the 
right  of  the  Red  line  swept  forward  and  gained  the 
Blue  intrenchments  in  their  front.  Many  Blue 
prisoners  were  captured  particularly  among  the 
organizations  that  had  held  the  left  of  the  line  of 
their  brigade. 

What  followed  thereafter  in  respect  to  the  op- 
erations of  the  sanitary  troops,  the  advance  of  the 
reserves,  the  quick  forward  movement  of  the  cav- 
alry to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  retiring  Blue  in- 
fantry, resembled  generally  the  operations  of  the 
morning  which  have  already  been  described. 


338        The  Modern  Army  in  Action 

The  foregoing  gives  an  outline  of  the  manner 
in  which  an  action  is  conducted  where  the  auxiliary 
arms  of  the  service  are  present  and  coordinating 
their  efforts  with  those  of  the  infantry  for  the  ac- 
complishment of  succeso.  There  are  many  varia- 
tions of  the  form  in  which  contact  with  the  enemy 
is  made  and  subsequent  combat  conducted.  Each 
situation  demands  its  own  methods  of  tactics  and 
of  leadership,  but  the  foregoing  will  suffice  to  in- 
dicate the  wide  diversity  of  technical  knowledge 
necessary  for  proper  coordination  in  the  field  and 
the  necessity  for  thorough  advance  preparation 
in  time  of  peace  to  make  the  expectancy  of  success 
reasonable,  in  time  of  war. 


VAIL-BALLOU  CO.,   BINGHAMTON   AND   NEW   YORK 


Plan  of  the  March  of  the  Red  Division,illustratin{j  Chapters  XVI  and  XVII 


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